Haze Gray (Variegated), All the Way
(See R. L. Crossland, p. 12, November 2012 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Anthony T. Dunn, U.S. Navy (Retired)—In looking at the new Navy uniforms I often wonder if those making the decisions on uniforms ever went to sea.
One of the lessons from World War II was that the uniform should not be loose, but tight-fitting so it does not catch while going through the ship.
Other lessons were uniforms should not be torn or dirty. Torn uniforms snag easily and in case of a flash burn do not provide protection. If wounded, dirty uniforms provide a haven for germs. Additionally uniforms, and shoes, should be easy to get out of and turned into flotation devices.
The white hat (“Dixie cup”) served a number of functions—when inverted an excellent sun screen, and in the water an extra flotation device. If you are unhappy they’re white, dye them blue.
Patch pockets on dungarees were practical. In days of yore when sailors made their uniforms, it was easier to attach the pocket on the outside. A bonus was that when you moved your leg the pocket closed—very nice when climbing aloft. Another thing, it kept the sailors’ hands out of their pockets.
I don’t understand the desire for camouflage in Navy uniforms. Naval battles are no longer fought alongside each other with “boarding party away.” They are fought at a distance; even air attacks are standoff. The only one who might see a ship is a submarine skipper who couldn’t resist a “final bearing and shoot” moment.
As to the material, wool was chosen because even wet it kept you warm. Dungarees were made from cotton because it was cheap, easy to wash, and easy to fold.
Speaking of dungarees, why are officers and chiefs wearing them? (The camouflage uniform did take the place of dungarees, didn’t it?) Dungarees are not uniform for officers and chiefs. Officers and chiefs should look like officers and chiefs.
I will not comment on the uniform that replaced the undress uniform, except to say I thought the wearer was a Marine (my apologies to the Corps).
Finally, whatever happened to tradition? Sailors should look like sailors.
(P.S. For the record, I still have my patch-pocket bell-bottoms.)
Handling a Cyclone
(See D. S. Coles, pp. 78–79, November 2012 Proceedings)
Captain Scott Phillpott, U.S. Navy—There are several good tips in the article by Lieutenant Commander Coles, but a few are counter to my experience and advice. The author describes some controllable forces as “nail-biting,” specifically the “bumping” of throttles on and off as the ship works next to the pier. While correctly identifying the potential of “automatically” activating normal mode when the throttles are at/past the 40 “notch,” this is not justification for abandoning a slower, more controlled, and less nail-biting pier approach by using slow mode.
First, the throttle detent (when the engines kick into normal) can be adjusted beyond the 40 percent notch. This gives the conning officer the opportunity to stop advancing the throttle without activating normal mode. You can feel the 40 percent notch, stop advancing the throttle, and then the approach is no longer nail-biting.
Using slow mode also removes stresses placed on lines and line handers since the bumping of engines is unpredictable, not overly useful, nor recommended as a maneuvering strategy. In the early patrol-craft days many PC skippers reached the same conclusion to not use slow mode, and many who insisted on this tactic had some pier-side allision, e.g., lines parting, bouncing off bumpers, impacting piers with great force, etc.
Lieutenant Commander Coles also describes “compressed conditions” as a justification for using the “hold” line-handling command—neither true nor safe. Using the “hold” command as “routine” while also operating the PC throttles in normal mode is a recipe for disaster. On board the USS Typhoon (PC-5) I used slow mode in nearly every mooring, the check command was routine, and approaches were planned in advance to alleviate any sense of compressed conditions. A well-trained linesman knows what “check” means, and taking away the added safety he offers is not prudent.
The Cyclone-class ships have power to spare, even in slow mode. They are tremendously maneuverable, and conning officers become much more proficient in understanding the forces involved when slow mode is used. I suggest an Operational Risk Management review, since anytime an event is described by the commanding officer as “nail-biting,” it is worth closer scrutiny.
Co-Ed Crew: Reality vs. Taboo
(See K. Eyer, pp. 44–48, October 2012; M. Junge, p. 8, and T. Davis, pp. 8–9, November 2012 Proceedings)
Captain Raymond J. Brown, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired)—Captain Eyer has stepped into an editorial minefield. To even question that co-ed ships might have some problems will have many tending to equate the questioner to a misogynist and someone who had said the same thing with respect to racial integration. Even now in agreement with the author, I feel obliged to state that I am enormously proud of my mother who held the first billet of sergeant major in the Marine Corps in 1945 at MCAS Cherry Point, and that the only officer I ever had decorated twice was a female intelligence officer.
Captain Eyer, get thee ready for assault of rapid continuous fire from many quarters. Good thing you are retired now. But here are several corroborative points for us to consider:
Sailors have a long history of sexual incontinence. This is the subject of both truth and legend, though the legends are based in truth. I am old enough now to have remembered the “Sexual Revolution” taking place in my adolescence. Seventeen days after graduating from high school, I entered the U.S. Coast Guard Academy and in summer cruises learned that the revolution for many sailors was a non-event, as it had become a way of life for at least a millennium or two already.
Though I ardently believe in chastity and marital fidelity, I do not believe it is the mission of the Sea Services to foster such ideals. But fostering readiness is a mission—perhaps the crucial mission, as all others depend upon it.
We spend an awful lot of time simultaneously denying the obvious and then studying it. I recall a senior captain in personnel earnestly stating to a number of gathered officers: “We are finding that a great many women officers are departing the service as they approach age 30 . . . and we need to study this.” Knock yourself out, captain, and discover the manifestly obvious in plain sight.
I also recall a distinguished master chief command enlisted adviser, a man for whom I have tremendous respect, telling me that we need to consider pregnancy a normal part of service life. I have crawled too many bilges, endured too many nor’easters, and climbed up the sides of too many drug-runners (all really integral to seagoing life) to really accept that. And no, I am not willing to equate pregnancy to a physical injury, as is the manner of some.
And there are a few more inconvenient truths about upper-body strength no one wants to talk about. Damage control, boat operations, and boarding evolutions often require considerable upper-body strength. There are some women who can meet the requirements, but there are many who cannot. I have heard the comeback that there are also some males who cannot accomplish these basic seagoing tasks. My response is that they too should be made to go away. Seeing a boarding officer who needs assistance to get over the rail is neither safe for the boarding party nor intimidating to an adversary.
All this reminds me of John Buchan’s wise statement: “The sea endures no makeshifts. If a thing is not exactly right, it will be vastly wrong.”
Ensign Patrick Wiedorn, U.S. Navy—Captain Eyer’s article tries to raise some hard questions about the combat effectiveness of women on ships. Those are questions that need asking, with answers provided based on the physical capabilities of women, how they shape force-manning numbers, and the costs and benefits of integrated ships. But instead of that, the article serves only to lay unwarranted blame for sexual misconduct wholly on women. The article starts by explaining how the sailors who used to go “skulking about the fleshpots of the Bangkok high-street” are now instead simply having sex with the women on their ships. This is not a promising way to open an unbiased debate.
There are nuggets of truth in the article, because the Navy has indeed been changed by “time, technology, and events.” With sailors constantly in the technology-enabled public eye, they are held accountable for the moral and professional decisions they make. And Captain Eyer is right—retention rates for females in the Navy are lower than for males. But instead of asking if females are compatible with combat effectiveness, let’s ask the actual hard questions, like why those rates are lower. It might be because, as Captain Eyer says, females tend to view family life as incompatible with service.
But there’s another option: What if female retention rates are lower because of attitudes in the service such as those presented in Captain Eyer’s article? He details the “inevitability” of female sexual misconduct and that the “natural equilibrium” in the Navy is far fewer women serving. Because the article asserts that females on ships leads always to sexual misconduct, and the best solution is drastically reducing or eliminating the number of women on ships, that means that no matter how hard they work or how skilled they become as shiphandlers and warfighters, the mere presence of women on ships reduces the Navy’s ability to do its job. I agree with Captain Eyer—the Navy requires a gender-neutral approach to warfighting. However, articles like his encourage anything but that standard. Indeed, let female sailors be judged on their individual actions and abilities, the same as any male sailor.
The Navy’s Newest Warfighting Imperative
(See K. L. Card and M. S. Rogers, pp. 22–26, October 2012; and P. A. Strassmann, pp. 9, 84, November 2012 Proceedings)
Loren Thompson—I certainly agree with Vice Admirals Card and Rogers that “information dominance has become a Navy warfighting imperative.” I recently had an opportunity to discuss Navy cyber goals with Vice Admiral Rogers and was impressed with the candor and clarity of his thinking. He argues convincingly that the Sea Services need to understand their information-assurance and security needs in light of related warfighting skills such as electronic warfare and signals intelligence, rather than regarding cyber in isolation.
I am not convinced that cyber thinking has evolved to a similar level of sophistication in the other services, or in most defense agencies. One area where even the Navy may need some help is in generating reliable criteria for securing cyber services from the private sector. Much of the really deep expertise in cyber offense, defense, and exploitation resides in private-sector companies, and they are all trying to win federal contracts. Unfortunately, many newcomers with relatively thin or narrow experience are also crowding into the field, and the government doesn’t seem to have mature standards for determining who is really qualified to lead major efforts. If it merely defaults to the lowest bidder, that could eventually lead to catastrophe at the hands of sophisticated cyber adversaries.
Perhaps the place to begin is to ascertain which providers are most qualified is to invoke the thinking of Vice Admiral Rogers concerning “cross-domain” expertise. If a prospective cyber-security provider has real experience in electronic warfare, or in signals intelligence, or in reconnaissance and surveillance, then it is more likely to see the connections between cyber security and the other competencies contributing to information dominance. Similarly, if a provider has background not just in the defensive aspects of cyber security, but also in offense and exploitation, that implies a higher level of understanding. After all, how likely is it that a company can really understand the defensive side of the equation if they have never participated in the offensive side? They are opposite sides of the same metaphorical coin.
Beyond possessing full-spectrum skills, the Navy also should be seeking cyber support from enterprises that have mature organizational cultures and a demonstrated commitment to the field. Cyber security is an infant industry in which many of the recent entrants are not going to survive. One way of discovering which providers are really committed to the business is to ask whether they were engaged before the current gold rush began. Those are the companies that are likely to still be players after the gold rush is over.
Rebalancing the Rhetoric
(See J. R. Forbes, pp. 16–21, October 2012 Proceedings)
Steven Hertz—Congressman Forbes’ article is spot on-target: No potential adversary is deterred for long by over-stressed sailors and worn-out ships. The United States must rebuild its economic strength, and the Navy must develop an affordable, cohesive fighting force that can protect our interests.
Any conceivable Pacific-theater confrontation will nevertheless feature a few forward-based warships struggling to deter or engage greater forces of adversaries nearer to their Asian bases. People and assets will be stretched by economics and by the sheer vastness of the Pacific regardless of how we trim and massage shipbuilding.
Still, we must do our very best. Our potential adversary(ies) must not induce us to burn up scarce resources while they await further American decline. The United States must play this game its own way, conserving people and material resources wherever possible.
To succeed in this endeavor, we must break througth the habitual constraints we place on our thoughts and actions when these may hobble strategy so we do not waste scarce resources. Utilizing suitable U.S.-flag, government-owned merchant ships in commercial service is an economic path to achieving required U.S. presence.
Reintroducing regular U.S. shipping into the cross-trades on the sea lanes and into the ports of the western Pacific and Indian oceans will immediately demonstrate U.S. committment to open trade with local nations and peoples. The related shoreside services will serve as vital sources of information in distant Asian lands.
A measured shipbuilding program will not strain resources and will achieve secure, peaceful presence over time. Moreover, from its adoption the plan would demonstrate commitment to our vital interest in open trade and free passage.
Fortunately, we have the opportunity to base the new construction program on a fast combat-support ship, a double-hull replenishment-ship design now slated for inclusion in the 2014 Naval Shipbuilding Plan. By acting expeditiously, the United States can take advantage of existing circumstance, suitable design, and civilian mariner crews.
Simply building some of these ships with a few commercial modifications for cross-trading will make our overall deterent posture vastly more robust and believable along the litoral. The ships will provide assured replenishment to deployed U.S. and allied forces. They will trade while deployed in forward positons and will be available for use when needed.
Planning strong deterence with staying power is one key factor in successfully defending U.S. interests, peace, and prosperity. Broad and timely information is another. I suggest to Congressman Forbes and to Proceedings readers that the most effective way to deter peremptory challenge and to gather necessary information along the Asian littoral is to operate U.S.-flag merchant ships and networks of local agents in the Asian cross-trade as an integral component of our rebalancing effort.
Does the Navy Value Joint Education?
(See J. T. Kuehn, p. 12, October 2012 Proceedings)
Colonel Talbot N. Vivian, U.S. Air Force (Retired)—I found Commander Kuehn’s editorial most interesting but not surprising. When I attended the Armed Forces Staff College in 1986–87 the Goldwater-Nichols Act had just been passed. Admiral Carlisle Trost, soon to be the Chief of Naval Operations, stood in front of my class and announced, “I am a graduate of the United States Naval Academy, I have no advanced degree and no PME [professional military education]. Any time spent not on a ship is wasted time. You Army and Air Force officers, do not feel smug. I have my own army and my own air force and I do not need you.” So much for jointness.
It was well known at that time that if you were allowed to attend the Armed Forces Staff College you were between assignments in Norfolk and the detailer had not found a suitable fit for you. This attitude seemed to permeate the entire Navy, even to the end of my 30 years in the Air Force.
When checking the U.S. Navy website and reviewing the biographies of all full admirals, only three listed any PME and only one listed a joint PME. So what does this tell the young ensign? PME is not important.