Future Australian Submarine Capability
ce White Paper, plans for a future force of up to 12 submarines for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) have been the subject of controversy, both in-country and overseas. Late in 2012, pressure grew as the time approached for difficult decisions as to what design should be selected and where it should be built.The specific challenge for Australia is the need to manage the “tyranny of distance” with a non-nuclear submarine. When the passage between the navy’s two major bases near Perth in the west and at Sydney in the east is equivalent to that between London and Istanbul, the issue of endurance becomes central, even considering operational requirements in a purely defensive context. Endurance is very much more than a question of fuel alone; it is also the ability of the boat and its crew to operate effectively for extended periods far from base support. Even more than the weapon and sensor packages—although these have demands of their own, particularly in the need to “future proof” and make provision for elements such as unmanned vehicles—the endurance issue will drive the power requirements and thus the size of the design.
Practical Considerations
The Australian government has specifically excluded the possibility of nuclear propulsion, and this includes such concepts as leased boats, with the builder retaining responsibility for deep maintenance and eventual disposal at the end of life. There is a severely practical aspect to this. Apart from the fact that the cost of a nuclear-powered attack submarine is more than twice that of a conventional attack submarine with the same weapon and sensor package, Australia has no nuclear industry and no institutions that produce nuclear engineers or technicians. Given the skills shortages in so many engineering disciplines, it is likely that the challenge of creating and maintaining a trained nuclear workforce, let alone the physical infrastructure, would be too much, even if the government were willing to provide the money.
Determining the way ahead for the future submarine has been made more complex by the status of the present force. The current Collins class and the RAN submarine arm as a whole have experienced many problems, some interrelated and some very serious. Nevertheless, the boats are much better than the media have painted them, particularly after the resolution of some initial design problems. Both the funding and management of their maintenance have been greatly improved, with further reforms to come. Sorting out reliability remains a work in progress, particularly as there are both short- and longer-term aspects to resolving such problems, but it is very much in progress.
The weapon and sensor packages, development of which is now closely integrated into the U.S. Navy program, are working well. Manning the class remains a challenge, particularly as the booming resources industry in Western Australia, where the submarines are based, continues to offer tempting packages for technicians in particular. Nevertheless, three crews are operational, and a fourth is in the course of formation. Deployments continue, including that of HMAS Farncomb to Hawaii for the 2012 Rim of the Pacific exercise, in which the submarine sank former USNS Kilauea (T-AE-26) with the latest Mark 48 Advanced Capability Common Broadband Advanced Sonar System torpedo.
Setbacks and Possibilities
Despite the brave words of the 2009 Defence White Paper, setbacks with the Collins have made the government cautious to the extreme in embarking on the new project. Several years have been consumed by feasibility studies, but the insights gained from this work have not been enough to persuade the government to commit itself. Rather, in May 2012, A$214 million was allocated to assess the four different approaches that seem possible. The first is construction of a military off-the-shelf boat with the principal systems, sensors, and weapons as offered by the builder, modified only to meet Australia’s regulatory requirements. The second would be such a design modified to take the combat system, sensor, and weapon package desired by the Australian Navy. The third would be an evolution of the Collins class. And the fourth, and last, is an entirely new design.
Analysis of each of these possibilities is being funded by the government in parallel with the others. French, German, and Spanish boats will be considered for the off-the-shelf variants, while the original designer of the Collins class, Kockums of Sweden, will undertake initial studies for an updated vessel. Furthermore, there will be “umpires” in the form of assessments and comparative capability modeling by U.S. firms including General Dynamics Electric Boat. Although the government will determine the combat systems, sensor, and weapon packages in 2013, a decision on actual boat design will not be made until 2013–14, with the intent of final approval, in what is termed a two-pass system, in 2017.
In terms of national capacity, whether or not the new boats are built in Australia, their support and maintenance requirements will still create significant demands. There is much more involved than the building process alone and the government has initiated a Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan in order to identify, develop, and sustain the skills required to support a submarine capability at every stage of its life.
One wild card in the assessment process is the possibility of cooperation with Japan. While there are obvious problems, the recent relaxation of controls on defense exports and growing Japanese interest in working with partners such as Australia do raise at least the chance that Australia might be able to utilize Japanese expertise. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force’s submarine fleet is arguably one of the most capable in the world, and its boats are among the largest conventional craft in service—very much the size of the likely Australian requirement. Furthermore, the Japanese units are built around much the same sensor and weapon packages that the RAN operates.
Money Is Needed
Some pundits have suggested that the 12-boat target should be reduced to provide funds for other elements of the Australian Defence Force (ADF), but this ignores both context and timing. Whether the final submarine numbers move eventually to 12 is, at least for the shorter term, beside the point. If the Collins class is to be replaced, then six boats will have to be built before there is any increase in overall numbers. Even if the operational lives of the Collins can be managed to ensure continuity in operational strength during the transition to the new vessels, the class cannot be run on longer than absolutely necessary. A decision to restrict the size of the force will have little or no effect on the funding requirements for at least the next decade. If there are to be new submarines at all, then money is needed soon.
The plan for a future submarine capability will almost certainly survive any changes in Australian defense strategy—a new white paper is currently under development, very much with the constrained financial environment in mind. However, recent reductions in defense spending and the prospect of little or no real growth in the future do create real challenges for the ambition to build the boats in Australia. No matter the design selected, in-country construction must involve a significant premium over purchase from experienced submarine builders overseas. In such circumstances, the key questions for the government will not only be whether it is prepared to pay such a premium in the interests of the wider national benefit, but also whether it is willing to support defense funding to the extent that the extra costs will not impact the remainder of the ADF.
Australia has always struggled to maintain a sufficiently flexible and balanced force structure within all elements of the three services. The complex strategic environment that is emerging in the Indo-Pacific will create ever more demands for capabilities across the range of conflict and an overly specialized or restricted force will not be up to the task.
Whichever approach is selected, achieving Australia’s goal of a new submarine force will not be simple. Submarines present vast challenges, not only to bring them into service, but also to maintain operational and maintenance standards at the levels required by an unforgiving environment. Possessing a national submarine force of any consequence requires a truly national commitment.
Submarine Tactical Team Performance
The U.S. submarine force, in carrying out its task of ensuring access to critical world regions and denying adversaries access and maneuver, conducts highly complex operations. This is because of both expanding mission sets and demanding littoral operating environments. Success is not achieved by doing only one thing well; it requires flexibility, redundancy, and variety. While this is true at the platform level, it is particularly challenging at the human level.
In addition to honing submariners’ technical skills, deliberate and effective team practices are also necessary to manage the wide variety of simultaneous and complicated problems during tactical operations. The force has a sophisticated, institutionalized approach for developing and measuring the skill-based proficiency of its tactical teams, but until now has had nothing analogous for developing team behaviors. One reason for the focus on skills is that the service knows how to observe, measure, and train for them. Now we can say the same for tactical team behaviors.
The Operating Environment
In an effort funded by the Naval Sea Systems Command and Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, we undertook an extensive study of this subject and present our results here. The submarine-warfare domain is very different from others studied for teamwork and decision-making, largely because of the highly uncertain, inferentially derived environment. Elsewhere, sensor data (e.g., radar) is a direct representation of the real world. But in the submarine passive-acoustic environment, the inferential process, based on incomplete, discontinuous, and often ambiguous data, is a prerequisite for sound judgment and decision-making. This has several unique implications for submarine operations:
• They are necessarily team-based, requiring specialists from several functions to look at the problem from different perspectives simultaneously.
• They need “generalists” who can integrate the efforts of the team, extract the meaning of source data, and challenge that meaning.
• They are highly vulnerable to human error, including cognitive biases and faulty assumptions.
At the most basic level, submarine tactical teams solve problems. In particular, they spend significant time and effort building a shared understanding of the developing situation. While this makes submarine warfare fundamentally a cognitive process, it manifests itself in the outer (observable) world of team dynamics and team behavior. We “see” the building of shared understanding through, for example, orders, reports, discussions, attention, body language, and posture. Therefore, it should be possible to improve the performance of tactical teams by focusing on the purposeful and deliberate use of practices and behaviors that are most closely associated with effective and resilient problem solving.
Teamwork: Not Just a Nice-to-Have
As problem complexity and risk increase, and as a submarine moves from routine watches to battle stations, to stay in control of the evolving situation, the boat must exhibit progressively more advanced team behaviors. A group that performs in these situations is resilient in the sense that it can react to and recover from disturbances with minimal effect on the dynamic stability of the organization.
We identified five levels of a team’s resilience. Starting from the least to the most capable, we call them un-stressed battle rhythm, leader-sustained battle rhythm, basic team resilience, intermediate team resilience, and advanced team resilience.
So how does a team increase its resilience? Just as we equip people with technology and tools to enhance their ability to perform skill-based and physical tasks, we need to furnish submarine tactical teams with a set of tools that will improve their ability to manage the wide variety of simultaneous and difficult problems encountered during tactical operations. They need a set of team practices specifically tuned to the needs of submarine tactical teams.
Behaviors That Work
By looking deeply and broadly into teamwork and group behaviors, we discerned a set of five practices that provide new insights into how submarine tactical teams need to operate at sea. The more these behaviors were degraded or missing, the more problem solving suffered in some important way. It is the specific combination of mission requirements, the undersea environment, and the continual and shifting effort to understand and negotiate it that makes execution of all five practices essential for resilient performance. We labeled the practices dialogue, decision-making, critical thinking, bench strength, and problem-solving capacity. They are addressed in that order here.
Dialogue: This is the extent to which the team members verbally engage with one other, both formally through reports and orders, and through discussion while evaluating the situation. Both are essential; absence of either is a red flag. Specific aspects of submarine-team communications appear to be necessary for resilient operations, communication behaviors that go beyond the language and formal structure of the Submarine Interior Communications Manual. During complex tactical operations, dialogue is the most revealing indicator of team performance.
Decision-Making: On resilient teams, decision-making is pushed down to the lowest levels possible (appropriate to the individual’s skill level and experience and the task). Decisions are made even under uncertainty. Team leaders tend to use decisive language such as “I intend to.” While the other practices are definitely team-based, this one is much more individually focused.
Critical Thinking: This is the extent to which alternative explanations are actively sought or discrepant data are questioned. It describes thinking that is engaged with the developing situation and operates within the tension between “believe your indications” and “have a questioning attitude.” This practice depends on both analytic and intuitive modes of decision-making. It requires members to give voice to their intuitive thoughts so the rest of the team can scrutinize those feelings.
Bench Strength: We call bench strength the extent to which the team is inclusive of all members and works to develop the long-term capacity of all. It helps to create flexibility and redundancy for the group. Its use specifically inhibits placing special emphasis on “A-team” development to the exclusion of less-proficient members. Resilient teams are especially on the lookout for situations when the commanding officer is tempted to act alone (except for rare situations when only the CO can and should act). This practice tries to keep the CO as a “backup provider” rather than placing the team in the position of defending against the CO’s human error.
Problem-Solving Capacity: This describes the extent to which the organization deliberately broadens the scope of its problem-solving abilities and applies a broad range of different skills to address problems. Resilient teams see the big picture and develop many ways of doing things. Groups with limited problem-solving capacity tend to do what is most familiar and comfortable rather than dealing with harder, more complex problems.
We are currently validating this model through controlled experiments, while its measures and tools are being evaluated in the field. Early feedback is that it provides a structure and a language, both previously missing, that will help COs and post-command personnel (commodores, squadron deputies, tactical readiness evaluation teams, and so on) address team performance from a behavioral perspective in real time and in real (operational) settings.
The complexity of submarine technology and operations has long surpassed the capabilities of individual decision-makers. Only engaged and resilient teams can carry out safe, successful submarine-warfare operations. This is why it is imperative to focus on improving the behaviors of tactical teams using a model that works in a variety of situations (is robust) and reflects what teams actually need to do to be successful (is realistic). The behavioral model of team performance offers a new context for description and evaluation that goes well beyond skills and individual capabilities to provide new insights and direction for the submarine force.
Captain Steed is the former commander of Submarine Squadron Two and is a principal at UpScope Consulting Group, LLC, where he serves the submarine force on research-and-development projects.
Lieutenant Smallidge is a research psychologist at the Naval Submarine Medical Research Laboratory. Her research focuses on human performance.
E-Ring Safety Tips
Each year, leaders from the Fleet head to the Pentagon for the first time. Among the most challenging assignments they will encounter are front-office and staff jobs that directly support the leadership of the Navy and Department of Defense. For those entering these high-tempo, high-visibility jobs such as aide, special assistant, or executive assistant, keeping a few things in mind can make the transition from the Fleet more successful.
Get your life together before you report: Although your peers may be heading to shore jobs with a more generous tempo, the persistent pace of front-office jobs can make them less forgiving in offices where every member is essential. If you are coming off sea duty, take leave, recharge, and make sure you and your family are well situated prior to starting the job. Think carefully about where you will live—as close as possible to the office or mass transit translates to less commute time—and that directly translates to more time with your family.
Listen closely to the one you relieve: Do everything you can to get a face-to-face turnover. Just as on board a ship or in a squadron, the information you glean during turnover is often the last “free” knowledge you will get. The job will likely be vastly different from the one you left, so listen carefully and reserve your opinions until you’ve lived in your predecessor’s shoes for a while.
Be your “best self” at all times: As a member of your principal’s personal staff, your behavior will be intrinsically linked to your boss. In some ways, until you are in command, your actions will never be more scrutinized, particularly if you are wearing a loop on your shoulder. Your uniform, fitness, and attitude are all fair game, and others will judge you not by your intentions but by your actions. Be positive and, no matter what, keep your composure.
It’s not about you, it’s about the institution: The vast majority of senior leaders you work for will be extraordinarily dedicated human beings who are trying to do the right thing now and for our future. Accordingly, a strong ethos of selflessness runs through the best front offices, without a lot of room for self-interest. Senior leaders don’t want strivers with their own agendas; instead, they are looking for those willing to put the broader organization’s needs before their own.
Long hours are likely: Yes, these are usually part of the job. In the Navy, we are not living in a nine-to-five world, and our leaders don’t live that way either. Early mornings to prepare for the day ahead, later hours to secure the office for the day, and supporting the boss for evening events may very well be part of the job. Over time you will likely discover just enough flexibility and slack in the tempo to grab a quick workout or take a little leave, but don’t count on either during the job’s early stages.
High performance and integrity, low drama: Front-office teams often work in close quarters with no privacy in the most visible part of the organization they represent. The best embody confidence without ego. Integrity and discretion are also essential. Most principals will tolerate an occasional mistake, but none I’ve worked for stood for a failure of integrity or discretion. The advice we learned as children to always tell the truth and never gossip still pertains.
All-stars abound: While we’ve all met exceptional people throughout the Navy, the concentration of excellence that surrounds our leadership can be extraordinary. In addition to strong line officers, you will interact more frequently with JAGs, PAOs, and other specialists we don’t encounter in the Fleet as junior officers. Many, by nature of their career fields, will have far more experience working on senior staffs, so they can be good sounding boards on staff dynamics and history.
Expect to encounter a difficult personality once in a while: Senior staffs often attract folks with a healthy ego to match their strong abilities. You will encounter strong, able leaders who will fight very hard for their organizations and their beliefs. Some may be abrasive or more rarely, worse. Work hard to stay above the fray, be respectful to your seniors, but don’t be a doormat.
Don’t forget where you come from—and where you will return: As important as the work you may be doing in a front office is, our profession’s foundation remains leadership at sea. Those who keep their perspective don’t get intoxicated by palace intrigue or creature comforts; even in an office, the warfighter at sea or in the field should come first.
Engage your civilian teammates: If you come from the Fleet, your contact with Navy or Department of Defense civilians may have been limited. At the Pentagon you will work alongside civilians every day. Many are exceptional, but the expectations and conditions under which they serve are different from those in uniform. Still, the vast majority of these professionals will be valuable resources if you treat them well.
Be nice to gate guards and administrative assistants: This old adage will save you quite a bit of trouble. I’ve been saved countless times by both. Confidential assistants who are assigned to some of our most senior civilian and military leaders are among the most talented and knowledgeable professionals in the building. Ignore them or treat them offhandedly at your peril.
Go on trips and attend meetings: Seek out these opportunities even if they are not required. Travel often represents the fastest way to build camaraderie and accelerate your assimilation on the team. More important, these occasions will accelerate your understanding of your boss as you watch her or him deliberate, challenge the staff, and ultimately make decisions that will impact our future.
Be careful about speaking for your boss: If you are an executive assistant or an aide, you will often be telegraphing your admiral’s desires or standards to others. But remember that only one person has earned the stars on your boss’s collar. You need to be diplomatic but forthright. Whenever you hear yourself saying, “The Admiral wants . . . ” be very, very careful.
Relationships matter: On the waterfront, having friends in different departments and commands helps. Front offices and staffs work the same way. Tough issues often cross organizational seams, so teamwork and coordination are essential. Don’t be so busy that you crowd out time for building relationships you will need when the going gets tough.
Who owns the schedule? As former Secretary of the Navy Gordon England observed, time once spent is gone forever. Across the Pentagon, people will be pushing for more time, looking to save time, and fighting for your boss’s time. Managing your boss’s most precious resource may well be the most difficult and emotional process in the office. Understand who can say yes to scheduling requests, who can say no (sometimes this is not the same person), and how the office collectively manages this process.
Have you thanked an action officer today? If time is the coin of the realm on the E-ring, action officers are the lifeblood. To make meetings count and more complex issues manageable, action officers prepare read-aheads that enable a principal to read, review, and seek follow-up prior to the meeting. More significant, they are often managing million-dollar programs or high-stakes relationships with another nation’s navy with very little fanfare and visibility. Treat them like gold when they visit the front office—you could not do your job without them.
Strive for balance any way you can: Serving on the E-ring is both a marathon and a sprint. I didn’t always get it right. You won’t have endless time, and this is probably not the moment to pick up a new time-consuming hobby. Make every minute out of the office count by focusing on your family and maintaining health and fitness. The nature of the work can be intellectually taxing as well, so make time for outside reading, even if it is just a few pages before bedtime.
Although these jobs—whether in the E-ring or at a bustling combatant command—can be both hard and humbling, you will learn from some of the masters of our profession. You will also see, hear, and learn things that most of your peers won’t experience for years. In some cases, the men and women you work for will become lifelong mentors. Through it all, you will work in a world with constrained resources, no perfect solutions, and good but imperfect people trying to do the best they can. Work hard, be flexible, and most of all, remember that important work awaits you back in the Fleet.