Stop ‘Engagement at all Costs’
(See J. Fanell, p. 12, September 2016 Proceedings)
Commander J. Michael Dahm, U.S. Navy; Intelligence Officer and former Assistant Naval Attaché to China—Captain Fanell’s call for an end to military-to-military (mil-to-mil) engagement with the Chinese is both erroneous and ill-advised.
Overarching U.S. strategy toward China in most policy realms is to get them to “follow the rules”—i.e., international laws, norms, and standards. The Department of Defense’s contributing strategy is to “manage competition with China from a position of strength, while seeking ways to reduce the risk of misunderstanding or miscalculation.” (See Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia Abraham Denmark, press conference, 13 May 2016.) U.S.-China mil-to-mil engagement supports the latter objective.
China’s navy is akin to a teenager who has grown into an unfamiliar muscular physique and has the keys to a used aircraft carrier with a new paint job. But, carrying the analogy forward, China also has no life-experience in modern warfare. “So-called China experts,” as Fanell labels them, contend there is great potential for shortsighted and immature actions by the Chinese and a high risk for misunderstanding and miscalculation. While the United States necessarily should prepare to impose consequences and “take away the keys,” cutting off engagement and communication with a capable but inexperienced navy likely would inspire and not mitigate more adventurism and intransigence.
Some of the article’s supporting evidence is questionable. Take, for example, the statement that on 9 June, the People’s Liberation Army Navy “made its first intrusion into the territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands.” That day, two Japanese destroyers and one Chinese frigate apparently investigated three Russian ships sailing near the Senkakus. According to the Japanese, the Chinese combatant entered the contiguous zone (within 24 nautical miles) but not Japanese territorial waters (12 nm). (See “Takeaways from a Nighttime Naval Chase in the East China Sea,” Nikkei Asian Review, 23 June 2016.)
Fanell asserts there is “unconstrained mil-to-mil engagement” with China. But in reality, military engagement with China is fantastically constrained. Chinese media may spin U.S. liaisons for “prestige,” but Chinese officers themselves complain endlessly about the significant limitations imposed on U.S.-China engagement by the Year 2000 National Defense Authorization Act.
In 2001, after a U.S. Navy EP-3 collided with a Chinese fighter and landed on Hainan Island, military officials in Beijing literally did not answer the phone for three days. More recently, the Chinese military cut off mil-to-mil engagement when the United States sold arms to Taiwan and hosted a Dalai Lama visit. Now, however, the Chinese Defense Ministry continues engagement and dialogue and does not pout when faced with a diplomatic affront. Captain Fanell’s suggestion that we should throw our own tantrum over Chinese transgressions flies in the face of a strategy that has been successful in keeping lines of communication open.
There certainly are things we could do to improve U.S.-China mil-to-mil engagement. But comparatively, it is a modest investment that does not undermine the significant U.S. Navy acquisitions and training that prepare us for “competition” with China. There should be no question that U.S. Navy leadership can hold this dichotomy in tension and still pursue our multipronged China strategy.
Navy Helps Develop F-35 A Integration Tactics
Lieutenant Ross Eldridge, U.S. Navy—In the largest detachment of F-35A aircraft since initial operating capability on 2 August 2016, 12 F-35A aircraft from the Air Force’s 58th Fighter Squadron joined with Navy F/A-18F Super Hornets from Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA)–11 and EA-18G Growlers from Electronic Attack Squadron (VAQ–132 to develop fifth-generation fighter-integration best practices.
The two-week joint exercise, Northern Lightning 2016, hosted by the Wisconsin Air National Guard’s 115th Fighter Wing (FW) at Volk Field, Wisconsin, included more than 50 participating aircraft and 1,500 active-duty and reserve servicemen and women from the Navy, Air Force, Army, and Air National Guard.
The exercise simulated a contested battlespace with an increasingly elevated threat environment and focused on developing how best to integrate F-35 fifth-generation capabilities with fourth-generation fighters and a broad range of air assets including AWACS, F-16s, F/A-18Fs, and EA-18Gs. Lessons learned from the exercise will greatly assist the F-35 program office in the development of both unit-level and joint integrated tactics as the aircraft continues to reach full operational capability.
“Working together with the F-35s, Growlers, and other assets was not only invaluable training and exposure for our Super Hornet aircrew, but the exercise was an incredible opportunity for us to help develop fourth- and fifth-generation integration tactics, techniques, and procedures,” said VFA-11 Department Head Lieutenant Commander Jeff McLean. “The Wisconsin Training Range was world-class, and the scenarios developed by the 115th FW were very challenging, driving us all to adapt our tactics and fully utilize the capabilities of each type of aircraft involved in the exercise.”
Are We All Sailors?
(See K. Eyer, p. 16, September 2016 Proceedings)
Captain Thomas R. Beall, U.S. Navy (Retired)—When I was selected in 2005 as an Individual Augmentee to oversee organizing, training, and equipping sailors (officer and enlisted) to be guards at Joint Task Force Guantanamo, I was very mindful of what had happened at the Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad. Just as my predecessor, who established the first Navy Guard Force, had experienced, I was basically told by the Navy leadership, “Don’t screw this up and turn this into the Navy’s Abu Ghraib.”
Our sailors were organized into platoons for training in detention-guard force procedures. One of the most important things I instituted during this training, I believe, was that each platoon, including all officers, chief petty officers, and rated and non-rated sailors would recite the Sailor’s Creed each morning at quarters.
After each platoon arrived at Guantanamo, I turned its sailors over to the Army colonel who commanded the detention camp, who then assigned them to a Navy commander who acted as their commanding officer. My authority (though not my responsibility) over the sailors thus ended. As I walked around the camp periodically, however, I noticed a number of the sailors still reciting the Sailor’s Creed each morning at “guard mount” before they went on duty. Its words resonated with them as they assumed responsibility for detainees who were to be treated in a firm, fair, impartial, and (yes) compassionate manner.
I understand the reservation of officers to profess the Sailor’s Creed because of the words “I will obey the orders of those appointed over me,” but I believe the reservation is weakened by other phrases such as “I will support and defend the Constitution,” and “I am committed to excellence and the fair treatment of all.” If everyone, from officer to non-rated sailor, abides by those two statements, it will be impossible to issue an unlawful order much less obey one.
The Sailor’s Creed served all of us well at Guantanamo, grounding us in our essential duty to protect and uphold the Constitution, practice our core values every day, and pursue professional excellence and the fair treatment of all . . . even a detainee at Guantanamo.
From that experience, I believe no officer should have any reservation about reciting and embracing the Sailor’s Creed.
What Are Ethics of Going Political?
(See F. Hoffman, p. 72, September 2016 Proceedings)
Captain John L. Byron, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Colonel Hoffman concerns himself with retired senior officers participating in the political process. He advocates formulating policy—or at least ethical guidelines—to address the topic.
I have a suggestion for the precise wording of such a policy, as follows:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”
Go to ‘27-Section Duty’
(See J. Cordle, pp. 18–21, August 2016 Proceedings)
Lieutenant (junior grade) Jessica Bloodsworth, U.S. Navy—The “Modern Duty Plan” or “80/20” written about by Captain Cordle embodies the future of the surface Navy in a forward-leaning, outside-the-box way. Created and implemented by then-Captain Charles B. (Brad) Cooper II, this 27-section duty plan has proven to be successful, yet most who hear about it around the waterfront scratch their heads at and say, “How could that possibly work?”
In fact, it has worked—twice, on the USS Russell (DDG-59) and Gettysburg (CG-64). As described in Captain Cordle’s article, the Gettysburg exercised this Modern Duty Plan for nearly a whole year before sailors began to rotate off of the ship for the SLEP (Ship’s Life Extension Plan) decrew process. The impact this duty-section rotation had on the ship and her crew is unparalleled. Having sailors actively working 24 hours a day, without time lost to sleep, directly improved the material condition and the preservation of a 24-year-old ship. This kind of time and attention is invaluable to the lifespan of an aging guided-missile cruiser.
The sailors also personally benefited from this plan. They were able to attend college—notably, to have college come to them in the form of instructors teaching on the berthing barge. Furthermore, sailors had more time with their families, they were well rested, they were fully qualified, and overall morale reached an all-time high. DUIs and other destructive behaviors were nearly nonexistent, and every person in the crew worked together like a well-oiled machine.
As a member of the wardroom on board the Gettysburg during this time, I wholeheartedly want this Modern Duty Plan to spread like wildfire throughout the surface fleet. The impact this innovative plan has on sailors both professionally and personally is unmatched. Rear Admiral (Lower Half) Cooper’s passion for people and their well-being is the cornerstone of this plan and is seen in every decision he makes. Simply, I believe in this plan. And I believe in Admiral Cooper as a leader. I personally plan to continue to introduce his duty-section plan to my future chains of command and endorse what I’ve witnessed as a success. I hope every person who reads Captain Cordle’s article and this comment does the same. It’s time to think outside the box in the surface Navy and put our sailors first; everything else will follow.
Replace the PCs
(See T. Shultz, pp. 40–41, July 2016 Proceedings)
Lieutenant (junior grade) Benjamin R. Carrington, U.S. Navy—Captain Shultz makes a convincing case for the strategic value of the low-cost, force-multiplying patrol craft (PC) assets, but he falls short of outlining a viable solution for their replacement. While it is true that the PC fleet offers a unique advantage to the 5th Fleet, its presence and mission contribution are often considered an afterthought in overall U.S. naval strategy. To the Navy’s detriment, the PC fleet has been reduced to an augmentative role, usually exchanged among task forces, surface action groups, and strike groups indiscriminately.
While the purpose and presence of the PCs are given adequate homage by Captain Shultz, not enough credit is bestowed on the tireless efforts of their crews. When you only have 30 sailors on board, the quality of training and support received plays an influential role in the unit’s ability to operate. No one is expendable. Each individual plays an integral if not crucial part in the unit’s performance, which earns the PCs their renown. For first-tour sailors, these challenges are incomparable in the naval service, yet every day they rise to the opportunity to perform well beyond their pay grade. In a rush to phase out our present assets, let’s not disregard the incredible efforts these young people contribute without a second thought.
The concept of replacement, the “out with the old, in with the new” way of thinking poses certain dilemmas. The time and fiscal commitments that go into design, construction, testing, refurbishment, and finally deployment more often than not run over budget and are hampered at every stage from a failure of theory to meet reality. One can recall the recent examples of the hurdles of the LCS program, the billions of extra costs emanating from the Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78)-class supercarriers, and the fact that despite years of investment in the revolutionary Zumwalt (DDG-1000) series, only three ever will realize commissioning. There is an enticing incentive to push for new ships, to create something unique and lasting, to break ground and cut the ribbon. Many naval leaders have made a name for themselves by pushing the limits of innovation and championing a new ship class. But shouldn’t we value what we have now and look toward a more viable process to maintain and equip the PCs rather than give up on them entirely?
Of course, it is never too early to start looking at future options, but let’s not abandon the overlooked workhorses of the Persian Gulf for ill-devised notions of progressive development. These ships still have a lot of fight left in them.
These Men Are Our Warriors
(See B. Scales, pp. 66–67, September 2016 Proceedings)
Frederico De Los Rios—I agree with Major General Scales the Marines and Army soldiers are our warriors, but I disagree with his statement about other people in uniform not being the same.
Many brave men and women sign up to serve our country; they wear their uniforms with pride knowing that they may be send into harm’s way anytime anywhere around the world. These people are the sailors who man our ships, the airmen (or women) who arm and maintain the aircraft our pilots fly into combat. While the Marines and soldiers are the tip of the spear, the other people in uniform are the shaft, and all of them are our warriors.
Cyber Secrecy Undermines Deterrence
(See B. D. Herzinger, pp. 44–46, September 2016 Proceedings)
Captain Scott Phillpott, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Using comparisons to nuclear weapons in any form causes me concern. For instance, the “smoking gun/mushroom cloud” hyperbole about Iraq’s WMD arsenal comes to mind. I therefore was drawn into Lieutenant Herzerger’s article, which compared nuclear deterrence and active-defense cyber security policy and protocols. Reading closely, I was alarmed by the cyber skills attributed to foreign hackers, the cyber buzzwords used as proxy for deliberative thought, and the “game” analogies being applied to warfare—of any type. War is not a “game,” and it is a fallacy to treat it as such. Those issues aside, there are serious mistakes in using nuclear deterrence as a model for cyberspace.
First, the underlining principle of nuclear deterrence is the gravity of mutually assured destruction (MAD). The threat (the deterrent) is annihilation. And while cyber hackers are an expensive and time-consuming tax on our economy, it is an ankle-biter compared to a retaliatory thermonuclear strike. And comparing “zero-day” cyber exploits to a nuclear warhead is a bit disingenuous.
But, as the author noted, relying on a cyber Maginot Line is worthless; yet, who says we are? When people suggest “active” defense we reflexively assume that anything short of “active” is by default “passive.” I would argue that an active defense need not translate to going on the offense. Better word choices are agile defenses, adaptive defencss, honey-nets, and more, all of which are used by our forces today. To suggest anyone has drawn a cyber line is not true.
Where we need to be particularly careful is when we stretch an exhausted military into another non-war war. The pursuit and prosecution of cyber criminals should be just that, a prosecution by law enforcement. The attribution problem alone makes striking back a reckless proposition that is likely to escalate the situation, not subdue it.
Cyber security challenges are best characterized as a “wicked” problem archetype. There are no rules as per a game. There are no boundaries, starting points, ending points, or solutions. Global collaboration is needed to thwart cyber crime and not threats of escalatory attacks, whether codified or not.
EDITOR’S NOTE: Captain Phillpott is a senior analyst at Valkyrie Enterprises and served as commanding officer of four U.S. Navy combatants including the USS Leyte Gulf (CG-55).
The Coastal Riverine Community Needs Attention
(See R. C. Law, pp. 76–77, August 2016 Proceedings)
Captain Zachary Griffiths, Special Forces, U.S. Army—Lieutenant Law could bolster his argument for creating a coastal riverine specialty path by recognizing the unique strength of the coastal riverine community in security-force assistance. Few nations can field blue-water navies, but U.S. partners around the world operate green- and brown-water navies. The coastal riverine community’s experience with these operations makes them powerful trainers. Just last year, coastal riverine sailors trained Indonesian Special Forces, the Forsa Defesa Timor-Leste, and deployed mobile training teams to Kenya, Togo, Benin, and Senegal. Even the coastal riverine community’s foundational study, published by the Center for Naval Analyses (CAN) in 2006, recognized security assistance as an area of “substantial capability” for this community.
The author’s hybrid strategy, with rotating officers and permanent enlisted personnel, mirrors the successful development of my branch, the Army Special Forces. Rotating Special Forces officers imparted broad professional knowledge, while enlisted noncommissioned officers trained technical experts. His proposal also is supported by findings from the 2006 CAN study, which identified the need to track riverine experts into trainers.
Training is not just a side job. The officers and noncommissioned officers I work with in the Army Special Forces drill constantly to be better trainers, preparing themselves at home and training partner nations when deployed. Embracing security-force assistance as a key task of the coastal maritime forces strengthens Lieutenant Law’s argument for this important naval capability.
Who Watches the Watchmen?
(See K. Eyer, p. 16, August 2016; R. Stockton, D. Daly, and R. T. Zavala, Jr., September 2016 Proceedings)
Robert E. Kornman, former U.S. Navy junior lieutenant—I usually enjoy Captain Eyer’s contributions, but I have to take exceptioon with his attack on the riverine sailors for not defending their boats against Iranian forces last January. He cites Article II of the Code of Conduct, which applies to combat or captivity, and states our sailors violated it.
I, for one, am glad our junior lieutenant and chief petty officer chose not to defend themselves that day. We only would have had a bunch of dead sailors and a major international incident on our hands.
Instead, they admitted their mistake (they screwed up), suffered the consequences, and apologized. If only more adults, especially senior officials, would act in such a mature manner. The Fat Leonard case and Hillary Clinton’s emails come to mind.
As Captain Eyer stated in his piece, we are not at war with Iran. Yes, the Iranians were typical jerks about our trespassing and humiliated our sailors, but I still think forbearance was the prudent way to go here. Stop attacking those poor sailors.
Rethink the Triad
(See F. W. Lacroix, pp. 48–53, September 2016 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Thomas A. Dames, U.S. Navy (Retired)—While costs should not drive strategic deterrence, Rear Admiral Lacroix is correct in bringing to wider attention the colossal costs of modernizing the three legs of current strategic force structure. These costs call to question the relevance of that structure going forward. Some parts of our current triad undoubtedly will persist, for reasons good, like they seem to work, and maybe not so good, like culture, acceptance, legacy, and momentum. Perhaps, though, we already can perceive some replacement legs of a successor triad.
One replacement leg might be labeled “We are in your head . . . and you know it.” Intelligence, surveillance, indications, and warnings capabilities likely would improve as strategic deterrents through increased investing. Demonstrable cyber-war capabilities that remotely disable and disrupt nuclear weapons and their delivery might prove to be the best strategic deterrent. “If you pull the nuclear trigger, your weapon won’t work in multiple ways, and we can prove it.” This leg also holds the potential of deterring non-state actors from seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. Why bother, if we can know and disrupt?
Another replacement leg might be labeled, “We can completely soft-kill your economy.” Financial information simply disappears. Wealth is eradicated. The things that always have worked stop working, without remedy. All the things held dear wither quickly. Governing structure fails, communications fail, utilities fail, public safety fails, culture fails, national identity fails. Our full strategic retaliation need not be nuclear or even kinetic.
Along with some legacy nuclear retaliation, the replacement legs would wage cyber war and economic war. Besides being overt nuclear-war deterrents to be demonstrated and trumpeted, both the replacement legs seem to have spinoffs that can be used softly, selectively, perhaps covertly, to deter non-nuclear aggression and terrorism, state-sponsored or not. This is a capability our current strategic force structure lacks.
U.S. Coast Guard Flag Officers & Senior Enlisted Leaders
U.S. Coast Guard Organizational Chart & Information Sources
(See pp. 54–57, August 2016 Proceedings)
Public Affairs Master Chief Mike Hvozda, U.S. Coast Guard—The August issue highlighting the Coast Guard is a significant compilation of stories, but I would like to recommend using the most current version of the Coast Guard Seal when listing the leadership. It’s not likely anyone would really notice other than detail-oriented public-affairs types like me, but as the former editor-in-chief of Coast Guard Magazine, I felt I would want to know if something were amiss.
Blue Angels—Keeping the Public Interested
(See T. Cutler, p. 94, July 2016; and B. Tillman, p. 82, August 2016 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Mark Swinger, U.S. Navy—I read with great interest Lieutenant Commander Cutler’s article on the Blue Angels. Summarizing the team’s history in one page is no small feat, and he did an excellent job! I was fortunate enough to have flown as the #3 and #4 pilot (left wing and slot) during the 2008 and 2009 show seasons, and without a doubt, flying for the Blue Angels was a fantastic tour that I will remember for the rest of my life.
Commander Cutler’s summary at the end of the article caught my attention: “And while there is no way of knowing how much influence the Blues actually had on the preservation of the Navy’s air arm, there can be no doubt they have succeeded in their official mission to ‘keep the public interested in naval aviation.’”
While I was with the squadron, many people asked the question of how many people the Blue Angels recruit every year. I didn’t have an answer for them, but I told them that virtually every aviator I know, myself included, remembers the first Blue Angel show they attended. I am of course somewhat biased, but after traveling the country with the Blues and talking with folks who think that the Air Force owns aircraft carriers, I can tell you that there is no more effective recruiting tool than a Blue Angels airshow.
Nevertheless, the team faces budget questions every year. Are they worth the money? I know they are, but to add some substance to my argument, I’ll pass on a short story to you. As a member of the team, you visit schools in the local area of each show site to talk to mostly high school children about the Navy and Marine Corps. As the #4 pilot at a show in Alabama, I was scheduled to speak at an auditorium of about 300 school kids. Because of some scheduling issues I found myself in a room with three elementary school children about ten years old. We sat down and talked for a few minutes with them and their teachers, and I asked them what they wanted to do when they grew up. I was told that they wanted to drive trucks, program computers, and maybe be a fireman.
After some more discussion about their upcoming summers, I turned on the 12-minute DVD we had at the time that described the team, our mission, and the Navy and Marine Corps as a whole. When the video was over, the room was quiet, and one of the children raised his hand. I smiled and said, “Yes, Tim?” Tim from Alabama, age ten, who until that moment was going to spend the weekend at the county fair, stood up, looked me square in the eye, and said, “I want to be a pilot in the Navy.” And with that, I rest my case.
‘Clinton Defense’ Will Undercut Classification/Clearance System
(See T. A. Brooks, p. 10, August 2016; and R. J. Brown, p. 8, September 2016 Proceedings)
Commander Robert Pohlman, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)—Admiral Brooks’ article identified a possible “do as I say, not as I do” mentality within some branches of our government. But as a retired cryptologic officer, I find it provides little redress for those reprimanded, reduced in rate/rank, or courts-martialed for much lesser offenses than what Hillary Clinton did. The seamen, petty officers, and chiefs, as well as the officers who faithfully protect our classified material should be commended for doing their duty, especially in the light of such bad behavior and media coverage of others getting away with a breach of their signed non-disclosure agreements (NDAs).
What constitutes the mishandling of classified material is clearly explained in the NDA, as are penalties assigned for such offenses. People in the military do make mistakes without any intent, yet are still judged; the Clinton issue clearly was exercised over years. I believe that as Secretary of State she knew and understood her NDA, but her own chosen methods of handling classified material were more expedient and more confidential for her own personal use. No one is above the law—especially a law that protects our secrets and the security of our nation.
Why the Milk?
(See W. Galbraith, p. 88, September 2016 Proceedings)
Lieutenant James B. Craven III, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)—I did not know Harvey Milk was a naval officer, but neither am I bothered by naming a ship for him, unlike Cesar Chavez. I admire Chavez, but he made it clear he had zero use for his naval service. I’d like us to get back to fish for submarines, too, but I know that battle is lost.
It does concern me, though, that Mr. Galbraith references “a radical political agenda” and “the administration’s open contempt for the armed forces.” What’s radical about accepting gay naval officers? Or left-handed naval officers, or those with blue eyes? There’s a difference? And as for open contempt, I think of the magnificent work Michelle Obama and Jill Biden have done for military families over the past eight years, and the President’s stirring remarks at Medal of Honor award ceremonies, and when he welcomed the Navy football team to the White House. His obvious pride in those who wear the uniform of our country is evident and almost tangible.
Cover Caption
(See p. 1, September 2016 Proceedings)
Major Mike McGinn, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)—It is truly disappointing when the Navy’s premier professional journal is unable to correctly identify the type, model, and series of the Navy’s premier aircraft on the cover of its magazine.
When I received my September Proceedings I saw on the cover an F/A-18C plugged into a KC-135, obviously having some aerial refueling issues based on all the spray coming out of the basket. Then I flipped to page 1 and read that this month’s cover image was identified as “a U.S. Navy F-18E Super Hornet.”
Although I haven’t flown a Hornet since 25 May 2004, two things immediately jumped out at me. To assist your caption writers, there are five very prominent features that can be used to very quickly and accurately determine if an aircraft is an F/A-18C or an F/A-18E. The Super Hornet has “chopped” instead of “rounded” horizontal stabilizers, a drastically different leading-edge extension forum (LEX), no LEX mod, no ECM “bumps,” and a MIDS array.
EDITOR’S NOTE: Major McGinn is spot-on. The September cover shows an F/A-18C. We failed to check the caption supplied with the U.S. Air Force photo distributed by the Defense Video Imagery Distribution System. We relearned an old lesson: Always verify supplied captions.