People Development is Key to Acquisition
(See J. E. Colvard, p. 10, June 2015 Proceedings)
John C. Tomlin, Human Resources Director (Retired), Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock Division—Dr. Colvard makes some excellent, coherent points on the problem of modus supra materiem (“procedures are more important than substance”) in the world of Navy systems acquisition. His concerns regarding the lack of in-depth technical-knowledge development and the migration of Senior Executive Service (SES) positions from the laboratories to the headquarters program offices are right on the mark.
During my tenure at the NSWC Carderock Division’s Human Resources Office (HRO), every vacated SES billet below the ED/TD level disappeared. Positions that for years had gone through the evolution of PL-313 to GS supergrade (16, 17, 18) to SES were now restricted to classification at the GS-15 equivalent under the NAVSEA Warfare Center Personnel Demonstration Project. To be sure, we had a smattering of ST, SL, and SSTM allocations for a select few technical folks but the message was clear; technical management opportunities were better at the headquarters.
Was the management work less difficult? No. Was it more challenging? Yes. Was there an incentive for skilled, successful technical managers to remain at the laboratory? Not really. Warfare-center laboratories have traditionally been and continue to be centers of technical excellence in their product areas. Maintaining that level is made much more difficult when recognition is not forthcoming. As the Carderock Division HRO I was lucky to serve a series of highly skilled commanding officers (Navy O-6 Engineering Duty officers) who worked very hard to see that our workforce was carefully selected, properly trained and developed, and compensated as best as possible under Civil Service rules.
Much technical program management was delegated to the laboratories in the “old days,” and the process seemed to work well. I believe that connectivity between the headquarters program-office staff and the laboratory staff enhanced program performance. The Navy needs to reexamine how it does business with an eye toward maintaining the warfare centers as the technical leads.
By No Means Enough
(See J. F. Tanalega, pp. 153–55, May 2015 Proceedings)
Commander Charles Turner, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Kudos to Lieutenant (j.g.) Tanalega for his apt summary of the shortcomings in and ideas for updating the current initial training pipeline for our new surface warfare officers (SWOs). Sadly, professional training for our junior SWOs has waxed and waned over the last 55 years. A very similar debate and discussion over officer development occurred during the post–World War II years and led to the establishment in 1961 at Newport, Rhode Island, of the Naval Destroyer School, which morphed into the current Surface Warfare Officers School (SWOS) Command. In late 1970, during the tenure of Admiral Elmo Zumwalt as the Chief of Naval Operations, the SWO Basic Course (later renamed SWOS Division Officer Course or SWOSDOC) sprang into existence at Newport as well as in Coronado, California.
The demise of junior SWO training started in the 1990s when SWOSDOC in Coronado was shuttered with all subsequent students attending SWOSDOC classes in Newport. The final death knell was the 2003 implementation of SWOS At Sea. New SWOs reported directly to their first ships with nothing more than their wits, ad hoc surface training from their accession source, and maybe a stack of CDs. Now, in the immortal words of Yogi Berra, “It’s déjà vu all over again.”
From July 1992 through January 1993, while en route to the USS New Orleans (LPH-11), I attended SWOSDOC, the Steam Engineering of the Watch (EOOW) course, and other courses at Naval Amphibious Base Coronado, California. Looking back on that experience, I feel that Lieutenant Tanalega proposed some great material for the SWO Basic Tactics Course (SWOTAC) and Advanced DOC (ADOC). His SWOTAC and ADOC should be merged into the existing Basic DOC.
There are three major advantages to officers attending a consolidated DOC en route to their ships. First, new SWOs will arrive aboard strongly rooted with the fundamental knowledge that can set them up for success as surface warriors. Separate SWOTAC and ADOC classes mean that these officers are away from their ships, which can ill afford to lose them, and at the ships’ financial expense. Second, a single longer course allows these officers, who come from a myriad of accession sources, to build relationships with their peers that will be invaluable during subsequent tours. They can share insights and work through common issues with this network of colleagues. Third, this consolidated course provides the surface community with the ability to manage a standardized curriculum through a single course instead of over three smaller courses.
Thought should be given to locating SWOSDOC at Coronado instead of Newport because of the former’s proximity to the ships at Naval Station San Diego. Hands-on experience is a powerful educational “force multiplier,” allowing students to see technology in action. Being able to tour the engineering plant of a Knox-class frigate during the Steam EOOW course brought classroom material to life to an extent unobtainable through instruction alone. A side benefit is that mentor relationships can be built if SWOSDOC students interact with wardrooms, chief messes, and sailors.
Deconstructing Navy Inc.
(See D. S. Stefanus, pp. 54–58, May 2015 Proceedings)
Commander Edward G. Conley, U.S. Navy (Retired)—I read Ensign Stefanus’ critique of “Navy Inc.” with some interest as I am a retired Navy officer and have spent over 23 years supporting the Navy and other services as a contractor. I have the experience of working in a broad range of contractor-supported services for three different companies. Before we indict the entire system, please keep in mind that the vast majority of research-and-development/test-and-evaluation, shipbuilding, aircraft production, initial and new equipment training, logistics support efforts, training courseware, and interoperability testing is accomplished by civilian contractors. Many of the jobs and tasks we support as civilian contractors are not career-enhancing, require an experienced and seasoned veteran, and are often things we do not want our active-duty force doing.
I do disagree with Ensign Stefanus’ remark that “These companies often have looser regulations and security than the Navy and could be compromised or cease operations during a national emergency.” The Navy and other federal agencies require contractors to certify to high standards and to agree, in writing, to comply with all laws, regulations, and security for the area of responsibility where the work will be accomplished. I will acknowledge that the contractor community has had some shortfalls and criminal-activity issues. Believe me, we all hate and abhor that kind of press, as the vast majority of us perform to the same level of professionalism, ownership, accountability, responsibility, and ethical behavior that we learned and lived while on active duty.
The Navy and other services have a crisis in the personnel-funding accounts. The cost of increased manning that the author recommends is simply not a sustainable choice. Personnel costs are already a serious burden to the armed forces. As Military Times reported in February, “Pentagon officials note that the per-troop costs have risen significantly since 2001 as Congress granted a series of generous pay raises and new benefits to troops during the height of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Top Pentagon officials say that cost growth is unsustainable and continue to seek reductions to military compensation in an effort to scale back the growth in per-troop costs.”
I am somewhat mystified by the author’s indictment of the Navy Supply System. I have seen it provide superb support both in the United States and abroad. Perhaps the better question to ask is: Why do we have to have all systems operating at full capacity all of the time? Can we allow some systems to be degraded and wait until return to the United States for repair? If you are a Tomahawk shooter in the Persian Gulf, can you afford to have your sonar degraded? How much are we willing to spend for full-up systems 24/7?
Breaking the Anti-Access Wall
(See S. J. Tangredi, pp. 40–45, May 2015 Proceedings)
Nick Fast—Captain Tangredi’s article had some great ideas, both new and old. Another source of inexpensive delivery platforms would be used supertankers. They have the size required, double hulls, plenty of ballast tankage, and small crew requirements. All their deck gear and rigging should be left in place so they don’t stand out as oddballs. Different names and stack colors should be applied so that their former owners do not become targets. A few of these wandering around the oceans would not attract much attention, but would provide a big punch when called upon.
Charles B. Warren—Why not raft up suitable barges to make an arsenal ship? The United States is pretty good at building barges. It isn’t particularly good at building ships any more. From need to delivery my bet is that barges could be built for the task quicker, cheaper, and better than a ship.
Barge modules also minimize the damage-control problem. One of the barges is sinking? Cut it out of the raft and leave it. For heavier seas, tow in line astern. That would also complicate targeting for an adversary.
The whole concept is to align the cost of attack with the potential loss. At the moment the loss of a billion-dollar ship to a million-dollar missile is what makes anti-access/area denial attractive. It gets even more so if the missile might also kill sailors.
One of the advantages of the arsenal ship is in that last category. It is planned to have a minimum crew. It is also planned to be as cheap as possible. Well, the achievement of that objective has to be viewed in the light of the littoral combat ship. We have everyday experience building barges and tugs. Barges are inherently manned minimally. Similarly, if we wanted a large number of affordable coastal combatants, we have a whole infrastructure that builds workboats for the oil industry. Modular payload? They do that daily.
Can Honor be Remediated?
(See R. Rubel, pp. 83–84, April 2015 Proceedings)
Captain Arthur H. Wagner, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired)—As usual, Proceedings continues to publish thought-provoking dissertations on the perceived issues facing the nautical services and the recommended remedies to solve them. I enjoy them all, but I could not help but gnash my teeth and grumble about yet another crumbling of standards of ethics, morals, and academics to appease some unknown ill-defined current will-of-the-wisp dictating a softening on honor.
I will grant that our nation’s culture is changing in so many ways and at such a rapid pace that I am sure those in personnel (or human resources) are scratching their collective heads on how to have our services remain attractive yet serve the collective good. However, recruiting and retention statistics may dictate short-term changes that are not in the long term beneficial.
Relaxed standards of honor and ethics are not measures of inspired leadership, but symptomatic of what is happening on so many fronts within our services. Hold on to at least one bastion that will stand the test of time. State the rules; pass on those who do not comply.
Earn Back the Trust and Reconsider the Model
(See J. Murphy, p. 14, March 2015, and C. Bouck, p. 9, June 2015 Proceedings)
Senior Chief Jim Murphy, U.S. Navy (Retired)—I thank Mr. Bouck for his kind opening words in his letter regarding my column, and for adding a different perspective to the discussion. My intention was not to suggest all for-profit companies have unethical leaders, nor to suggest there is not a place for these organizations in our national defense. However, I think it’s beyond question that the Department of Defense and other government agencies are “relying . . . heavily on for-profit businesses,” and in my opinion, too much so. The same could be said for civilian DOD employees. Mandated military end strength reductions have resulted in the expansion of DOD contracting to the point that some functions hinge on for-profit companies performing work that not long ago was done by uniformed personnel.
Fat Leonard is not the first or last case of corruption we’ve experienced as a result; it’s simply the largest. The suggestion to reconsider “the business model that pervades the Navy” was intended to suggest we relook at how, where, and why we employ contractor employees, and perhaps redefine and reinforce “inherently governmental functions” and return those responsibilities to uniformed personnel and, where appropriate, government civilian employees.
‘Distributed Lethality’
(See T. Rowden, P. Gumataotao, and P. Fanta, pp. 18–23, January 2015; P. E. Pournelle, p. 8, February 2015; W. P. Hughes Jr., pp. 8–9, March 2015; and J. P. Adams, p. 86, April 2015 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Joseph M. Hatfield, U.S. Navy—Vice Admiral Rowden and Rear Admirals Gumataotao and Fanta challenged the U.S. Navy to adopt “distributed lethality” as an innovative strategy designed to re-establish the ability to project power in an increasingly potent anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) environment. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States and NATO enjoyed near-total freedom to operate unchallenged across the global maritime domain. However, this is rapidly changing. The modernization and proliferation of A2/AD weapon systems, including sophisticated coastal-defense cruise missiles, threatens U.S. and NATO access to areas of the littoral and open sea from which power projection must occur. The centerpiece of the authors’ strategy is the employment of “hunter-killer surface action groups” able to take, hold, and defend critical areas of the maritime domain from which lethal power can be projected—similar to the way Pacific island chains were used in World War II.
However, just because A2/AD is increasingly a problem for the surface Navy does not mean it should be solved by the surface navy. Submarines are equally capable of taking, holding, and defending areas of the maritime domain, while, unlike the surface Navy, being relatively immune to many an adversary’s A2/AD advances. Furthermore, in an era of fiscal variability, investing in submarines to fill this role is more cost-effective because it also solves another problem confronting the post–Cold War Navy: the significant institutional atrophying of antisubmarine-warfare (ASW) readiness that resulted from the decline of the Russian submarine fleet. This has impacted not just the U.S. undersea fleet, but other aspects of ASW readiness that depend on training opportunities that U.S. (and allied) submarines provide (e.g., maritime-patrol-reconnaissance aircrew readiness has suffered significantly due partly to the decline in training opportunities).
It was inevitable that the solution to a surface Navy problem is first conceptualized by and for the surface Navy. We solve problems using the tools we know best, and new problems are understood through the lens of familiarity. However, submarines have the ability to project power ashore (with cruise missiles), while their sheer secrecy acts to deny to the enemy a large amount of water space (we aren’t the only force able to draw furthest-on circles).
Hunter-killer surface action groups would likely require more surface ships to be built. After all, carrier and expeditionary strike groups would continue to require their cruisers and destroyers. The same investment in submarines would address two problems with the same investment.