As the United States pivots to the Pacific, the Marine Corps must prioritize the education of its leaders in regional cultures.
On 5 January 2012 President Barack Obama announced the national need to “rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific Region” in his remarks on the Defense Strategy Review. At the same time, he underscored the need for a leaner but “agile, flexible, and ready [military] for the full range of contingencies and threats.”1 The Marine Corps is uniquely equipped to meet this national objective, but it will take leaders who are cognizant of cultural and historical sensitivities in the region to successfully execute the President’s vision.
The Southeast Asia region, especially the Indo-Pacific sea lanes, holds strategic value for the United States. A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower specifically notes that:
Credible combat power will be continuously postured in the Western Pacific and the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean to protect our vital interests, assure our friends and allies of our continuing commitment to regional security, and deter and dissuade potential adversaries and peer competitors.2
This objective can be made possible by engaging the nations of Southeast Asia. Currently, the Navy and Marine Corps execute initiatives like the Global Maritime Partnerships concept and the annual Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training bilateral exercises.3 However, in addition to these naval exchanges and training, it is important to recognize how essential personal interactions are between U.S. Marines and sailors with these nations’ military members and citizens.
Even as the military increasingly relies on technology such as drones and “intelligent” weapon systems, officers with linguistic, historical, and cultural knowledge remain vital. As Marines work alongside their Asian counterparts through training evolutions and future missions, they need to understand the people with whom they are working.
Southeast Asia is incredibly diverse and complex. Australian National University Asia expert Christopher Roberts writes in his essay “Region and identity: the many faces of Southeast Asia” that “while only 9 percent (500 million) of the world’s population resides within the territorial confines of Southeast Asia, the peoples of the region speak about 17 percent of the world’s languages.”4 Even within a single state, language alone creates divisions in society. For example, in Indonesia “there are around 300 distinct ethnolingustic groups speaking 250 languages and inhabiting 6,000 islands.”5 This diversity compounds problems for local and state governments, but also for countries (like the United States) that seek to strike partnerships with them. Insurgencies and terrorist activities threaten stability throughout the region: The National Revolution Front in Thailand, the Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines, and the Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia are just a few examples. If the United States wants to partner with these countries, then knowledge of the threats they face is key to providing efficient aid to win their support.
The rise of China in the Pacific opens up many opportunities for the United States to pursue alliances in the region despite historical anti-American sentiment. As China gains more clout here, other nations seek to balance against it. In light of China’s aggressive behavior in the South China Sea, countries like the Philippines and Vietnam are weighing the option of partnering with the United States to hedge against China. This will only happen if the United States can prove to be a dependable ally.
All levels of the armed forces need to understand the sensitive history these nations have in relation to past military partnerships with the United States. The misbehavior of just one or two sailors or Marines can disrupt strategic-level plans. Recent events in Japan have clearly shown how the “strategic corporal” or “strategic sailor” can impact alliance-building and base rights.6 As the United States rebalances to the Pacific, negotiations on reopening bases like Subic and Clark will only be realized if sailors and Marines understand why the United States was strongly encouraged to leave the Philippines in the first place.
The human terrain is just as important as the physical terrain. The Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual, written in the 1940s, calls for Marines to make connections with the local populace through language skills and cultural knowledge. This manual recognized the importance of cultural understanding more than 70 years ago, but today the Corps continues to struggle to provide such leaders.
Female engagement teams (FETs)—now cultural support teams—can be better utilized in today’s conflicts and even in trust-building exercises. Master Sergeant Julia Watson writes that FETs “support notions of direct engagement with the local population, disseminating commanders’ messages, information collecting (passive and active), deescalating/softening the public’s perception of offensive operations, and influencing and understanding the needs of the population.”7
FETs can be an effective solution to understanding the local people, with or without a counterinsurgency (COIN)threat. However, the Marine Corps needs leaders with cultural understanding to direct these teams, and the Marine Corps needs to start developing these leaders now. One Marine officer wrote, “A lot of problems with the FETs have come about because the team is made of 18- and 19-year-old Marines led by a 21-year-old Marine [all] with high school educations trying to understand foreign cultures and COIN for the first time.”8 This problem can be mitigated if the Marine Corps educates its officers and enlisted in a more thorough program geared toward understanding the local language, people, and customs. As we shift to the Pacific, Marines will need to have at least basic knowledge of the nation in which they are working so that they can begin to understand the threats their host nations, and possibly the United States, face.
If we as a nation want to cooperate with Asia, then leaders dedicated to cultural understanding and awareness must step up. It was this need, and the opportunity to fill it, that drew me to the Marine Corps. I want to take charge of Marines in such a way that is both sensitive to the Marine Corps mission and to the human environment in which we are called to operate. I believe that my knowledge of Chinese, Tagalog, and Malay languages and culture will be a strategic asset as the nation refocuses on the Pacific region.
The President has given our military an incredible responsibility. It is up to the Marine Corps to fulfill these strategic objectives through the right manning, resources, and training. I look forward to being part of this effort.
1. White House, “Remarks by the President on the Defense Strategic Review,” news release, 5 January 2012.
2. United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, October 2007, www.navy.mil/maritime/Maritimestrategy.pdf.
3. John F. Bradford, “The maritime strategy of the United States: implications for Indo-Pacific sea lanes,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 33, no. 2 (August 2011), 183–99.
4. Christopher Roberts, “Region and identity: the many faces of Southeast Asia.” Asian Politics & Policy, vol. 3, no. 3 (July 2011), 365–81.
5. Ibid.
6. Martin Fackler, “Arrests of 2 U.S. Sailors in Rape Case Threaten to Fan Okinawa’s Anger,” The New York Times, 16 October 2012.
7. Julia Watson, “Female Engagement Teams,” Marine Corps Gazette, vol. 95, no. 7 (July 2011), 20–24.
8. Kristen Sproat 1LT, “Protramid and Human Intelligence,” email message to Katie Whitcombe, 20 October 2011.