The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps are uniquely capable of providing sustained forward presence and power projection from a sovereign base at sea. These capabilities are likely to be of increasing importance in the emerging international security environment as fixed overseas U.S. bases become fewer in number and more vulnerable, competitors increase their claims on international waters, and rogue states and non-state actors threaten regional peace and stability. Reflecting these and other concerns, the report of the National Defense Panel calls for a significant expansion of naval forward presence all across maritime Asia.1
The challenge of providing robust logistics support to the Fleet is increasing as demands for forward presence actually grow, the overall number of Navy ships declines, and resources to maintain existing vessels or acquire new ones dwindle. While the attention of Congress and the American people has been focused on controversial proposals to inactivate almost half of the operational Ticonderoga-class cruisers and forego refueling of the USS George Washington (CVN-73), the situation in the support elements of the Fleet is equally serious.
The Military Sealift Command (MSC) combat logistics force, the heart of the Navy’s worldwide underway- replenishment capability, consists of just 12 dry-cargo/ammunition ships, 4 large fast combat support ships (T-AOEs), and 15 fleet oilers. The T-AOEs, the largest and most modern ships of their type, are designed primarily to accompany carrier strike groups (CSG). Due to their size and gas turbine engines, they are expensive to crew and operate. In a surprise move, the Navy plans to retire two of them, one in 2014 and a second in 2015 (nearly 20 years early) and, should sequestration return in 2016, could inactivate the remaining two. Sequestration also could interfere with the Navy’s current plan to begin acquiring 17 new fleet oilers in 2016.2
A Uniquely Navy Mission
There is a second string to the Navy’s at-sea replenishment capability, one that is particular to the service: the use of aircraft to provide carrier on-board delivery (COD). The COD mission is to move personnel, supplies, spare parts, mail, and other high-priority cargo from bases ashore to aicraft carriers at sea and both people and medical evacuees from ship to shore. The U.S. Navy is unique in having several squadrons of specialized fixed-wing aircraft dedicated to this mission. Since the late 1960s, the primary COD aircraft has been the C-2A Greyhound, a variant of the E-2C Hawkeye airborne early-warning aircraft. At present there are 35 C-2As. A single aircraft carrier’s detachment of two C-2s will transport thousands of people and around a million pounds of freight during a typical six-month deployment.
The youngest C-2A is 24 years old and the current fleet will have to be replaced beginning in about 2020, leading the Navy to begin the process of assessing its options. In reality, there are three options. The two that have garnered the most attention are to substantially upgrade the existing C-2As or to replace the Greyhounds with a fleet of V-22 Ospreys. The Navy is conducting an assessment of the ability of the Osprey to operate as a COD platform on board an aircraft carrier.3 Recently, a third option has emerged: refurbish some S-3 Vikings, an antisubmarine warfare aircraft.
Modernizing the COD capability presents the Navy with a particular budgetary challenge, coming as it will in the midst of the efforts to introduce the F-35C fighter, upgrade the EA-18 Growler with the Next Generation Jammer, acquire some version of an Unmanned Carrier Launched Surveillance and Strike system, deploy the P-8 Poseidon antisubmarine-warfare aircraft, and bring the MQ-4C Triton high-altitude unmanned system into the force. The decision will be made largely on the basis of such criteria as cost and performance trade-offs. But it also may reflect a changing appreciation of how U.S. maritime forces will have to operate in the changing geopolitical and military-technical environment, particularly in the Western Pacific.
Modernize the Greyhound
Without question, the C-2A Greyhound has been a capable, reliable, and effective COD platform. It can deliver up to 10,000 pounds of cargo, passengers, or both at distances of over 1,000 nautical miles. It can carry litter patients in medical evacuation missions. It possesses a specially designed cage system or transport stand that restrains cargo during carrier launch and landing and is equipped with a large aft cargo ramp and door and a powered winch to permit rapid rear loading and unloading. The aircraft also has a unique quadruple-rudder structure, folding wings, and self-contained power-generation capability for engine starting that permits self-deployment to/from remote sites. The C-2A’s pressurized fuselage allows it to fly—with passengers—at altitudes above most severe weather. Finally, the C-2 is compatible with the air wing’s air traffic control and landing systems, catapult and arresting gear, wind over deck parameters, and cyclic operations.
The Navy is completing a service-life extension program (SLEP) on the Greyhound to increase its endurance from 15,020 to 36,000 landings and from 10,000 to 15,000 flight hours. The SLEP involves structural enhancements to the wing; rewiring; a new propeller system; and navigational upgrades such as the addition of a global positioning system, the dual Carrier Aircraft Inertial Navigation System (CAINS II), crash-survivable flight incident recorders, and a ground-proximity warning.4
Northrop Grumman has indicated that regardless of whether there is a competition or a sole-source selection for the COD mission, it plans to propose a remanufactured Greyhound. In doing so, the company plans to exploit the commonalities between the E-2 and C-2 by remanufacturing the latter’s airframe and simultaneously upgrading it with new avionics and the same engines, wings, and cockpit as the E-2D. This option would allow the Navy to take advantage of increased commonality across the two fleets and lower operating and sustainment costs for both.5
There are technical and operational factors that favor a remanufactured C-2A. Its unrefueled range (1,300 nautical miles) is substantially greater than that of the V-22 (390 nautical miles) or any other rotary-wing platform. Its pressurized cabin allows the aircraft to achieve a higher operational ceiling than the V-22. C-2 advocates point out the fact that the aircraft is already integrated into the aircraft carrier’s flight-deck operations. This combination of range, pressurized cabin, and compatibility with carrier-deck operations make it particularly effective in meeting the needs of the carrier strike group for logistics support without compromising maneuverability.
Turn Things over to the Osprey
The V-22 Osprey, capable of taking off and landing like a helicopter but flying like a fixed-wing aircraft, has become a star in the hands of the Marine Corps and U.S Special Operations Forces. V-22 squadrons have repeatedly deployed with Marines to Afghanistan, performing extremely well while establishing the best safety record of any Marine Corps aircraft. The V-22 now operates routinely both from fixed and expeditionary airfields on land and also from large-deck amphibious-warfare ships.
The V-22 has some advantages vis-à-vis the C-2A. In particular, its maximum internal capacity is 20,000 pounds compared to 10,000 pounds for the C-2. The V-22 also can carry supplies and some outsized items in a net slung under its fuselage. However, because of its cabin structure, the C-2 has greater internal volume, called cubage, which is important given the variety of spare parts and cargo that the carrier strike groups demand.
In addition, the V-22 is capable of in-flight refueling, which could dramatically extend its range. Marine Corps V-22s routinely deploy with KC-130 tankers, allowing them to undertake deployments in excess of 1,000 nautical miles with full loads. In 2013, two Marine V-22s flew all the way from Okinawa to Australia via the Philippines, supported in the air by fixed-wing refueling tankers. In theory, to provide critical supplies and spare parts to the carrier strike group, Navy V-22s in a COD mode also could make use of aerial refueling.
The long-term procurement plan for the V-22 has always had a wedge of 48 airframes, which it is assumed would be the force dedicated to the COD mission. The acquisition of V-22s for this task would lower the cost of the remaining aircraft the Marine Corps plans to order. In addition, with some 400 V-22s in operation, the aircraft offers a large, single platform–based supply chain, leading to savings in overall operation and support costs. Additionally, the Osprey can be the centerpiece of a distributed aerial logistics chain.
Proponents of the V-22 concede that on a pure platform basis, a C-2 SLEP would likely be less expensive. They counter, however, that the more applicable comparison is one that captures the full cost of cargo delivery to the entire carrier strike group, which (unlike the C-2) the V-22 could do. A mission-based construct would therefore include the costs not only of the C-2 but of the procurement and operating costs of the helicopters that conduct the “spoke” delivery as well. From a mission perspective, proponents argue a V-22 COD fleet would enable greater direct, distributed logistics operations, particularly to the amphibious warfare fleet, allowing the Navy to gain significant cost and operational efficiencies.6 There would still be a requirement for some use of helicopters to move people and supplies to other classes of ships.
Resurrect the Venerable S-3 Viking
A recent, one might say “dark horse,” entrant into the competition is the S-3 variant. It is not commonly known, but for a while the Navy employed several S-3s in a COD role before turning the mission entirely over the C-2 Greyhound. Eighty-seven of the Vikings are available in storage, well beyond the 35 that the Navy needs. According to industry articles, Lockheed Martin has proposed refurbishing the platform, keeping the wings, empennage, engines, and flight controls, while discarding the current fuselage and replacing it with one that is larger and purposely built for the COD mission. This new fuselage would be designed to allow the F-35’s engine to be carried fully assembled, something that neither the C-2 nor the V-22 can do. The S-3 could carry as much cargo and as many passengers as the C-2 does. It also would have an advanced cargo-handling system based on that currently found on the C-130J. Reportedly, the S-3 not only would have a refueling probe but could retain its erstwhile role as an aerial refueler, something the carrier air wing has sorely missed since the plane was retired.7
A refurbished S-3 would operate similarly to the C-2. Its range, some 2,400 nautical miles, would provide a distinct advantage over the other candidates, and could be extended due to its ability to be refueled in the air like the V-22. It is not clear how much a rebuilt S-3 would cost, but it probably would be no more expensive than a modernized C-2.
Strategic Considerations
The changing security environment is impacting the Navy’s investment in platforms and weapon systems as well as the basing of Fleet elements. The growing anti-access/area denial threat necessitates acquisition of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, Next Generation Jammer, and a carrier-based, long-range unmanned system. The proliferation of antiship ballistic and cruise missiles makes the development of effective directed-energy weapons for shipboard defense-strategic imperative. The pivot to the Asia-Pacific is dictating a shift in the weight of Navy force posture toward that region. Already U.S. nuclear-powered submarines are disproportionately deployed to the Pacific; several are now stationed at Guam. The littoral combat ship’s first deployment was to Singapore, and the current plan is to station continuously at least four there. All three Zumwalt-class destroyers are slated for the Pacific.
Since 7 December 1941, the aircraft carrier’s unique strategic and operational contributions to modern warfare have been most evident in the Pacific. Now, and for the foreseeable future, carrier strike groups will play a vital role in providing both peacetime forward presence and effective combat power in the event of conflict. The key to the effectiveness of the carrier strike group is its ability to persist in the right place at the right time. This requires it to maintain operational maneuverability, which allows for both tactical flexibility and stealthiness.
The space needed to secure operational maneuverability can be envisioned as a “box” defined at one end by the distance to and from the objective and at the other end by the distance to and from resupply. When operating against hostile forces, the box also must encompass a sufficient area to allow the CSG to disappear from view or, as necessary, actively defend itself. If the CSG can “see” and strike at great distance without being targeted in return, and simultaneously remain within range of its logistics support base, it will be able to perform whatever mission assigned.
The ability of the CSG to achieve operational maneuverability is challenged today perhaps as never before. According to retired Admiral Robert Willard, former Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, China is now deploying a long-range, antiship ballistic missile with a maneuvering warhead. Additionally, China and a number of prospective adversaries are acquiring aircraft carriers, advanced naval- strike aircraft, long-range antiship cruise missiles, and modern, quiet diesel-electric submarines. Even as the CSG fights to maintain a position within striking range of its targets it will have to contend with the growing long-range threats to its survival. If the CSG and amphibious ready groups are to maneuver as necessary, remain on-station, and conduct operations for protracted periods, they must be able to receive timely resupply of mission-critical material and personnel. To avoid having to return to port, the Navy resupplies the CSG in its maneuver box. It does so by relying on underway replenishment and carrier onboard delivery. While some consumables can be resupplied by means of ship-to-ship transfers, critical supplies such as spare parts, munitions, and replacement personnel must be flown to the CSG.
The vast distances of the Asia-Pacific region cry out, too, for rotary-wing platforms that are fast, long-range, and can operate from a variety of bases and ships. Also, there is the need for airborne logistics systems that support proliferated basing, which, particularly in the Western Pacific, is one way of combating the growing threat posed to fixed airfields by long-range ballistic and cruise missiles.
The choice between the Greyhound, Osprey, and Viking should be about more than the price of the three systems or reducing the cost of the Navy’s aerial supply chain. The need to create a large maneuvering space for the carrier strike groups and support distributed operations by all Fleet elements will require a COD system with range, payload, and the ability to operate in bad weather. This would seem to favor a modernized C-2A or S-3. However, many of the low-intensity challenges the United States is likely to face create an increased demand for the combined air-sea-land power provided by the Navy’s amphibious ready groups built around large-deck amphibious-warfare ships and their accompanying Marine expeditionary units. Because it can deliver cargo and personnel directly to these ships, the V-22 can extend the range and operational flexibility of the Navy’s amphibious ready groups.
The Osprey’s unique combination of speed, range, and vertical agility creates interesting possibilities for transforming the way that carrier on-board delivery is accomplished in the Pacific—and elsewhere. Because V-22s can land on or hover over pretty much every warship in the Fleet, they have the potential to fly people and supplies directly to their intended destination at sea, eliminating the bottleneck that results when items have to be moved from C-2As to helicopters on carrier decks. That would greatly increase the volume and velocity of the resupply mission. It would also speed the movement of people in medical evacuations and other passenger trips.8
Which strategy will the Navy pursue: one that continues to emphasize the centrality of the aircraft carrier or one that shifts, albeit subtly, in favor of the smaller, more flexible, big-deck amphibs and dispersed land basing? There is a case for both approaches. Unfortunately, the Navy can only acquire one fleet of COD aircraft.
1. “Ensuring a Strong U.S. Defense for the Future,” U.S. Institute of Peace, The National Defense Panel Review of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, 31 July 2014, 39.
2. Christopher P. Cavas, “More Ships. At Least On Paper, In New Fleet Plan,” Defense News, 12 July 2014. Christopher P. Cavas, “U.S. Navy Still Seeks To Decommission More Ships,” Defense News, 23 April 2013.
3. Amy Butler, “U.S. Navy Assesses Osprey for COD Mission,” Aviation Week, 18 April 2013.
4. “C-2 Greyhound Carrier On-Board Delivery Aircraft, United Sates of America,” naval-technology.com, www.naval-technology.com/projects/c2-greyhound/.
5. Richard Burgess, “Northrop Grumman Offers Modernized C-2 Carrier Delivery Aircraft,” Seapower, 8 April 2013. Daniel Goure, “Greyhound Versus Osprey: The Choice Matters A Lot,” Lexington Institute, Early Warning Blog, 19 April 2013.
6. Maren Leed and Andrew Metrick, “Whither Carrier On Board Delivery?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Strategic Insights, 21 May 2014.
7. Dave Majumdar, “Lockheed Pitching Revamped Viking to Fill Carrier Cargo and Tanking Roles,” USNI News, 8 April 2014, http://news.usni.org/2014/04/08/lockheed-pitching-revamped-viking-fill-carrier-cargo-tanking-roles. “How We Rollo,” Defense Industry Daily, 15 April 2014, www.defenseindustrydaily.com/89m-for-fy-2007-support-of-the-usns-s3b-vikings-02777/.
8. Dr. Loren Thompson, “V-22 Tiltrotor Could Revolutionize Naval Logistics In The Pacific,” Forbes, 9 April 2014.