The Demise of the Cutterman
(See B. Smicklas, pp. 28–33, August 2015 Proceedings)
Captain Brendan C. McPherson, U.S. Coast Guard—Although things may not be as dire as Lieutenant Commander Smicklas seems to portray in his article, he raises some interesting points—the most important of which is that the Coast Guard is first and foremost a seagoing service. No other federal, state, or local agency has the authority, capability, or capacity to do what the Coast Guard does on the high seas. It is the one thing that sets the Coast Guard apart from every other law-enforcement agency or branch of the armed forces. It is also what sets our cutter fleet apart from the rest of our shore-based forces. In order to attract and retain the best cuttermen, the Coast Guard needs to recognize and reward them for the unique service they provide and the sacrifices they make over the course of their seagoing careers.
First, our cutter commanding officers need to do more to encourage our junior officers to consider a seagoing career. Part of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy’s mission is to instill “a liking for the sea and its lore.” Since 2003, however, a relatively small percentage of graduates have been provided the opportunity to pursue flight training or seek assignment ashore right out of the Academy. The most important thing the Coast Guard can do to attract and retain career cuttermen is to return to the policy of sending every graduate to sea for their first assignment upon commissioning. What our commanding officers should then do is to make that afloat assignment both rewarding and enjoyable. A successful afloat assignment is the keel on which the remainder of every officer’s career should be built. While a seagoing career is not for everyone, our commanding officers hold a special duty and responsibility for identifying, training, mentoring, and inspiring the most promising prospective cuttermen to “stay afloat.” It may help to remind them that few communities within the officer corps offer more opportunities to assume command, at the most junior levels, than the afloat community.
Second, we need to make it easier for cuttermen to earn a professional mariner’s license. Despite similar requirements as professional mariners, Coast Guard officers do not get credit for most of the training and experience they gain at sea. That is bad for cuttermen as well as the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard National Maritime Center is working on a plan to accept more training and experience within the service while bringing that training in closer alignment with professional standards.
Finally, we need to eliminate the current policy prohibiting a cutterman from being assigned as a sector commander. Although cuttermen are not expressly prohibited from being screened for command, the Office of Personnel Management has made it a practice the past few years not to assign any cutterman to command a sector. As a result, many highly qualified officers are left without a command opportunity simply because there are fewer cutters available, especially among our most senior officers. Sector commands are multimission units that employ all Coast Guard resources, including cutters, while performing all 11 statutory missions. Therefore, it makes no sense to arbitrarily exclude cuttermen.
With a planned fleet of 8 new national security cutters, 25 offshore patrol cutters, and 58 fast response cutters, we need to invest as much into building career cuttermen as we do into the ships in which they will ultimately sail.
Ensign Carol Yin, U.S. Coast Guard—The cutterman will always be a small, sacred, and well-regarded community in the Coast Guard, because officer-accession sources ensure seagoing experience is a top priority to fully gain an understanding and appreciation for the sea. Whether an officer graduates from the U.S. Coast Guard Academy or Officer Candidate School, he or she has experienced sea time before graduation. While some may argue this “sea time” is not worthy of being called such, one can attest that a short amount of time on any Coast Guard cutter can reinforce an appreciation of the sea and its lore and the challenges of life at sea.
The Coast Guard’s strong foundation and historical relevance as a seagoing service will not be lost, because cutters are essential to performing the service’s 11 statutory missions; however, more junior officers are realizing the vitality of an operations-ashore career after their first initial afloat tour based on the number of ashore vs. afloat billets available.
Remaining operational throughout an officer’s career is essential to staying competitive at boards and panels. As an ensign or lieutenant (junior grade), most operational billets are on board cutters; however, as an officer progresses through the ranks, the number of operational billets afloat decreases by a substantial amount. Currently, 465 jobs exist afloat and 394 jobs exist ashore at the O-1/O-2 level. At the O-3 level, 149 jobs exist afloat and 415 jobs exist ashore, according to Office of Personnel Management figures. In a mere four years in the Coast Guard, an officer’s chances of going back to sea at the O-3 level decrease by over 68 percent.
While more opportunities for promotion are available for officers if they pursue operations-ashore billets, the officer cutterman will always be part of a highly regarded family because so few officers have the chance to remain operationally afloat after their initial JO tour. Whether or not a JO chooses to remain a cutterman, operations-ashore billets are essential to executing the Coast Guard’s missions.
Lieutenant Commander Brian Boland, U.S. Coast Guard—Lieutenant Commander Smicklas raises some legitimate concerns regarding the choices junior officers are faced with when deciding on a career path. Indeed, the career of a cutterman is an uphill battle, but so too are many of the other specialties in the Coast Guard. Specifically, the sector-command path he discusses is also largely unavailable to aviators, who spend their first ten years almost exclusively in the cockpit and find themselves limited in out-of-specialty opportunities at the mid-career point.
Addressing drug interdiction, he alludes to the “demoralized and demotivated cutter crews” who deploy for long stretches of time but see very low rates of interdiction. This too is a problem for fixed-wing aviation, where skilled operators yield very high detection rates of narcoterrorists but are tempered by very low rates of interdiction. Nevertheless, morale among these tight-knit crews remains high.
He also argues that the rise of “deployable law enforcement teams has added to cutter mission atrophy.” This may be true, but he looks at the issue from a cutter-centric view. The reality is that deployable law enforcement teams, whether Tactical Law Enforcement Teams, Maritime Safety and Security Teams, or the Maritime Security Response Team, have significantly raised the proficiency and capability of Coast Guard law enforcement. It has been more than a decade since I was a boarding officer on board a medium endurance cutter, but I distinctly recall the relatively modest level of proficiency expected of a cutter’s boarding team.
In a complex world, and with the rise of terrorist organizations targeting the United States, any improvements in our collective law-enforcement abilities should be welcomed, not resented. I can also recall the competing time demands of law-enforcement training when faced with a litany of both primary and collateral duties as a junior officer afloat. And while “tactical” training is cool, there is hardly any time to set aside for a junior officer on board a cutter to maintain even a fraction of the tactical capabilities of a unit geared solely for that skill set. Indeed, camouflage, face paint, and looking like a SEAL, as the author put it, would surely entice more junior officers to continue their careers as cuttermen, but the reality is that a deck watch officer’s life is far less exciting. To argue that a properly trained and equipped Coast Guard cutter “presents the option for a specialized maritime counterterrorism response” would require that crew to forgo many of the other capabilities that our cutter fleet provides, such as search-and-rescue, fisheries enforcement, aids to navigation, and disaster response.
Cutters are a critical piece of the Coast Guard’s arsenal, but they are only one element of a much larger organization. To undo much of the progress made in the sector structure and deployable forces in the name of enticing more junior officers to stay afloat would be a mistake. Rather, the cutter fleet should look inward for creative measures to entice more junior officers to make a career at sea.
Better Than When They Came
(See E. Wright, pp. 22–26, August 2015 Proceedings)
Captain Reg Mitchell, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)—Three important issues were not addressed in this article. Where is the money coming from for the Navy to provide meaningful civilian-employment counseling for about-to-be-separated officers and enlisted? What unique qualifications do current career active-duty naval officers have to perform such a role? And to what extent will such a significant allocation of man-hours impact combat readiness in a force already suffering from serious readiness deficiencies?
Given the current perilous financial situation the Department of Defense finds itself in due to severe budget cuts, financial gimmicks such as borrowing from the Overseas Contingency Account, the disastrous sequester, and the cost of the Ohio-class replacement, the idea of the DOD taking on the responsibility of career-transition services is both unreasonable and unrealistic.
In a job market that has been stood on its head in recent years, the line is long for such help. Even professional recruiters are baffled by the job market’s volatility, instability, loss of benefits to workers, stagnant pay, and the fact that so many companies are moving to a part-time work force (the new business model in this country if anyone has been noticing).
I’m all for the comprehensive plan that Lieutenant Wright is suggesting to help our non-career veterans find employment. But if the American people expect that meaningful back-end transition counseling be included in the All-Volunteer Force commitment, then Congress should grant the Veterans Administration additional funds to adequately staff and resource that mission with professionals. The best idea would be for Congress to appropriate funds for the VA to hire a nationally known company that understands our military, is willing to establish offices near military bases in the United States and abroad, is wired into today’s job market, and could market in private industry and deliver the services to veterans in a timely, cost-effective, and successful manner.
These services will have to be acknowledged and paid for by the taxpayer, and not simply assumed to be the responsibility of the DOD within the current defense budget as if no additional cost were involved. The focus of our career military officers must be on operational readiness, the welfare and advancement of the men and women in their command, and retention of skills critical to their service. Unprecedented benefits accrue to those leaving the service, and wounded warriors will absolutely never be forgotten, but the rest need to take responsibility for their own lives after military service.
Updating the Joint Information Environment
(See J. B. Hunter, pp. 64–69, August 2015 Proceedings)
Commander Charles Turner, U.S. Navy (Retired)—The Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security (for the Coast Guard) carry the unenviable burden of managing an information-technology infrastructure that supports millions of service members, civil-service employees, contractors, and assorted denizens in an operational warfighting environment that incorporates a hodgepodge of networks and weapon systems. Any effort to keep this mechanical menagerie in some semblance of pace with commercial technology is enough of a struggle in the best of times, and the outlook rapidly tanks during the interminable hiccups of fiscally austere periods. Making the challenge harder are capable and motivated adversaries who can nimbly poke at chinks in the armor virtually with impunity.
Lieutenant Hunter’s article presented many good ideas and measures. His proposed operation centers can provide critical command-and-control through a robust advanced intelligent network (AIN). He articulates a clear and compelling case for a homogeneous (if even somewhat decentralized) IT ecosystem. Maximizing common standards and equipment while minimizing or eliminating specialty gear will provide for better security and operational performance while reducing costs in the long run. I argue that there is still a compelling case for maintaining powerful analog systems in the event that digital systems fail or become degraded.
The problem remains twofold: 1) the Byzantine bureaucratic hurdles of the DOD’s languorous acquisition system, and 2) the sheer numerical expanse of systems and equipment that we should be refreshing on a regular basis. The military perpetually lags behind a business world and an adversary set that lacks the same self-imposed constraints. We face never-ending cycles of rapidly evolving technology and constant software patches. An oppressive level of financial outlays will be needed to cyclically and rapidly replace or update systems if we expect to have any hope of fixing the problems that attackers can easily and quickly exploit for pennies on the dollar.
The easy answer is that we need to revamp acquisition controls so the government can rapidly purchase and deploy the latest and certifiably best technology. The downside is that any implementation of that “easy answer” overnight will lead to everything ending up in shambles. Deploying new tools, systems, and equipment on a scale as large as the DOD and DHS, though, is a project manager’s nightmare. We’re not talking about upgrading an office building or data center. We are constantly deploying and updating a vast array of technology onto multiple hundreds of complex ships, submarines, aircraft, and landing craft that have operational commitments with limited availability for maintenance.
We need to increase the extent of close collaboration with a wide spread of civilian IT and information-security professionals as they offer a much-needed fresh perspective. This independent feedback helps us to ensure we are employing best practices for operating and maintaining our IT systems and for shaping our human-capital management. Constructive criticism from others who are facing similar challenges plays a vital role in improving our own situation.
Advocating Naval Heresy
(See R. B. Watts, pp. 48–53, June 2015, and C. R. Rosende, pp. 8–9, August 2015 Proceedings)
Bruce B. Stubbs, Deputy Director, Strategy and Policy Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV N51)—Captain Watts makes a disconcerting claim that the Navy is shaping itself into “an unsustainable liability,” unthinkingly wedded to a Mahanian principle of capital ships as the primary instrument of sea power. Downplaying the possible threat posed by a rising China and spending a large amount of space attacking the aircraft carrier, the author attempts to incite heresy in the service by focusing on irregular warfare and the need for a smaller combatant. The author’s narrow focus on power projection and the carrier misses the intent of the revised maritime strategy and the role of the Navy in providing maritime power to national leadership.
The Navy is tasked with supplying the ability to project national influence through the control and exploitation of the maritime domain to achieve strategic, operational, or tactical objectives. That control and exploitation in turn give the United States the ability to use the world’s oceans as a medium of maneuver and operations for defending its global interests. The ability to use the world’s oceans in this manner—and to deny other countries the use of the same for taking actions against U.S. interests—constitutes an immense asymmetric advantage for the United States, one so ubiquitous and long-standing that it can be easy to overlook or take for granted. Projecting sea power relies on more than a capital ship like the aircraft carrier; it also involves surface combatants, amphibious ships, submarines, and more.
In trying to talk up the irregular-warfare threat, Captain Watts irresponsibly dismisses that posed by China’s navy, stating that its rise is “at best, a public-relations event for the United States.” He then focuses most of his dismissal on China’s sole carrier and inability to adequately project power. The reality is that China’s naval power and broader military modernization are aimed at curbing U.S. influence in the region and reasserting that of Beijing, and go well beyond the development of its carrier force. Its notable anti-access/area-denial capabilities and land-reclamation projects are two key examples and ones that the author fails to even mention, let alone discuss. The Navy believes China to be both an opportunity and a challenge, necessitating a greater focus on this near-peer competitor.
As for the need to deal with the challenges of irregular warfare and terrorist groups such as ISIS, what is interesting is that the key platform employed to take action was the very capital ship that Captain Watts bemoans: For almost two months, the carrier USS George H. W. Bush (CVN-77) and her air wing of more than 60 aircraft provided the only combat-response option to ISIS’s advance. In fact, since the beginning of this current irregular challenge, carriers have been critical, providing the majority of special-operations air support in the fall of 2001 for Operation Enduring Freedom. The aircraft carrier and her “multi-tool” mission structure provides national leadership the full range of military operations—from deterrence, to humanitarian assistance to large-scale combat operations against irregular challenges—to protect our national interests.
Captain Watts is calling for a “time for heresy,” encouraging new ways of looking at the Navy’s future. In that he is correct to do so if the Navy is to remain sharp going forward. However, the “heresy” he advocates must be based on facts and underwritten by critical thinking that is fair and objective.
It’s Time to Take the ‘Petty’ Out of the American Sea Services
(See B. Moore, p. 12, July 2015, and R. Baptista and G. R. Geithmann, p. 86, September 2015 Proceedings)
Timothy Duff—“Tradition? Tradition!” laments Tevye in Fiddler on the Roof. Among the sources of pride within each service are its distinctive traditions that connect us to the past and allow us to place ourselves in the continuum of history; past, present, and future. They are important. I am a petty officer. I didn’t look in a modern dictionary to find my meaning, I looked to the past, where, from the French, I am simply a “small” officer. My ego is not so easily bruised that I must look for ways to equate myself with an Annapolis graduate, nor do I wish to be a sergeant of infantry. I like my three Nelson stripes on my dress blues; I like my boondockers and my practical work dungarees, which are just like the ones my grandfather wore as his body swirled to the bottom of the Indian Ocean. I look at the crow on my shoulder and get misty-eyed knowing that I am a petty officer, a recipient of a proud and blood-soaked tradition.
Mark Swan—I totally disagree with Lieutenant Commander Moore’s column. I have many good memories of proud moments in my life, and one of those occurred when my shipmates “pinned” the Petty Officer 3rd class “crow” to my left arm. My arm was sore and bruised for a week, but I wouldn’t have had it any other way. And I exuberantly participated in similar events for my fellow shipmates when they earned their petty officer ratings.
I must say I never applied the dictionary definition of “petty” to my status as a petty officer. In general, I was treated with the respect deserved of my rank. The few occasions of disrespectful behavior were exhibited by commissioned officers who routinely showed disdain for enlisted personnel.
Lieutenant Commander Moore relies on the dictionary definition of “petty” as the basis for his proposal to transition to the “noncommissioned” officer terminology of the other military services. So let’s do the same for the “noncommissioned” term. Webster’s Dictionary states that the term “non” is “used to give a negative force to nouns, adjectives, adverbs . . . a negative particle.”
Thus the “noncommissioned” term implies, “You’re not good enough to be a commissioned officer.”
I am a traditionalist. I loved the 13-button bell-bottoms, the neckerchief, the white hat, the bosun’s pipe calls over the 1MC, the naval terms such as “the smoking lamp is out throughout the ship,” etc.
“Petty officer” is a traditional naval ranking that, in my opinion, long ago transcended the dictionary definition of “petty.” I never hear anyone state, with pride, that they were a “noncommissioned officer” in the Army or Air Force. I was, and still am, proud of the fact that I was a petty officer in the U.S. Navy.