The Marine Corps currently has nine geographic component commands and three “type” functional component commands. Over the past decade the service has expanded and codified these commands to provide component responsibilities to the nation’s combatant commanders (CCDR). However, the Marine Corps does not retain adequate resources, fiscal or personnel, to properly perform this function. In addition, the situation is quickly getting much worse. Our Corps will soon be well under 180,000 Marines and any excess money is already gone. In addition, we have created a larger and more serious problem by operating these component commands: The Corps has marched away from its Navy brothers. Current examination and efforts to reorganize these commands are steps in the right direction, however, reshuffling the deck chairs on the Titanic will not solve the problem. Our most severe problem, related to component structure, is leaving the Navy behind because of our desire to be “the big dog on the block.” Our historical approach to components is wrong for two reasons. First, we are not the big dog, and we will never have the personnel, general officers, or fiscal resources to mirror the other services’ component commands. Second, we are inextricably tied to the Navy.
We don’t have to maintain our current course regarding component capability. There is a smarter, cheaper, and more effective way to provide both Fleet commanders and CCDRs with sound component support regarding Marine force employment, capabilities, and utilization: Consolidate our ineffective component headquarters and strengthen support to the Fleet commands.
Who Are We?
Although Marines, we are naval in character. Marine officers are naval officers. We have spent over ten years ashore assisting the U.S. Army in two major counterinsurgencies, and those wars are now over or ending. Our future is tied, as always, to the U.S. Navy. Many former and current Marines have complained, “The Navy does not understand what we do!” How could it? We have created or renovated our own buildings, staffed them with Marine Corps personnel, and pursued our own agenda. Some of this has been a clear attempt to subvert existing command relationships with our Navy counterparts. We provide lip service to supporting the Navy–Marine Corps team, but in reality we have been marching to our own tune, believing the good of the Corps and employment of our forces and our desires to be more important than the goals of the Fleet and in some cases, even higher commands.
The Fleet Anti-Terrorism Support Teams (FAST) and Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) belong to the Fleet commander. However, instead of supporting the proper training, movement, support, and employment of those forces, in concert with the Fleet, we have focused on creating staffs with their own desires for employment of our expeditionary forces. Their attempts to “out-staff” the Navy and thereby achieve “virtual operational control” are out of step with the Fleet, unhelpful to all, and ultimately detrimental to the Corps.
The best-recruited and -trained Marine is worthless if not employed correctly, and we cannot do it without the Navy. Although we have numerous mission sets and ongoing initiatives, both ashore and without specific Navy equities, we are an important part of the Department of the Navy. Neither of our services can operate independent of the other. The Navy cannot “employ” us correctly, or its own forces, without our advice and expertise, and vice versa. We must immediately invest our brightest personnel, in the right military occupation specialties (MOS), with the right experience, to the commanders of the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th Fleets. By integrating our personnel into the Fleet commands and throughout their staffs—Future Ops, Current Ops, Maritime Operations Centers, Logistics, Future Plans, Assessments, Aviation, Ground Ops, . . . etc.—we will leverage access, collaboration, influence, and relevance within their areas of responsibility (AORs).
Our nation must retain prepared conventional forces, most important of which is a capable and ready Navy. While we must expand our collaboration with special-operations forces and the interagency (the only way to effectively engage counterterrorism) we cannot forget who we are. As maritime soldiers-of-the-sea, we owe it to our Corps, the Navy, and our nation to execute “to the rear march.” We are not the most relevant and effective, regardless of mission, when separated from the Navy. Indeed, the complete opposite is true.
Relationships Are Everything
In the summer of 2009 the USS Bataan (LHD-5) was departing the Red Sea after almost 60 days on station. She had been stuck in a Gator Box for months due to an outbreak of swine flu. Although only a severe form of the regular flu and less dangerous than other strains, it was still not well regarded in the Middle East. Finally clean of infection, the ship set sail for the Persian Gulf for a scheduled operation in Kuwait.
Both the amphibious ready group and Marine expeditionary unit (ARG and MEU) commanders were eager to get the sailors and Marines off the ship for a few days’ liberty prior to the exercise in Kuwait. The ARG/MEU had been involved in training ashore and afloat with Jordan prior to the flu outbreak, and most personnel had not received liberty for almost two months. How does one get a ship, previously infected with a globally feared and regionally despised disease into port, within a week, without previous coordination?
I was the MEU future-operations and liaison officer (LNO) to the 5th Fleet, Future Operations (FOPS)/Combined Task Force 51/59 (CTF-51/59). I was located in the “LNO pit” surrounded by the LNOs to the carrier, missile defense of the region, U.S. Army Central, Horn of Africa, Theater Special Operations, and Combined Air Operations Center located in Qatar. Over the preceding months, I had developed a good relationship with Commander Dino Petrantino, who was the deputy FOPS for the 5th Fleet. When I asked Dino if the Bataan could come into port, he thought for a few moments and said, “Okay.” The ship’s scheduler made the adjustment on a PowerPoint slide. The Bataan pulled in a few days later, and 4,000 Marines and sailors received three days of well-deserved liberty.
A component command was not required to assist the afloat Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) and ARG. It was the established relationships within the Fleet Headquarters that made this event happen; FOPS knew they would get straight and timely answers from me, their MEU LNO. The atmosphere within the office was one team/one fight. Numerous issues were resolved for both sides within FOPS without problems being sent down to Expeditionary Strike Group-2, out to the ship, back to ESG-2 and finally returned to FOPS. In concert with the amphibious squadron LNO, most issues, problems, and concerns never left Bahrain. Resolution occurred in-house at the fleet.
When Marine Corps Forces Central Command (Forward)—MARCENT (Fwd)—personnel moved aboard the Naval Support Activity, it was a different story. Housed in a separate building, their actions and efforts centered on how to gain “virtual” operational and tactical control of the MEU. Instead of collaborating, they marched smartly to their own tune, established their agenda, and sought numerous opportunities to establish/validate a reason for their existence. The price tag for 150 Marines stationed at Manama, Bahrain, in a temporary duty status was staggering. The first year’s per diem and lodging alone consumed $16 million. To what purpose has this served the Corps or our nation? The Marine Corps has poured money down a rabbit hole, planned in a vacuum, established a separate command center (not in assisting the upgrade of the 5th Fleet Maritime Operations Center), and caused additional reporting requirements and work for the afloat expeditionary forces. There is not a single event accomplished by MARCENT (Fwd) that could not have been executed from Tampa, Florida, in concert with an active presence within the 5th Fleet.
Institutional Paranoia
As the smaller naval service, the Marine Corps has always been guarded when considering structural changes and wary of interaction with our sister services. There is good reason, as numerous attempts have been made to disestablish the Corps. Rationale has varied from cost savings to alleged technological advances theoretically rendering our core competencies irrelevant. In the current era of severely constrained budgets, our leadership must remain vigilant and prepared to counter the arguments of the “bean counters” and other institutional enemies. However, our service’s strongest position of continued relevance and survival is our seamless integration and collaboration with the U.S. Navy.
While personalities at the highest levels may occasionally generate friction between our two services, in general, the Navy loves its Marines and greatly values our planning skills and successful execution in all manner of expeditionary operations. While debate over budget priorities will occur at the service level, relations and productivity between our services are usually best within the fleets. Tremendous synergy and positive accomplishments result from Marine and Navy planners working collaboratively, side by side, at the operational level. Although it’s understandable that we retain some institutional paranoia, we need not be wary of increased representation at the fleets. Increasing our presence within the fleet staffs only solidifies and enhances our position as a service and improves our readiness, performance, and overall capabilities.
Integrated Model
Increasing our presence at fleet commands fully meets the intent of the Commandant and Chief of Naval Operations guidance and fosters the relationships necessary to get the job done right. We need to consolidate our component commands and collaborate with the fleets. The right personnel provide the Marine Corps leverage, insight, and relevance and greatly enhance the employment of our expeditionary forces for the fleet commanders and CCDRs.
Approximately 25 personnel would be assigned per fleet/naval component headquarters. This not only assigns the right people to the fleet headquarters but allows the Marine Corps to use Navy “blue dollars” for work space, electricity, general facilities maintenance, and overhead. The Corps can support four Navy fleet commanders with approximately 100 active-duty personnel. A simple reorganization saves us 900 boat spaces (active/reserve and civilian), significant budgetary allocations for no longer required operations and maintenance (four physical sites) and provides a more efficient, rapid, flexible, collaborative planning and employment effort with the Navy.
The mission of the component headquarters is “to ensure Marine Corps forces meet all of the CCDRs’ requirements and are employed in accordance with their capabilities.” Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-40.8 (MCWP 3-40.8) on “Marine Corps Componency” claims the Corps component commanders “have assumed many of the planning, administrative, and logistical responsibilities that formally belonged to the MAGTF commanders serving within their respective AORs. This change has permitted those MAGTF commanders to focus more of their attention on operations.” That statement is not true. Having completed three deployments from 2008–12 with the 22d MEU, we served in 4th, 5th, and 6th Fleet AORs.
In every fleet, the components have demonstrated a lack of experience and ability to perform the basic functions listed here. In fact, they routinely caused more work for the MAGTF commander and his staff in most cases for provision of courses of action, appropriate orders, and daily reports. No value is gained for the ARG/MEU, special-purpose Marine air-ground task forces (SPMAGTFs) or the fleets from Marine Forces Europe, Africa, or South (MARFOREUR, MARFORAF, or MARFORSOUTH). In most cases, their contribution was to add confusion and duplicated requirements. Worse, MARCENT (Fwd) greatly increased dual reporting requirements and routinely tried to insert themselves in operational matters falling directly under the purview of ESG-5 and 5th Fleet/NAVCENT (Naval Forces Central Command).
‘Exercise Planners?’
Organizing the force is another duty of the component. As per MCWP 3-40.8, “the options for organizing the forces available to the CCDR are by service components, functional components, or a combination of the two.” None of the four components has organized any expeditionary forces (MEU, SPMAGTF) for deployment. There is no reason Marine Forces Command (MARFORCOM) cannot supervise and perform this responsibility. In effect, the four geographical components are little more than exercise planners (with the exception of MARCENT actions in Iraq/Afghanistan), planning, building, and scheduling exercises in support of the CCDRs Theater Engagement Plan for Theater Security Cooperation. With adequate Marine representation, the naval forces (NAVFORs), who do this on a much broader scale, can easily administer this function.
Finally, service component commands are tasked to “exercise operational control (OPCON) of forces assigned or attached to their CCDR or they may be limited to tactical control (TACON) of these forces.” While our components may wish to exercise OPCON, Marines ride ships, and we are designated OPCON to the fleet commander. That is who we are and what we do. There are times when Marines are ashore where OPCON or TACON can and should be transferred to the MARFOR.
For example, the SPMAGTFs currently supporting EUCOM and AFRICOM are assigned OPCON to MARFORAF and MARFOREUR. However, the more rational approach is also the more usual. Marine Forces landed ashore will likely be assigned to a Joint Force Component, Sub Unified Commander, or Joint Task Force Commander. The current SPMAGTF-Crisis Response (SPMAGTF-CR) could be more effectively operated via an integrated Marine presence within the 6th Fleet. Components are not warfighters. Nor are they manned, equipped, or prepared to accomplish such tasks. Our Corps cannot maintain the current posture of our component commands. Our component headquarters for Europe, Africa, and South America do not have the depth, skills, or experience to provide command and control over operational forces. We need to stop pretending they do, that it’s part of their job description, and we can maintain our current posture. Worse, continuing along this path will drive an irrevocable wedge between us and the Navy.
The responsibilities of the current geographic component commands can be distributed among the fleet commands or operational components such as a Joint Task Force Command or Sub-Unified Command. Through augmentation of the fleet commands as described in the integrated model, and perhaps some minimal augmentation to MARFORCOM/Marine Forces Pacific, all component functions can be accomplished at significant cost savings (personnel and dollars) to the Marine Corps. The following is a proposed realignment of component responsibilities.
Component responsibilities realigned to the fleet commands/NAVFORs (with additional allocated Marine presence):
• Conduct joint and combined training, including the training, as directed, of components of other services in joint operations for which the service component commander has or may be assigned primary responsibility or for which the service component’s facilities and capabilities are suitable.
• Conduct joint, component, and combined contingency, crisis action, and exercise planning to support CCDR-assigned missions.
• Retain administrative control of forces attached to a service component or force commander of a subordinate joint force command or another unified CCDR.
• Develop plans and procedures for the effective and efficient use of reserve and active forces.
• Provide and/or coordinate logistics support and inform the CCDR of plans or changes in such support that would significantly affect operational capability or sustainability.
• Conduct theater-security cooperation planning and execution in support of CCDR requirements.
• Coordinate, execute, and report external funding for Marine Corps operations and exercises.
• Establish and maintain a resource-evaluation and analysis function to ensure effective and accurate control and use of funds and resources provided for CCDR mission accomplishment.
• Develop, coordinate, and execute strategic force plans and basing in the CCDR’s AOR.
• Ensure assigned and attached forces have command-and-control systems that are interoperable in joint and combined environments.
• Maintain information-management programs.
• Ensure planning, coordination, and execution of information operations.
• Plan, coordinate, and execute support for special technical operations, conducted by or in support of Marine Corps forces through the CCDR.
• Establish a critical infrastructure program to meet Department of Defense, CCDR, and service requirements.
Component responsibilities realigned to MARFORCOM/MARFORPAC: (most of these can occur prior to the deployment of forces):
• Recommend the allocation and coordinate provision of Marine Corps forces or individuals to support the CCDR’s operations.
• Make recommendations to the CCDR on the proper deployment and employment of Marine Corps forces.
• Conduct deployment/redeployment planning and execution of assigned/attached Marine Corps forces.
• Select and nominate specific units or individuals of the service component for attachment to the CCDR subordinate forces and recommend command relationships.
• Ensure that internal service functions—e.g., general and personnel administration, finance, discipline, training, logistics, processing of urgent universal-needs requests, force protection, safety, and service intelligence in support of assigned or attached forces and individuals—are performed as directed.
• Develop program and budget requests that comply with the CCDR guidance on warfighting requirements and priorities.
• Inform the CCDR of program and budget decisions that may affect joint-operation planning.
• Develop and submit the Marine Corps force’s input to the CCDR’s integrated priority list.
• Ensure compliance with force protection, force health protection, and personnel recovery requirements for assigned and attached forces, civilian personnel, and families.
• Ensure commanders, staffs, and forces are trained to conduct joint, combined, and service exercises and operations.
Component responsibilities realigned to Joint Force Components, Fleet Commands, Sub-Unified Commands, or Joint Task Force Commands:
• Command all Marine Corps forces assigned or attached to the CCDR, to include all elements of support required.
• Accomplish such operational missions as may be assigned by the CCDR.
Proposed Componency Realignment
The Marine Corps will still maintain relationships with the geographic component commanders, both via the Fleet Commands with our increased presence, and through our remaining MARFOR commands. To maximize consolidation and gain efficiencies, MARFORCOM should gain the functions of four existing MARFORs, in addition to its current functions, allowing those commands to close their doors.
• MARFORNORTH (Marine Forces North)—Assumes responsibilities for all continental United States response. Located directly opposite the U.S. Navy Fleet Forces Command in Norfolk, this makes perfect sense. MARFORCOM supports NORTHCOM.
• MARFORSOUTH—Assumes all current responsibilities. The deputy commander, MARFORCOM currently supervises this responsibility. MARFORCOM supports SOUTHCOM.
• MARFOREUR—Commander, MARFORCOM currently supervises this responsibility. MARFORCOM supports EUCOM.
• MARFORAF—MARFORCOM assumes responsibility and supports AFRICOM (Africa Command).
Marine Forces Reserve relinquishes MARFORNORTH responsibility, as it would transfer to MARFORCOM. Reserve component functions would remain unchanged. Marine Forces Pacific continues to support PACOM as it currently does. However, recommend disestablishing Marine Forces Korea (MARFORK), with MARFORPAC performing those responsibilities via a forward liaison element. Marine Forces Central Command continues support to CENTCOM. However, recommend removing the “forward” element from Bahrain and returning the current facility in Bahrain to “caretaker status” for utilization, if required, during major conflict. Marine Forces Cyber and Strategic remain as currently configured.
Making these changes and increasing our support to the fleet commanders, the Marine Corps saves significant fiscal resources, eliminates unnecessary duplication of effort, provides solid support to the Navy’s deployed fleets, enhances training and employment opportunities for our deployed forces, streamlines support to the CCDRs, and simplifies command and control. This realignment fosters seamless operations for the Navy and Marine Corps within the deployed fleets. In addition, the requirement for an Expeditionary Strike Group Headquarters may no longer be necessary. With increased Marine representation within the fleet staffs, the MEU and amphibious squadron commanders could report directly to the deputy fleet commanders. This is the model currently used by the 6th Fleet, and it works very well.
A Reshuffle that Works
Consolidating four regional MARFORs as well as MARFORK and MARCENT (Fwd) is the right thing to do for all the right reasons. It is relatively easy to accomplish and provides significant cost savings in personnel and facilities. As we reduce our headquarters we can realign our best and most qualified to the fleet commands while also providing additional structure for the operating forces.
This provides increased relevance for the Corps. It also ensures we have a proper seat at the table while demonstrating our understanding of where we belong at the table. In addition to reduced burdens/requirements on our general officers and providing balanced responsibilities and expectations, the most important result will be increased responsiveness, capability, collaboration, and cohesion with our Navy brothers—a team sport, if you will.
Mr. Moskowitz is the Center for Naval Analyses representative to Marine Forces Command.