The Next Security Frontier
(See J. S. Spaner and H. LeBail, pp. 30–35, October 2013 Proceedings)
Captain Jim Howe, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired)—The odds that “climate change” will rise to the top tier of threats facing the nation and its maritime services hovers around zero. The authors present a one-sided look at the possible impacts of a changing climate and fail to recognize that much of the gloom-and-doom rhetoric they reference is overtly political and highly speculative in nature. Quoting from the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the White House, CNN, and The New York Times—with no contrasting views—drives home this point.
For example, the authors state that “As climate change continues, extreme and unpredictable weather events are expected to increase in frequency and intensity.” According to whom? There is no scientific consensus that a warming climate will produce more violent weather, with some climatologists arguing just the opposite. Even the NASA website referenced in the article states that a rise in global temperature, should it occur, “will produce beneficial impacts in some regions and harmful ones in others.”
But even if the most extreme climate scenarios prove accurate, these natural forces move hundreds of times slower than real-world geopolitical threats and provide ample time for adaptation by our military and security services. We can keep a weather eye on the climate and adjust as necessary, with the Coast Guard’s efforts in the Arctic being a prime example.
Having our intensely resource-constrained military build a strategy around politically correct and potentially biased scientific theory is unwise and could lead to security gaps in the short term. We must not allow possible climate change to be treated as the equivalent to threats from an unpredictable North Korea, a nuclearizing Iran, an expansionist China, a bellicose Russia, a dysfunctional North Africa, and a bevy of terror groups devoted to jihad. Because it really won’t matter if the sea level has risen an inch or two when our military is scratching its head wondering how an enemy avoided our defenses, lit off a nuke, and turned a vibrant American city into a wasteland.
Donn Dears—The article by Captain Spaner and Ms. LeBail was essentially a poster child for the IPCC. They focused on extreme possibilities while making some inaccurate statements. Global warming is a fact, but attributing it to carbon dioxide emissions alone, without acknowledging that there is at least one other highly probable cause, is misleading—at best.
The article highlighted sea-level rise and Hurricane Sandy. Had the Great Hurricane of 1938 hit 70 miles to the west it would have caused more damage than did Sandy. The 1938 hurricane was substantially larger than when Sandy hit New York. As it is, the 1938 storm flooded a Consolidated Edison plant in Manhattan. It also killed many more people than did Sandy—and this was before global warming was in our vocabulary.
The article used fear of sea-level rise to show that island people would be displaced.
Sea-level rise has been fairly consistent at 7.5 inches per year over the last few centuries, and experts in this area say this rate will continue.
In addition, the article highlighted Coast Guard installations that were damaged by flooding because of sea-level rise. In fact, it was subsidence around the New York area that played an important role in flooding. The New York area has been sinking about 4 inches per century, so adding this to a sea-level rise of 7–8 inches means that rise, relative to New York City, has been around 12 inches. And this wasn’t because of global warming.
The supposed decline in Arctic ice was highlighted in the article, but Arctic ice during the summer of 2013 was over 500,000 square miles greater than last year. Remember, the proponents of the IPCC said Arctic ice would disappear by the summer of 2013.
One summer shouldn’t be the basis for reaching any conclusion, but worldwide temperatures have remained the same for 15 to 17 years, in spite of a continued rise in atmospheric CO2.
While it may make sense for the Coast Guard to make contingency plans for what may happen in the Arctic, they shouldn’t be based on fear or hyperbole.
It’s been many years since I served on active duty during the Korean War, but after a lifetime engaged in energy issues around the world, I rely on science and common sense, not hysteria, to reach conclusions.
Naval Postgraduate School: A Sacred Cow?
(See J. McDonnell, pp. 60–64, October 2013 Proceedings)
Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein, Medical Service Corps, U.S. Navy—Reading Captain McDonnell’s article on the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), I felt compelled to clarify a few points. I am not a graduate and have never visited the school, and my only interactions with NPS have been writing occasional pieces for its online journal Culture and Conflict. I cannot claim to assess the quality of the instruction provided; however, Captain McDonnell states that only 40 percent of the student body are in the Navy, the remainder being from other services, other countries, and the civilian population. She then appeals to the reader, “Is this the Navy’s mission?” From my point of view, my answer is a resounding yes!
The Department of Defense’s International Military Education and Training is an absolute necessity and an investment in future military-to-military relations, aside from providing a window on American culture, thought, and education for international officers. It also develops the needed relationships between countries that allow for ease of access and discussions during periods of crisis. A classic case has been that of the open channels cultivated with Egypt’s generals, due to General Abdel-Fatah al-Sisi being a graduate of the U.S. Army War College.
Second, civilians and members of other services get to learn views outside their respective agencies to develop not just a globalized perspective, but a reinforced sense of jointness. Such an inter-agency view is vital as more and more staff officers must now deal with a myriad of federal agencies to solve increasingly complex problems.
While I am not defending a sacred cow, and maybe the Naval Postgraduate School should be consolidated with, say, the Naval War College, the integrated education of international students, students from other service branches, and civilian students is more needed today than ever.
Sustaining American Maritime Influence
(See J. Harvey Jr., W. Hughes Jr., J. Kline, and Z. Schwartz, pp. 46–51, September 2013 Proceedings)
Eric Wertheim, author, The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World—The article by Admiral Harvey et al. offered some thoughtful analysis and interesting concepts. Without endorsing or criticizing the article, I would like to offer one suggestion: Why not include unmanned surface vessels (USVs) in the flotilla mix? The idea of small vessels operating together in contested waters during short-duration, intensive combat operations is not necessarily new, but the technology USVs could offer may provide a solution to minimize casualties while taking the fight to the enemy. These unmanned vessels could deploy from a nearby sea base in the region, or from a USV mother ship, and they could be armed with the same mix of guns and antiship missiles suggested by the authors. If they really want to minimize casualties in high-intensity, high-attrition flotilla operations, I propose re-examining the concept to include stealthy, missile-armed, unmanned vessels.
‘Semper CVN!’
(See S. C. Truver, p. 10, September 2013; and P. E. Pournelle, p. 8, October 2013 Proceedings)
Adam Siegel—In the October “Comment and Discussion,” Commander Pournelle provides figures on aircraft carrier costs meriting elucidation.
The figures provided are “then-year dollars.” Comparing a ship (CVN-78) procured in Fiscal Year 2008 with one (CVN-80) in FY 18 in this manner ignores a simple reality of inflation. Very roughly, we are talking in the range of 20–25 percent over this time period.
We have to be careful about including non-recurring engineering costs in shipbuilding discussions. Yes, these are real costs, but the Navy puts these costs entirely on the first ship(s) in a class. This adds $3.2 billion to CVN-78’s “cost” and $900 million to CVN-79’s. If other services did things this way, the first Army Humvee would have cost about $100 million, and the first Air Force F-22 would have had a $30 billion price tag, and, well, the first Joint Strike Fighter might have had a $100 billion sticker price.
Focusing on “cost to buy” distorts the picture when our true concerns should be “cost to own” (total ownership cost/life-cycle cost) and “cost for capability.” On this basis, the Ford class is a leap ahead against the Nimitz class it is replacing, where the upfront costs are a little (perhaps 15 percent) higher, but the operating costs will be far lower with increased capabilities.
As well, Commander Pournelle asserts that we should focus on “payloads” without discussing a simple reality: The aircraft carrier has been and remains the U.S. Navy’s most flexible “payload carrier.” And Ford-class improvements—such as the electromagnetic air-launch system and its growth margin—will enable it to operationally and cost-effectively integrate new payloads, from unmanned aircraft to new missiles to directed-energy weapons. These will make aircraft carriers a significant contributor to Navy and national capabilities across the full range of military operations, from disaster relief to high-end combat operations.