In December 2012, the then-Chief of the Italian Navy, Admiral Luigi Binelli Mantelli (now Chief of the Italian Joint Defense Staff), highlighted several measures to reorient the service according to evolving geopolitical conditions and a period of budget austerity. He released a document titled Changing for Growing, offering analysis and discussion on several naval issues. Additional details were provided in the yearly Italian Navy’s Report, published in January 2013, and confirmed by the current Chief of the Italian Navy, Admiral Giuseppe De Giorgi.
Italy, like other European nations, has been obliged to drastically reduce its public spending to face the global economic crisis. Thus, the Italian defense budget has been thoroughly scrutinized to find and implement measures needed to pursue two objectives: first, rebalancing the expenditures across personnel, operations, maintenance, and procurement; second, maintaining efficiency in the military as a whole and improving interoperability with other forces and nations.
The first objective is mainly centered on reducing total military in-service personnel from 180,000 to 150,000 over a 10-year period (including major reductions in flag posts) and diverting saved money for operations, maintenance, and procurement purposes. The second objective is aimed at eliminating overlapping and duplication, trying to decrease the ratio between the total military personnel and forces deployed for operations, mostly abroad. Another measure closely related with the first objective is the downsizing of operational forces and the reorganization of infrastructures, to be achieved through functional integration and rationalization of existing commands. As far as the Italian Navy is concerned, the current strength of about 34,000 personnel will be gradually reduced to a level of about 27,000 men and women by 2024.
Roles and Operations
The two key roles for the Italian Navy are maritime defense of national interests and contribution to international efforts aimed at solving conflicts and crisis. These roles are broken down into several functions and missions carried out by the Italian fleet in a geographical theater that spans the Mediterranean Sea to the western Indian Ocean and includes critical areas such as the Horn of Africa, the Persian Gulf, and the North Arabian Sea. Since the 1980s, the Italian Navy has been operating in these maritime areas with allied navies and forces.
The Italian Navy operated in many circumstances to safeguard national interests, either autonomously or jointly with other services or agencies, and within NATO- and EU-led forces. During 2012, Italian warships totaled an operational tempo of about 65,000 hours, while naval aircraft totaled more than 12,000 flight hours, a marked increase compared with recent yearly figures. More specifically, Italian surface combatants, submarines, and minehunters provided an enduring contribution to the NATO-led antiterrorism maritime activities in the Mediterranean, an amphibious ship and several patrol vessels and frigates contributed to the monitoring of refugees from North Africa, and a technical-support team was deployed to Libya as part of reconstruction activities overseen by the United Nations, thus helping recovery of wrecked vessels sunken in some Libyan ports.
In the Red Sea, three Italian coastal vessels operating under the U.N.-led Multinational Force of Observers patrolled the Strait of Tiran to enforce the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, an ongoing mission since 1982. In the Indian Ocean, the Italian Navy contributed to antipiracy operations within EU-led (Operation Atalanta) and NATO-led (Operation Ocean Shield) task forces. In some cases, the Italian Navy provided the flagship and the staff to command and control those operations. Last but not least, in Afghanistan the Italian Navy’s marine infantry and special forces operated within units of the International Security Assistance Force.
Downsizing . . . but Enhancing Capabilities
Dwindling financial resources have caused several changes and postponements in the Italian fleet’s major procurement programs, but the most disturbing issue will be a drastic reduction of warships. Unfortunately, the anticipated service retirement of older vessels seems the only approach that would allow for the concentration of available (albeit scarce) resources on other priority requirements.
The Italian Navy has planned to retire 30 combatant and support vessels between 2012 and 2018, including 7 frigates, 2 submarines, 6 corvettes, 3 minehunters, and 12 major and minor auxiliaries. Many of these warships have a remaining service life of about seven years, but their retirement was the only option to ensure resources would be available for the effective operation and maintenance of the newer vessels. In the same time frame, only eight new warships will be commissioned in the Italian Navy. Therefore, the objective is to increase efficiency and effectiveness by replacing quantity with quality.
In a reduced Italian fleet a number of important decisions have been made to improve force projection and deployability. The Italian landing force, an organic component of the fleet, has been strengthened. The Brigade San Marco, the Navy’s marine force, currently is composed of three regiments; each of them is specialized for a specific function, but the entire brigade might be used as a single, agile, fully deployable unit.
In addition, synergy is being enhanced between the Italian Army and Navy. The two services reached a formal agreement in late 2012 so that the Army has begun training its pilots to operate A-129 Mangusta (“mongoose”) attack helicopters from the flight decks of Italian surface combatants. It is noteworthy that the Army’s helicopters (both Mangusta and CH-47 Chinook) already operated from Italian warships in 1995, as part of Italy’s contribution to the final withdrawal of U.N.-mandated coalition contingents from Somalia. However, doctrine and tactics have evolved since then, while two versions of a new type of medium helicopter, the NH-90, are entering service with the Italian Navy and the Army. Moreover, the Brigade San Marco has been training with a similar Army regiment, thus establishing a so-called “power-projection national capability,” a descriptor used to identify a brigade-sized landing unit that can be deployed from the sea.
Three Hubs
The Italian Navy has also decided to downsize its territorial posture because it does not meet real requirements. However, this process has been intertwined with a reorganization of training and logistic structures that seems to reflect a different approach.
The Italian Navy’s organization was shaped so as to concentrate most resources into three major hubs: La Spezia (Northern Italy), Taranto/Brindisi (Southern Italy), and Augusta/Catania (Sicily), each of them including a naval base, a naval shipyard, and a naval air station. Other relevant structures in Rome (the Navy Staff), in Leghorn (the Naval Academy), in Ancona, in Venice, and in Sardinia are notable exceptions to the “three-hubs” rule. In addition, six naval maritime districts, each commanded by a three- or two-star admiral, have territorial responsibilities along the Italian coasts and islands and operate a few minor auxiliary units.
The reorganization process being implemented since 2013 will cut at least one maritime district and reorient other districts as geographical logistic commands (north and south). This move includes two additional major measures: the establishment of a new three-star Logistic Command in Naples, responsible for naval shipyards and geographical logistic commands, and the creation of a new three-star School Command, based in Ancona and responsible for the activities of currently existing Navy schools and education centers.
All these measures are fully consistent with a much-needed process of streamlining the “tail” of the Italian Navy, and in accordance with the reduction of personnel, especially in the higher ranks. However, it seems that the approach does not fully match with the principle of concentration on existing structures. In fact, the establishment of the Logistic Command has moved personnel and equipment from Rome to Naples and was aimed at exploiting infrastructures previously used by NATO. (The new Logistic Command is physically based in the buidling that hosted the NATO Maritime Component Command.)
A similar consideration applies to the School Command in Ancona, because supervision of training and education was performed earlier by a dedicated three-star department located within the Italian Navy’s central organization in Rome. It seems that these measures involve more of a boost of Navy “presence” across Italy rather than the claimed concentration of resources in the three hubs. This is all the more so if one considers the current locations for training and education purposes, including the Naval Academy (in Leghorn), the Navy officers’ postgraduate school (in Venice), two NCO schools (in Taranto and at La Maddalena, at opposite locations on the Italian peninsula), and one center for Navy personnel’s preliminary selection (in Ancona). Thus, it would have been more logical to establish a School Command in Rome, aggregate education and training of officers in Leghorn, and unify the NCO schools into a single campus in Taranto.
As far as the three hubs are concerned, the evolving changes in the geopolitical arena have drastically diminished the operational importance of La Spezia, where four frigates, a few logistical and support vessels, and all minehunters are homeported and supported by a naval shipyard. (The naval air station for this hub is located at Luni, about 40 miles from La Spezia.) In addition, La Spezia is the provisional homeport for new warships constructed at nearby Fincantieri shipyards. Thus it seems logical to reorient the entire role of the La Spezia–centered hub by moving combatants and major auxiliaries to Taranto and Augusta and leaving only minehunters and minor support vessels at La Spezia. The naval shipyard should be downsized and reorganized for supporting both remaining vessels and newly constructed warships and also be made usable by private maritime companies and organizations.
Modernization Efforts, Future Projects
A partial replacement of warships being decommissioned in the 2013–18 time frame would be achieved by commissioning only nine new vessels. The most important program for surface combatants currently carried out by the Italian Navy is named FREMM, an acronym standing for Fregata Europea Multi-Missione (European multimission frigates). Italy’s FREMM initiative involves ten vessels. Two of them, the Carlo Bergamini and Virginio Fasan, have been commissioned, while four others are in various stages of construction and fitting out. There are two versions of these 5,800-ton frigates, one for antisubmarine warfare and one devoted to land attack. Both designs are being improved with the installation of active phased-array radar and longer-range surface-to-air missiles to achieve an extended self-defense capability. Eight Bergamini-class FREMM frigates are already funded, while funds for the last two units could be allocated in future budget laws.
The FREMM program is being managed through a bilateral cooperation between Italy and France under the aegis of OCCAR, the European armaments cooperation organization established in 2001. However, the design of the Italian frigates has very few similarities to the French ones, with little commonality and two strikingly different profiles. (The varying features of the French and Italian FREMM frigates can be compared with the U.S. littoral combat ship program, from which two different classes—Freedom and Independence—have evolved.) In addition, the program-management approach chosen for this very loose cooperation is based on two different construction and support contracts; an OCCAR program management division based in Paris includes two dissimilar functional components (one Italian and one French) and is linked with an Italian branch based in Rome. Due to this bizarre scenario, a cost/benefit analysis should be performed that may conclude the Italian Navy could continue a more efficient management of its Bergamini-class program by a fully national organization.
Projects on Tap, Funding Delayed
Another new construction program is related to Todaro-class submarines. The Italian undersea force includes four boats: two Todaro-class units are already in service, while two additional similar units in 2017–18 will replace the older Sauro-class (fourth-batch) boats. The design of these submarines is the outcome of cooperation between Italy and Germany that commenced in the early 1990s and resulted in the U-212A submarine project. These boats are equipped with state-of-the-art systems, including modern acoustic sensors and weapons, and an air-independent propulsion system based on fuel cells.
The modernization plans for the Italian Navy also include several new projects; the most immediate priorities are related to offshore-patrol, amphibious, and auxiliary vessels, but funding has been delayed over time. Therefore, the Italian Navy is continuing to update two projects: a multi-role support vessel designed to perform submarine and diving support and hydro-oceanographic activities; and a logistic support ship badly needed to replace two fleet-replenishment units that entered service in the 1970s.
Another area of concern is the amphibious component. The Italian Navy operates three 8,000-ton LHD-type amphibious-assault ships that were commissioned in the 1980s and ’90s, with a total lift capability of about 1,000 troops. Although equipped with a well dock for LCM-type landing craft and a hangar/garage, embarked helicopters cannot be accommodated in the hangar. Being aware of the increasing importance of amphibious power projection, the Italian Navy has planned to bolster its amphibious fleet for a long time, but budget priorities have shifted the start of new construction programs. The creation of the Navy’s marine infantry brigade and the boost of power-projection capabilities provided by the deployability of Army helicopters and amphibious units from Navy ships have to be matched with a significant increase of amphibious-lift capabilities.
To achieve this objective, the Italian Navy had established plans for the construction of three 20,000-ton LHD-type ships (each capable of embarking 700 troops and 5–6 helicopters) and one LHA-type ship of similar size tasked also for command-and-control functions. But funding is currently not available. A partial gap-filler is being implemented by operating the light aircraft carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi (C-550) as an interim LHA vessel, equipping her with an air wing entirely composed of helicopters, including about 12 troop-carrying AW-101s. The Garibaldi is already equipped to perform command-and-control functions for Commander Amphibious Task Force/Commander Landing Force roles.
However, the near-term objective remains the replacement of older major combatants, corvettes, and patrol vessels, although not on a one-for-one basis. Therefore, a design for a multi-role offshore patrol vessel has been developed with an eye toward additional non-military capabilities such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. This new ship is referred to as a dual-use combatant. The range and speed requirements of both homeland and expeditionary tasks (antipiracy, etc.) are being factored into design-element considerations, and two variants being built from the same hull is a possibility. Studies for this new dual-use combatant are being conducted with different configurations of machinery, weapons, and sensors. All concepts have in common an aft flight-deck/hangar configuration for medium helicopters and/or unmanned aerial vehicles and a mission-modular bay located beneath the flight deck for operations with manned and unmanned systems.
To avoid a dangerous block-obsolescence of the fleet, the Italian Navy has defined an organic plan for financing and building new warships in a ten-year time frame. The 2014 Italian budget law recently approved by the Parliament includes provisions that ensure funding for the construction of several new warships, although not according to the overall requirements of the Navy. Therefore, it is important that in the near future a proper rebalance among operational, support, and territorial organizations takes place so that financial resources can be adequately used.
Toward a New Italian Military?
Since the establishment of the Italian armed services, budget allocations have been decided in accordance with a hierarchy that has always privileged the Army and penalized the Navy, a trend following World War II and through Italy’s longstanding participation in NATO. The geopolitical landscape that emerged from the end of the Cold War has not changed this trend, despite a remarkable involvement of Italian naval forces in crises and conflicts that have occurred in Italy’s areas of interest. After all, Italy is a peninsula with 5,000 miles of coastline, surrounded by many islands and archipelagos. With most of its import/export traffic traveling by sea, Italy’s geostrategic interests are unquestionably maritime interests, because of the reliance of the Italian economy on maritime trade in stable and secure regions not only in the Mediterranean but also farther afield.
Therefore, consideration should be given to a new approach, in which a future Italian military would be sized and funded in accordance with those geostrategic maritime interests, with a potential change to the Army-Navy hierarchy. It is time for Italy’s political and military leadership to define a new model of development for Italian forces, one that enhances jointness and defines budget allocations in accordance with affordable real-world requirements and capabilities, thus meeting geopolitical objectives.