While there are hopeful signs of cooperation in the Arctic, the current geopolitical landscape underwriting national interests of Arctic and non-Arctic nations may precipitate more conflict than cooperation. An ambitious formal defense and security-cooperation organization would help meet the stated ends outlined in national and defense Arctic policy and strategy documents.
Science and policy circles widely accept that receding ice in the Arctic will impact the manner in which national resources—in particular the U.S. Sea Services—will be required to operate in the future. The key tenets of U.S. national, defense, and Sea Service objectives in the Arctic can be summarized in several overarching themes: preserving U.S. sovereignty and advancing security interests, strengthening international cooperation, and protecting freedom of the seas and preparing responses to a wide array of challenges.
Similarly, each of the eight founders of the Arctic Council have developed and adopted an Arctic strategy. There is unanimous recognition of the potential of value creation from precious resources in the region. Coupled with the concern surrounding second- and third-order effects of climate change in the Arctic and the possible impacts around the world, it is no surprise that both Arctic and non-Arctic nations view the region and the challenges associated with it with great strategic interest.
Differing Strategies
For instance, the joint Arctic strategy of Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands summarily aims to increase their own status in the Arctic, develop reactions to the changing geopolitical and socioeconomic conditions, and identify actions to demilitarize the area. Denmark’s joint Arctic strategy assesses that alternative open-water sea routes mean “that the military and commercial shipping will no longer be dependent on passage through the politically unstable Middle East nor the piracy-infested routes through the South China Sea, the Malacca Straits, and the Gulf of Aden.”1 The emerging strategic value of the new sea lanes is largely based on more direct access between East-West trade leading to shorter transit times and potentially massive cost savings. China, for example, can buy and ship iron ore resources from northern Norway using the Northeast Passage and cut 30 percent of the transit distance.2
Denmark’s strategy seems to imply that current shipping choke points and high-interest/high-value convergence areas, including the Suez Canal, the Malacca Strait, and the South China Sea, might actually reduce in geostrategic value with the opening of the Arctic sea routes. This could precipitate a major shift in core national interests of not only the United States, but other major powers that rest on the current littorals of these choke points. Their concerns might also shift to guarantee access and protection along new routes and sea-lane convergence zones if they become more economically reliant on them.
Denmark’s defense and policy planners see Asia-Pacific nations as key players in the Arctic region. The Bering Strait and Bering Sea, as an emerging gateway to the northern Pacific trade routes, could become a strategic convergence zone of core interest to Russia, Japan, South Korea, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Australia, and likewise to nations such as Denmark and Norway, which stand to see value creation and national economic growth in future trade partnerships with these nations. Their involvement in the Arctic will therefore affect its trajectory either toward peaceful development and cooperation, or conflict.
The Bering Strait gateway to the Pacific conveniently intersects key “great circle” shipping routes. Such a confluence of seaborne economic communication might exacerbate sea-power competition for guaranteed access to and protection of trade routes. Beijing, for example, already has a great deal of anxiety about U.S. distant interdiction capabilities. Should some portion of East-West trade shift to the northern Arctic-Pacific gateway, the United States could see competition from the Asian continent that manifests in ways such as greater Russia-China bilateral military cooperation and deeper, longer range anti-access military investments. Thus significant potential military energy could result from the opening of the High North sea routes and subsequent merging with the northern Pacific great circle shipping routes.
Like Denmark, Norway’s national policy and strategic documents on the Arctic also recognize the vast economic opportunities there. The 2014 Norwegian Arctic policy and the Norwegian government’s High North strategy summarily describe “The North” as its most important foreign-policy priority. The Norwegian Arctic policy has several common and noteworthy underlining themes: value creation, building knowledge, and international cooperation. A key tenet of its strategy is to “take advantage of the opportunities the Barents Sea presents as a new European energy province in accordance with the principles of sustainable development.”4 Opportunities for the development and trade of resources are of principal interest to Norway’s economic development, and its strategic objective of value creation can capitalize on the Arctic gateways and abundance of resources to export oil and natural gas to Asian and European markets. It is clear why, among other necessities related to safety at sea, the Norwegian policy articulates its national intention to maintain a strong operational capability in the north, specifically within the Norwegian Coast Guard, a subunit of the Royal Norwegian Navy. Should its sovereignty be encroached by another nation, it too will undoubtedly take defensive measures to protect its national interests.
While seeking responsible development, Norway sees great economic potential in the High North. Oil is usually the first resource discussed by experts, but the trade of seafood products should not be overlooked. Norway is frequently assessed as number two in the world in seafood exports (China is number one); in 2008 Norway exported $7 billion in seafood products as compared to China’s $10.3 billion in seafood exports.5 These figures are meaningful to the United States and its population, as it is the second-highest consumer of seafood products, importing $14.1 billion the same year.6 By 2060, the U.S. population is expected to have 100 million more people than it does now.7 The demand for seafood products will rise to some degree with population growth. As one of the world’s largest exporters of both seafood and farmed fish, Norway will look to its High North to increase the profitability of the seafood industry and in facilitating “maritime business operations.”8 On building knowledge, Norway’s Arctic policy also seeks to manage the effects of “aggregate stress on species and ecosystems.”9 To protect these valued operations in the future, Norway will likely rely on its coast guard, and it should not go unnoticed that some of Norway’s offshore patrol vessels, such as the Nordkapp class, could be adapted to function as well-equipped warships and complement the already well-equipped Skjold class of navy patrol vessels.
Post–Cold War Demilitarization
At the peak of the Cold War, the Arctic was considered one of the most militarized areas in the world, with massive resources and new technologies deployed there as part of the high-risk strategic contest between the United States and the Soviet Union. In October 1986, President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev met at a summit in Reykjavik, Iceland. This meeting is generally viewed as a major defining point in the Cold War “thaw” between the two adversaries. While many experts point to the fall of the centralized Soviet Union and volatility of the global oil and natural gas market as factors that likely helped catalyze future Arctic cooperation, the foundation for international cooperation in the Arctic was nevertheless established, to include the formation of the Arctic Council in 1996. The post–Cold War changes to demilitarize great power Arctic politics were well underway.
But will the thaw continue? Could an otherwise encouraging “zone of cooperation” turn into a new “zone of conflict”—a repeat of historical military standoffs in the region?10 From an international perspective, there exists a high degree of mistrust and suspicion toward Russian good intentions for cooperation described in Russia’s 2013 Arctic strategy. Both Norway and Denmark, for example, maintain cooperation as a crucial element of Arctic sustainability, but approach Russia with a great deal of caution.
The prospect of the reemergence of Cold War–style zero-sum game militarization in the Arctic remains a key concern. As evident during the Cold War, the Arctic was directly related to the security of the Western Hemisphere and in particular, ballistic-missile defense of the United States. Other Arctic nations will likely view the American definition of its interests in the Arctic and execution of its policies as having a key impact on U.S. future position in the international order. Non-arctic nations such as China and countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations already see the importance and centrality of the Arctic region in future global politics; Singapore, South Korea, and Japan have each been granted permanent observer status in the Arctic Council, a move that stresses the desires of those nations to have some influence in Arctic politics. China has also received permanent observer status in the Arctic Council. The rush for relevance and potential spillover of ongoing tensions in the Asia-Pacific has implications to Arctic security matters.
Some experts already contend that China has a deep sense of entitlement in the Arctic. In March 2010, Chinese Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo stated: “The Arctic belongs to all the people around the world, as no nation has sovereignty over it. . . . China must plan an indispensable role in Arctic exploration, as we have one-fifth of the world’s population.”11 China’s global referendum is essentially a justification that its size and population alone rightfully give it a stake in Arctic resources. Beijing will likely insert itself as a player there, and given its current undermining of international law with respect to its behavior in the East China and South China Seas, coupled with the perceived need to guarantee itself access to the abundant resources in the Arctic, the resulting confrontational prospects could be significant. China’s right-to-resources referendum could extend to the same creation of exclusion zones in the Arctic, just as it is doing today in the Asia-Pacific.
Russia, a member of the A5, has signaled much more direct militarism, which indicates a resurgence of its Cold War–style zero-sum antics. In September 2012, the Russian military launched a joint land, sea, and air military exercise involving more than 7,000 troops, over 20 surface ships and submarines, and 30 aircraft.12 One senior Danish official highlighted that these forces were far from amateur, but rather fully trained, professional combat troops. The exercise included a heavy air-capable cruiser, antisubmarine-warfare ships, landing ships, small antisubmarine-warfare ships and small missile ships, minesweepers, and nuclear and diesel submarines.
This exercise was not the first of its kind. It happened again in March 2015—only without warning and larger in every aspect, spanning a huge swath of territory, and with the looming question of Crimea sitting in the subtext. In this instance, President Vladimir Putin ordered a “snap” Russian military drill to test the readiness of its northern and western military forces.13 Such a demonstration advertises Russia’s ability to mass forces in the Arctic quickly and is highly indicative of Cold War–style escalation and provocations. This highlights critical aspects of Russia’s foreign policy toward the West and Northern Europe. The principle aspect is echoed in a joint statement by Nordic defense ministers: “Russia’s leaders have shown that they are prepared to make practical and effective use of military means in order to reach their political goals, even when this involves violating principles of international law.”14 While this statement speaks specifically to defense cooperation against the uncertain potential of border violations by Russian military or paramilitary in the Baltics, it, too, is given under the subtext of the recent Crimea annexation and demonstrates the potential for spillover should Nordic nations spar against Russian militarism and expansionism in the Arctic. Coupled with the strategic value Russia might place on the High North, its foreign policy in events peripheral to the Arctic is an important indication of what Russia might also want to undertake in the Arctic.
As for future capabilities, open-source literature calls attention to Russian requests for hull-construction modifications to the Mistral-class amphibious-assault ships, which can carry about 1,000 landing troops and over two dozen helicopters (possibly composed of Ka-52K strike helos and Ka-29TB assault transport helos), along with four amphibious-assault craft, to accommodate sustained Arctic operations.15 While delivery of the Mistrals was indefinitely suspended in 2014 and later cancelled altogether, Russia’s pursuit of an ice-capable amphibious carrier speaks volumes for their military trajectory in the region.
The international perspectives from nations such as Norway and Denmark would likely call specific attention to these provocations. And under the subtext of Russian actions—and constant denial of its actions—in Crimea, these nations might perhaps conclude that Moscow is once again testing the patience of non-Russian competitors that claim stake in the Arctic. Finally, with Russia’s recent efforts to open a new Arctic Joint Strategic Command, along with its declared intent to expand its operational military capacity in the Arctic with 14 new airfields, Russia is signaling its hand in favor of militarization.16 Russia might view the Arctic as a battleground for resources, making the region a core geostrategic interest vital to its national survival. The risk of future escalation in the Arctic highlights the need for mechanisms for rapid response, crisis management, and a model of military security cooperation.
Future Arctic Defense
Under current exclusions and procedures, the Arctic Council may not be organized to manage military inertia that could be generated from future military infrastructure and medium- to high-end military capability buildup. The 1996 Ottawa Declaration formally established the Arctic Council, and it included a key exception: The Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to military security. But the decoupling of military-security matters within the Arctic Council will prove difficult under the subtext of Russia’s apparent expansionist foreign policy and military buildup in the Arctic. While the Arctic Council serves as a platform to get ahead of flashpoints before they arise, the potential for military conflict still necessitates formal security-cooperation mechanisms for enhanced security dialogue, exchanges, formal and informal military-security agreements, memorandums of understanding, and codes of military conduct. One answer is a collective defense and security engagement platform that is joint, multinational, and interagency, which could serve as an all-resource institution for managing security matters in the Arctic.
The risk of future zero-sum escalation in the Arctic highlights a need for controlling mechanisms related to crisis management and a model of military security cooperation. The areas of possible conflict could be managed in the long term through a dedicated organization for security cooperation in the Arctic. One such organization could come in the form of a Joint Interagency Task Force-Arctic (JIATF-Arctic) organized under the U.S. Northern Command.17 Similar in form to the JIATF-South mission construct, a JIATF-Arctic could be developed as an all-resource fusion and employment of joint, interagency, and international capabilities to manage and respond to manmade or natural disasters, or acts of aggression and military coercion in the Arctic that threatens U.S. national security and regional stability. A JIATF-Arctic integrated with multinational partners could also support future multinational defense-security cooperation in the Arctic.
Another consideration is a long-term organization for mutual defense and security cooperation, which might manifest as a formal organization evolved from the current and less publicized Arctic Security Forces Roundtable and Northern Chiefs of Defense conference. An alliance such as an Organization for Security Cooperation in the Arctic (OSCA) could serve as a formal platform to enhance dialogue between the OSCA participating states on military conduct in the Arctic, and security-building measures in the region. The architecture should be tailored specifically to military security in the Arctic and go beyond a common operating picture to build a collective rapid-response military force as a deterrent to possible aggressions of any one nation seeking hegemony in the region. An OSCA could also stress information exchange and exercise schedules and develop and foster a code of conduct that targets non-escalatory military infrastructure, buildup and troop deployments, unplanned military-to-military air and sea interactions, and notification and observation of military exercises and changes to national policy and strategy documents.
Here are some basic guidelines:
Partnerships. Standing alliances and partnerships, particularly with Canada, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, and Great Britain, should emphasize shared objectives, investments, and methods to mitigate critical vulnerabilities and seek to identify possible responses to conflict flashpoints, such as future infrastructure investments in the Arctic by potential adversaries that begin to mirror anti-access regimes designed to restrict freedom of maneuver in the region.
People. Permanently stationed military and civilian personnel from each partner nation are crucial in building sustained shared values. A permanent base of multinational civil-military personnel would build structure and continuity and establish long-term opportunities for defense planning and training.
Maritime security and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Operational goals should pace environmental and geostrategic shifts. At the moment, seasonal sea-ice extents remain highly volatile and present a number of risks to maritime-security operations. There remains, however, significant scientific research that argues that current trends in declining ice coverage will open navigation in the Arctic Ocean. Multilateral air and maritime activities should obviously occur in ice-free areas and focus on humanitarian aid and disaster relief as well as search-and-rescue operations. Air and seaborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance exercises should promote information sharing and proficiency building while reinforcing freedom of maneuver and access to ports and lines of communication.
Modular logistics. Harsh weather, floating sea ice, icebergs, and permafrost make infrastructure development problematic. Future innovation might focus on modular construction to build on permafrost soil. This is not a new idea. Constructing portions of the logistics-infrastructure hubs in separate locations with a more conducive climate and shipping them to be assembled in place with other pieces of infrastructure might offer a cost-effective semipermanent solution. Using such methods could make multinational transportation hubs and forward basing for security-cooperation activities achievable.
Transparency. Managing expectations and burden sharing is especially important, as each of the partner nations maintain different national priorities and investment constraints. National policy and defense-planning issues should be open, and a tradespace among partners should be established to build and sustain the capability and capacity to operate effectively as a team dedicated to building security and prosperity in the region.
Both a JIATF-Arctic and an OSCA could be used as civil-military and military-to-military platforms from which to focus on perhaps the most promising areas of international defense cooperation. Mutual areas of interest may include maritime domain awareness, the advancement of safe navigation and the prevention of environmental accidents and collisions at sea, and search-and-rescue operations. Such organizations could strengthen the interests of all nations seeking cooperative and peaceful development in the Arctic—and dissuade any countries seeking the opposite in support of higher-order national-policy objectives.
1. Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands, “Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020,” http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomacy/Greenland-and-The-Faroe-Islands/Arctic%20strategy.pdf, 19.
2. Ibid.
3. Camilla T. N. Sørensen, “Changing Geopolitical Realities in the Arctic Region: Possibilities and Challenges for Relations between Denmark and China,” Newsletter for Center of Polar and Oceanic Studies, vol. 3, no. 2 (2014), http://research.ku.dk/search/?pure=en/publications/changing-geopolitical-realities-in-the-arctic-region(2ca8a63f-72ed-4f2e-a7c1-b83bf7724fbb).html, 6.
4. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy,” December 2006, 5.
5. United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, “Fact Sheet: The International Fish Trade and World Fisheries,” April 2010, www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/newsroom/docs/fact_sheet_fish_trade_en.pdf.
6. Ibid.
7. U.S. Census Bureau, “2014 National Population Projections,” www.census.gov/population/projections/data/national/2014/summarytables.html.
8. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Norway’s Arctic Policy (November 2014),” available in English at www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/departementene/ud/vedlegg/nord/nordkloden_en.pdf, 20.
9. Ibid., 36.
10. On “Zone of Cooperation” and “Zone of Conflict,” see ADM James Stavridis, USN (Ret.), “High North or High Tension? How to Head Off War in the Last Frontier on Earth,” Foreign Policy, 21 October 2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/10/21/high-north-or-high-tension/?wp_login_redirect=0.
11. David Curtis Wright, “The Dragon Eyes the Top of the World: Arctic Policy Debate and Discussion in China,” Naval War College, China Maritime Studies Institute, Research Publication no. 8 (August 2011), www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/China-Maritime-Studies-Institute/Publications/documents/China-Maritime-Study-8_The-Dragon-Eyes-the-Top-of-.pdf, 2.
12. “Russia launches large-scale military exercise in Arctic region,” BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union - Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 23 September 2012, www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
13. Sam LaGrone, “Russian Military ‘Snap Drills’ Include Bomber and Ballistic Missile Deployments to Crimea, Kaliningrad,” USNI News, 17 March 2015, http://news.usni.org/2015/03/17/russian-military-snap-drills-includes-bomber-and-ballistic-missile-deployments-to-crimea-kaliningrad.
14. Ishaan Tharoor,“The Arctic is Russia’s Mecca, says top Moscow official,” The Washington Post, 20 April 2015, www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2015/04/20/the-arctic-is-russias-mecca-says-top-moscow-official.
15. Nikolai Novichkov, “Russia Orders Ka-52K Helicopters for Mistral-Class LHDs,” Jane’s Defence Weekly 51.37 (2014) ProQuest, http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/docview/1551265825?. “France agrees to share Mistral shipbuilding technology with Russia – website,” BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union - Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 25 November 2010, www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
16. Ankit Panda, “Russia to Build 10 Arctic Airfields by 2016,” The Diplomat, 15 January 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/russia-to-build-10-arctic-airfields-by-2016.
17. As an example framework, see Douglas R. Bradley, “Forging an Arctic Alliance: Canadian-U.S. JIATF-Arctic,” April 2011, www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/WebJournal/Default.aspx?IssueID=30.