A JO’s Guide to Operating Abroad
s translate, practically speaking, when you find yourself either forward deployed or permanently stationed in Southeast Asia as part of this rebalancing and you are trying to further the goal of building bilateral and multilateral relationships? While we often think of diplomacy as an activity that occurs at the strategic level, real progress advances one person and conversation at a time.In the last decade, our Navy and armed forces have become more expeditionary with increased interaction occurring at junior levels, whether sailors are operating with a foreign navy during an exercise or on liberty during a foreign port visit. With that in mind, the following are a few lessons I learned after living and working in Southeast Asia for almost three years.
Don’t Generalize
Southeast Asia is a diverse operating environment. Encompassing approximately 1.6 million square miles, its countries include Brunei, Cambodia, Christmas Island, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Singapore, and has a population of almost 400 million. Although 40 percent practice Islam (with majorities in Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia), Buddhism, Christianity, and Hinduism are also widely practiced. Each country has at least one official language, but many countries in Southeast Asia have hundreds of other languages and dialects. Cultural differences within a single country that may seem subtle to you can be glaringly obvious to your Southeast Asian counterpart.
So you must be a student of each country. Take the time to learn at least its basic history and understand the ethnic, linguistic, and religious demographics of your assigned location. You should also be familiar with the history of the United States’ and U.S. military’s relationship with that country. By not making generalizations about the region, you will avoid making potentially offensive oversimplifications.
I once overheard an American comment to a Singaporean of Chinese ethnicity that after having completed a tour in Japan he felt he had a pretty good handle on the Asian experience. Although the American probably did not mean to offend with his comment, a bit more sensitivity to the history of Japan in Singapore and Chinese/Japanese cultural differences would have avoided the uncomfortable silence that followed his comment. Remember, it is better to ask than to assume.
Reflect On Your Biases
We are all products of our environment. Think about where you come from, how you were raised to think, and whether and how that has changed throughout your life. Recognize that if you were raised in a small town in the Midwest in the United States, the way you view the world will probably be very different from someone raised in Bangkok. It is important to acknowledge that our biases will have an impact on our personal and professional interactions with our counterpart/host nation. Be honest with yourself about your biases, whether positive or negative, and be prepared to challenge them frequently.
I am fortunate to have enjoyed military engagement opportunities during exercises with foreign navies in a number of countries, but I carried biases with me. For instance, before participating in the Military Operations (MILOPS) Symposium as part of Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) 2011 in Bangladesh, I assumed that its navy would be limited based on some of the challenges this resource-constrained and heavily populated nation has experienced over the years relative to a “first world” military. Quite the contrary, Bangladesh, despite having over 40 percent of its population living below the poverty line, had one of the most professional cadre of officers with whom I have ever had the pleasure of working.
MILOPS discussions, which can range from the Law of Armed Conflict to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, can sometimes result in one-sided lectures when host-nation navies have never been exposed to the material or when language or cultural barriers prove insurmountable despite translators. During a maritime-interdiction operations discussion at Bangladesh’s Chittagong naval base, which had not previously generated too many questions or comments during previous CARAT phases in the region, my Bangladeshi counterparts very articulately challenged me during several of the discussions.
They asked why the United States has failed to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea even though we proclaim it as codification of international law. They questioned the validity of ship boardings pursuant to bilateral boarding agreements as part of the Proliferation Security Initiative. Their queries frankly reflected a greater degree of subject matter understanding than ones I have received from an American-only audience of lawyers and operators. It turns out a good percentage of the Bangladeshi audience had taken some sort of course at the U.S. Naval War College.
Recognize Host-Nation Biases
Although it is important to reflect on your own assumptions, the analysis of your relationships with counterparts/host nation would not be complete without reflecting on what biases they may have about Americans or even about the role of the U.S. military. Their assumptions will have as significant an impact on your interactions as your own.
Does your counterpart think of the U.S. military as aggressors in the region, a meddling party with no valid stake there, a stabilizing force, or a combination of the three? Are there regional tensions or mistrust among neighbors? Could their view on the roles of a military officer differ from yours? All of these questions are worthy ones to consider as you prepare to engage internationally.
During the first MILOPs in the remote Ream Naval Base near Sihanoukville, Cambodia, as part of CARAT in 2010, my American colleague was leading a discussion on the Law of Armed Conflict when he posed a classic scenario meant to illustrate the difference between lawful and unlawful orders to the mixed American/Cambodian audience, after he had made the point that lawful orders must be followed and that unlawful orders must be questioned or not followed. He asked the audience for a show of hands on who would obey their commander’s order to kill a village of innocent civilians.
Many Americans in the audience smirked at what they felt was such a ridiculously basic scenario and none of us raised our hand. Imagine our surprise when all of the Cambodian officers raised theirs. After they noticed their American counterparts had not raised theirs, there was a flurry of animated discussion among themselves in Khmer that I did not understand. After a couple of minutes, though, one of the Cambodian officers raised his hand and clarified, “We would first verify that we did not misunderstand our commander’s order, then we would shoot the civilians.” Clearly, our emphasis on international human rights norms and the Cambodians’ emphasis on resolutely following orders drove us to very different conclusions.
Show Interest
Express an interest in learning about your counterpart’s Navy, professional track, culture, language, family, etc., and focus on similarities instead of differences. This will not only enhance the quality of your engagement, but it will also leave you with some unforgettable and personally rewarding experiences.
I fondly recall the time that after noting that my counterpart at Sattahip Naval Base near Pattaya, Thailand, would pause before a Buddhist statue during a planning conference, I asked through a translator how Thai officers worship Buddha during the work day. He then drove me to the top of a hill and demonstrated how he worshipped at a Buddhist shrine.
Or the time when my Brunei Navy counterparts took me around town and showed me a famous mosque, their national museum, and discussed how Sharia law is applied in everyday life in Brunei. Or the time when another Thai Navy counterpart told me about how she had been forced to move onto a base two hours from Bangkok because crocodiles invaded her living room after severe flooding.
It is also quite helpful to learn some key phrases. Although it is unrealistic to expect that all naval officers would become fully conversant in all the various languages spoken in Southeast Asia, it is not unreasonable to push oneself to learn the basic phrases—“hello,” “please,” “thank you,” “what is your name,” “my name is”—that are sure to show your counterparts or hosts that you are interested. Even if you botch the pronunciation, use of these key phrases during your first interactions with your counterpart will more likely than not break the ice.
Avoid Faux Pas
Regional/country faux pas are best learned by asking those who have been operating there before you. Understanding these are probably the most important turnover item of all. For example:
• American work norms are often different from those in many countries in Southeast Asia. Don’t rush straight to the professional/work-related items without having paid attention to pleasantries. The relationship comes before work. Be patient when coffee breaks last longer than working groups or when your counterpart does not show up until after lunch.
• Take cues from your counterparts. Do they stand when they present or do they sit? How do they address you and each other? Do they hand business cards with two hands? How do they hold their utensils? Do they consider it to be rude to ask questions during a presentation?
• Don’t expect everyone to speak English outside of English-speaking countries.
• Be aware of gender-appropriate interactions.
• If invited to break bread, eat what you are given even if it does not look particularly appetizing.
The world is becoming increasingly smaller and connected. To meet the demands of a flatter, faster world amid smaller ship numbers, every member of the Navy–Marine Corps team needs to be an engaged and savvy ambassador. Hopefully these tips will help those who are not only engaging in Southeast Asia, but across the globe as well.
Highlighting Coalition Cooperation
On a calm and starry night 600 nautical miles off the coast of Florida, the survival of German submarine tender FGS Main is at stake. She has to make for the open sea through an inlet 50 nautical miles long and at its narrowest stretch only little more than 20 nautical miles wide, knowing that the U.S. fast-attack submarine USS Norfolk (SSN-714) is hunting her. Although she doesn’t have the conventional protection of several antisubmarine warfare (ASW)-capable ships to screen her advance, she does have the backing of the USS Roosevelt (DDG-80). And the Roosevelt has uncommon support at her disposal: the German military research vessel Planet, equipped with an active/passive low-frequency towed-array sonar (LFTAS); the U-32, a German-type 212A submarine; and, in addition to two embarked MH-60R Seahawk helicopters, constant coverage by U.S. and German maritime patrol reconnaissance aircraft. Together they will deny the Norfolk a clear shot.
A Successful Training Exercise
This situation was the April 2013 Tactical Development Exercise (TACDEVEX 5-13) scenario. One of the focal exercises of the German Submarine Squadron’s 195-day Western Atlantic (WESTLANT) deployment to the U.S. East Coast, its main objective was to use ASW warfare technologies to fight a submerged opponent from a distance. TACDEVEX’s overarching motivation, however, was to integrate German and American submarine and ASW forces in a coalition effort to hone each other’s skills in facing modern low-signature and air-independent submarines operating in confined waters, one of the future’s most daunting threats.
The German submarine force has years of experience in operating submarines, from the shallow waters of the Baltic and Norwegian seas to the eastern Mediterranean Sea. With four fuel-cell-powered 212A-class submarines belonging to the squadron and two more boats undergoing pre-acceptance trials, the German Navy knows firsthand how hard it is to fight modern air-independent conventional boats. Capable of submerged operations in as little as 60 feet of water, they have an endurance of several weeks and are virtually undetectable by passive means. Air-independent propulsion (AIP) may not yet give conventional submarines the sustained speed and endurance of a nuclear submarine, but it does relieve them from needing to snorkel, which makes them less susceptible to visual or radar detection. At the same time, a conventional AIP boat has the advantage over an attack submarine with a significantly smaller acoustic—and, in the case of U-212A, magnetic—signature. Armed with fiber optic-wire-guided long-range and high-velocity torpedoes, U-212A poses a threat at distances hardly foreseen by standard ASW-tactics.
The only option for fighting this opponent is to coordinate far-reaching active acoustic sensors, fixed- and rotary-wing ASW, and long-range ASW weapons. In numerous exercises in European waters, German and NATO ASW forces experienced situations in which the long-range ASW weapons’ modern low-frequency sonars and fiber-wire-guided torpedoes could not be harnessed, no effective airborne or force ASW weapons were available, or submarine ASW weapons could not be brought to bear due to restrictions within the water space management or a lack of procedures and doctrine. So the German submarine squadron developed ideas and concepts for new ways to better employ submarine sensors and weapons in a force ASW effort, both tactically and technically.
The WESTLANT deployment to the East Coast of the United States provided the necessary means and capabilities to bring these to the test in a tactical scenario. With the vessels and aircraft of the German Task Group TG421.04; U.S. Navy surface, subsurface, and airborne assets; and the command and control (C2) provided by the COMDESRON 22 staff embarked on the Roosevelt, reinforced by German officers and senior chiefs, TACVDEVEX provided the critical mass required.
Working Together
The C2 backbone, preparatory staff work, and tactical leadership of COMDESRON 22 personnel held the elements of TACDEVEX together. In a dense schedule of 160-plus coordinated standard ASW exercise hours distributed over only ten days’ effective exercise time, COMDESRON 22 and CTG421.04 went from basic submarine-tracking exercises to free plays with deceptive screening and restrictive emission-control plans.
The substantial investment both navies made as well as the uniqueness of the opportunity to assemble such a variety of assets demanded that particular heed be given to analysis and evaluation. In a remarkably trusting and congenial collaboration of German and U.S. forces, this process was pushed through in an exemplary manner. This allowed the In-stride Debriefing Team of the German submarine squadron embarked on the Main to prepare a full-scale reconstruction of all ASW-action in all three dimensions already at sea with a minimum time lapse to the exercise.
The helpful data provided by both sides disproved the preconception that NATO partners can be reluctant to exchange tactical information. In fact, the reconstruction and analysis of TACDEVEX are a prime example of what can be accomplished with limited means if all sides collaborate.
Lessons Learned
The ranges at which LFTAS on the Planet could detect and track both submarines—even when both targets’ tracks merged—provided the ASW commander with a valuable range advantage. By taking the cue from LFTAS, he could employ airborne ASW assets more effectively, not only reducing buoy expenditure but also limiting the risk of giving away the force’s intentions by the tactical behavior of airborne assets. Repeatedly during prior exercises since arriving on the East Coast, U-32 had been able to divine the next leg of the force’s track simply through analyzing the buoy patterns dropped by flying assets.
Perhaps even more noteworthy is how the ASW team of COMDESRON 22 put U-32 to use against the opposing U.S. Navy nuclear attack submarine. Conventional wisdom has it that non-nuclear boats are too slow to be of any use in protective ASW, particularly as passive detection ranges between submarines rarely exceed a couple thousand yards. Even in confined waters, the trouble of getting the water space management right and organizing communications seemed somehow not worth the effort of having a further asset whose range of detection resembled that of a sonobuoy.
TACDEVEX, however, has shown that a modern conventional submarine, slow or not, can significantly contribute to the ASW effort if it is combined with long-ranging active sensors. U-32 could be summoned to the surface and provided with target data and thus be employed as a responsive ASW asset well ahead of the force without inhibiting the tactical freedom of other assets: communications to bell ring, initiate target discrimination, or transmit target data were camouflaged using pre-defined sonar-signals from active sonobuoys or LFTAS on the Planet.
What is more, the tactical use of bistatic detections for target-motion analysis on the Norfolk was proven beyond any expectation. U-32, which was never equipped with her own active sonar, suddenly enjoyed the increased sensor range of the Planet’s array remaining silent.
Perhaps the most gratifying experience, especially for the two commanders at sea, was how seamlessly the two forces joined in the complex exercise. But having two different sets of only superficially congruent series of publications—NATO and U.S. Navy—did not make life any easier and led, understandably, to some astounded exclamations on both sides. Nevertheless, the staff integrated quite effortlessly with only two days of transit to the exercise area.
The exercise also shed light on our shortcomings. Despite all efforts within NATO to align communications standards and procedures, full-scale compatibility of satellite communications could not be resolved throughout the exercise, forcing the task group to revert to conventional terrestrial communications. This threatened to eliminate the tactical advantage gained by using low-frequency sonars in bistatic constellations with submarines. Weapons’ capabilities and sensor ranges have outrun our coalition’s means to communicate.
Likewise TACDEVEX has laid down the next steps. In bistatics, the obvious evolution is not only to mine a force’s sonar signals for target information, but any sonar signals in the area. Communicating with a submarine through predefined active pulses proved to be a viable means for coordination and should be further refined.
As the exercise demonstrated, even with nuclear-powered attack submarines and formidable surface and airborne ASW assets, it is very much desirable to have modern AIP submarines in your order-of-battle. But as long as allies can fight together with the efficiency, trust, and creativity that were displayed in TACDEVEX, you do not need to own them—you only need a friend to join you in the fight.
Commander Rackwitz joined the German Navy in 1991. He has served on German submarines since 1996 including as commanding officer of the U-24 and was commanding officer of 1 German Submarine Squadron, based in Eckernförde, Germany. During the Western Atlantic deployment he acted as commander of the German Task Group 421.04.
Non-Lethal Force: Options for U.S. Policy Makers
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has attained mixed results using the traditional instruments of national power to achieve policy goals. Because of changes in the geopolitical environment and America’s domestic problems, their application may be even less effective in the future.
However, advances in technology have given rise to a new family of military capabilities that present viable non-lethal options to policymakers. While non-lethal force, derived from information-based, non-lethal, or directed energy/laser weapons, is not a substitute for war, military leaders should consider how and when non-lethal options could serve as effective instruments of coercion outside the traditional warfighting paradigm.
The growing aversion to casualties during interstate conflicts must also be considered. During World War II hardly any Americans objected to the incineration of hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians, and throughout the Cold War few objected to the principle of killing on a wider scale in retaliation for a Soviet attack. Today, post-Cold War norms and Pentagon lawyers have put those ideas out of bounds and that type of thinking is no longer deemed legitimate.1
By the end of the Cold War, most realized the power derived from nuclear weapons had proved so awesome and destructive that their actual application became muscle-bound.2 Increased lethality and proliferation of technology may result in a similar dilemma for conventional weapons.3 In the future, the total cost of full-scale war among great power states may be so destructive that conventional military force will become taboo as well. State-level confrontations will have to be resolved through other means.
While the United States and its western allies may find it difficult to shift from their quest for overwhelming firepower, some states are exploring other options. As Dean Cheng of the Heritage Foundation notes,
Successful coercive psychological warfare is the realization of ends for which one is prepared to go to war without having to take that final step and engage in active, kinetic, destructive warfare. From the Chinese perspective, given the destructiveness of nuclear weapons and even conventional forces, there is also significant incentive to develop coercive psychological approaches in order to achieve strategic ends without having to resort to the use of force.4
These issues notwithstanding, the United States will likely attempt to maintain its status quo position in the international system.5 Our global role should be guided by the strategic concept of discriminant power and be far more judicious about the application of conventional military force. This will involve greater use of innovative, selective, and asymmetrical approaches.6 The application of non-lethal force is a natural fit for this emerging school of thought.
Outcomes of Non-Lethal Force
The ultimate goal of using military force is to achieve the objectives of the nation’s political leaders by compelling a target state to accept conditions. Historically this resulted in the loss of life and destruction of an adversary’s military materiel or civilian infrastructure. Under certain conditions, non-lethal force may be applied in a manner that could yield the same political outcomes—without the destructive effects. Some futurists even believe that because of advances in technology, future wars among states could be fought without the loss of human lives, and with less human involvment.7
The stuxnet attack on Iranian nuclear facilities in 2010 and the cyber-attack on Estonia’s financial network in 2007 show that states are already changing how they assert power. Some U.S. military experts recognize how non-lethal options could be used on a much broader scale.8 Specifically:
• Non-lethal force could provide flexible options between diplomacy and lethal force. Non-lethal force could avert an emerging crisis by creating time and space, control the level of violence, and fill the gap in the options between diplomatic and lethal force. It adds strength to sanctions and protects diplomatic efforts.
• Non-lethal force could allow for intervention at a lower threshold of conflict. Early intervention may reduce the cost of such actions and the risk of escalation and lethal destruction.
• Employment of non-lethal force is most effective as part of a synergistic strategy. The non-lethal strategy must be closely coordinated and executed in conjunction with the respective political and economic efforts. The combined effects produce a powerful, coercive tool to achieve national -policy goals without incurring the risks of traditional military actions.
The three different, but often overlapping, classes of non-lethal capabilities all offer great potential for the future, and their wider utility will challenge the conventional thinking on the use of military force. It should be noted that the U.S. Navy and the Marine Corps are largely the leaders for each non-lethal component. However, both services are under fiscal pressure to reduce their traditional capabilities. It is important to understand the full potential and limits of these capabilities before lethal for non-lethal tradeoffs occur.
Overview of Options
The United States has historically used its power to induce or coerce a target state into accepting conditions aligned to America’s policy goals. Some experts suggest the United States should rethink its traditional approaches to how it pursues its foreign policy objectives. As Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen note in Foreign Affairs,
Democratic governments will most likely be tempted to further their national interests through the same combination of defense, diplomacy, and development on which they relied during the Cold War and the decades after. But these traditional tools will not be enough: although it remains uncertain exactly how the spread of technology will change governance, it is clear that old solutions will not work in this new era.9
American presidents from John F. Kennedy to Barack Obama have expressed dissatisfaction with their military options during periods of interstate tension.10 In part, this can be attributed not only to a flawed planning system, but also to the fact that very few options below the lethal threshold existed. Non-lethal force could be used in a variety of scenarios where coercion is required to achieve favorable outcomes. It is important to consider the full potential of weapon systems of the future and not the current state of technology. As scientists have noted, there is a great deal of trade space between our current engineering practices and the limits of physical laws. The following examples describe how non-lethal force could be applied as a coercive instrument in the future maritime environment.
Electromagnetic blockade. In April 2007, a series of cyber-attacks were conducted against Estonian government websites, media websites, and online banking services. The attacks came the day after a Soviet-era war memorial was removed from the Estonian capital, Tallinn. The attacks continued intermittently for ten days and primarily focused on the financial industry. Ninety-four percent of all financial transactions in Estonia occur online and were crippled during these attacks.11 The national economy virtually came to a standstill. Similarly, in April 2010, Internet traffic from U.S. federal agencies was unknowingly rerouted to servers in China. Information from the U.S. Senate, all four military services, the Secretary of Defense, and other federal agencies was affected.12 It can be assumed the United States has similar capabilities to deny communications as well; how and when to apply this form of non-lethal force must be fully considered in national policy debates.
Offshore control enforcement. One strategy currently being discussed for the unwelcome scenario of a military conflict with China is offshore control. At the heart of this strategy is the ability to intercept and divert the supertankers and post-Panamax containers essential to China’s economy.13 Disrupting navigation systems, disabling computers or control systems, or even incapacitating the ship’s crew could provide viable options below the use of conventional military force.
Conflict termination: If military tension at sea escalates, the United States may be faced with intervening in small-scale naval skirmishes in support of critical allies. Ship-mounted non-lethal capabilities could be used to terminate or suppress an incident by disabling weapons or communications systems of one or both belligerents. In future state-level conflicts, maintaining regional stability may replace the traditional notion of winning. By reducing casualties by whatever means possible, adversaries may be more acceptable to terms of termination of conflict while minimizing resistance and animosity that destabilizes the situation.14
Wide-area denial. Several small sparsely populated islands in the Pacific could be the impetus for military conflict in the future. Most notably the Spratly Island chain and Senkakus are of primary concern. Should these become the object of military occupation, non-lethal force could be used to temporarily prevent occupation or incapacitate the occupiers of the disputed territory.
Despite being a dominant power for the past several decades, the United States has achieved mixed results in attaining political goals through the use of national power. In the future, the traditional instruments of power may prove even less effective for a variety of internal and external factors. The growing aversion to human casualties and the increased lethality of conventional weapon systems may result in strategic paralysis and limit military options available to U.S. policy makers. Emerging non-lethal capabilities in the form of information operations, non-lethal weapons, and directed-energy weapons offer great potential. Non-lethal force will fill a critical gap between sanctions and conventional military force when U.S. political goals require coercive action.
1. David Rothkopf, “The Cool War,” Foreign Policy, 20 February 2013, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/20/the_cool_war_china_cyberwar.
2. Joseph Nye, “The Changing Nature of World Power,” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 105, no. 2 (Summer 1990), 177–92.
3. Shawn Brimley, “Strategy Technology, and the Next Disruption in Military Affairs,” Center for a New American Security, Brief, November 2013.
4. Dean Cheng, “Winning Without Fighting: The Chinese Psychological Warfare Challenge,” Backgrounder #2821 on Public Diplomacy, Heritage Foundation, July 2013.
5. Robert Kozloski, “The Danger of Power Shifts,” U.S. Naval Institute Blog, 14 January 2014.
6. Michael J. Mazarr, National Defense University Strategy Study Group, “Discriminate Power: A Strategy for a Sustainable National Security Posture,” Philadelphia Papers (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2013).
7. E. Eric Drexler, Radical Abundance: How a Revolution in Nanotechnology will Change Civilization (New York: Perseus, 2013) 260–2.
8. Joseph Siniscalchi, “Non-lethal Technologies: Implications for Military Strategy,” Occasional Paper 3 (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Center for Strategy and Technology, Air War College, March 1999), 31.
9. Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen, “The Digital Disruption-Connectivity and the Diffusion of Power,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 89 (2010), 76.
10. Janine Davidson, “Civil-Military Friction and Presidential Decision Making: Explaining the Broken Dialogue,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 43, no. 1, March 2013, 130–1.
11. John Kelley and Lauri Almann, “eWMDs,” Policy Review, 2009, 41.
12. US China Economic Commission, 2010 Annual Report, 244.
13. COL T. X. Hammes, USMC (Retired), “Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict,” INSS Strategic Forum No. 278, National Defense University, June 2012, 5.
14. John Alexander, Future War: Non-Lethal Weapons in Twenty-First Century Warfare, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 205.