The term “fleet in being” originally meant a naval force that was inferior to its enemy, but could be formidable enough to be a threat without being brought to battle. 1 Today that term may apply to the Russian Navy under President Vladimir Putin. The Russian fleet is definitely inferior in numbers and capabilities by most criteria when compared to the U.S. Navy. Still, Putin is employing the fleet to carry out political presence and combat missions without fear of being defeated. Undoubtedly, Russia’s senior admirals are toasting Putin and increasing their budget requests.
The first significant role of the Russian Navy in the post–Cold War era was to demonstrate its political capabilities, as occurred when the lone Russian aircraft carrier—the Admiral Kuznetsov—periodically deployed to the Mediterranean.2 At some 60,000 tons full load, the ship is considerably smaller and less capable than U.S. nuclear-propelled carriers. Although deploying with only some 40 aircraft embarked (about 30 planes fewer than a U.S. carrier air wing), the Kuznetsov’s periodic appearance in the Mediterranean beginning in the 1990s demonstrated Russian interest in the region and was extensively reported in area media.
Probably more significant, in November 2008 the nuclear-propelled “battle cruiser” Pyotr Velikiy sailed into the Caribbean—America’s backyard. At 26,400 tons full load, the cruiser and others of the class are the world’s largest surface combatants, with a heavy gun, missile, and antisubmarine armament. The Pyotr Velikiy entered La Guaira, the principal port of Venezuela, at the same time then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev was visiting the country.3
The cruiser was accompanied by other Russian warships, including the destroyer Admiral Chabaneko. The Russian ships participated in an exercise with the Venezuelan Navy, and the Admiral Chabaneko also visited ports in Panama, Nicaragua, and Cuba. During the six-month deployment the Pyotr Velikiy additionally visited Cape Town, South Africa, and Mormugao, India. (She also was credited with capturing ten pirates off the coast of Somalia.)
Like the Admiral Kuznetsov, the Pyotr Velikiy also made deployments into the Mediterranean, including visits to the Syrian port of Tartus. That city has hosted Soviet and, subsequently, Russian naval ships on an almost continuous basis since 1971. It provided repair and replenishment facilities—staffed by Russians—with naval repair ships periodically at the port.4 Tartus gained in importance after the Soviets lost their influence (and support facilities) in Egypt in the mid-1970s. With the outbreak of the civil war in Syria that began in 2011 the Russians have provided increased military aid to Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, with merchant and naval cargo ships unloading at Tartus.
With the Russian commitment of combat aircraft and ground forces to support al-Assad against his opponents, Navy landing ships joined the cargo ships in unloading weapons, combat vehicles, aviation-support equipment, and combat helicopters at the port. Tartus provides the Russian gateway into the Middle East.
The Russian Navy made more points with Putin—and appears to have taken Western intelligence by surprise—by launching a missile barrage from the Caspian Sea against rebel groups fighting the al-Assad regime. On 7 October, the frigate Dagestan and the corvettes Grad Sviyazhsk, Veliky Ustyug, and Uglich launched 26 3M-14T Kalibr missiles. Although four projectiles failed to reach their targets (and apparently came down in Iran), the others overflew Iran and Iraq to strike targets in Syria, a distance of more than 900 miles delivering 990-pound warheads. Reportedly, the missiles struck 11 targets in Syria, joining the Russian fighter-attack aircraft that had been bombing al-Assad enemies—and not Islamic State targets, as stated by Russian officials.
The missiles, given the NATO designation SS-N-30, are vertical-launch weapons. The Dagestan and the corvettes each have eight vertical-launch missile cells (in addition to guns, surface-to-air missiles, point-defense weapons, and antisubmarine systems). The corvettes are especially impressive as they have a full-load displacement of only 940 tons, less than half that of the much larger U.S. littoral combat ships (LCSs). The U.S. ships are badly undergunned, and only now is the Navy’s leadership beginning plans to enhance their armament. (Admittedly, the Russian corvettes have a speed of only 26 knots compared to 40-plus knots for the LCS designs.)
Earlier, the Russian Navy had an important role in the 2014 seizure of the Crimean peninsula from Ukraine. Ships of the Black Sea Fleet sank or captured the few Ukrainian warships, reportedly landed troops, and provided other support to the Russian operation. The taking of Crimea gave the Russians additional fleet and air bases on the Black Sea as well as recreation areas for Russian officials and other VIPs.
One could argue that the Russian naval forces that undertook these operations—at least the surface ships—do not pose a major threat to U.S. and NATO navies. However, Russian undersea craft may be a reason for anxiety. The newer Russian submarines, especially the attack/cruise missile submarines of the Severodvinsk (Project 885) class, appear to be a major concern to U.S. Navy officials. (The vertical-launch cells in those submarines can accommodate the 3M-14/SS-N-30 land-attack missile; the submarines also are armed with antiship missiles, a weapon not found in U.S. submarines.)
The Russian Navy’s forward operations in the Caribbean and other distant areas, especially the Mediterranean, the ship-launched missile barrage into Syria, the fleet’s role in supporting ground and air forces in Syria, the Crimean operation, and various foreign port visits all have demonstrated to the West as well as to Putin the reach and capabilities of its ships. Further, these naval activities have not aroused Western military countermeasures—such as sending a surface action group into the Black Sea. Thus, one can expect that the senior Russian admirals are even now proposing more funding for new ships, aircraft, and weapons. And, based on their achievements of the past few years, Putin will support their requests and further employment of their ships as he strives to return Russia to superpower status.
1. See, for example, RADM S. S. Robison, USN (Ret.), A History of Naval Tactics from 1530 to 1930 (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 1942), 206. The term is credited to Arthur Herbert, First Earl of Torrington, a British fleet commander, in 1690.
2. The ship’s full name is Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov (Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov); Kuznetsov was head of the Soviet Navy from 1939 to 1946 and from 1951 to 1956.
3. Medvedev is currently prime minister; he served as the president of Russia from 2008 to 2012 (at which time Putin was the prime minister).
4. The Russian Navy classifies the facility as a “material-technical support point” and not as a “base.” Its facilities are minimal.
Mr. Polmar, a columnist for Proceedings and Naval History magazines, has visited the Soviet Union and Russia on several occasions to work with senior naval officers and the leading submarine designers.