LCS Delivers
(See S. H. Swift, pp. 34–38, July 2016 Proceedings)
Remo Salta—The Pentagon and the Navy have invested so much time, effort, and money in the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) concept that it just has to work, regardless of how it performs. For a vessel that started life as a small, expendable, warship in the $250 million range, to the now frigate-sized warship costing well over $600 million each, the LCS had better work. And let’s not even talk about those expensive and much-vaunted “mission modules” that still are under development and are not fully operational.
If the LCS program is the success Admiral Swift claims it is, then why has the Pentagon stopped production of the initial LCSs and stated that all future warships of this class are to be more heavily armed and will become, basically, frigates? And what makes matters worse is nobody is ever held accountable for the huge delays and cost overruns when a project like the LCS goes wrong. Nobody ever gets fired; no builder ever gets fined; and no one even gets reprimanded. Nothing. Just keep spending the money until you eventually “get it right.” And all we get from officers like Admiral Swift is how surprised we “simple folk” are “when things do not go according to plan with ‘early adopted’ platforms.” Please, if a major corporation lost as much money and was run like the Pentagon, half the people in it would be fired.
The LCS program is by no means the only bloated Pentagon budget. Whether it’s the F-35, the F-22, the San Antonio-class LPDs, or the V-22 Osprey, to name just a few, the Pentagon has made an art form out of spending two or three times more than what was initially estimated for a program. Why is it we can’t seem to build anything on time and within a projected budget? And the same people who created this mess come back to the American taxpayer and complain that we’re not spending nearly enough money on new ships and planes.
But where were the admirals calling for an end to the LCS program when it was spiraling out of control? A wide range of ship designs being built all over the world could easily have replaced the LCS. Though not as fast as the LCS, they are just as capable, if not more so. Ships such as the Danish Absalon class or the cutting-edge BAM (Buque de Accion Maritima) class of modular offshore patrol vessels for the Spanish Navy are just a few alternatives to the LCS. All of them would have been a lot cheaper. Why is it that other navies with more limited budgets can spend their money efficiently but we can’t?
Yet the LCS program continues. The day may come when we simply run out of funds for new programs, and then we’ll only be able to afford one ship, one plane, and a few tanks per year. But, hey, they’ll be really awesome.
Michael J. Clowes—As a civilian long interested in naval affairs, I read Admiral Swift’s article carefully, wanting to be convinced that the LCS was a good use of my tax dollars. I’m still waiting.
Admiral Swift spends four pages without ever telling us what the LCS can do today, except enter harbors too shallow for other U. S. Navy vessels and show the flag. He mentions its capabilities several times, but never spells them out. I have read elsewhere that the LCS would have a hard time defending itself against any frigate, submarine, or aircraft. Is that true? What weapons does it currently carry that make it a useful addition to a naval task force? Other than showing the flag, what military tasks can it currently execute?
Admiral Swift’s article read like a marketing brochure for the LCS, not an honest appraisal of the current (rather than prospective) utility of these ships. At the current rate of development, the additional weapons the class is supposed to carry that might make it useful in combat will arrive as the ships begin to retire.
Hello, Is Anyone On Board?
(See D. Walsh, p. 88, July 2016 Proceedings)
Captain Robert Allee, U.S. Navy (Retired), Senior Shiphandling Instructor, Mid-Atlantic Maritime Academy—Mr. Walsh gives two valid reasons for the reduction in merchant-ship crew sizes that has been steadily occurring (cost of paying people and a decreasing labor pool). But there is a very strong third reason: reduction in shipping accidents. The data from virtually every marine accident investigation agency show that upward of 80 percent of ship accidents are the result of purely human factors. So it follows that if ships can be operated totally unmanned, then accidental occurrences will be reduced drastically.
Most mariners with whom I discuss this dismiss the idea of totally unmanned ships as an impossibility. If you look at the current unmanned-ship project at the Rolls-Royce Company, however, you will see it is well under way, and the manufacturer predicts a successful introduction by 2020.
My fellow mariners raise many points to claim that unmanned ships are an impossibility, but all of these objections can be overcome by technology; in fact, one could say the technology already exists to run a ship with zero crew on board. Certainly, if we can land an unmanned aircraft on a moving ship, we can remotely control a ship movement.
So if it’s not a technology issue, why aren’t we doing it already? There are two things that I see. The first is a lack of common procedures. Consider the airline industry, certainly as international an operation as shipping: A large aircraft can take off from a busy airport even in poor meteorological conditions, traverse a sky crowded with other aircraft, proceed to another airport on a different continent, and land in equally poor conditions.
The airplanes don’t run into each other, and they get to the right place because of the standard procedures and protocols that the aircraft and the air-traffic controllers follow. Certainly, there are pilots on board (and probably will be on passenger aircraft for the foreseeable future). But one can easily foresee pilotless cargo aircraft.
The point is that the air control system works because all of the participants follow the same procedures. Similarly, if all watercraft in a given area followed a common procedure that kept them in safe water and at a safe distance from each other, whether manned or unmanned, safety would be greatly improved. Vessel Traffic Control Systems do that to a certain degree today, and will be a key element in any system developed to control unmanned vessels.
The second element that may be considered as delaying unmanned shipping in general is a lack of belief that it can be done. My mariner friends can come up with reason after reason that it can’t be done, and express dismay that if it happens, it will make them and their jobs unnecessary. The technological problems they state all have technological solutions. As for their jobs, they will not go away. Take the time to observe the Rolls-Royce control-center concept. In their vision, the future ship’s officers will still be needed; they just will not be on the ship.
The ISIS Conundrum
(See S. Kime, pp. 85–86, July 2016 Proceedings)
Chief Yeoman Bernard Michael Burawski, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Captain Kime provided some good points about ISIS. I also would add that addressing this issue seems to focus on only one aspect of a situation that requires a broader look at the big picture. Listening to the presidential candidates provide sound bites or bumper sticker-type answers to a very complicated issue scares me. There are questions I have been asking myself for years with regard to what exactly is our long-term foreign policy in the Middle East.
What is our strategy? Why is such a strong emphasis placed only on use of the military, without a more balanced approach using economic and diplomatic avenues as well?
Combating ISIS is not only just a matter of wiping them out. It really is a situation involving hearts and minds. U.S. foreign policy should take this into account. Examining ways to stop human trafficking is important as well, because ISIS is involved heavily in the slave trade. While the Islamic State is losing territory, it is tightening its grip on the estimated 3,000 women and girls held as sex slaves. Combining ancient barbaric practices and modern technology, ISIS sells the women like chattel on smartphone apps and shares databases that contain the victims’ photographs and the names of their “owners” to prevent their escape through ISIS checkpoints. The fighters are assassinating smugglers who attempt to rescue the captives, just as funds are drying up to buy the women out of slavery.
Social media also has provided sounding boards for the enemy to broadcast its message directly into our homes, which then provides further opportunities for lone wolves to sympathize with the cause. Perhaps a way could be found to counteract the propaganda.
The solution to the ISIS problem is easier said than done.
Blue Angels—Keeping the Public Interested
(See T. Cutler, p. 94, July 2016 Proceedings)
Barrett Tillman—I enjoyed the retrospective on the “birth of the Blues” partly because I’ve been fortunate to know so many team leaders and members over the years/decades. I moderated a Blue Angels symposium at Pensacola in the 1990s that included original team leader Butch Voris, who (as always) was in fine style, enchanting the audience with his humor.
The team photo on page 94 is posed with an F8F-2 Bearcat rather than an F6F-5. As I recall, Butch said the team flew the first ten shows with Hellcats, then converted to Bearcats, which were ideally suited for a close-in, “tight” performance.
As a side note, one of the team leaders was Greg Wooldridge, who said that during the Russian tour, after trading rides with the host team, one of his guys sidled up to him and whispered, “Boss, we shoulda played them in the Big One!”
Honor a National Treasure with USS Los Alamos
V. Brian D’Andrea, USS Los Alamos Committee—The name “Los Alamos” is iconic in the lexicon of Americana, conjuring visions of brilliant men and women working in secret on world-changing science. The community of Los Alamos, New Mexico, is the embodiment of the best in people: honor, duty, country, and service, which is why so many New Mexico residents support efforts to name a U.S. submarine Los Alamos.
What started with a few dedicated individuals quickly has grown from a grassroots campaign into a statewide groundswell of support from residents, politicians, the military community, and those who have dedicated their lives to developing deterrence weaponry at Los Alamos National Laboratory. The submarine-naming request has received robust and enthusiastic support from the U.S. Congress as well as the state and local legislatures. In addition to the political support received to date, numerous individuals and organizations also staunchly back the naming effort.
For more than 70 years, Los Alamos has been a remarkable contributor to the advancement, strength, and success of the U.S. Navy. Steeped in tradition, the scientists, engineers, technicians, and skilled labor of the Los Alamos community designed, tested, and certified nuclear deterrents that tipped the scales and helped end the Cold War. No community of comparable size has or continues to have such a dramatic impact on our national security and global stability.
The nuclear age began in Los Alamos. It was at the forefront of creating the labyrinth of nuclear technologies for powering ships, deterring aggression, and ending wars. It is best known as the birthplace of the Manhattan Project, which developed the nuclear technology that brought the deadliest war in human history to an abrupt conclusion.
Today, Los Alamos and the surrounding communities remain involved in fulfilling the ever-evolving scientific and engineering needs of the U.S. Navy by continuing to develop innovative technologies, tools, and processes. The people of these communities provided the scientific basis for the creation of the Navy’s nuclear-propulsion systems. Today, Los Alamos experts routinely certify the nation’s nuclear stockpile for reliability, including the entire sea-based deterrent on board U.S. Navy submarines. The dedication and experience of this rare group of people have been key contributors to the U.S. Navy’s superior presence worldwide.
A final thought on the ship-naming process: The community of Los Alamos is much like a Navy community—one where the whole is much more than the sum of its parts. Naming a nuclear submarine after a community that has been built on the premise of protecting and serving the people of the United States seems quite fitting and right. Almost no other place is so entwined with our nuclear history than Los Alamos.
For more information please contact the USS Los Alamos Committee at [email protected] or www.facebook.com/USSLosAlamos/.
Bronco 12, Cleared Hot
(See A. Walton, pp. 42–47, June 2016; T. J. Rath, p. 8, July 2016 Proceedings)
Captain Thomas Pinard, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Bravo Zulu to Captain Andy Walton and the “out of the box” Combat Dragon II team that took the OV-10G+ into Iraq to show what our Marines and Army ground forces need to support their efforts. The captain and his team’s achievement underscores the article that Major Michael Clark wrote in the November 2015 Proceedings (“Two is One, One is None”) and the subsequent Comment & Discussion pieces that speak to other types of aircraft that very much support the efforts of Combat Dragon II.
My letter regarding that earlier article spoke to the utility of the tail-dragging Air Tractor, an “off the shelf,” tried-and-true close-air support aircraft built off a cropduster design. But I applaud the team at Combat Dragon II, and I hope their work does not go into that Indiana Jones storage warehouse, never to be seen again.
Submarines Reign Supreme
(See G. Fuller, pp. 54–57, June 2016 Proceedings)
Federico De Los Rios—When I read Ensign Fuller’s very interesting and informative article about submarine capabilities, the expression “there is no I in team” came to mind. The U.S. Navy always must be a superior team, one that uses all its players wisely. To use a football analogy, the submarine is like a quarterback: No matter how strong his arm is or how far he can throw the ball, he could never win a game without the support of other players. Our submarines have fantastic capabilities, but they can’t win a naval battle (unless these submarines carry nuclear ballistic missiles) alone; the moment they used their weapons they would be exposed to enemy countermeasures, some of which probably would come from carrier-based aircraft.
Our submarines can only reign supreme as long as they are a very important “player” with the powerful team that is the U.S. Navy.
EDITOR’S NOTE: On page 55 of “Submarines Reign Supreme,” the reference to the date of the collision between the USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63) and a Soviet submarine should read “1984,” not 1974.
Focus on the Marines
(See T. Grell, pp. 18–22, July 2016 Proceedings)
W. Garth Smith, CEO, MetaVR—Captain Travis’ article gave valuable insight into Marine aviation readiness. The most revealing comment in terms of remedies was: “Simulators are suitable to train aviators to perform . . . but they do not accurately replicate low-altitude terrain flight, carrier landings, . . . .” This interesting assessment was substantiated by citing a 2002 master’s thesis on visual requirements for low-level flight. Much has happened in the flight simulation community in the 14 years since that analysis was performed, and this seems like a dated reference given the rapid advances in computer graphics.
To a large extent, the article helped me understand how it is that so many subpar flight simulators are fielded, as it’s clear the author has not flown a worthwhile flight simulator. (Perhaps the most ironic foreshadowing of this article was the immediately preceding one on Leonard Glenn “Fat Leonard” Francis, and the systemic corruption that occurred for 25 years with a potentially large number of participants from the service.)
Better flight simulators exist, but the culture prevents them from being fielded. We have watched as the Navy makes F-35 simulator procurements for image generators awarded as sole source rather than a competitive fly-off, even though there are many viable small companies able to provide varying levels of fidelity of image-generation technology. There are many lesser Fat Leonards with varying degrees of ethical or intellectual compromise.
I agree with Captain Travis that the simulators he is most likely aware of don’t properly represent much of what he described . . . if you only account for what the Navy buys and fields. There is better technology available; you have to insist on fair and open competitive fly-offs where everyone uses the Common Image Generator Interface (CIGI) standard that allows any image generator to be plugged into a simulation host if the host uses CIGI as well. We can show the captain imagery at the highest level of detail. Full disclosure: MetaVR makes 3D image generators for many different platforms, including flight simulators.
Jutland Through a Hundred-Year Lens
(See A. Gordon, pp. 54–59, May 2016; W. J. Holland, Jr., p. 84, June 2016; M. D. Van Orden, pp. 84–85, July 2016 Proceedings)
W. Steen Anderson—While crossing the “T” unlikely will be used again as a battle-fleet tactic, many other influences were present at the Battle of Jutland that are more relevant than ever.
Jutland resulted from the Imperial German Navy’s attempt to weaken the British fleet and so be forced, at least partially, to lift the blockade that was throttling German trade and naval operations. Blockade may be defined as an incident of war carried out as part of a containment strategy and policy.
The German Navy had learned from the French naval theorists of the late 1800s. More radical members of that Jeune École (Young School) believed fast torpedo boats, heavily armed and laying mines, could threaten heavy units of the British fleet in shallow seas, not just British trade. Cheap to build with easily obtained materials, these craft provided a weaker naval power with a capability for asymmetrical warfare at sea. The German Navy reinforced the strategy with the use of submarines in World War I.
Admiral Sir John Jellicoe faced these threats and knew the risks and tactics. He also knew his weapons and systems had not been tried in warfare conditions. He therefore acted on the defensive when contact with the enemy was made in the battle. It was the stronger form of war, according to Carl von Clausewitz.
This thinking lay behind Soviet naval strategy in the Mediterranean Sea against the U.S. 6th Fleet during Israel’s Yom Kippur War in 1973. The Soviets aimed to deter the United States from becoming directly involved on Israel’s side should Israel look like it was losing. They made use of the old, therefore disposable, light cruisers and antiship cruise-missile vessels. The idea appeared again in Soviet thinking about defense of the Soviet “near seas” when U.S. naval strategy favored forward deployment in the mid-1980s.
The Chinese Navy’s current compellence-deterrence strategy is similar. Mine-laying and antiship-missile-carrying ships and catamaran-hulled craft can “swarm” against a fleet. They are self-sacrificing or disposable—kamikazes of the sea—potentially capable of creating enormous attrition on the U.S. Navy.
Much modern equipment is untried in warfare. Technology is again changing at a very fast pace. Modern battle fleet commanders therefore may face a much shorter reaction time to a threat, incident, or surprise tactical attack. Those factors, plus the use of land-based antiship missiles, tighten the land-sea link. This increases the risk of escalation, which of course was something Jellicoe did not face.
Attrition is one thing Jellicoe needed to avoid, especially if at relatively little cost to the enemy. Jutland is very similar to the 1942 Battle of the Coral Sea in that the latter was a tactical victory for the Japanese but a strategic victory for the U.S. Navy. This in turn had supreme benefits for the U.S. fleet at the Battle of Midway.
Jellicoe knew his naval history; he was steeped in naval thinking. Naval commanders today, ashore and afloat, have much to read about critically and to discuss. Never before has the need been so great for wisdom in naval affairs.