Getting and Staying Connected
(See E. Lundquist and L. Osborn, pp. 48–53, February 2015 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral James G. Foggo III, U.S. Navy, Commander, 6th Fleet—Captains Lundquist and Osborn’s article was a creative and thought-provoking piece, and it truly struck home with me. The U.S. 6th Fleet area of operations is one of the most dynamic in the world, with a range of challenges that force my staff to think and plan creatively. The authors’ assertion that “operations may one day have to be accomplished with ad hoc teams, using the assets available” is right on target.
The Lundquist/Osborn scenario is about a hostage-rescue mission in the Horn of Africa, but it could happen anywhere, even here. So after reading it, I asked myself, if the call came tomorrow, what would we have available? Sometimes we’re lucky to have an amphibious ready group/Marine expeditionary unit (ARG/MEU) in theater conducting “transit presence” for a few weeks before going to Central Command. We have no permanently assigned ARG/MEU presence in the Mediterranean, but we do have our command ship, our Forward-Deployed Naval Forces ships, a joint high-speed vessel, and our P-3 squadrons. The U.S. Marine Corps has the special-purpose Marine air/ground task force deployed in theater. Combined with some of the Army and Air Force capabilities, we could, and would, develop what Lundquist and Osborn describe as the “ad hoc” team, and we’d get the mission done. During Joint Task Force Odyssey Dawn, we called this “the pickup game.”
When fast-moving events develop, we don’t have the luxury of waiting for the cavalry to arrive from the continental United States, so the prudent commander will empower his staff to look at the available assets on hand, be prepared to conduct rapid planning, and develop courses of action to employ those assets. In the U.S. 6th Fleet, this is exactly what we are doing. Thanks to Ned and Larry for helping us think out of the box.
‘Distributed Lethality’
Lessons Learned from the LCS
Designing the Future Warships
(See T. Rowden, P. Gumataotao, and P. Fanta, pp. 18–23; G. V. Cox, pp. 36–40; and W. J. Holland Jr., pp. 24–29, January 2015; and P. E. Pournelle, p. 8, February 2015 Proceedings)
Captain Wayne P. Hughes Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)—The January issue is a particularly valuable one. Standing out are two complementary essays, one by Vice Admiral Rowden, Rear Admiral Gumataotao, and Rear Admiral Fanta, and the other by Dr. Cox. The first one, by our surface Navy leadership, describes a future for the surface Navy that is more capable of offensive tactics under Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert’s rubric of “Warfighting First” and executed by a more distributable force. Dr. Cox’s article describes the three alternative visions that confused the design of the littoral combat ship (LCS) and resulted in an overambitious, expensive vessel with a growing crew requirement.
A third valuable essay, by Rear Admiral Holland, specifies the need for adequate lead time in designing future combatants. He affirms a point made by Tom and Trent Hone in their book Battle Line, that our Navy’s between-wars successes in cruiser and destroyer development came from a series of evolutionary ships, each embedding incremental improvements over the previous one.
Let me emphasize one thing introduced by Dr. Cox. The two LCS designs were overloaded with missions, tasks, and hopes. It will take two second- and third-generation ship classes to replace what turned out to be a bad compromise between a blue-water fleet frigate to replace DD-963s and FFG-7s in large numbers, and a green-water, offensively configured in-shore combatant built in even greater numbers to confront or fight an enemy in his lethal home waters. We are well on our way to evolving the blue-water frigate with a third-generation ship designed in the fashion described by Rear Admiral Holland. At the same time, I do not think it will not take long—less than the ten years suggested by Rear Admiral Holland—to develop the green-water combatant because it can and should be a relatively simple, single-purpose warship. In fact, in 2001 Naval Postgraduate School students designed a “streetfighter” of 500 tons that was offensively disposed with many missiles, a capable gun, and soft kill and decoys for defense.
What our Navy has not yet done to achieve competence in green-water operations is develop the trained crews that can carry out semi-silent surprise attacks and then disappear into the coastal clutter. The crews that man these offensively disposed vessels will aid in developing (1) command-and-control (C2) technologies and tactics, (2) deployable logistical support, and (3) methods of off-board aerial scouting. It is important to realize that different places such as the Yellow Sea, the China Seas, the Persian Gulf, the Aegean Sea/eastern Mediterranean, and the Baltic and Black Seas each entail different modes of C2, logistics, and scouting. They must be prepared to fight in differing hostile environments.
Under the clear directions of Admirals Rowden, Gumataotao, and Fanta the surface Navy ought to be able to fulfill expectations in one short decade and deploy an affordable, numerous, distributable, offensively competent blue- and green-water surface force that can attain and retain command of the critical seas and littoral waters.
Vice Admiral Robert F. Dunn, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Rear Admiral Holland has done a great service with his January article. One would hope that those who make decisions about future warship design will pay attention. Unfortunately, for a host of reasons (including politics and competing budgets) sufficient attention will most likely not be given, and we will continue to stumble along with ship and aircraft gestation periods of decades or more. By all means, I firmly believe that the author is on target and recommend his ideas be adopted; but given that the likelihood of adoption is slim, or at least far into the future, a much more effective option is at hand, indeed, is being executed as we read. That option is the evolutionary approach.
Almost under the horizon, Arleigh Burke–class destroyers and F/A-18 Hornets that first entered the Fleet well back into the last century are equipped and ready to meet and defeat any current threat. The Burke of today is almost nothing like the DDG-51 launched in 1989. The Hornet of today is nothing like the F/A-18A that first flew almost 40 years ago. Yet both systems are eminently capable of waging combat and surviving in today’s projected environments. That’s because as capabilities were developed, they were incorporated in succeeding units of the class and model and, where feasible, even backfitted into earlier production units. I add that even the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier fits that scheme, and it was only when it was decided that the new Ford class would be all-electric that the carrier train hit a serious bump.
Improving the overall fighting and threat-meeting capability incrementally affords the opportunity to test things out in the real world without putting all eggs in one basket. It also precludes such expensive debacles as the LCS and the F-35. It has recently been advertised that after untold millions the LCS is finally becoming operationally ready at a cost not so very much less than a new DDG-51. On the air side, Lockheed was first awarded the F-35 contract in 2001 and it’s still not in the Fleet . . . any fleet—not the Air Force, not the Navy, not the Marines. Meanwhile, the F/A-18 has developed into the F series (let alone the EW version G) doing yeoman service around the world today and capable of meeting the best the Russians or the Chinese have to offer.
Another advantage to the evolutionary approach is that it causes many fewer gas pains in the budget process and elicits much less noise in the media and on the political front. That’s because it doesn’t cost nearly as much in fiscal-year chunks as does a brand-new start, and it usually doesn’t prompt as many cries from politicos who want all the business in their own states or districts.
None of this obviates the need for planning such as Rear Admiral Holland advocates, but instead of biting off all improvements in one big chunk I say we’re better off to proceed in increments, especially when a proven hull form or airframe is available. Plans such as he advocates are useful because the Congress and Office of the Secretary of Defense demand that incremental approach, but they can also provide a framework for developments that can then be implemented one small bite at a time. This, in turn, provides the greatest service soonest to the warfighter.
When Quality Slips
(See N. Pettigrew, pp. 58–64, January 2015; and D. Bolgiano, p. 8, February 2015 Proceedings)
Robert M. Rosenthal—Mr. Pettigrew’s article on shipbuilding wastefulness is the most disturbing I have read in Proceedings in some time. I am not Navy, I’m a retired attorney and businessman. As such, I can attest to two things. One is that if a multibillion-dollar ship were released for use in the civilian world and the toilets didn’t work, there would be heads rolling and lawsuits flying. There wouldn’t be any eating of the cost. Does the Navy really think that Princess Cruises would accept a ship without working toilets? The other is that there would be criminal investigations!
My problem with the outrageous malfeasance on the part of the Navy is that no heads appear to be rolling and no criminal investigations appear to be ongoing. As a taxpayer (as are members of the Navy) I simply am unwilling to put up with this nonsense anymore. During my small contact with America’s military I discovered one continual redefinition of a word. If a civilian executive was a complete blithering idiot I was told that he was “really dedicated” and couldn’t be fired.
Besides people being fired and going to prison I have a suggestion:
Institute a course major at the Naval Academy in shipbuilding, maintenance and repair, and marine-yard operations. Part of this could be an adjunct of the current naval-architecture major. The Navy should enter into discussions with graduate universities for degrees leading to master’s and doctorates in ship maintenance and repair and in shipbuilding operations.
Let’s stop kidding ourselves. This complete failure in protecting the Navy and the public is on the shoulders of those civilians who supervise our shipbuilding and repair operations. The Navy and the American public cannot afford these “dedicated” civil servants.
Tim Rishel—Mr. Pettigrew’s article enunciates a recurring theme I have been reading in Proceedings over the past few years: ship-maintenance evolutions resulting in delays, cost overruns, and poor quality. As a senior airline maintenance-management professional, the alleged ineptitude astonishes me.
I think the Navy should observe how the commercial-airline sector handles such on their primary equipment. I submit, from a certain perspective, the modern heavy commercial jet is the pinnacle of mankind’s technical evolution. It is an expensive, highly sophisticated machine, operating in an inhospitable environment, and it self-perpetuates—meaning, it makes money. The airlines are mandated to have a Continuous Maintenance Program in place that details all periodic inspections and rectification requirements to ensure the airframe, engines, and systems meet performance standards. All defects are thoroughly documented, rectified, and inspected for completion and compliance with technical instructions. This is all under strict and comprehensive regulatory oversight, reliable and safe operation being the premium goals.
Airline profit margins are very thin. Billions are spent every year by U.S. operators to maintain their airplanes. Therefore, the airline maintenance and engineering departments scrutinize every dollar billed by an outsourced contractor to achieve the best value possible. The requirement for extensive record-keeping enables the airline’s on-site representatives to review all labor and materials expended to assess accountability, quality, and economic efficiency.
The Case for Midshipmen Summer Training
(See J. Testa, pp. 77–78, January 2015 Proceedings)
Commander Earl Higgins, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Lieutenant Testa’s article is timeless. For my first-class midshipman cruise in 1962, I was assigned to a destroyer in the Mediterranean along with seven other midshipmen, two of us NROTC, the others Naval Academy. We were barely tolerated, except by the weapons officer who had been assigned to oversee our training. The captain was a curmudgeon who lectured us while on watch about “the real Navy” and his contempt for the aircraft carrier we often trailed as plane guard. The executive officer was a sycophantic toady, and the wardroom was populated with grumblers and pompous pontificators. No one seemed pleased where he was professionally, including the commanding officer.
As an impressionable 20-year-old looking to a Navy career, the experience was disconcerting and discouraging. I did not want to spend my professional life in that atmosphere. It particularly struck me that the CO, who had achieved what should have been the pinnacle of a naval officer’s career, command of a warship, was so negative about his situation and was foisting onto the next generation of officers his narcissistic and anachronistic notions about what the Navy should be. When I left active duty years later, I fortunately found a rewarding professional career as a reserve officer.
In those days before the surface-warfare designator, many surface officers had feelings of inferiority, because policies seemed to demand that the best and brightest seek out careers in submarines and aviation. My NROTC adviser told me as much. Despite more than 40 years since the creation of the designator, surface warfare still seems to be the default for the newly commissioned.
Lieutenant Testa’s recommendations should be read and taken to heart by all SWOs who are responsible for summer training of midshipmen. My summer cruise of long ago was unfortunate but not unusual then. I trust there is now more respect and self-respect in the most traditional of warfare communities.
Reinvest in the DOD Workforce
(See M. Moran and S. O’Neill, pp. 60–65, December 2014 Proceedings)
William Burnett, Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Command; and Thomas Cuff, Naval Oceanographic Office—We would like to thank Rear Admiral Moran and Mr. O’Neill for their insightful and timely article about rebuilding the Department of Defense’s scientific and engineering workforce. They stressed the need to find more meaningful work to engage employees and provided relevant recommendations to ensure the next generation is adequately trained and, most importantly, retained. We definitely agree with their assessment.
We also would like to offer an additional critical requirement—sending our scientists and engineers to scientific and technical conferences. These gatherings comprise the only meaningful professional training available for this crucial component of our naval workforce. Just as important, conference attendance fosters collaboration that accelerates the transition of science and technology into naval operations, improving Fleet readiness and effectiveness through speed to capability. Since 2012, the oceanography community’s conference attendance has been reduced by 85 percent; this was largely due to government-wide restrictions imposed following some well-publicized Geological Society of America conference missteps.
More recently, however, scientific and technical conference attendance, rather than being recognized as a necessary means for maintaining excellence in our workforce and world leadership in science, has been viewed simply as a prudent area for cost savings through reduction. While well intentioned, the current resource-intensive conference request-and-approval process costs more in lost productivity at the requesting commands and supporting headquarters staffs than it could ever save. This inability to adequately train our workforce directly impacts hiring and retention of our scientists and engineers, greatly diminishes our ability to be at the cutting edge of emerging technical thought and innovation, and decreases warfighter mission readiness. As we rebuild our scientific and engineering workforce, the DOD should encourage attendance at scientific conferences and simplify the inefficient approval process.
CORRECTION
The caption on page 39 of the February issue misidentified an MQ-4C Triton UAV as an RQ-4 Global Hawk.