The best way to fight an idea is with a better idea. To defeat the idea of violent radical Islamism, the United States should leverage its experience in destroying the violent ideologies of Nazism and Communism. If we continue to ignore the religious nature of this war or attempt to change it into something it is not, radical Islamism will win. Al Qaeda’s leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, makes it clear the radical beliefs that inspire global Islamic militancy: “Restoration of the caliphate and the dismissal of the invaders from the land of Islam . . . is a battle of ideologies, a struggle for survival, a war with no truce.”1
Radical Islamism has transformed operationally since the initial concept of guerrilla jihad in 1984 and the creation of al Qaeda in 1988.2 Contemporary imperialistic jihad exports radical Islamism globally through indirect influence, which presents an intangible threat of persuasion through regional affiliates, semiautonomous groups, and self-empowered individuals. It inspires violence through terrorism as logic and a method of action across networks including al Qaeda, Boko Haram, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The latest group brand or the quasi-nationality of its members, however, is irrelevant. Their ideology is.
The United States has struggled to defeat violent radical Islamism because it presumed that cumulative tactical military successes against terrorist groups comprised a strategy, failed to acknowledge the religious nature of the war, and failed to attack radical Islamic ideology strategically. The U.S. National Strategy for Counter Terrorism (2011) ordered a positive vision of engagement in Muslim communities and government agencies, a strategy to undermine and inhibit ideological appeal, and persistent local presence in Pakistan and Afghanistan. For some inexplicable reason, however, the United States did not complete these tasks. A new four-step U.S. strategy is needed to defeat radical Islam’s narrative.
First, the United States and its allies must partner with legitimate Islamic agencies to undermine radical Islam’s appeal within Muslim communities. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)—second only to the United Nations with 57 member states on four continents—is a unified voice for the Muslim world to promote international peace.3 Yet the United States is neither a member nor an observer, which prevents diplomatic collaboration and limits the OIC’s influence.
Second, we need a comprehensive religious campaign to integrate Catholic, Jewish, and Buddhist spiritual leaders to empower legitimate Islamic authorities, the Ulama, to defeat radical Islamic ideology through robust programs of their own design. States that consistently degrade Islamic militancy successfully—such as Jordan, Singapore, and Indonesia—employ similar dynamic interfaith dialogs, which the United States and its allies can emulate regionally, nationally, and locally.
Third, we must establish a persistent local presence—achieved through enduring military bases, modern infrastructure, and sustainable peacekeeping forces—in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan to prevent violent radical Islamism from regenerating. A sustained presence also would provide lasting stability, security, and prosperity just as similar U.S. and allied presence in Germany, Japan, and South Korea deterred violence for several decades after past wars.
Fourth, we should negoiate neutralization agreements with Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan to prevent international interference while efforts to combat terrorism, improve governance, and enhance security progress. Such understandings between regional and hegemonic powers would reduce significantly violent radical Islamism’s unmitigated expansion and support. Similar agreements would benefit Somalia, Nigeria, Yemen, and others.
The United States should anchor its new strategy on the Truman Doctrine by promoting individual freedoms through “the spread of liberty [as] the lofty and broad goal that organizes American foreign policy for the coming decades.”4 An aligned and supporting Middle East policy would caution leaders to understand their limitations in a theocratic domain by committing counterterrorism capabilities as permanent fixtures in U.S. foreign policy. Nuclear nonproliferation in Iran, reduction of global dependence on the region’s oil, economic aid for refugees in Jordan and Lebanon, and democratic advancement in Egypt and Turkey would prevent unprecedented regional unrest from worseing as violent radical Islamism’s appeal is diminished.
President Barack Obama says the United States needs a counterterrorism strategy that reflects our “resilient spirit.”5 Democracy alone, however, is not an antidote to terrorism. Believing in life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness without destroying a violent ideology diametrically opposed to it is not a national strategy. The United States cannot simply stand against violent radical Islamism. It must fight for something far greater.
1. Ayan al-Zawahri, Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner (London: Al-Sharq al Awsat, 2001), 31. Abdullah Azzam, “Join the Caravan,” Religioscope, 10 November 2013, www.religioscope.com/info/doc/jihad/azzam_caravan_1_foreword.htm.
2. Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Random House, 2006).
3. Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, “About OIC,” www.oic-oci.org/oicv2/page/?p_id=52&p_ref=26&lan=en.
4. Michael McFaul, “The Liberty Doctrine.” Policy Review (April-May 2014). www.hoover.org/research/liberty-doctrine.
5. Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama at the National Defense University,” Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., 23 May 2014, www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2013/05/23/president-obama-speaks-us-counterterrorism-strategy#transcript.