Millennials Bring a New Mentality: Does it Fit?
(See D. Cunningham, p. 10, August 2014 Proceedings)
Captain Raymond J. Brown, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired)—Commander Cunningham perhaps suffers a bit from chronological snobbery. The current generation of junior people in the service certainly bring their own baggage. Every generation does.
Though I am no longer fresh from the fight, I too well recall having been commissioned shortly after the Vietnam war stood down, and serving in a Hamilton-class cutter homeported in New York City. Drugs were rife. Racial animosity was intense. Pay was still lousy. Discipline seemed to be an afterthought among the flower-child generation. It all gave me serious pause about my chosen career. That was the military back then, which has never been fully examined.
But after my first year on board a new executive officer and ops boss reported in. The XO, Bob Kramek, would later become Commandant. The OPS Boss, Thad Allen, would do the same. In less than a year I saw a ship transformed—not by Commander Cunningham’s middle ground, but by an assumed dedication to excellence. It was not easy, and, yes, some folks were excused from serving in Coast Guard blue. But we went from zeroes to heroes, and everyone was proud. I can recall a Navy admiral writing about us having “a positive attitude, superior readiness, and professionalism.” In fact, I still have the message.
My next ship was in a Navy destroyer on exchange, and when she arrived I thought, “oh here we go again.” Same problems. But shortly thereafter a new CO and XO arrived. Again, excellence in all respects was not directed, but assumed. The path was not easy—at all. I still regard that tour as the hardest of my career. But though I had left by the time, the destroyer—whose wardroom remains in close touch to this day—wound up second in 6th Fleet honors.
Young sailors do not require accommodation. As ever, they need hard work and pride, which come from good leadership. That has been true for every generation.
Lieutenant Matthew R. Hipple, U.S. Navy—Commander Cunningham’s column has a number of significant problems and appears to claim an entire generation is not suited for military service and must be coddled like children.
Those whom the author takes to task, and claims are likely ill-suited for service, are a group of men and women who joined post-9/11, during a time of war. But indulging contrasts of intergenerational motivation is folly. From the American Revolution to today, we, of every generation and branch, chose a cloth that may require us to kill, or be killed, in the service of our nation. The fact that the author doesn’t appear to respect that, or the many members of the “millennial generation” we have lost over the past 13 years, verges on the insulting.
The piece’s thrust ignores the reality and core principles of our services, to include the Coast Guard. It is quaintly garrison in attitude—describing our customs and courtesies as the foundation of our service. No, our customs and courtesies are generated from a culture that changes as we pursue our foundational purpose—fight and win.
Yes, some millennials complain, but that is hardly a unique phenomenon faced by today’s leadership. Said a certain Lieutenant Mahan in his diary, “The Captain has annoyed me, and I have felt and spoken angrily and sullenly.” Why does every military generation rage against some part of the machine? The root of this is not narcissism—it is a desire for excellence, a desire to maximize our ability to win. “Because that’s how it’s done” will get us killed.
From Maiduguri to Bahgdad to Donetsk to Scarborough Shoals to cyberspace, there’s conflict of varying temperatures. Every generation brings value to this fight with discussion and debate in our wardrooms, in Proceedings, and in the online discourse—generations exchanging experience and perspective. This productive exchange, not intergenerational bomb-throwing, is something to celebrate.
Lieutenant Nicholas Zieser, U.S. Coast Guard—The millennials who serve today do not bring a new mentality; they are simply seeking meaningful work with clear expectations about their future. In the absence of such they will be more inclined to ask for extra time off in order to pursue other, more valuable, endeavors or gripe about the opaque promotion system. Commanding officers are the pinnacle mentor at any unit and therefore in the ideal position to correct these millennial issues by inspiring the crew and encouraging them to perform at the level they expect.
“What am I getting out of this job?” This thought rightfully and regularly crosses our minds; it helps us put into perspective why we chose our profession, that of servicemen and women. It is absurd to suggest that we chose this career because we are only required to do the bare minimum required every day. It has never been about leisure time, promotions, or fringe benefits. It has always been about finding value, meaning, and purpose in the work we do. The Coast Guard is well positioned to attract top talent—not because of the paycheck and opportunities for free time, but because the work we do is so important and the most junior members of our organization are at the leading edge of doing it! That’s why the line of citizens aspiring to join our ranks is so long.
The task for senior leaders is not to superficially “engage” their junior members; rather, they must challenge them to achieve more, to convince them that the work they have been tasked to perform is just as, or more, valuable than anything else they might do with their time. To meet this challenge our leaders will be compelled to regularly answer the question “why?” and to sell my generation on the idea that hours spent behind a computer in a cubicle at a sector, base, or headquarters is just as important and necessary as boarding a panga at midnight to seize contraband and detain smugglers. In the new data-rich and budget-poor reality in which the Coast Guard is operating, we need analysts, financial managers, and logisticians just as much as we need boarding officers and airborne use of force.
I think that the “problem” some COs may be experiencing with the millennials under their command lies more with their motivation than desire to perform. Specifically, as a senior leader at a mission-support unit such as a Coast Guard base, how can you inspire and encourage your subordinates to perform their seemingly mundane tasks with as much vim and vigor as a coxswain chasing down a go-fast? The answer lies with your passion for the job, your excitement to perform the mission, and your ability to sell the same to your people. Connect the dots for them, go above and beyond to inspire them, and I believe you will be rewarded tenfold.
Additionally, I challenge those who maintain a negative opinion toward the millennials in the armed forces to read just a few passages from In the Shadow of Greatness (Naval Institute Press, 2012).
Commander Harrison Schramm, U.S. Navy—Commander Cunningham’s piece on millennials raises an important issue for the Sea Services. My observation is that millennials do not accept “because that’s how it is” as an answer. This is particularly true with respect to advancement. They want to be judged today on their merits, and are offended by having to “wait their turn.”
The challenge for leadership is to get buy-in from them in the processes we need to keep, and to use their energy to change the ones that should go.
I’m not suggesting that millennials are always right—just observing that they aren’t always wrong.
(See S. Paschal, pp. 50–54, August 2014 Proceedings)
Captain R. O. Strange, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Having had experience with the nuances associated with the acquisition of the Major-Caliber Lightweight Gun and later on with the design and development of the Advanced Gun System in Zumwalt-class destroyers, I read Mr. Paschal’s article with some degree of interest.
As the author correctly states, the U.S. Marine Corps for years has sought, with doctrine endorsed at the highest levels, to fulfill the need for a major-caliber gun to support amphibious-assault operations. Historical experience, however, has shown that, because of the higher priority of other programs in years when the DOD budget was not as austere as it is today, gun programs unfortunately dropped below the approved funding levels. These programs were justified and approved with congressional backing, but when prioritized with other programs of greater need they could not be justified to be included in the President’s budget. With sequestration and further fiscal drawdowns as defense spending returns to a peacetime profile, the electromagnetic-railgun (EMRG) program in my opinion currently falls into the category of a “laboratory toy.”
The author indicates that the EMRG has no explosive charge, making it safer to handle and store on board ship, but by the same token you must have pinpoint accuracy to achieve the desired kill results on the battlefield. Gunfire-support missions in certain scenarios call for air bursts to neutralize targets over a wide area. It does not seem possible to achieve these results with an EMRG by filling the air with high-speed ingots. When the author suggests installing railguns on smaller vessels, such as dedicated amphibious ships, one wonders where the power source needed to generate the megajoules of energy for operating the railgun would come from. There was extensive deliberation along with considerable modeling and simulation that went into the design and development of the Zumwalt-class destroyer and the electrical requirements for its operation. I believe to achieve the introduction of the railgun to the Fleet that a platform equivalent in size to a Zumwalt would be required. To suggest that it be installed in a merchant ship with a dedicated crew seems rather far-fetched.
There could be a market for a railgun in the future if the electrical-power requirements for generating the energy needed for such a weapon could realistically be installed in a smaller platform, and if an explosive projectile (rather than an ingot) be considered when delivering ordnance on target for Marine support operations. I believe that the challenge of solving these obstacles over time would turn this laboratory toy into a viable program with potentially effective results.
A. J. Daverede—As an avid follower of naval-ordnance developments and history, I found Mr. Paschal’s article most interesting, but I believe the enthusiasm for the electromagnetic railgun to be misplaced for three reasons. First is the timing associated with the deployment of this system. Mr. Paschal estimates that such a weapon could have an initial operating capability in the 2020–25 timeframe. However, as pointed out in Lieutenant Dave Cope’s following article in the same issue (“Stop the Revolution,” pp. 56–61), the increasing complexity of modern weapon systems is leading to decreasing affordability and operability for those systems. The railgun shows characteristics similar to the other revolutionary weapons mentioned in that article. It is unlikely that the railgun will be available that soon, and , frankly, it is a weapon for which a ship will have to be designed, much like the nearly worthless 1890s-vintage Zalinsky pneumatic gun battery on the “dynamite cruiser” USS Vesuvius.
The potential weapon effects that Mr. Paschal praises so highly are the second reason to discount the railgun. Theoretically, it is capable of considerable firepower compared to the 5-inch 54-caliber Mark 45 in all of its various mods. However, recent combat experience seems to show that firepower in the advertised amounts for the railgun is not only unneeded, but could also be counterproductive, as witnessed by the most recent Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The United States simply can’t politically afford the effects of 160–496 Tomahawk warhead equivalents except in a contest with a symmetrical enemy. The likelihood of such a contest seems to diminish with each passing year.
The final argument against the railgun is the impact its introduction would have on amphibious lift. Mr. Paschal feels that amphibious warships would make the ideal railgun platforms and proposes the new LX(R) hull as a railgun platform. The problem here is that shipbuilding budgets are not on a favorable curve right now or even in the foreseeable future. There is a shortage of amphibious lift today, and much of that lift is aging rapidly. The effect of a two-railgun battery on shipboard space is bound to be considerable, even with a hull the size of today’s LPD-17 class. The Navy is just not going to be able to afford specialized fire-support platforms when there is a shortage of lift assets. Even when the Navy possessed an excess of amphibious lift in the 1950s and ’60s, the service built only one specialized fire-support ship during that period, the USS Carronade (LFS-1/IFS-1).
(See W. M. Beasley Jr., pp. 66–71, July 2014 Proceedings)
Commander Robert C. Whitten, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired) and Vice Admiral Robert F. Dunn, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Mr. Beasley tries to make the case that because of poor public relations the “Revolt of the Admirals” in 1949 was ineffective in its attempt to preserve naval aviation. We disagree.
The admirals, led by then–Vice Admiral Arthur W. Radford and assisted by then-Captain Arleigh Burke, were quite effective in organizing defense of naval aviation, especially the carriers. Even Arthur Godfrey, one of the leading radio personalities of the time, joined in to broadcast the message to a wide national audience. Perhaps even more importantly, House Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Vinson of Georgia, one of the most influential and powerful congressmen of the time, was a strong advocate of the Navy, particularly the air Navy. Working with the admirals, he led the House in blocking efforts by the Truman administration to downsize the Fleet.
While there are kernels of truth in what Mr. Beasley writes, he does not really address the central issue: Did air power have the potential to match the claims of its advocates and, if not, what then? Gulio Douhet, Arthur “Bomber” Harris, Billy Mitchell, and Curtis LeMay all espoused the idea that an enemy could be subdued totally by bombing from the air. The lessons of World War II and the fact that Germany was not subdued by bombing alone had no effect. Their excuse? “The ordnance had not been lethal enough.” Now, with the atomic bomb, the bomber theorists thought they finally had the lethality they needed.
American politicians were swept up in this philosophy, and legislative action was about to follow. Fortunately for posterity, naval officers, particularly naval aviators, recognized that land-based air power never had and never could match the overstated claims of its advocates. From the beginning, the naval officers devised sea-based systems that could fill the gaps. Thus came nuclear-capable P2V Neptunes launched from carriers, the development of the AJ Savage bomber and later, when nuclear devices were made smaller, even lighter carrier-based attack aircraft.
Meanwhile, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson’s cancellation of the United States (CVA-58) proved to be a blessing in disguise. It gave time for the British to come along with the angled deck, steam catapult, and mirror landing system that were incorporated into the very successful Forrestal class and retrofitted to the Essex and Midway classes.
Even more fortunately, when the North Koreans invaded South Korea the aircraft carrier USS Valley Forge (CV-45) and later the British carrier HMS Triumph were on scene to lend air support to the beleaguered allies, the Air Force being unable to contribute much from bases in Japan.
The “Revolt of the Admirals” did indeed have positive effects. It’s true that a Chief of Naval Operations was fired and the Navy took a lot of bad press, but Radford, with the help of Burke and others who testified before Congress, made their points and naval aviation survived. The nation owes them much for that.