To the United States, which for decades has been the dominant naval power in the world, China exemplifies the “near peer” rival—one that has come a long way in a short time, modernizing its armed forces to a level at which it is able to significantly challenge U.S. interests in the region. The changing face of China’s surface fleet is proof of its growing ambitions on the open ocean. It is developing not only carrier-based naval aviation, but area air-defense ships such as the Luyang II– and III–class destroyers to defend it—roughly equivalent to U.S. Arleigh Burke–class destroyers.
Not only have the Chinese started to adapt our force composition, they also have adopted the acquisition philosophy of Rear Admiral Wayne E. Meyer, the father of the Aegis weapon system: “Build a little, test a little, learn a lot.” For decades, China has observed, replicated, tested, and refined sensors and weapons the world over. Chinese scientific and industrial efforts have been focused on creating a force designed to deprive the United States access to and influence in the Western Pacific—an advanced sea-denial strategy that the U.S. Department of Defense calls anti-access/area denial (A2/AD).1 The result is weapons such as the DF-21D antiship ballistic missile, the YJ-62 antiship cruise missile (ASCM), and the soon-to-be Type 055 cruiser. The massive scale of the country’s efforts is commensurate with its economic strength. But even nations such as Iran have built capable forces that, while not projecting much power, can make any regional conflict a costly one for opponents.
As potential adversaries around the globe develop more robust capabilities, they escalate an arms race with the United States. The U.S. Navy’s counter to A2/AD strategies is to develop equally advanced and intricate ballistic-missile defense (BMD) and air-defense systems to intercept and neutralize them. Upgraded versions of Aegis and the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) BMD interceptor are just small samples of U.S. adaptation to the A2/AD environment.2 When potential opponents build newer, more advanced ballistic missiles or ASCMs, we develop sensor and missile upgrades with which to intercept them. They reply with more advanced weapons, and the cycle continues. This process can go on, but for how long? How will the U.S. Navy be successful in this competitive research-and-development cycle when it is constantly fighting for its share of an ever-shrinking budget?
The DOD response to the A2/AD capability of potential adversaries is Air-Sea Battle. Since renamed the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC), it provides a framework for the Navy and Air Force to coordinate their efforts as a “networked force” to defeat A2/AD systems and allow for follow-on retaliatory action, according to a 2013 DOD summary.3 JAM-GC is not a silver-bullet solution to the A2/AD problem—only a framework in which the Navy and Air Force can work together to stay in the fight. It involves joint coordination of highly intricate weapon systems operating in a complex command-and-control environment. It is also a great gamble. In an armed conflict, much would ride on the success of JAM-GC; assumptions we make in peace could very well be proven wrong in war. The complex command-and-control structures on which we rely so heavily may fail, or worse yet, be exploited. We need another defense design, with greater quantities of smaller, cheaper combatants to hedge our bets in the Pacific.
The United States needs to counterbalance possible enemies by teaming up with partner nations to develop a capable asymmetric force to deter aggression. Rather than solely seeking newer and more astronomically expensive technologies to counter potential foreign threats, the United States can augment its counter-A2/AD strategies by building small, stealthy ships, anti-radar drones, and coastal-defense cruise missiles (CDCMs). By developing and procuring such systems, and promoting their sale to regional partners—such as the Philippines and Vietnam—the United States can provide regional partners a combat capability that would reaffirm their sovereignty and provide an effective back-stop to the JAM-GC.
Asymmetric Naval Threats
The term “asymmetric threat” brings to mind a David-and-Goliath struggle in which the smaller, weaker foe can keep its larger opponents off balance and, if not defeat them, at the very least exact a heavy toll. Asymmetric tactics have been used since time immemorial—from the Minutemen to Mao. In the maritime world, this is what the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps-Navy is counting on if it ever decides to close the Strait of Hormuz. Swarms of Boston Whalers and jet skis jury-rigged with rocket-propelled grenades, light machine guns, and heavy explosives are easy to produce and can be expended with minimal cost.4 Such equipment may seem insignificant when compared to the area-defense capability of an Aegis cruiser or destroyer, but in narrow seas and choke points they can be effective sea-denial weapons. Individually such weapons are not powerful, but en masse they create a more complex and stressing problem for any foe, especially one faced with the threat of submarines, mines, missile- and torpedo-armed attack craft, and CDCMs—all of which Iran possesses.
Smaller ships and craft have certain advantages in the littoral environment—the sea areas close to land. Littorals contain shallow waters unnavigable by larger warships, and often are dotted with islets and small fishing boats that clutter radar surveillance. Littorals often have increased susceptibility to naval mines. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), in addition to building a first-rate fleet of large surface combatants, is well prepared for a more technically nuanced version of asymmetric warfare. While news agencies fawn over the Liaoning, China’s Ukrainian-made aircraft carrier, fewer have paid attention to the country’s smaller surface combatants.5 The PLAN’s Houbei, for example, is a cruise-missile-equipped, low-radar-profile, fast-attack boat. Since the first in its class was commissioned in 2004, China has produced 83 of these craft, also known as Type 022 missile boats. Camouflaged and working in teams, the Houbei-class vessels can more easily blend in with their surroundings and, if provided adequate sensor support, conduct over-the-horizon missile strikes and escape at high speed.
The missile boat is only one of the PLAN’s many threats. Two tiers above the Houbei is the Jiangkai II–class frigate—an advanced, multimission platform with robust air-defense and surface-attack capability. Comparable to the U.S. Navy’s Freedom- and Independence-class littoral combat ships (LCSs) in displacement, China has produced 20 of these in seven years, with two more on the way.6 China has very quickly commissioned 22 Jiangdao-class corvettes, also equipped with ASCMs and capable of embarking antisubmarine-warfare helicopters. In contrast, the United States has commissioned only four LCSs since 2008, with surface and mine warfare “mission modules” still in development. While the U.S. struggles to break into the littorals, China has taken the open ocean by storm. In the past decade, China has started building its own indigenous Aegis cruisers and destroyers—the Luyang II– and Luyang III–class destroyers, with a new class of cruiser, the Type 055, on the way. Combined, this high-low mix of PLAN surface combatants and fast-attack craft create a complex threat. By adapting readily available technology, however, the United States can develop its own sea-denial capability and provide an equally challenging threat with LCSs.
The A2/AD LCS
The LCS is designed to employ various mission modules—easily replaceable weapon systems that provide a ship with specialized capabilities in a particular mission area. With the mine-warfare module, for example, an LCS would transform from a generic surface combatant into a capable mine hunter. Other modules are in various stages of development, such as the surface-warfare, antisubmarine warfare, and the visit, board, search, and seizure module, designed for maritime interdiction. However, the rate at which mission modules are being tested and developed lags far behind the production of hulls.7 This is partly due to the challenge of integrating the weapons and sensors in the mission packages with the ships themselves and then having to certify them on two completely different hull designs.
To perform A2/AD, the U.S. Navy can develop a low-cost suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) module based on existing technology. SEAD is an essential part of any air-to-surface strike and entails disabling or destroying an enemy’s air- and missile-defense radars and missiles. Israel’s Harop unmanned combat air vehicle is designed specifically to perform such a mission.8 The Harop is an advanced drone that is small and slow enough to penetrate an adversary’s air defenses undetected and, with an anti-radiation homing seeker, destroy air-defense radars. This anti-radiation homing capability allows the drone to target a radar using the emissions of that radar to guide the craft to its target. If that radar ceases emissions as a self-defense measure, the Harop is also capable of being remotely directed to its target by an operator on the launching ship. Able to loiter for up to six hours, the drone can search for its target, gather intelligence, and assess the effectiveness of previous strikes. It also would be able to function as a stand-alone system, meaning it would require less integration time with the ship’s combat suite.
A surface action group (SAG) of four LCSs can, with a low probability of being detected, harass an enemy force—in its very own waters if need be. If one is SEAD- equipped and the other three configured for surface warfare, armed with Norway’s naval strike missile (NSM), the SAG as a whole can present a complex threat to enemy shipping.9 Such a SAG, in addition to a carrier strike group, would be enough to force an adversary to either commit more forces to its search or risk making itself vulnerable. While they alone may not be capable of destroying an enemy carrier or its escorts, an LCS SAG would be a fleet in being—a force that, even if it avoids a decisive conflict, denies its adversary total sea control.10
Going Smaller
The LCS, while brimming with potential, is only an intermediate-sized vessel. In many ways, it is too large for much of the littoral environment.11 While the LCS can more easily access shallower waters than an Arleigh Burke–class destroyer, many contested littorals will remain inaccessible. While the U.S. Navy was supporting the amphibious landings at Leyte Gulf during World War II, it had difficulty gaining control over its western approaches. As a result, Japan was able to resupply its holdings in the Philippines and prolong the conflict. As U.S. Naval War College Professor Milan Vego stated in his article “On Littoral Warfare,” this failure was largely due to “a lack of ships larger than PT boats but smaller than destroyers and capable of operating in confined waters.”12 The United States needs to acquire its own fleet of fast-attack craft, capable of navigating shallow waters while still posing a credible cruise-missile threat to larger surface combatants. Missile boats such as Norway’s Skjold-class corvette displace just 270 tons with a draft of three feet, but carry eight NSM and can travel up to 45 knots in high sea states.13 Constructed with radar-absorbent coatings, made of glass-reinforced plastic, and using an air cushion to improve seakeeping, the boats are widely regarded as capable surface platforms with the strike capabilities of much larger frigate-sized vessels.
Though such craft could operate only at short ranges from their harbors, this limitation can be mitigated by operating from forward bases in the Philippines, Vietnam, and Singapore. With such forward basing, missile boats would be ideal for providing presence patrols through the South China Sea.If American shipbuilders partner with their Norwegian counterparts to build Skjold-class corvettes under license, then the United States would be able to take the best of both worlds—using a tested hull design with proven capabilities while still promoting U.S. shipbuilding. If allowed to modify the design to provide for more U.S. components, the Navy could ensure that replacement parts would be shared across multiple platforms, easing long-term difficulties in logistical support. The U.S. goal of maintaining the status quo of maritime claims also would be well served by providing such missile boats to partners in the Pacific and the Persian Gulf. Rather than relying solely on American freedom-of-navigation operations to maintain its sovereignty, the United States would be better prepared to defend its own interests without spending the prohibitively expensive price of an Aegis destroyer.
All good defense designs need overlapping layers of protection, and smaller nations in the region also will need a coastal-defense asset with greater staying power. While fast-attack craft have limited endurance, CDCMs provide a relatively low-cost, persistent alternative to nations wishing to defend their territorial waters. CDCMs do lack the stealth and maneuverability capabilities of small craft; the former can be easily avoided by staying far enough from the coastline. But even when mitigated by this measure, they still deny their adversary free access to coastal waters. By promoting the sale of CDCM versions of the Norwegian NSM and developing a land-launched version of the already prolific Harpoon ASCM, the United States would provide smaller nations with their very own sea-denial capability to counterbalance growing regional powers. Even the Harpoon, first developed in the 1970s and no longer the vanguard of ASCM technology, would be a deterrent if deployed in sufficient quantities. Providing these missiles to nations such as the Philippines and Vietnam would allow them to protect their sovereignty and have a more credible, conventional deterrent to potential aggressors.
One disadvantage of small craft and coastal-defense systems is the limited range at which they could detect enemy ships. With the low height of their antenna masts, they would be unable to detect other ships from as far a distance with their own sensors. By using radars, they also would be alerting ships to their presence. While overhead sensors alleviate this concern, the small size of the Skjold class also would prevent flight operations with manned helicopters such as the MH-60R Seahawk and more modern UAVs like the MQ-8 Fire Scout. Because they would not be operating too far from their bases of operation, this can easily be mitigated by land-based UAVs such as Boeing’s ScanEagle.14 This would provide corvettes and CDCM batteries with significant surveillance support and over-the-horizon targeting. As they are less likely to be detected by the ships they are targeting, enemy vessels would likely not even know they are being targeted. Even if they are detected, the long endurance of UAVs would allow them to be so persistent that enemy vessels would have to operate under the assumption that they would be continuously targeted.
Training: Closing the Loop
The buildup and distribution of these technologies will not bear any fruit unless reinforced with training and naval exercises. During the Battle of the Java Sea, a combined surface force of American, British, Dutch, and Australian ships met a disastrous end at the hands of the Imperial Japanese Navy on 27 February 1942. Though the various vessels were very formidable in their own right, the De Ruyter, the Dutch flagship of the group, sent conflicting and contradictory commands to the rest of the group, dooming them to failure. Prior to the battle, the ships had minimal training together.15 No matter how great the individual components of a surface fleet, they will be ultimately ineffective if they do not practice coordination.
The final component in an allied counter-A2/AD strategy must be a training program and standing naval exercises for the U.S. and foreign navies to hone their skills in littoral combat. A training program and exercises would serve not only to improve our collective proficiency but also to increase the development of a combined doctrine that would ease command-and-control difficulties. While the Navy runs an international version of its Surface Warfare Officers School, the courses focus on damage control, leadership development, and other subjects that, while important, are not tactical. By developing international tactics, techniques, and procedures, and training foreign navies, the United States and its allies can get the greatest value out of the systems they procure.
For far too long, we have been fascinated solely with the capabilities of newer, more technologically advanced sensors and weapons. Even the most capable systems, when used without practice, will prove ultimately ineffective. Unless we match new capabilities with better international training on how to employ them, we will find ourselves no better prepared for conflict than the American, British, Dutch, Australian force hastily convened in the early days of World War II. While that ad hoc force ultimately met a terrible fate and almost all its ships were sunk, the allies had time, industrial might, and the vastness of the Pacific to their advantage. In the 21st century, we might not be so lucky.
1. Department of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015,” 7 April 2015, 33.
2. Megan Eckstein, “Navy, Missile Defense Agency, Japan Conduct First Flight Test of Standard Missile-3 Block IIA,” USNI News, 8 June 2015, http://news.usni.org/2015/06/08/navy-missile-defense-agency-japan-conduct-first-flight-test-of-standard-missile-3-block-iia.
3. Department of Defense, “Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial Challenges,” May 2013, 5.
4. Milan Vego, “On Littoral Warfare,” Naval War College Review, vol. 68, no. 2 (Spring 2015), 16.
5. Sam Lagrone, Dave Majumdar, “Chinese Weapons that Worry the Pentagon,” USNI News, 9 June 2014, http://news.usni.org/2014/06/09/chinese-weapons-worry-pentagon.
6. Ridzwan Rahmat, “China Commissions Type 054A Frigate into East Sea Fleet,” IHS Jane’s Navy International, January 2015.
7. Grace Jean, “Tracking to a New Headmark: LCS Evolves Into a Frigate,” IHS Jane’s Navy International, April 2015.
8. “Harop Loitering Munitions UCAV System, Israel,” airforce-technology.com, www.airforce-technology.com/projects/haroploiteringmuniti/.
9. Naval Surface Force U.S. Pacific Fleet Public Affairs, “USS Coronado Performs Live-Fire Test of Norwegian Strike Missile,” 23 September 2014.
10. John B. Hattendorf, “The Idea of ‘A Fleet in Being’ In Historical Perspective,” U.S. Naval War College Review, vol. 67, no. 1 (Winter 2014).
11. Vego, “On Littoral Warfare,” 46.
12. Ibid, 54.
13. “Skjold Class Missile Fast Patrol Boats,” naval-technology.com, www.naval-technology.com/projects/skjold/.
14. “ScanEagle Unmanned Aerial Vehicle,” Boeing website, www.boeing.com/history/products/scaneagle-unmanned-aerial-vehicle.page.
15. James D. Hornfischer, Ship of Ghosts (New York: Bantam Dell, 2006), 73–87.
Lieutenant Tanalega is the fire control officer on the USS John Paul Jones (DDG-53) and a 2011 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. This essay won Third Prize in the 2015 International Navies Essay Contest, sponsored by Finmeccanica North America/DRS Technologies.