‘Sir, why do so many SWOs hate their lives and then get out of the Navy?” I was recently asked this question during a trip with the U.S. Naval Academy Investment Club. A midshipman second class who was considering the surface-warfare community worried about what he had heard regarding the Fleet. Then a midshipman first class who was slated for flight school this summer chimed in, “Yeah, and what’s all this talk about the Navy’s personnel system being broken?” In a government van, driving from Annapolis to New York City can take about six hours, but I wasn’t sure I’d have time to cover everything that would be needed to answer their questions adequately.
First I explained the challenges of being a first-tour division officer in a chain of command. Your commanding officer could be bad. Your executive officer could be worse. Your senior watch officer could have a grudge against you, and your department head could be incompetent. You might get stuck as the junior officer requiring guidance, not to even mention the problems of being in the lower half of the chain of command, with its Alice in Wonderland–like world of divisional politics.
The picture I described to the midshipmen was very different from the one painted by Commander Guy Snodgrass in his white paper on officer retention, “Keep a Weather Eye on the Horizon.” Snodgrass describes a looming crisis as the result of internal problems, including a high operational tempo and the loss of a combat mentality, combined with external factors such as an improving economy. In my depiction, junior-officer retention hinges on JOs’ day-to-day experiences during their first tours, very complex experiences that are far from perfect.
Chief of Naval Personnel Vice Admiral William Moran echoed Commander Snodgrass’s reasoning during a recent brief to faculty and staff at the Naval Academy. He discussed various solutions being proposed at the Bureau of Naval Personnel. They include a pay bonus for deployments over 190 days and increased autonomy at the commander level. The idea is that cash incentives and refocusing commanders on warfighting will enhance the overall quality of life, thereby improving retention.
Vice Admiral Moran’s vision to improve sailors’ and officers’ quality of life has the correct focus, but it will take time for junior officers to receive greater autonomy through a type of trickle-down leadership. And yet, if we accept Commander Snodgrass’s findings, we know that time is a luxury the Navy officer corps does not have. With Naval Academy and NROTC graduates hitting the Fleet right now, we need to act to prevent this new group from facing the same challenges that have caused 65 percent of junior officers to leave the service. So what’s the solution?
Let’s start with what it cannot be, which is “If they want to leave, let them.” The cause for concern is that they then take their training and experience with them. Without general retention, specifically of quality officers, risk factors start to increase in everything from daily maintenance to combat effectiveness.
Next, we ought to consider where a solution could best be implemented. I believe the answer to that comes from within the junior-officer corps itself. The essence of what I explained to the midshipmen during our ride to New York is that JOs decide during their first tour whether or not to make the Navy their career. This means that because of their direct, day-to-day contact, department heads are in the best position to make an impact on a JO’s impression of the Navy.
So what’s a department head to do? Lots! Be a teacher. Be a mentor. Empower your people. The list goes on and reads much like a Leadership 101 syllabus. What needs to happen first is to recognize that the retention problem is a leadership challenge that can most immediately be addressed and most positively affected by the current JO corps.
I once received the advice that people should want their bosses’ jobs. In the 2013 Junior Officer Retention Survey, a majority of JOs did not view the position of commanding officer afloat as being desirable, nor did they aspire to serve a career in the surface-warfare community. In short, they did not want their bosses’ jobs. Somewhere among Commander Snodgrass’s paper, Admiral Moran’s briefs, and the 2013 Retention Survey, or maybe in a combination of those documents, is the answer to the question of why JOs are leaving naval service. Perhaps the better question is: What are we going to do about it now?