Cuba, the Coast Guard, and Chaos
(See B. Smicklas, pp. 18–22, October 2015 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Nick Monacelli, U.S. Coast Guard—Though I agree with Lieutenant Commander Smicklas’ view that the political dynamics between the United States and Cuba may change the character of the Florida Straits, I cannot agree with his apocalyptic predictions. Describing the Florida Straits’ future as “chaos” is hyperbolic and overstated. The problem with transnational organized-crime (TOC) networks is obvious, but not new. Where is the discussion on Joint Interagency Task Force South (based, of course, in Key West), whose direct mission is narco-interdiction and TOC network disruption? The commander speaks in broad brush strokes about regional partnerships, but where is the mention of the Coast Guard’s own Operations Bahama, Turks, and Cacos (OPBAT)? No doubt, Lieutenant Commander Smicklas is cognizant of these organizations that thwart the regional TOC trade. The Departments of Homeland Security and Defense have worked together over decades to foster regional partnership to address TOC. This will not change if Cuba destabilizes while becoming a more democratic society.
Further, the author fails to note that the Coast Guard patrols the Florida Straits more than it does any other stretch of international water in the world. With seven major cutters in Florida alone, supported by nine of the newest and most capable ships (fast response cutters), coverage is excellent. With the station capabilities Lieutenant Commander Smicklas described, and ready access to additional patrol boats in Puerto Rico, the straits are well monitored and protected. For comparison, the entire West Coast has only six major cutters, which conduct additional Western Pacific operations.
Yes, the seven major cutters are aging. However, Florida will be the first to receive the already-in-development successors, the offshore patrol cutters. The Florida Straits thus far benefit from the brand new fast response cutters. Lest we forget, the Coast Guard’s Atlantic Area and District 7 supplement this web of enforcement assets with seagoing buoy tenders from the far corners of the Eastern and Gulf coasts. Further, U.S. Customs and Border Protection maintains its own fleet of enforcement vessels in Key West. I can only hope that the Coast Guard would be able to leverage a portion of the straits’ assigned assets to other up-and-coming hotspots, such as the Eastern Pacific. Even Lieutenant Commander Smicklas notes that our largest narco-interdictions are in that region, quickly approaching $1 billion this year.
Turning to concerns over safety of life at sea (SOLAS), the Florida Straits see their fair share of commercial traffic. As a gateway to the major ports of Houston, Tampa, and New Orleans, the straits are well churned. I have a difficult time imagining that a handful of high-speed ferries add more than a marginal disruption. However, we need to use our cordial relationship with Cuba to emphasize shared responsibility for SOLAS concerns. This may involve joint training, exercises, and boardings, but joint operations are far from imminent.
I agree with Lieutenant Commander Smicklas that the Florida Straits will continue to be an area of primary attention. I simply do not believe that he can so handily dismiss the organizations, structures, and support all working to address the issues he raises. The straits are, and will remain, the most (and best) patrolled U.S.-international maritime boundary.
Fly the U.N. Pennant Over East Asian Waters
(See J. Thompson, pp. 40–45, September 2015 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral Fumio Ota, Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (Retired), PhD—Commander Thompson wrote, “Why would the Senkakus matter in this regard more than the other island groups? The reason is that these islands are within the Exclusive Economic Zone of China, within 200 miles from its mainland, and therefore the balance of legitimacy somewhat favors China even though some countries (most notably the United States) have acknowledged Japan’s ‘administration’ of the islands.”
This statement is wrong. There are no international laws that define islands within a state’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as belonging to that state’s territory. That is a misreading of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The reverse is true. Determination of the sovereignty of land in accordance with international law is required first, and UNCLOS Article 55 defines the EEZ relative to the territorial waters of that land. Even China has not made claims based on the distance from its mainland yet. Additionally, demarcation of China’s continental shelf has not been solved. China insists that its shelf extends to the Okinawa Trough. However, due to the results of soil surveys, the Japanese position is that the continental shelf extends to the Ryukyu Trench. Since there are Japanese islands within this area, UNCLOS Article 83, on the delimitation of the continental shelf between states with opposite or adjacent coasts, applies and therefore we should draw the middle line between both sides’ territories.
In 1998, China passed an EEZ/continental-shelf law defining its EEZ as extending 200 nautical miles from its sea baseline and stating that China will determine a demarcation based on the principle of equity where China’s EEZ/continental-shelf claim overlapped with those of other states. China, however, has never mentioned its EEZ limitation in the East China Sea.
The international courts have used the middle-line concept since the mid-1980s to settle similar territorial disputes. China and Vietnam drew the middle line over the Gulf of Tonkin, because the solution made equivalent maritime space for the two states. China has recently constructed 16 maritime platforms in the East China Sea. All are within the Chinese side of the middle line—meaning China is also respecting the middle line.
Additionally, China did not claim the Senkaku islands (after Japan incorporated them in 1895) until 1971—right after the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East announced the possibility of oil below the seabed in the area.
On the other hand, the United States had used part of the Senkaku Islands as bombing/gunnery ranges until the mid-1980s. It is obvious that if the United States recognized Chinese sovereignty over the islands, it would not have used the Senkakus as bombing/gunnery ranges.
In conclusion, the Senkaku Islands are Japan’s territory based on the international law for dominium. The balance of legitimacy does not favor China as Commander Thompson claims.
The Moral Component of Leadership
(See J. Greenert, pp. 16–20, September 2015 Proceedings)
Commander Arthur G. Dorsey Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)—Admiral Greenert’s article should be reprinted as a handout for each incoming plebe at the U.S. Naval Academy, for each new recruit at boot camp, for each newly promoted 3rd class petty officer, each newly promoted chief petty officer, and each new student at a service school.
It is a very powerful treatise.
A ‘Black Rack’ Solution?
(See S. Tangredi, pp. 64–68, September 2015 Proceedings)
Commander Charles Turner, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Captain Tangredi is spot-on with a solution that needs to be applied across the board to the installation of any command, control, communications, computer, combat systems, and intelligence (C5I) system on our own ships, not just to those dealing with international operability. Long gone are the days when technology evolved just slowly enough for the bureaucracy to keep pace. Today, Moore’s Law is in full swing everywhere—technology is advancing at such a dizzying rate that even the pros have a hard time keeping up with developments, much less the deckplate sailor and the shipbuilding and modernization communities.
Both Captain Tangredi’s ideas and my proposal to expand on his recommendations will require the Navy to take a hard look at its shipbuilding and modernization philosophies. Captain Tangredi wisely notes that his solution requires a C5I infrastructure that is resilient, tamper-proof, and scalable with an eye on the judicious implementation of information-security and physical-security measures to mitigate against either the intentional or inadvertent compromise of the systems or the data traveling across them. My suggestion for the in-place upgrades of complex systems such as Aegis or a network server presents a notion that is not as simple as swapping out an airplane black box, but we can get a lot closer than one thinks at first blush. These proposals call for components that allow for rapid physical replacement or software upgrades.
Having space for the “black box” idea will require us to build ships with copious amounts of excess capacity, both in terms of network capacity as well as the physical space for unused racks and compartments to support Captain Tangredi’s suggestions. This excess capability, however, drives up costs in many other areas. How do we ensure that these unused spaces and racks are maintained in a truly “ready 5” state? What are the impacts of this dead space on a ship’s design, stability, performance, and weight? What is the impact of a sudden jump in data flow on the performance of the network and satellite-communications systems when partners attach their “black boxes” to the ship’s network? How do we introduce this “black box” idea into the current fleet?
Many other problems remain unsolved. How do we rapidly test new capabilities so that we don’t break other systems or inject new cyber-attack vectors? How do we deliberately field these new capabilities in a responsible manner based on ship schedules and overall cost to the Navy? At what point do we say that a ship is too old and too far into her projected service life to justify the expense of a major upgrade? How can the Department of Defense’s current acquisitions be revamped to provide the sufficient leeway to field new proven and tested technology in a manner that minimizes the gap with the commercial world?
First Impressions Matter
(See G. G. Van Hook and K. Yost, pp. 79–81, August 2015 Proceedings)
Midshipman Third Class Conor Keating, U.S. Navy—As a fervent reader of Proceedings, I have not once seen an article that applied to me more than Lieutenants Van Hook and Yost’s. While flipping through the pages, trying to decide which article to read first, I was quite surprised to see a picture of my good friend Dan in his coveralls on board the USS Essex (LHD-2). I immediately dove into the article, and was rewarded for my time.
Having just returned from my third-class cruise as a midshipman at the U.S. Naval Academy, I was less than impressed with my experience on board the USS Dewey (DDG-105). Although I had been treated excellently by crew and officers alike, and had enjoyed my experience overall, the lack of work for midshipmen to actively participate in left most of us with empty hours filled with naps, movie-watching, or in my case, cleaning the same spaces five or six times per day. Lieutenants Van Hook and Yost’s proposal not only takes away this feeling of uselessness for midshipmen but could save the Navy quite a sum of money. If I had been at the Basic Division Officer Course for a few weeks and had been sent out to different ships for a day or two at a time, I would not only have gotten to experience life on board a carrier, cruiser, or amphib, but might have also gotten the chance to participate in the work of several different divisions, rather than witnessing the same division (OI) for two weeks. In their article, the authors not only weighed the wishes of complaining midshipmen but also took into account the needs of the Navy, devising a plan that would encourage talented future officers to join the surface warfare community. It has a lot to offer, and it is long past time that midshipmen get the chance to see this.
Ralston P. Cole, U.S. Naval Academy, Class of 1962—I agree with the Lieutenants Van Hook and Yost that the summer cruise experience is the greatest recruitment tool to attract surface warfare officers (SWOs), but I disagree with their solutions.
I have the unique experience of having spent seven years as a midshipman. It was a long time ago, but not much different from the situation today. First I was a Regular NROTC student at Tulane University. My third-class cruise was one large cruise for all midshipmen, third class and first class, and included all NROTC units and the Naval Academy. The cruise lasted eight weeks and consisted of 2 battleships, 2 cruisers, and 16 destroyers. It was planned to provide shipboard training both for midshipmen and the ships’ crews. As third classmen, we dressed and were treated as enlisted men. We worked and stood watch, and there was never a dull moment. We shifted every two weeks from department to department. All very exciting, but nothing more so than being on duty in the pilothouse when the fleet made a high-speed turn at 25 knots and destroyers were passing each other to take station at night. There was not a hint of “fraternization” with enlisted men. The whole thing was hard work and little sleep, but great. We were all aware that we were there to be Navy line officers (there was no such term as SWO).
The next year we went to NROTC aviation summer. Then I was appointed to the Naval Academy and was a plebe at plebe summer. The next year I was on the third-class cruise again; we had a big group of ships and went up the St. Lawrence Seaway into the Great Lakes. This was another professionally run cruise, and the ports of call were great.
The next year was my aviation summer at Pensacola, plus Marine training at Little Creek again. My first-class cruise was a single-ship experience on a cruiser in the Mediterranean. Lots of gunnery, fired missiles, responsible watch-standing, fun ports of call. My class had more requests for line-officer duty than any other option. Aviation, Marines, and Nuclear Power School were far less desirable.
Then, 45 years later, my son went to Annapolis, Class of 2007. His third-class cruise was a joke. He was assigned to an LSD in Norfolk. It just sat there. Once it got under way and went to Mayport then back to Norfolk. His second-class cruise was not related to surface warfare. He was in charge of pistol training for the plebes at Annapolis. His first-class cruise was worse. He was put on a bus from Annapolis to Portsmouth, New Hampshire, where he got on a Naval Academy yawl and sat around and finally sailed back to Annapolis with one stop in Long Island.
The bottom line is that my son is a Harrier pilot in the Marine Corps. He did not consider surface warfare. All the top midshipmen in his class went Marines. Until the Navy restores the excitement and responsibility—and fun—into the summer cruise, this situation will continue.
Maintenance, Modernization, and Modules
(See R. N. Hein, pp. 20–25, July 2015 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Tim Gallaudet, Commander, Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Command; Oceanographer of the Navy—I applaud Captain Hein’s excellent article that highlighted the potential use of Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships to formalize their role in low-end peacetime missions, as well as high-end missions if the need required. I would like to point out that there is a versatile class of MSC ships already employing the modular concept of operations he describes: the T-AGS-60–class oceanographic survey vessels. MSC operates these ships for the Navy Meteorology and Oceanography Command to conduct hydrographic, bathymetric, geophysical, oceanographic, and biological missions that facilitate the Navy’s undersea dominance, safety of navigation, and humanitarian-assistance/disaster-relief capabilities.
Various configurations of environmental-sensing systems with unique support and maintenance vans are employed from these ships, depending on the environmental-collection mission. These include unmanned underwater and surface vehicles, floats, buoys, and trawl-resistant bottom-moored sensors. The newest member of this class, the USNS Maury (T-AGS-66), will be delivered to the Navy in February 2016 and will incorporate a revolutionary moon-pool design that will allow for deployment of off-board sensors in higher sea states than by the current method of deployment. The oceanographic survey ships have a long history of providing quick-response support to Navy requirements. The next-generation survey ships will continue to provide versatile and innovative support to meet the Navy’s requirements and the CNO’s vision.
It’s Time to Take the ‘Petty’ Out of the American Sea Services
Captain Jerry D. Parr, U.S. Navy (Retired)—I can understand that some might not like being called a “petty” officer, but when I was one it made me proud that I was not a seaman anymore. Back in my day, it meant I would no longer get assigned as a mess cook on deployment. As for me, I am a little disturbed that in the Navy a captain has the same title as an O-3 in the other services. It might cut out some of the confusion that it creates for me, if I had retired as a naval colonel, instead.
The Marines must laugh every time we make these changes for little more than the sake of change. The Corps is not perfect, but it appreciates the value of tradition. Every Marine can tell you why some of them wear the blood stripe on their blue trousers and why others do not. I imagine that they are proud when they get to wear it. Probably, it is a little like the pride I had when the other “petty” officers in my squadron made sure that my new crow was tacked on properly. It hurt a little, but was an easy tradition to live with because it meant that I was accepted by those who could proudly be demeaned as “petty” officers. It is a tradition that I hope is not continued, because it could really hurt to be hit on those little collar devices that “petty” officers now wear on those new uniforms that do not camouflage them from anything but make it impossible from a distance to tell whether they are an E-4, E-5, or E-6.
I know that I am just a dinosaur and that some things are meant to change. However, we in the Navy have a history. It is the power of that history in the form of tradition that helps bind one generation to the next. It is an essential purpose and challenge of leadership to instill that tradition in the next generation and to make those new sailors proud of it and of themselves. Perhaps we can, by changing our uniforms and redefining our ranks, change the meaning of leadership, as well. I know that I was not asked, but I for one hope we never do.