Creeds and oaths are common throughout the military to motivate and drive esprit de corps. They remind us of higher and more fundamental purposes beyond the potentially mundane activities that fill a service member’s working life. As U.S. sailors recite the “Sailor’s Creed,” they proclaim to “represent the fighting spirit of the Navy and those who have gone before to preserve freedom and democracy around the world.” These words imply that warfighting is one of our core competencies and that it should be the crucial principle influencing our actions at all levels throughout the Navy. But is warfighting truly the essence of the Navy today?
The service has a long history of fighting and winning wars with tenacity and tactical aggressiveness. From John Paul Jones wanting a fast ship “to go in harm’s way” to Rear Admiral David Farragut damning the torpedoes to press the attack at Mobile Bay, to World War II submarine commander “Mush” Morton instructing second-in-command Richard O’Kane, during an attack to have tenacity and “stay with the bastard ’til he’s on the bottom,” the Navy’s spirit has been fighting. So many naval heroes sailed into harm’s way knowing they could die. They did it not because they were ordered to, but because it was in their essence to do so.
The physical appearance of the Fleet and how it operates has changed numerous times throughout history as a result of technical and tactical innovations. The introductions of steam propulsion, iron and steel warships, submarines, and aircraft carriers are only the most obvious ways in which the Navy has changed. The wooden sailing fleet that blockaded the Confederacy and bombarded key Southern cities during the Civil War is virtually unrecognizable from the fleet that roughly 80 years later decimated the Imperial Japanese Navy and hopped Marines from island to island to win the Pacific campaign in World War II, with the exception of one key aspect: the service’s fighting spirit.
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States has enjoyed nearly undisputed control of the seas. Without a challenging naval power, the Navy had to again evolve to maintain its relevance. Smaller regional conflicts such as those in Bosnia and the Middle East, the norm, do not require obtaining maritime superiority. Even so, the Navy has contributed by projecting power inland through strikes from aircraft and precision-guided munitions.
The service was in the past not just a delivery mechanism, but itself a weapon manned by warriors and wielded by our leaders whenever the call arose. The Navy brought the fight to the enemy, which is not the same as delivering effects. Both can contribute to success in conflict, but only one forges and emphasizes a fighting spirit, while the other can arguably be accomplished by any well-trained group of mariners.
The current transition in how wars are fought comes with a risk. Because the Navy has been used recently not as a weapon but as a very expensive delivery mechanism for projected power, there is no need for military leaders with a fighting spirit to man and command such platforms. All they need is technicians and managers.
Skill at writing personnel watch bills or efficiently and safely managing maintenance availabilities can prepare a ship to be at a given location at a set time, but it will not teach others to employ it in naval combat. Masking micromanagement as intrusive leadership may keep sailors out of trouble, but this type of direction does not inspire a crew to sail into a fight as a team to confront a comparable threat and assume whatever risk is necessary to preserve the safety and security of the nation.
Technical and managerial skills are extremely important tools in our modern Fleet. Navy leadership should use them, but they should never become the sole or even the primary standard by which career-influencing evaluation is conducted.
If an ability is not practiced, atrophy sets in. If the Navy does not reemphasize bringing the fight to the enemy, our fighting spirit will continue to fade. If in the future naval combat means achieving maritime superiority as well as projecting power, we will be unprepared.