The authors were fortunate to serve as numbered fleet and type commander N-6s during the rapid technology insertion through the “Information Technology for the 21st Century” program in the Fleet and during the early to mid-2000s as we recovered from some significant challenges with surface combat systems. We both were nuclear trained, so we were accustomed to the propulsion plant’s highly structured modernization process in which the reliability, maintainability, interoperability, and sustainability of new technology was thoroughly planned and vetted prior to shipboard installation. But we quickly learned that the command, control, communications, combat systems, and intelligence (C5I) world lacked the same level of focus on preparedness. Unfortunately, the speed of delivery of the latest and greatest technology often exceeded the emphasis on quality and mission assurance.
C5I Modernization Lessons
Here are the top lessons learned about C5I modernization during our time as N-6s:
• Because the Navy did not pay up front for system engineering or cross-systems command interoperability, to fix these issues later, we had to pay more than if we had done so up front.
Systems engineering, the foundation of advances in ship design or nuclear engineering, seems to be lost in the C5I world. As N-6s, we faced the challenges of training crews and deploying ships with C5I systems that were not integrated. We saw problems similar to those experienced by HMS Sheffield in the Falklands where some combat system elements had to be disabled in order for the unit to communicate with higher-level headquarters. Sometimes, the fielding of systems was delayed due to a lack of acquisition interoperability testing on the new systems with the existing shipboard legacy equipment. Many times, the operational Fleet had to develop workarounds or apply more funding to pay for the resulting interoperability fixes. Spending small change on up-front system engineering would have ultimately saved many dollars.
• The Navy is fielding state-of-the-art commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment that may not work with other COTS or legacy equipment.
Our kids and grandchildren know that they cannot mix and match state-of-the-art computer hardware and software without thoroughly researching the possibility of incompatibility—this is the layman’s method of system engineering. Have you ever seen fire pumps get turned off by new portable radios? We have. We have also seen new wireless shipboard networks interfere with legacy C5I systems, as well as new systems fielded on board ships that required the operator to choose to use either the new system or an existing legacy platform because the operation of both was impossible. We must ask the acquisition community, “What testing is being done on hyped ‘latest and greatest’ systems to determine what their impact would be on shipboard technology designed 10 or 20 years ago?”
• If the crew is lucky, they will receive training on procedures for using and troubleshooting the new systems as well as spare parts on board your ship to fix any problems. But the supply system on board or ashore may not have the parts you need, and it’s not guaranteed that someone will know how to fix your particular problem.
The first budget cuts on a “funded” new C5I system usually affect Fleet training, spare parts, shipboard documentation, and troubleshooting or diagnosis guides. Our sailors are more likely to get “difference training” for the new equipment, marked up red-lined diagrams of the new system design, and no troubleshooting guides or spare parts to fix the system. COTS technology is often rapidly superseded by newer technology, and parts can be hard to get once this occurs. Similarly, training for the repair personnel is at the far end of the budget dollar flow. In addition, most of the procedures for troubleshooting and repairing the systems do not rapidly get transmitted to our maintenance centers.
• There is little electromagnetic interference (EMI) or spectrum consideration behind the acquisition of the new system.
EMI poses unique interoperability problems between systems. COTS systems are usually not designed to meet the DOD military standards for EMI interference and compatibility. For the Navy, the shipboard underway environment is decidedly harsher than the operating conditions for which the COTS system or its parts were designed. Based on what the authors have seen, many shipboard systems were fielded by program managers without a rigorous application of Military Standard 461. In addition, the acquisition element at times does not anticipate the result of placing a non-integrated C5I system on a ship that could potentially affect its preexisting electronic warfare or self-defense systems.
• You will not be able to train on the C5I systems as you do your engineering systems.
A commanding officer should have confidence that his crew can respond to potential battle damage or casualties to the ship’s engineering, navigation, or combat systems. How will he fight his C5I systems and networks in a battle degraded status?
Our experience has been that C5I systems are very susceptible to electrical surges or a sudden loss of power. The Navy does very little in the training cycle to teach personnel how to “fight the networks.” As nuclear engineers, we both learned that the more we operated and stressed the propulsion plant, the better it worked. Not so in the COTS C5I world. We are not very well prepared to use our C5I systems with simulated battle damage because we do not adequately train on them, and our sailors do not often have the background to fix battle-damaged systems due to training shortfalls or a “let’s turn it over to the technical representative” mindset. (The concept of “fighting networks hurt” also applies to the Navy Marine Corps intranet and its follow-on.)
• Systems that were fielded via the rapid-deployment concept were not fully tested in an operational environment before being installed on your ship.
If you want a new gadget bad enough, you will get it bad enough. We have seen major new SATCOM systems fielded under the rapid deployment concept, bypassing traditional system acquisition requirements. The idea that you can power on a new SATCOM system in port with the rest of the systems shut down and expect it to work under way in a dense integrated spectrum environment is not realistic. Where is the equivalent to a fully capable shore prototype for our shipboard C5I systems?
• While the Navy talks a great deal about total ownership cost, the C5I system was designed, built, and acquired with the up-front acquisition cost as the primary concern.
Guess who pays for systems that are not properly up- front system engineered? Not the original equipment manufacturer. It is the taxpayer who has to spend more money—and sailors are still stuck with inferior systems.
Why is the System Broken?
Before we can start to address these issues, we must understand how we got into this state of affairs in the first place. The authors contend that there are two fundamental reasons: the challenges of modern complex systems and the organizational issues that complicate the acquisition process.
We have a system that tolerates and often encourages bad behavior. We are rewarded for expending all available funds rather than seeking ways to spend them more efficiently. And despite our emphasis on total cost of ownership, we still make decisions based on acquisition costs.
In the current age of interconnected systems, it is fair to say that few people understand individual systems in their full complexity. Even fewer understand the complete range of issues regarding interoperability in the “system of systems” that constitutes a modern warship, a strike group, or a joint force. In such an environment, it is unfortunately likely that we will fail to account for the system of systems effects of our acquisition decisions. This probability increases both because of challenging fiscal times and the increasing complexity of technology.
Before the real-estate bubble burst, the phrase “house poor” was used to describe someone who had purchased a house only to be unable to maintain it. The authors believe that as a Navy, we have become “platform poor.” Due to sky-rocketing prices for today’s platforms (for example, an aircraft carrier costs $11 billion, a Joint Strike Fighter requires $200 million, a ballistic-missile submarine replacement is $8 billion, and even a “cheap” littoral combat ship goes for $500 million), we rapidly exhaust our annual shipbuilding and aircraft procurement budget.
In this environment, we have become predisposed to focus on the platforms rather than the capabilities that we seek. We buy the “house” and then force ourselves into a beans-and-rice diet that has little discretionary funds for “luxuries” such as training, spare parts, and interoperability studies.
The second cause of this situation is the manner in which we are organized to acquire, man, train, and equip our forces. While it might be tempting to assign fault to the acquisition program for shortfalls in C5I systems, “we” are all complicit.
• “We” are a Congress that has created huge disruptions in all facets of operation by forcing resource sponsors and program managers to try to manage acquisition while on a continuing resolution with looming government shutdowns. Congress has also frequently plussed up programs, often with the effect of creating jobs and wealth in their own district, but limited—or even negative—output in terms of capability and readiness.
• We are the Office of the Secretary of Defense that, for a variety of reasons, has been unable to get the military services to work together to provide capabilities jointly at the most reasonable price. Joint capability delivery appears to be an illusion.
• We are the resource sponsors that are unable to make the difficult decisions that would fund training, logistics, and interoperability programs today. Instead, we develop plans to “get well in the out years” or kick the can farther down the road by incrementally making cuts across the board.
• We are program managers that, for institutional imperatives and cultures, avoid risk at all cost, work tirelessly to maintain funding for flawed programs and program elements, dissuade any change to the program plan even if it would be cheaper to restore interoperability, and focus our attention more on our resource sponsors rather than on the Fleet that we serve.
• We are systems commands that have lost our technical capabilities and expertise, and are hard pressed to provide technical oversight for our programs.
• We are “the Fleet” that doesn’t understand the technical issues, accepts systems with interoperability issues and with no training and logistics tail, and are far too quick to become enamored with the latest shiny object rather than focus on the fundamental capabilities required to achieve our mission.
• We are the defense contractors who pay attention to this quarter’s profits rather the long-term benefit of our customers.
Fixing the System
So what can we do about this mess? The most obvious and most difficult solution is, of course, the beast that we all know and love: acquisition reform. We’ve tried this before with limited success. However, this is a DOD-wide issue—not just a Navy issue. While the authors fully agree that we must learn to buy things better, faster, and at a lower price, we maintain that there are some steps that the Navy can take today to start resolving some of these issues.
• Pay for system engineering up front. Naval Operations for Warfare Systems (OPNAV N-9) must become the Navy’s champion for system engineering and look to the Navy’s program offices and systems commands to be the executors. We must ensure that system engineering is the starting point of all programs and not something we will do only if we have enough money. We must also ensure that we account for not only the systems manning, training, equipping, and planned interfaces with other systems, but that we look for those unplanned interfaces and assess their impact. We must fully fund this activity up front with the understanding that it, in fact, is the basis for understanding and controlling total ownership costs.
• Rebuild engineering capability. When the authors, who may be also referred to as dinosaurs, first roamed the halls of Naval Sea Systems Command, drafting tables were a common sight in those buildings. Real engineering was taking place in those halls. But young engineers in our systems commands today spend their days mastering spreadsheets, developing PowerPoint slides, and answering mountains of email. While we can’t recommend the purchase of a number of drafting tables for the systems commands, we believe that the insourcing of engineering capabilities and work into the systems commands is imperative for our service’s future technical health. Government software engineering expertise needs to be re-established within the DOD.
• Eliminate the barriers. Just as we have sought to focus all warfighting integration under one organization, N-9, we must look to focus our engineering and acquisition expertise within a single entity. We attempted to address this in the last decade through the implementation of a “virtual SYSCOM,” an effort that fizzled. We must reinvigorate the acquisition effort to make decisions focused on warfighting capabilities, not just individual systems or platforms.
• Rebuild and refocus. One reason for the failure of the program offices to respond to “the Fleet” is that the Fleet has failed to provide a consistent and effective communication of what it needs. The Fleet and Force N-6 organizations are a shadow of what they once were. Robust N-6 organizations, headed by a U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFF) flag officer with operational experience and a senior executive service member with engineering and acquisition experience, can go a long way toward providing the voice of the Fleet and demanding the accountability from the program offices and resource sponsors. USFF N-6 used to be responsible to the USFF commander for combat system performance and interoperability issues. It is not clear today who is in charge after the stand-up and the metamorphosis of the Naval Network Warfare Command into the Navy Cyber Forces.
• Fix what we have. We recognize that an “acquisition holiday” is not feasible, so resources must be reprioritized to start addressing these problems.
Program offices, resource sponsors, and the Fleet need to engage frequently to address the detailed system engineering challenges in operating the complex system of systems that are our battle forces. The authors contend that the Fleet enterprise approach has succeeded in doing this in a number of areas: surface force hull, mechanical, and electrical areas, for example. However, it has not been successful with respect to C5I. This is because we have not brought in the right players, which include multiple system commands, program offices, resource sponsors, and different voices from the Fleet. We must find a mechanism to expand the enterprise approach to effectively address these areas.
• Invest in a battle force system engineer. One mechanism for doing this would be to assign one of our best systems engineers (perhaps a contractor would be required at first) to identify and address the interfaces that exist in a battle force when operating in a joint environment. This individual would report directly to the system commander, work with the system commander and program executive office technical warrant holders, and be an asset for the battle force N-6 in identifying and correcting force interoperability, training and logistics issues.
Admiral Hyman G. Rickover once told one of the authors that if you cannot put your finger on who is in charge of a system or problem, no one is. We strongly recommend that Navy acquisition leaders and senior Fleet representatives put someone in charge of fielding combat-ready C5I systems to include cross-systems command and program executive office interoperability leadership.
Captain Adams is former commanding officer of the USS Pittsburgh (SSN-720), Enterprise Battle Group command and control warfare commander, COMSECONDFLT Assistant Chief of Staff for JC4I, and Deputy Director for C5I, U.S. Fleet Forces Command. He is the former director of Tidewater Operations at DELTA Resources Inc. and a former Copernicus Award winner.