As the war in Afghanistan winds down, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps will focus on regaining their amphibious capabilities to confront threats to world security. Attention has already started to shift from the Middle East to the Pacific region as described in the Asia-Pacific Strategy.1 The United States’ ability to project influence and power in the Pacific will increasingly hinge more on the maritime services due to the rise of China and India as regional and global powers and its need to build relationships with the large Muslim populations of the Pacific.
Given the number of unstable and developing countries along the Pacific Rim, the necessity of skilled amphibious forces is clear. With so many of these nations easily accessible by water, a regional or global power possessing a strong amphibious capability will be more likely to influence them. One of our closest allies, Australia, has embarked on a program to improve its proficiency in amphibious operations for many of these reasons. The U.S. Navy-Marine Corps team can derive clear lessons from Australia’s assessment process and efforts to improve its ability to project power from the sea.
Australia’s Strategic Reality
The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is that country’s equivalent of the U.S. Department of Defense and includes the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), the Australian Army, and multiple civilian agencies. In concert with the Australian government, the ADF conducts periodic assessments of Australia’s strategic and geopolitical situation, the outcomes of which are published in a Defence White Paper. By analyzing this document, Australia’s government and the ADF can determine the requirements and capabilities of its future force.
In the 2009 Defence White Paper, policymakers recognized a number of factors that could threaten the ongoing stability and safety of Australia and its neighboring regions. While most of Australia’s neighbors, such as Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, East Timor, New Zealand, and the South Pacific island states pose no immediate threat to the country, it was clear that:
Beyond our immediate neighbourhood, Australia has an enduring strategic interest in the stability of the wider Asia-Pacific region, which stretches from North Asia to the Eastern Indian Ocean. In particular, we have a deep stake in the security of Southeast Asia. Strategically, our neighbours in Southeast Asia sit astride our northern approaches, through which hostile forces would have to operate in order to sustainably project force against Australia. A stable and cohesive Southeast Asia will mitigate any such threat and is in our strategic interests. More broadly, we have a deep stake in the maintenance of an Asia-Pacific regional security environment that is conducive to the peaceful resolution of problems between regional countries and can absorb the rise in strategic and military power of emerging major players.2
While Australia is a close ally of the United States, its government believes that the nation must be capable of defending itself without resorting to foreign assistance. Given that Australia’s “neighbourhood” is dominated by the Pacific Ocean and island nations in varying stages of development, identifying power projection from the sea as a priority makes sense. To ensure the continued stability of the region, Australia must be able to project positive influence by deploying peacekeepers and humanitarian assistance and providing disaster relief through amphibious operations. This determination came after several other nations around the globe significantly upgraded their own amphibious capabilities.3
In 1914, during World War I, the Australian military undertook an amphibious mission to seize German-held territory in Samoa. By the end of World War II, it had become skilled in this form of warfare. During that war, the 1st Australian Corps successfully assaulted Balikpapan, Labuan, and Brunei. Fighting alongside General Douglas MacArthur, Australian amphibious forces took part in landings in New Guinea, the Dutch East Indies, and the Philippines.4
After World War II, the ADF retained various levels of amphibious capacity and capability, but always in an ad hoc manner. It became clear to policymakers and senior defense leaders they had to develop a comprehensive approach to maritime power projection that took into consideration the ADF’s capabilities, what Australian taxpayers were willing to support, operational requirements, and what was a good fit culturally for the ADF. It was ultimately determined the Australian Army, in concert with the RAN, would jointly acquire an amphibious capability and competency.
Naval Platforms
Joint Project 2048 (JP 2048), a long-term acquisitions project, will replace the legacy amphibious deployment and sustainment capability in service now with a comprehensive “system of systems” approach to amphibious platforms. The project has five phases: Phase 1 is the development of an amphibious landing platform watercraft, Phase 2 is a project-definition study, Phase 3 is the amphibious watercraft replacement, Phase 4 is the acquisition of amphibious assault and strategic sealift ships, and Phase 5 is the heavy landing craft replacement. Phases 1 and 2 are complete, Phase 3 is ongoing, and Phase 4 is approved.
As part of JP 2048, the ADF will acquire new amphibious-assault ships, sustainment assets, strategic-sealift capacity, and ship-to-shore connectors in the 2005 to 2020 timeframe.5 The most visible and expensive aspects of the ADF’s transformation from a land-bound force into one capable of maritime power projection was the acquisition of two new amphibious ships that would serve as the cornerstone of this new capability.
The search for these ships began in 2000, and Australian policymakers kept in mind their country’s experiences in East Timor as they determined the ship’s requirements.6 (During the unrest following the 1999 withdrawal of Indonesian occupation forces and Australia’s intervention to restore order and stability, the ADF was limited in its options and had difficulty projecting power and conducting operations due in part to the lack of a coherent amphibious capability.) It was determined that the new ships would be landing helicopter dock ships (LHDs), meaning they would be equipped to handle landing craft and conduct helicopter operations. Australia chose an LHD based on a proven Spanish design—the buque de proyección estratégica, or strategic force-projection ship—over several contenders. In terms of capabilities, the ships, renamed the Canberra class, share many characteristics with the American Wasp-class LHD, but are somewhat smaller. They will replace HMAS Manoora and Kanimbla, former Newport-class tank landing ships first laid down in the early 1970s and purchased secondhand from the U.S. Navy in the mid-1990s.7
After purchasing former U.S. Navy ships at the end of their service lives, the RAN experienced significant readiness and reliability issues with its amphibious fleet. Not willing to repeat that experience, it was determined that new construction would provide the best balance of lifecycle costs, longevity, flexibility, and affordability. The Canberra class offers nearly the full range of amphibious capabilities that the U.S. Navy requires from its ships: complete command-and-control suites; the ability to launch, recover, and maintain rotary-wing aircraft; ample storage space for vehicles and rolling stock; a well deck for watercraft; and ship-to-shore connectors. The ship also has a British or Soviet style “ski-ramp” designed to fling heavily-laden fixed-wing aircraft such as Harriers, YAK-121s, or F-35s into the air. The initial construction of the vessels began in Spain, with the final fitting taking place in Australia as part of a greater push to revitalize and improve Australian shipbuilding capabilities. Canberra-class LHDs are expected to enter service between 2014 and 2015.
Australia also purchased a British Bay-class dock landing ship, the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) Largs Bay, for 100 million dollars.8 Renamed HMAS Choules and commissioned in December of 2011, this ship will provide a capability for the Australian amphibious ready group (ARG) similar to what the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps have with their three-ship ARGs.
Australia will also acquire a number of utility landing crafts (LCUs) capable of open-ocean transit in support of the amphibious task group and surface connectors like air-cushioned and mechanized landing crafts. The requirement for oceangoing LCUs is a result of Australia’s experiences in disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operations where LCUs often operate independently of the amphibious “mothership.”9
The ADF also intends to acquire a vehicle analogous to the U.S. Navy’s amphibious assault vehicle. In 2005, Australia had to abort a plan to purchase mechanized landing crafts (LCMs), as the craft specified did not fit the well decks of current or future RAN ships, and there were serious longevity concerns. Now, the same company that is producing the LHDs, Navantia, will also provide an improved LCM, the Navantia LCM-1e, scheduled to enter service in 2014. The RAN will be responsible for the rotary wing aircraft assigned to the ship. The air wing’s composition is still up for discussion, but observers estimate it would be between 15 and 30 helicopters and consist of MRH-90s, MH-60Rs, and Tiger Reconnaissance helicopters. Australia also plans to purchase the F-35A conventional takeoff variant, which is not able to take off or land on a ship.
Organizational Challenges
When the ADF decided to acquire an amphibious capability, it looked abroad to determine if there were any foreign amphibious practices it could adapt or if it would have to develop its own unique approach. It examined the amphibious forces of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. The United States’ was ruled the most complete and cohesive. The ADF closely studied the U.S. Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) model, but it was too resource intensive to adopt.10 The difference in scale between the two countries’ forces is stark: The U.S. Navy has 33 amphibious ships, while the RAN will have four by the end of 2015. The U.S. Marine Corps has historically had 24 battalions, and the entire Australian Army has 10 battalion-sized battle groups.
While the U.K. model did not possess all the capabilities of the U.S. model, its scale and cost were attractive attributes to the ADF. Instead of attaching a ground-combat element to an ARG for a scheduled workup and planned deployment, the U.K. model has ground forces and naval forces that train up roughly in parallel. Instead of being forward deployed, they exist in a state of readiness for a prescribed period with several scheduled training exercises to maintain proficiency.
Although the French model yielded additional insights regarding the training and equipping of amphibious forces, it was not seriously considered by Australian planners, who did not like the rotational force headquarters model or the high turnover of personnel and constant re-training requirements. While the U.S., U.K., and French forces were the ones most closely studied, other nations’ amphibious capabilities were also examined. Some analysts believed the Italian Navy’s San Marcos Regiment and Italian Army’s Lagunari Regiments were valid analogues for the ADF.
Australian analysis resulted in three options:
• Create one amphibious battle group similar to the U.S. Marine Corps’ MEU ground-combat element centered around an infantry battalion with specialized training focused on amphibious operations.
• Create an amphibious brigade, which would give the Australians a capability on par with the Royal Marines’ 3 Commando Brigade.
• Rotate each of the army’s ten battle groups through the amphibious mission, as the French do.
The ADF exhaustively discussed the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. It concluded that the scope, scale, and level of expertise of the MEU program was unattainable due to resource constraints. However, given the close relationship between the United States and Australia, the new rotational Marine force in Darwin, and the United States’ renewed interest in the Pacific region, interoperability was identified as a priority. In every case, some sort of certification to either U.S. or U.K. standards was deemed necessary.
There are still other factors for the ADF to explore, mostly relating to hardware and organization. Some key army considerations include how to develop its amphibious culture, create a viable concept for sea basing, provide force protection for landing craft and ship-to-shore connectors, develop training requirements, and implement a sustainable force-generation process.
The ADF recently adopted measures to ensure that the future Australian force reflects the ends planners are trying to achieve. The current phase of the ADF’s Adaptive Army Initiative, Plan Beersheba, is a program intended to transform the Army and keep the future force modern and flexible. The Army’s restructuring entails the creation of three multirole brigades from the existing ten battle groups that are balanced: combined-arms formations similar in concept and structure to a U.S. Army brigade combat team.
Under Plan Beersheba, the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Royal Australian Regiment has been designated as the amphibious battalion. This is not a permanent step, as the battalion will do much of the amphibious “discovery learning” to share with the rest of the force. However, ensuring that Beersheba is aligned with the amphibious needs of the army is a still looming challenge for that service; it also requires the RAN and RAAF to continue to work closely with the army to ensure integration of aviation platforms into the amphibious capability.
The ADF must create an amphibious culture within its army, determine the structure and nature of the capability, and ensure it can be reliably generated—no small feat given its size. The ADF still has many challenges to overcome, including a pronounced single-service orientation among each of the three branches and the lack of a maritime tradition as a nation. The ADF is having many interesting discussions and looks to the U.S. model for inspiration, but not as a blueprint.
Relevance to the U.S. Navy/Marine Corps
The future of the U.S. Marine Corps is uncertain. In this era of constrained resources, budget programmers and legislators must examine every military capability to identify redundancy. Priorities come into sharp focus, and inter- and intra-service rivalries become more pronounced than in times of abundance.11 For the Marine Corps to remain a relevant, expeditionary middleweight force that gives the combatant commander great flexibility and the taxpayers an excellent return on their investments, it is not enough to regain our pre-9/11 amphibious competency.
What was state of the art in 2003—before Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom essentially turned the Marine Corps into a second land army—is now 11 years old. We must be careful about continuing with the MEU program, which besides the introduction of new platforms has soldiered on essentially unchanged since the 1990s. As successful and effective as MEUs have been, we cannot assume that the conjectures used to create them are still valid.
Our leadership has identified the Asia-Pacific region as the next strategic priority and has already started to make decisions supporting that end. With the advent of the Darwin-based rotational force of Marines, the historically close ties between the Marine Corps and the ADF will get even closer. Leveraging Australia’s deep understanding of the region and building a truly interoperable force will enable the U.S. Marine Corps to operate more effectively in the Pacific.
The Australians are developing a force tailored to current and emerging strategic realities. The ADF started its transformation by conducting a “clean sheet” strategic analysis of threats in the region, Australian equities, and its likely roles in future conflicts. This is a clear example for the United States to follow. With the end of the war in Iraq, the drawdown of the war in Afghanistan, and the new focus on the Pacific, a similar self-analysis would be useful for the United States.
Further, by living in the region we say is our own future focus, and understanding the neighborhood as only a resident can, Australia’s conclusions and outcomes should be of particular interest to us. An interoperable force that is compatible with Australia’s requirements would greatly improve our ability to achieve favorable outcomes in the region. Based on their analysis, the ADF and Australia had the courage to acquire groundbreaking new platforms and radically reorient and reorganize its entire force.
Of more immediate interest to the Marine Corps is the ADF’s approach to an amphibious capability with constrained resources. The Marine Corps must continue to “define the problem” of expeditionary operations and determine what a relevant 21st-century amphibious force consists of and can do. This assessment must take into account the work done by our allies—especially the Australians—on problems like amphibious force structure.
Our own future with regard to resources will look and feel much more like Australia’s today than our own recent past where money and resources were more plentiful. There is no guarantee our current amphibious force structure will endure. Learning to do more with less is important, and Australians seem to have placed great emphasis on the cost effectiveness of their amphibious force. Analyzing the Australian capability—during the development phase and after it has matured—will give us valuable insights on how to operate effectively on a smaller budget.
Our own strategic priorities and resource limitations are moving us in the direction the ADF is already heading. In the future, we also must re-evaluate what we want our amphibious capability to look like. Understanding the challenges facing the ADF and the solutions it developed will help strengthen the relationship between the United States and Australia and help us make better decisions when confronted by similar challenges.
We frequently speak of defense transformation, but the Australians are actually doing it. In this respect, we have much to learn from them.
1. Mark E. Manyin, Stephen Daggett, Ben Dolven, Susan V. Lawrence, Michael F. Martin, Ronald O’Rourke, and Bruce Vaughn, “Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s ‘Rebalancing’ Toward Asia,” Congressional Research Service, March 2012.
2. Australian Government, Department of Defence, Defence White Paper, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, 2009.
3. Grace V. Jean, “Naval Forces See Greater Demand for Large Amphibious Ships,” National Defence Magazine, October 2008.
4. Peter J. Dean, “Amphibious Warfare: Lessons from the Past for the ADF’s Future,” Security Challenges, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Autumn 2012), 57–76.
5. Australian Government, Department of Defence, Defence Capability Plan Homepage, December 2010, www.defence.gov.au/dmo/id/dcp/html_dec10/jp/JP2048.html; MAJ Andy Love, Australian Army, “You Can’t Ride a Concept to the Beach: The Gaps in the ADF’s Envisioned Capability,” Issue No. 186, 2011.
6. “Operation ASTUTE: The RAN in East Timor,” Semaphore: Newsletter of the Sea Power Centre—Australia, Issue 12, June 2006.
7. Ian McPhedran, “The Rust Never Sleeps on Pride of Navy Fleet,” Herald Sun, 18 October 2010.
8. Albert Palazzo, Antony Trentini, LTC Jonathan Hawkins, Australian Army, and CPT Malcolm Brailey, Australian Army, “Projecting Force, The Australian Army and Maritime Strategy,” Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra, 2010.
9. Albert Palazzo, Towards a Marine Force, Security Challenges, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Winter 2011), 41–45.
10. Dean, 57–76.
11. Marcus Weisgerber, “DOD Sees Four Sequestration Scenarios,” Defense News, 29 July 2012.