The Coastal Riverine Community Needs Attention
By Lieutenant Ryan C. Law, U.S. Navy
Coastal riverine forces have been an important U.S. military asset since Operation Market Time—a joint U.S. Navy and South Vietnamese mission to block the influx of supplies to North Vietnamese forces along the rivers of Vietnam in 1965. These brown-water forces laid the foundation for modern-day coastal riverine squadrons (CRSs) and could play an important role in the current administration’s vision for the future. In a 2012 interview, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell said, “The most important thing on the part of the United States is to secure a strong position in the Asian Pacific region.”1 With the Obama administration’s evolving “Pivot to the Pacific” plan, the Navy needs to create a professional officer corps and a specialized enlisted rating focused on coastal riverine operations.
A professional officer corps requires experience, something that today’s coastal riverine force lacks. Currently, junior surface warfare officers (SWOs) must struggle to gain high-level qualifications and achieve top rankings to be eligible for orders to a CRS. Once officers have finished one training cycle and one deployment, they are unlikely to complete a follow-on tour in the coastal riverine community. According to Bureau of Personnel data, only 425 of 5,253 active-duty SWOs (lieutenants through captains) have completed CRS-related tours. Only 65 of those officers have completed multiple tours, resulting in a scarcity of senior leadership experience.2 This deficiency leads to a reduction in operational effectiveness. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 states: “Every Marine is expected to be a student of the art and science of war. Officers especially are expected to have a solid foundation in military theory.”3 It follows that the officers and sailors in this unique littoral environment should be expected to have this foundation, which can be gained only through experience—which appears to be undervalued among the officer ranks in the CRS community.
Like officers, enlisted sailors struggle to gain experience in the CRS community, although in a different way. Those who develop specialized skills have difficulty attaining the source rating experience required for promotion; their on-the-job training is not the same as that of their non-CRS peers. The reduced training for their source rating makes them less competitive for advancement when being rated against their cohorts. The advancement rates over a three-year period for the total number of eligible sailors in a single CRS unit was lower than the average rate for eligible sailors, Navy-wide. This lack of advancement hampers the community’s ability to retain skilled sailors to conduct missions and train future sailors.
The problems of retention and leadership are exacerbated by the community’s status in the Navy in general. The CNO’s Navigation Plan, 2015–2019, an explanation of the Navy’s four-year budget and focus, does not mention the CRS capability. Its stated goals are as follows: “Sustain a credible, survivable, and modern sea-based strategic deterrent. . . . Sustain our advantage in the undersea domain . . . . Enhance our ability to maneuver freely in the electromagnetic spectrum . . . Strengthen our cyber posture.”4 None of these priorities applies to CRS capabilities. The Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), CRS’s parent organization, is only mentioned insofar as Seabees and explosive ordnance disposal teams are concerned. The absence of attention paid to CRS must be addressed if retention and experience problems are to be resolved.
To confront these issues, NECC should create a specialized career path for CRS officers. Current career paths offer multiple avenues for specialization within the traditional SWO community, but none for nontraditional communities such as CRS.
Creating a specialty path for the CRS community is a simple process and would resemble the current SWO nuclear pipeline. It would involve alternating traditional ship-based SWO tours with CRS tours for officers who already had completed the latter; no additional officers would need to switch career paths. The specific skills needed for the pipeline could be introduced and refined through established Navy and Marine Corps schools. Such a specialized pipeline would allow the CRS community to better develop and retain vital experience within its officer cadre.
Similarly, establishing a coastal riverine rate would allow CRS to retain and advance skilled sailors without concerns about source rating experience. In a 1985 proposal for a Navy Special Forces rating, scholar Gerald Michael Moy addressed the the specialized skill set and knowledge base required for some rates. In his research paper “Investigating the Feasibility of Establishing a Naval Special Warfare [NSW] Rating,” he states:
Because SEALs have diverse ratings, when they prepare for advancement exams they study manuals in their particular ratings. This detracts from their professional competence, for they should be studying manuals that emphasize their professional skills . . . . The argument that the NSW field requires a broad spectrum of enlisted occupational skills is exactly why an NSW rating should be created, not why it should not.5
As CRS is a similarly specialized community, the arguments for creating an NSW rate are nearly identical to those for creating a CRS rate. Instilling and developing these specialized skill sets in enlisted sailors, without worrying about source rating experience, would ultimately benefit the Navy by optimizing the performance of sailors in the CRS community.
Commander Gregory Sandway disputed this argument in his article “War on the River: Development of Joint Expeditionary Riverine Officers.” He states, “Such a niche field of highly trained riverine officers should be developed into their own designator or stand-alone riverine community, like EOD, and not be anchored amongst other naval communities, to best serve the future joint warfighter.”6 He argues that the NECC community is so specialized that it should be a separate officer corps, which would improve the overall efficacy of the Navy’s riverine capabilities.
While specialization is important, the Navy needs a versatile officer corps that can accomplish its mission sets. The official U.S. Navy website states that the Navy “holds the distinction of being the most multidimensional force serving the nation . . . whose duties often extend beyond the sea . . . [and] does far more than meet the overwhelming task of carrying out Naval operations around the globe.”7 This task requires knowledgeable officers who can perform across a broad range of locations and situations. The riverine mission, although important, provides a limited skill set for officers in the broader Navy. By alternating traditional SWO and coastal riverine tours, officers would develop skills pertinent to both communities and better contribute to the Navy’s global mission.
Another counterargument, presented in the CNO’s Sailing Directions, implies that the Navy’s focus on strategic-level deterrence will render riverine units unnecessary. It states: “We will deliver credible capability for deterrence, sea control, and power projection to deter or contain conflict and fight and win wars.”8 The additional development of the Navy’s new MK VI patrol boat (now being deployed with CRS units) and the littoral combat ship (LCS) will make coastal riverine boats obsolete. The MK VI patrol boat’s future missions include high-value unit shipping escort, theater security cooperation, and security force assistance, all of which are within current CRS capabilities. With its more capable communication systems, weapon systems, and better endurance, the Lockheed Martin team states that the LCS will be able “to defeat growing littoral threats and provide access and dominance in the coastal water battlespace,” an operating area for CRS assets. These vessels supposedly would remove the need for smaller CRS craft and specialized riverine capabilities. The deeper draft of the MK VI patrol boat (4 1/2 feet), however, inhibits its navigation of inland rivers. The draft of the LCS (14 feet) will not allow it to influence much farther inland than its weapon systems will reach.
With the recent “Pivot to the Pacific,” the importance of having a riverine capability becomes even more apparent. In Southeast Asia, there are more than 144,740 miles of riverways. Relying on the MK VI patrol boats and the LCSs would reduce mobility in the region and restrict the Navy’s ability to maintain control of these lines of communication. The riverine patrol boat, however, has a 2-foot draft that decreases to only 9 inches at speed, giving it greater flexibility to operate in such environments.
Operating proficiently in these environments requires specialized training for CRS sailors. The proper employment of coastal riverine craft will give the Navy greater access to and influence over the regions that the MK VI patrol boats and LCSs cannot reach. The flexibility and understanding that CRS officers must have to lead effectively in these environments and to be functional in the Navy as whole require them to have a broader range of jobs in the Navy. These officers and enlisted sailors will be able to perform much more efficiently in the CRS community.
As we pay more attention to Southeast Asia, the importance of professionalism and specialization in the CRS community will increase. By introducing a new officer pipeline and a specialized enlisted rating, the Navy will be able to develop a more proficient community.
1. Kurt Campbell, interview by Robert Kagan, The Brookings Institution & Foreign Policy Initiative, 13 March 2012.
2. PERS-41, Active SWO Billet History, Millington, TN: Navy Personnel Command.
3. Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Warfighting, MCDP 1 (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, June 20, 1997), 57.
4. Chief of Naval Operations, CNO’s Navigation Plan 2014–2018 (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations), 2013.
5. Gerald Michael Moy, “Investigating the Feasibility of Establishing a Naval Special Warfare Rating,” thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 1985, https://archive.org/details/investigatingfea00moygpdf.
6. Gregory Sandway, “War on the River: Development of Joint Expeditionary Riverine Officers,” Strategy Research Paper, U.S. Army War College, 2010, 11.
7. U.S. Navy, www.navy.com/about/mission.html.
8. Chief of Naval Operations, CNO’s Sailing Directions, Washington, DC: Chief of Naval Operations, 2011.
Sharing Information Strengthens Maritime Partnerships
By Stephan Lapic and Stephanie Hszieh
Maritime partnerships have origins that extend to man’s first conquest of the seas. Naval partnerships, however, are even more essential to a 21st-century navy. The U.S. Navy recognized this when Admiral Michael Mullen, then Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), proposed the “thousand-ship navy” concept at the 17th International Seapower Symposium in September 2005. The 1,000-ship theory still resonates, as CNO Admiral John M. Richardson’s strategy, The Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, notes. Released this January, the strategy calls for the prioritization of “key international partnerships through information sharing, interoperability initiatives, and combined operations.” Further, it recommends the Navy “. . . explore new opportunities for combined forward operations.”1
The 1,000-ship navy concept also was incorporated into the Global Maritime Partnership Initiative outlined in the 2015 Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. This initiative calls for the development of warfighting concepts to “[a]dvance the global network of navies . . . by deepening security cooperation with allies and partners.”2 Both Admiral Richardson’s strategy and A Cooperative Strategy recognize that the U.S. Navy does not fight alone.
The United States’ traditional way of doing business, however, has a “U.S. first, partners second” mentality, and current information-sharing mechanisms have neither the agility nor the low cost of entry to fully realize the vision of a unified multinational maritime force. Retired U.S. Navy Captain Sam Tangredi, the director of Strategic Insight, noted in his 2015 Proceedings essay “A ‘Black Rack’ Solution?” that meaningful coalition cooperation is hampered by growing technological gaps. Tangredi wrote, “If the U.S. Navy intends to someday achieve a significant degree of interoperability with ‘nontraditional’ partners . . . it must conquer the technological gap that prevents such navies from receiving operational data that is critical for close tactical coordination.”3 Fortunately, recent changes in policy and doctrine and increasingly flexible and accessible emerging technologies are here to help.
Current Operations
When the U.S. Navy operates with other navies today, it nearly always relies on one of the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) enclaves. Some of the major enclaves used for the exchange of collaboration, command, and control traffic in the maritime domain include:
• Combined Maritime Forces Pacific (CMFP)
• Combined Maritime Forces
• Central Command (CMFC)
• NATO Initial Data Transfer System (NIDTS)
• Global Counterterrorism Force (GCTF).
Each enclave hosts core applications and services: email, messaging, text chat, file replication, web, and common operational picture (COP). In situations where connectivity allows, we also are seeing limited deployments of Voice-over IP (VoIP). When a small deck deploys, it can operate only on one coalition enclave at a time. Larger decks simultaneously can support more than one.
Today, when a situation erupts, an enclave that includes all partners is selected as the mission network. In some cases, this may be CENTRIXS GCTF, which hosts a large (80-plus) consortium of nations and acts as de facto common transport for the greater maritime partnership. All data placed on the network have to be capable of being released to all network participants, regardless of whether the latter support the mission. There is little flexibility or appetite for standing up a new enduring network for the partnership-du-jour, because each such enclave requires a substantial footprint of dedicated hardware—not to mention time-consuming processes for approval and accreditation. In some cases, a potential partner may be party to an agreement but lack the necessary supporting equipment on its ship. Such a partner can have a fly-away kit (FAK) from the CENTRIXS program office installed for the duration of the mission. In other cases, a partner may not have access to the necessary cryptographic equipment. The Navy can loan controlled equipment to a partner, but U.S. personnel must be detailed to protect it.
Future Operations
The mission partner environment (MPE) is a new construct under which the Navy and joint forces will exchange information with allied nations, coalition partners, other agencies such as those involved in maritime law enforcement, and nongovernmental organizations. Neither a program of record nor a new network, MPE is aligning governance and technical architectures across the portfolio of networks used to exchange information outside DOD boundaries. The CENTRIXS maritime networks are an important part of that portfolio. The MPE construct describes not only enduring enclaves with long-established partnerships, but also episodic ones that can be established to address exigent operations with unplanned alliances.
Technology Matters
How can episodic enclaves be stood up without a proliferation of dedicated hardware—servers, networking equipment, and workstations—for each enclave? To address the server problem, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has made significant progress in deploying a virtual data center (VDC) that supports multiple logically separated enclaves on a single-blade server chassis. The concept is that a single VDC can support multiple MPE enclaves simultaneously, dynamically repurposing compute-and-storage resources among them, and even stand up episodic enclaves on the fly. The VDC objective is to be able to stand up a new enclave in 72 hours, whereas the current timeline for doing this is measured in months.
Even greater flexibility can be added by virtualizing critical networking functions such as intrusion detection/prevention, firewalls, application accelerators, and switches. Software-defined networking and network function virtualization can deploy these functions directly to the blade servers themselves, reducing the need for dedicated hardware.
To alleviate the requirement for dedicated workstations, users can employ a multi-enclave client (MEC), a thin or thick client that can simultaneously display multiple enclaves “on a single pane of glass” reaching back, for example, to a regional data center to obtain data and services for each. U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) is advocating an end-to-end model wherein shore-based MEC users reach through dedicated transport—known as common mission network transport (CMNT)—to a data center (or application service point [ASP]), at a fleet network operations center. In tactical applications, an ASP analog or VDC-lite could be hosted on board ships.
How, then, does one move the VDC capability to the shipboard environment? Hyper-converged infrastructure (HCI) refers to an emerging paradigm in the IT enterprise that tightly couples storage, compute, and virtual functions on a single, integrated, commodity-hardware platform. With multiple variants from various vendors, HCI shows considerable promise for its modularity and ease of use. Moreover, HCI products are available in small-form factors, 1 and 2 rack unit “data centers in a box” that are well positioned to address shipboard size, weight, and power concerns. On U.S. Navy ships, coalition and partner networks will be hosted on the Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) secret releasable enclaves. The CANES program is currently conducting investigations of the suitability of HCI for future builds.
HCI also has the potential to lower the cost of entry for potential maritime partners. A small HCI-based enclave is relatively affordable and is built with commercial commodity hardware. A future MPE build could be provided as software only. If necessary, an MPE enclave in a box could be provided as a fly-away kit. Crypto is always a special problem, but there has been a reduction in the cost of entry. The National Security Agency’s Commercial Solutions for Classified (CSfC) program now accredits the use of serial commercial-grade Internet Protocol Security encryption devices in lieu of traditional military-grade Type 1 encryption. CSfC is an important on-ramp to MPE for partners who might not have ready access to High Assurance IP Encryption or similar devices.
Long Poles
Significant obstacles remain to deploying agile mission-partner networks in the future. One such challenge is accreditation. The deployment of an episodic MPE in a rapid timescale will require substantial investment in preliminaries up front—a “type” accreditation that can be invoked as appropriate. It also will require stringent governance to ensure that a pre-established accreditation can be applied.
A second challenge will be data ingestion. An episodic enclave will support collaboration as a stand-alone activity but will prove its value for the warfighter if it is a rich source of actionable information. For example, data from external sensors and sources should be injected into the MPE common operational picture. At a minimum, data will need to be injected when the enclave is established. Enabling this capability will necessitate continued investment in cross-domain solutions. It also will require the Navy and its potential partners to strictly adhere to common data format and marking standards.
The Navy and the nation’s strategic goals call for greater collaboration with allies and partners. The scientists and engineers at Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) and its research and engineering systems centers are focused on addressing these challenges and building the constructs to allow the Navy to effect such collaborations. As Admiral Richardson noted at the 10th Regional Seapower Symposium in Venice, Italy:
Our forces will need to better leverage the capabilities that each of us brings and then combine to form networks of alliances and partnerships to make our combined force much more effective than the sum of our individual contributions.4
The U.S. Navy is networking its force to harness the power of shared information. If it cannot network with allies and partners, however, the Navy will not be able to command the power of the information age to address current and future maritime security challenges.
1. Admiral John M. Richardson, A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority (Washington, D.C., Department of the Navy, U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations), January 2016, www.navy.mil/cno/docs/cno_stg.pdf.
2. A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (Washington, D.C., Department of the Navy, 2015), www.navy.mil/local/maritime/150227-CS21R-Final.pdf.
3. CAPT Sam Tangredi, USN (Ret.), “A ‘Black Rack’ Solution?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 2015, vol. 141, no. 9, 64–68.
4. ADM John M. Richardson, USN, “The Growing Importance of the Maritime,” speech delivered at the 10th Regional Seapower Symposium for the Navies of the Mediterranean and Black Sea Countries, Venice, Italy, 22 October 2015, www.navy.mil/navydata/people/cno/Richardson/Speech/CNO_RSSPanelSpeech_22OCT2015.pdf.
Serving in an LCS
By Lieutenant Commander J. D. Kristenson, U.S. Navy
No matter the final number and type of littoral combat ships (LCSs) and fast frigates (FFs) that the Navy eventually operates, it is clear these ships will comprise a significant portion of our future surface forces. Much has been written in these pages and elsewhere on the wisdom and viability of large-scale building of the Freedom (LCS-1) and Independence (LCS-2)-class ships. This offering is meant for enlisted sailors and officers considering a tour in an LCS. It is designed to highlight what it is like to serve in one of these ships—specifically the author’s experience with the LCS-2 class.
LCS crews initially were modeled after the “Blue-Gold” crews used on ballistic-missile submarines but have moved to a 3-2-1 concept. (Three crews support two ships to keep one forward deployed.) When you are “on hull” you can expect two periods of operations, each four months—one conducting local ops and the other deployed. There also is a four-month “off hull” period in which you work out of an office, attend school, and complete unit-level training. Another advantage of this period is that without the demands of the ship and duty, work hours are reasonable, and a shore-duty tempo can be an effective way to recharge and prepare for the next challenging rotation on hull. There can be quite a bit of churn in transitioning on and off different ships, but as deployments are stretched across the fleet to eight, nine, and even ten months, a four-month deployment can look quite appealing. In practice, however, out-of-area deployments can be longer in support of extended mission package (MP) testing and precommissioning assignments.
A Small Crew
The biggest difference is in the manning. The initial concept allowed for only 40 sailors, which proved too lean. It has since been increased to 50, but that is still a small number given the ship’s size. By comparison, the LCS-2 class is about 80 percent the size of a guided-missile destroyer with fewer than 20 percent of the sailors; it is not just fewer sailors and more automation—it is a radically different manning model than the rest of the fleet. This means that your underway watch rotations will be demanding; four-section is a luxury, three-section is the norm, and port-and-starboard rotations happen from time to time. A side benefit is that motivated and talented sailors often will be given the opportunity for high-visibility collateral duties and to qualify controlling watch stations (command duty officer, officer of the deck, engineering officer of the watch) earlier than they might otherwise on “legacy” platforms. A crew this small does not require a food-service attendant program, and everyone pitches in around meals and to keep the ship clean. Fewer sailors and different shipbuilding standards mean that berthing and storage accommodations are notably better than those found on most other ships.
Having an MP or an air detachment embarked can stretch the in-port duty rotation from three-section with the core crew to as many as four or five sections with everyone on board. The wardroom consists of 11 officers. In addition to the commanding officer and executive officer, each of three main departments (operations, combat systems, and engineering) has one department head, one second-tour division officer, and one first-tour division officer. Aside from the XO to CO, there is one other “fleet up” billet where the combat systems officer transitions to operations officer for his or her second department head tour. There are no rated Supply Corps officers on board, but a logistics specialist chief fills that role.
As a new program, the LCS has been able to attract and screen top-notch sailors to get the program off the ground, and the first several ships were manned with some of the best sailors in the fleet. This resulted in very few of the more common disciplinary problems that can negatively impact readiness. It also can make for very tough completion within the senior enlisted pay grades.
So far, first-class petty officers in the LCS program have made chief petty officer at an impressive rate, but that may be a result of a previous strong service record. It has been tougher for chiefs to make senior chief because the low number of sailors for whom LCS chief is directly responsible for overseeing does not compare favorably with the precepts of the selection boards and the leadership opportunities of chiefs on larger platforms. Hopefully this is changing, but it will take time. The exception to this has been the senior enlisted leaders who arrive as command senior chiefs. They have reasonable shots at making master chief before the end of their tours.
It Takes Patience
Anyone considering taking orders to an LCS should be aware of the lengthy training requirements. Officers can expect to attend the LCS Officer of the Deck course at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, as well as billet-specific training. For some technical rates (such as electronics technician, fire controlman), this can be in excess of a year of training, depending on school availability. During this time, sailors are attached to the LCS squadron (LCSRON), and their sea duty counter and tour completion clocks do not start until all training is complete.
The role in the fleet for these types of ships is not yet fully established. Throughout naval history, ships have been tasked to perform challenging missions for which they were not designed. The primary three MPs have been surface warfare, antisubmarine warfare, and mine warfare.
During the service lives of these versatile warships, they will likely field MPs that have not yet been designed. The carrying capacity of these ships is high for their size. The Independence class in particular has an enormous mission bay. It has been suggested that future MPs could include a special operations package, a carry-on cryptological element, or a prepositioned humanitarian and disaster-relief element. The ship was designed with a purposeful emphasis on the payload over the platform, and this is what gives it such significant flexibility for future employment.
As the concept of distributed lethality spreads from a vision to a resource-backed strategy, LCSs will feature heavily in the calculus of what is possible for the future of surface warfare. In 2014, Crew 203 (“Sea Dogs”), successfully fired a naval strike missile from the USS Coronado (LCS-4). Work is already under way to examine the feasibility of equipping the LCSs with Harpoon, a Tomahawk derivative, or other antisurface missile system. The addition of a credible antisurface missile will force any potential adversary to consider both the speed and lethality of a future LCS hunter-killer group.
Serving in an LCS can be a challenging but rewarding experience. Driving these ships is fun—especially at 40 knots. The esprit de corps is high in each individual LCS crew, and there is a great deal of teamwork among crews built into the program and fostered by the leadership of the LCS squadrons.
The littoral combat ships are starting to show up in fleet concentration areas on both coasts. Anyone studying for a SWO board, considering a tour on an LCS, or with a general curiosity on the newest addition to the fleet should stop in for a visit and discuss what it is like to serve in these distinctive ships.