How to Handle the Freedom: Part I
By Commander Dale Heinken, Captain Robert Butt (Retired), and Lieutenant George Kunthara, U.S. Navy
Littoral combat ships (LCSs) are undeniably fast and highly maneuverable. They have an unmatched power-to-displacement ratio for a surface ship (114,490 horsepower to 3,348 tons), an ability to “walk” sideways, and access to waters too shallow for most warships. While a variety of forums have debated the LCS’s capabilities, its use, particularly shiphandling, has not yet been discussed in detail. The first portion of this two-part article will focus on how the LCS handles differently from other warships. The second part will examine pier work using these attributes.
The LCS family of ships has two radically different variants: the Freedom and the Independence. (Commanders Jerry Olin and Dave Back discussed the handling characteristics of the latter in "Shiphandling the Independence Class" in April 2014.) The Freedom variant is a semi-planing mono-hull, while the Independence variant is a trimaran. Both combine diesel engines, gas turbines, water jets, and a lightweight design to achieve speeds in excess of 40 knots and a shallow draft. While there are similarities between the two variants, there are also differences.
Characteristics
Below is a summary of the Freedom variant’s features:
• 387.6 feet long and 57.7 feet wide, with an average draft of 14.1 feet
• The propulsion plant consists of two Rolls-Royce MT30 gas turbine engines (GTEs) at 48,276 hp each, two Fairbanks-Morse/Colt Pielstick main propulsion diesel engines (MPDEs) at 8,969 hp each, and two drive trains. A GTE and MPDE are incorporated into each drive train and linked through a series of gears and clutches
• Four Kamewa 153-centimeter water jets consisting of two outboard steerable water jets (SWJs) and two static inboard boost water jets (BWJs). The steerable water jets have attached buckets that direct water flow forward or aft
• The height of eye is 54 feet, which is roughly an 8 nautical mile visual horizon for bridge watchstanders.
There is considerable flexibility in operating the propulsion plant with ten propulsion-plant states or configurations available. State 0 is engines secured. States 1 and 2 use one MPDE and one SWJ, differing only by which side is driving (1-STBD Diesel/2-PORT Diesel). This is the most fuel-efficient configuration for speeds below 5 knots. State 3 consists of both MPDEs driving their respective SWJ. This is the most efficient configuration from 5 to 13 knots. State 4 is two MPDEs driving all four water jets, which is the most efficient configuration for speeds above 13 knots. The maximum speed in this state is slightly less than 15 knots for LCS-1 and around 16 knots for LCS-3 and beyond. State 5 uses both GTEs to drive the SWJs only. This is the least efficient configuration at any speed. States 6 and 7 use one GTE to drive a SWJ and a BWJ on one side and one MPDE to drive a SWJ and a BWJ on the opposite side (6-PORT Diesel/7-STBD Diesel). This is the most efficient configuration for speeds from 16 to 22 knots. State 8 uses both GTEs to drive all four water jets. This configuration is the most efficient for speeds from 23 to 38 knots. State 9 is the full power configuration using both GTEs, both MPDEs, and all four water jets to propel the ship in excess of 40 knots. If a state is selected that has the BWJs available, they typically engage around 13 knots to provide extra thrust.
In State 9, an ahead flank (T10) engine order from dead in the water (DIW, less than 1 knot) will achieve a speed in excess of 40 knots in less than three minutes and within 3,000 yards. A back full (T-10) engine order will decelerate the ship from 40 knots to DIW in 75 seconds and within 470 yards. Of note, there is an imposed maximum astern limitation of 211 shaft rpms due to the thrust bearing being attached to the transom rather than the keel. Even with this limitation, the ship can go over 10 knots astern, but astern speeds should not exceed 5 knots due to the stern ramp configuration.
Similar to other ships, advance, transfer, and tactical diameter decrease with increasing steering angles on an LCS. However, the LCS is sensitive to speeds above 15 knots with the turn dimensions increasing with increasing speed. At speeds below 15 knots, there is essentially no change to the tactical dimensions with changes in speed, a characteristic typical of high-speed, vectored-thrust ships. Also, the number of water jets online affects the turning characteristics. With two steerable water jets, the ship’s advance and transfer are around 40 yards smaller and the tactical diameter is about 100 yards smaller than with the boost jets online, but it takes longer to complete the turn. Additionally, large jet angles cause a significant slowing of the ship when above 15 knots, similar to prop-and-rudder ships.
Steering Controls
Unlike other Navy ships with a helm and lee helm, the LCS uses combinators to manipulate the water jets and engine speeds. These combinators move the SWJs from centerline up to 30 degrees starboard or port and the attached buckets from 100 percent flow forward to 100 percent astern. For throttle control, the wooden handles can be moved from T0 (all stop) to T10 (full ahead) and back to T-10 (all back). The “T-settings” correspond to different speeds depending on the propulsion plant state ordered. At T0, the forces from the water jets are balanced in both the ahead and astern direction by the attached buckets, and the combinators can be placed at any angle between left and right 30 degrees with a net thrust of zero on the ship.
Here is how the system works to turn the ship to starboard. With the combinators at right 30 degrees, both SWJs are pointed at 150 degrees relative. As the throttle is pushed forward, the reversing bucket begins to retract, the forward thrust increases, the aft thrust decreases, and a net force in the direction of 330 degrees relative develops on the stern. As you would expect on a ship with an ahead bell and right full rudder, the ship begins to move forward and to starboard; however, there is no delay for wash to build over the rudders. The SWJs apply 100 percent of the thrust in the direction of 150 degrees relative as soon as it is ordered. From trigonometry, this equates to 87 percent of the thrust accelerating the ship forward, 50 percent pushing the stern sideways to port, and the ship’s head immediately rotating to starboard.
There are three ways to drive an LCS that use the combinators completely or only partially: autopilot, common lever, and direct mode. Backup controls that bypass the combinators are also available. Moving the backup controls left or right changes the angle of the SWJs, and moving the controls forward and aft adjusts the buckets (thrust). When back-up controls are activated, the engines immediately go to idle. With the engines idle and buckets open 100 percent, the maximum speed obtainable on the MPDEs is 5 knots and 8 knots on the GTEs. By taking local control of the MPDEs and increasing engine rpms, higher speeds can be achieved. The gas turbines cannot be locally controlled.
The autopilot is used frequently when transiting. With a minimally manned bridge, it allows the officer of the deck (OOD)/conning officer (conn) to focus on the safe navigation of the ship instead of the mechanics of steering. The autopilot can be operated in two modes: AUTO and NAV (waypoint navigation). In AUTO, the OOD/conn selects the heading with a control disk, and the SWJs are adjusted to achieve and maintain the desired heading. In NAV, the autopilot receives the course to steer from the voyage management system. In both modes, the ship’s speed is controlled using the outboard combinator. The common lever mode allows the OOD/conn to control both SWJs with only the outboard combinator. The direction the OOD/conn orders on the combinator translates to the same direction on both SWJs. The direct mode allows for each SWJ to be controlled individually through two combinators.
From water-jet propulsion to steering controls, the LCS differs from other warships. These differences were brought forward in the first part of this article, which established the foundation for understanding the science of LCS handling. In Part II, which will be published in the January issue of Proceedings, the use of these attributes to “walk” an LCS off the pier will be discussed in depth.
Commander Heinken is the former commanding officer and executive officer of Littoral Combat Ship Crew 101 (“Raptors”). During his tour, he served on board the USS Freedom (LCS-1) and Fort Worth (LCS-3), and deployed to 7th Fleet.
Captain Butt graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1976. During his career, he served on eight ships, including command of the USS George Philip (FFG-12) and Bunker Hill (CG-52). Since retiring from the Navy in 2006, he has worked for Lockheed Martin as the lead instructor at the LCS Training Facility.
Lieutenant Kunthara is an instructor at Tactical Training Group, Pacific. He served as the navigator for LCS Crew 101, and earned the 2012 Commander, Naval Surface Forces Pacific Shiphandler of the Year award.
Recapitalize the Ticonderoga Class
By Captain Steve J. Coughlin, U.S. Navy (Retired)
The greatest investment the United States can make in national security is the ownership and operation of a strong, survivable, and forward-deployed naval force. As a maritime nation, the importance of sea power is well understood and our history is replete with testimony to its relevance. Who can argue that the construction of six frigates through the Naval Act of 1794 has not yielded a high return on investment? And, ever since then, elected officials and uniformed officers alike have preserved this element of national power with enduring commitment.
But it’s been a long time since the U.S. Navy has been challenged on the high seas, which could lead to a false sense of security if one does not view the world as a dangerous place with evolving maritime threats. It is one thing to profess the achievement of strategic imperatives such as presence and deterrence; it is quite another to earn that advantage, then sustain it when a peer-competitor is determined to forbid any such geographical exploitation.
To achieve maritime dominance, the carrier strike group (CSG) must operate within the anti-access/area-denial defenses of any potential adversary and remain on station regardless of the threat. Therefore, protecting the “force-in-being” is the primary objective before any other naval mission is attempted. Some of this protection comes from the carrier’s embarked air wing, but the most significant contributor to aircraft carrier defense is the Ticonderoga-class cruiser, whose continuous presence within close proximity of the carrier guarantees its survivability. Otherwise, power projection is not possible and survivability at sea becomes questionable.
As we navigate fiscally austere times, it has become unaffordable to operate and maintain the cruiser force. To make matters worse, the average age of a Ticonderoga-class cruiser is 25 years old, so they are well beyond midlife and in need of increased maintenance to keep them afloat and modernization to keep them relevant. This could be considered the greatest force-structure dilemma faced by the U.S. Navy since the end of the Cold War. Plainly stated, we need a dedicated air-defense platform, organic to the CSG, and a creative and innovative approach to preserving these ships is absolutely necessary.
The Road to Recapitalization
Under enormous congressional pressure to preserve force structure without the resources to do so, naval leadership has devised a plan to retain the in-service cruisers to their expected service lives through a phased modernization approach. Normally, modernization is ongoing and coupled with the class-maintenance plan as the ship experiences its normal industrial periods over the course of its lifetime. However, in the case of a ship class that will serve to its expected service life and beyond, and as technologies make substantial gains in capability, there becomes a need for an extended period for significant upgrades to take place. An example of this is the very successful midlife modernization of Arleigh Burke–class destroyers in which new life is rebuilt into those ships in the weapons as well as the hull, mechanical, and electrical systems. Expanding on that approach to modernization, the cruiser plan takes advantage of the efficiencies gained when improving the ships’ overall combat lethality and warfighting capacity in a single undertaking while delivering greater return on investment than if those improvements were completed later in the ship’s life.
The Navy’s proposal for cruiser modernization has taken many forms as the program matures to the point where it will be executed. But regardless of the details, it will be a lengthy process on the order of years for each cruiser (CG-63 through CG-73) inducted into the program. Upon completion of the modernization period, the ships will be reintroduced into the fleet hull-by-hull, in conjunction with the planned decommissioning of the older cruisers (CG-52 through CG-62). The older cruisers were modernized earlier in their service lives before the phased modernization induction period of the higher numbered cruisers. So, with this plan, the fleet would contain 11 fully modernized, purpose-built air-defense cruisers continuously out to the early 2040s, all aligned with deploying CSGs.
A Package Deal with a Punch
One of the dangers when discussing very large, ambitious projects at the aggregate level is that the specifics can get lost in the general discussion of the plan. For the sake of understanding the advanced combat capabilities of a modernized Ticonderoga-class cruiser, it is worth reviewing the finer points of what the modernization package includes.
With over a dozen significant alterations to the combat system and propulsion plant, there is an order-of-magnitude warfighting improvement for the air-defense commander. These features overcome the obsolescence that we seek to avoid when considering the evolving threats around the world. Such a generational leap in technology in the CSG will make all the difference for fleet commanders when operating their naval forces in contested waters.
To begin with, the Aegis weapons system will receive a complete makeover with an advanced combat build that offers an entirely new operating environment with a common processing system and mission-critical enclosures to replace the original computing suite. All legacy operator consoles in the combat information center (CIC) are replaced with updated work stations featuring integrated video data distribution interfaced with a new Aegis display system. Needless to say, this is an entirely new and improved environment.
For the enhanced collection of tactical information inside the CIC, the package includes a new multipurpose, surface search-and-fire control radar in the AN/SPQ-9B, the latest electro-optical sight system, the digital MORIAH wind measurement and data distribution system, the Cooperative Engagement Capability, an upgraded Common Data Link management system, and an advanced sonar suite to include the AN/SQQ-89 A(V)15 with its multifunction towed array.
When kinetic effects are in order, tacticians will call on the Vulcan Phalanx (1B) close-in weapon system, the Mk-45 5” 62-caliber main gun with the associated Mk-160 gun weapons system, the Mk-116 Mod 7 underwater fire-control battery, and a modified Mk-41 vertical-launch system with the Evolved Sea Sparrow missile and RIM 174 standard missile.
The package also offers a wide variety of hull, mechanical, and electrical shipboard modifications, including advanced machinery controls for engineering efficiency and reliability so that our cruisers can always get where they need to be on time, ready to conduct any mission. The final outcome of this comprehensive upgrade and robust capability expansion will give the U.S. Navy a first-rate warship for the future.
The Art of Air Defense
A day in the life of the CSG air-defense commander requires a fixation on tactical circumstances and vigilant technical thinking to contend with every nuance and subtlety that this warfare area must address. Overall link management in the force, tracking aircraft during launch and recovery cycles, vectoring combat air patrols, and friendly-force interrogations are just the tip of the iceberg. Simply monitoring the airspace above the designated surveillance area does not begin to describe the complexity of effort. This business is much harder than it looks, and it requires a dedicated ship purposely built from the ground up as an air-defense commander platform.
Consequently, Naval Warfare Publication 3-56 directs that an air-defense commander is assigned to the most capable air-defense platform available: the cruiser. This CSG-centric operational doctrine drives the necessity for a dedicated air-defense platform, manned with senior leadership and the experienced personnel to carry out that mission. It comes from the Navy’s composite-warfare commander construct, the time-tested and battle-proven warfighting command-and-control architecture. Positioning the primary air-defense weapon, the Aegis weapons system, within the carrier’s vital area based on the threat axis and best geometry for maximum depth-of-fire is purely a surface warfare function and must be accomplished by the air-defense commander from a dedicated air-defense ship.
We must modernize and preserve today’s cruiser force so that it, with the carrier and air wing as its centerpiece, can continue to represent Western democratic values and American military might. Accordingly, the resulting forward naval presence is extremely important for the President of the United States to create the international conditions necessary to shape the global diplomatic environment. Enabling the commander-in-chief’s foreign policy objectives speaks to the seriousness of maritime air defense and the necessity of having state-of-the-art capability within the CSG.
When all is said and done, the cruiser phased-modernization approach punctuates a deep-rooted belief that can be traced back to one of the U.S. Navy’s matchless and unrivaled traditions: Don’t give up the ship!
Captain Coughlin is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and a career surface warfare officer who served primarily in aircraft carriers, destroyers, and frigates. He had command of the USS Bainbridge (DDG-96), Patrol Coastal Squadron 1 (PCRON-1), and Destroyer Squadron 2 (CDS-2).
International Engagements with Intelligence
By Lieutenant Colonel Seth E. Anderson and Major Paul Bischoff, U.S. Marine Corps
The U.S. military regularly conducts cooperative-engagement events with nations around the globe to develop and maintain international relationships. In February 2015, for example, the 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (2d MEB) took part in the Intelligence Capacity Building Workshop (ICBW) in Agadir, Morocco. The ICBW was designed as one of several distinct components for African Lion 2015, an exercise that took place in May. Six nations participated in the workshop: the United States, Morocco, Germany, Tunisia, Mauritania, and Senegal. Over the course of the workshop, intelligence personnel demonstrated how the intelligence function supports military operations through a curriculum consisting of various presentations, class discussions, and a practical application. The ICBW served as a key engagement opportunity for the United States, strengthening ties with its African partners and as a preparatory event for the command post-exercise portion of African Lion 2015.
To the greatest extent possible, the 2d MEB must achieve a degree of interoperability with the countries it works with in Africa. As such, the training in Morocco was essential for the 2d MEB to develop and maintain its capability to serve as a crisis-response force on the African continent. The ICBW offered a venue in which participants ranging from junior enlisted to senior officers from six different countries could share their professional experiences and gain a greater understanding of each other’s cultures, values, and norms.
The Benefits of Smaller Exercises
Various challenges arise when attempting to conduct international military engagements, not the least of which is the cost and complexity involved in planning and conducting a military exercise. The costs associated with moving forces to the training area as well as supplying and maintaining them can be a significant burden for most countries and, in many cases, the value of the training is not considered to be worth the cost. Smaller engagement exercises present a lower barrier to entry and do not require a significant number of military forces, which provides an opportunity for more counties to participate. While many countries do not have the resources to send a battalion of infantry or a squadron of aircraft to an engagement exercise, they might be able to afford sending a few personnel, especially if no equipment is required. Accordingly, the equipment and personnel requirements for the ICBW were relatively small. The U.S. contribution totaled ten personnel and their associated computers, printers, and various office supplies, fulfilling the small footprint required for the 2d MEB to successfully conduct the week-long workshop.
In general, military exercises with the United States can be overwhelming to our partners. When an exercise consists of thousands of U.S. personnel and hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of U.S. equipment, the other participating countries can be made to feel like “junior partners.” In fact, for many large-scale engagement events, countries will send only a handful of staff personnel to take part. Ensuring that other countries feel like they are equal partners encourages participation and reinforces the value of conducting security cooperation. With only 40 multinational participants, the ICBW offered a quality of engagement that is more difficult to achieve with a large-scale exercise. While the latter might have a battalion of infantry participating, only a small number of people in that battalion are actually working side-by-side with their international partners. Intelligence engagement with foreign partners at the staff planning level offers a cost-efficient and mission-effective means of conducting security cooperation while bolstering international relationships.
In addition to the efficient scale of the exercise, intelligence relationships offer an attraction that other, more general engagements cannot. For many foreign countries, military intelligence holds a certain mystique. Attendance at the ICBW offered countries the opportunity to see how U.S. military intelligence functions and integrates with the rest of the staff, with the added benefit of allowing the participants to interact directly with military-intelligence professionals. Participants at the ICBW were not restricted to intelligence personnel; in fact, the 2d MEB designed the workshop to have participants from across the span of warfighting. Foreign attendees included infantry officers, artillery officers, logistics officers, the commander of a naval vessel, and others. These attendees most likely had preconceived ideas regarding the U.S. intelligence community, and this engagement gave them an opportunity to dispel commonly heard myths.
Improving Interoperability
The international intelligence officers and enlisted were chosen to participate based on their performance during previous U.S. Africa Command–sponsored military-intelligence training events. These events, organized and led by Marine Forces Africa and Marine Forces Europe, were designed to train the participants in the fundamentals of intelligence, intelligence planning, and intelligence operations. The general goal of future training events is to increase the overall capability and interoperability of intelligence experts during exercises.
What the participants experienced during the ICBW demonstrated that U.S. military-intelligence processes are not mysterious, instead serving practical and necessary requirements for planning combined operations at the brigade level and higher. To facilitate this experience, participants in the ICBW were split into two groups: the Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE) and the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). Both groups received much of the same academic material but had different roles and tasks to accomplish. The JISE contained the preponderance of the junior personnel. Its role was to produce detailed intelligence products and learn specific techniques regarding how to conduct intelligence. JISE personnel went through the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment process in detail, building geospatial intelligence products, analyzing the enemy, and constructing a database of various intelligence support products.
Conversely, the role of the CJTF staff was to drive the intelligence effort. To do so, it needed to understand how the intelligence process worked and how to guide the the JISE to support the mission. JISE personnel gave periodic briefs and updates to the CJTF staff, and the CJTF staff informed the JISE’s efforts throughout the workshop. Due to the role of the CTJF as a headquarters operating at the operational level of war, both groups gained a greater appreciation of the need for deliberate intelligence planning and organization.
The purpose of African Lion’s ICBW was to improve interoperability while building up the intelligence-planning capacities of participating nations. The workshop covered techniques for the development of priority intelligence requirements, building a collection plan, leveraging open-source intelligence, unclassified geospatial intelligence, intelligence support to logistics, and a host of other critical skill sets. The engagement focused on operational-level intelligence and intelligence operations in support of peacekeeping and humanitarian aid/disaster-relief missions. While U.S. personnel arranged and coordinated the ICBW with their Moroccan hosts, personnel from all of the participating nations took part in the discussions and practical applications on an equal professional footing.
Intelligence is often characterized as being the realm of secrets and, therefore, not the intuitive choice for security cooperation with foreign partners. However, as demonstrated by the ICBW, sharing the processes of the intelligence warfighting function can be a highly effective venue for security cooperation. The reality is that most intelligence techniques and procedures are not classified. The U.S. military can freely share how it conducts intelligence operations, planning, and prioritization, as well as how those tasks feed the commander’s decision-making process. In the end, the ICBW enabled the U.S. military to work together, as peers, with our African and European allies. International engagement through military-intelligence channels provided an excellent opportunity for countries to participate as full partners in working toward enhancing interoperability and building stronger partnerships.
Lieutenant Colonel Anderson is the commanding officer of the 1st Intelligence Battalion at Camp Pendleton, California. He cowrote this article while he was the intelligence department head at the 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade.
Major Bischoff is the intelligence operations officer for the 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade. He was the lead planner for African Lion’s Intelligence Capacity Building Workshop.