The Great Green (Pierside?) Fleet
vy Ray Mabus shared his vision of the “Great Green Fleet” at the Naval Energy Forum in McLean, Virginia. The Honorable Mr. Mabus remarked that “in the drive for energy reform the goal has got to be increased warfighting capability.” Increased warfighting capability through energy reform? Is this really possible under the secretary’s timeline of the next ten years, or will warfighters be left with another constraint on their way into the combat zone?Secretary Mabus effectively communicated how energy reform in the Department of Defense could immediately reduce our nation’s dependence on foreign oil. But at what cost? For many in the armed services, “energy efficiency” might conjure images of turning down the thermostat, putting on a sweater, and learning to enjoy cold showers. For the surface Navy, an effective way to cut fuel consumption would be to remain pierside. While fighting wars, however, cutting corners and decreasing underway training time can cost lives. Metaphorical sweaters and cold showers decrease the Navy’s capability and do not meet the secretary’s intent.
The important distinction in the secretary’s remarks is that he established himself as a champion of energy efficiency, not conservation. Although military professionals may be masters of doing more with less, energy efficiency on board our warships will instead involve doing the same with less. Or, alternatively, doing more with the same: increased warfighting capability through energy efficiency.
Time Matters
In the past few years Proceedings has published several articles on energy reform, a topic that has gained publicity as our nation’s tremendous appetite for oil and our foreign policy collide.1 But many ideas, including those featured in this magazine, have extensive lead times, prohibitive up-front costs, and require significant infrastructure changes. Developing alternative fuels and driving reverse-hydrolysis with our shipboard nuclear reactors while in port might lead to energy independence—but all of the secretary’s goals fall within the next ten years. What can be done in the meantime?
The surface Navy’s response to rising fuel costs and budget constraints in Fiscal Year 2009 was to drastically curtail underway steaming days at the cost of unit-level training. These restrictions spilled into FY 10, and commanding officers can now anticipate only a handful of underway days each quarter to train their crews for combat readiness. The secretary’s energy goals likely have planners in every numbered fleet wringing their hands and preparing to chop even more underway time from schedules. This hardly meets the intent of increased warfighting capability. This is energy conservation, not efficiency.
Many ships have adapted to the new constraints and have found innovative ways to reduce their fuel consumption. In “Conserving Fuel at Sea,” authors Commander Glenn P. Kuffel and Lieutenant Commanders Barry Palmer and Mary Katey Hays outline several ways the USS Carney (DDG-64) saved significant amounts of fuel by reducing the redundancy of their engineering plant during restricted-waters transits. If risks are effectively mitigated, this can be a practical course of action to save fuel, however, this is another example of energy conservation and certainly cannot be argued to increase warfighting capability. But what other options does the surface Navy have?
Although little known, the results of a study the Department of the Navy commissioned nine years ago could drastically—and immediately—decrease energy use throughout the surface fleet. From December 2000 to January 2001 the Navy chartered a group of scientists from the Rocky Mountain Institute (RMI) to evaluate the potential savings from energy efficiency on board the USS Princeton (CG-59). RMI discovered that the typical at-sea electrical load could be reduced anywhere from 20 percent to 50 percent, which could reduce fuel usage by between 10 percent and 25 percent.2 These savings could bring the surface fleet much of the way toward Secretary Mabus’ energy-reform goals.
RMI’s 129-page report is extremely detailed in terms of both engineering and cost-savings analysis and includes recommendations for retrofitting fire pumps so firemains can remain pressurized without keeping two large pumps online 24 hours a day: “Rework fittings and the control system to maintain fire system pressure with a [variable-speed drive]-equipped lead pump and a backup pump in automatic startup mode, or small jockey pumps instead of the large fire pumps.”3
Most of the report’s recommendations are retrofits and could be added immediately into the continuous maintenance availabilities of ships throughout the Fleet. For example, RMI’s fluorescent lighting systems retrofits could reduce the number of lamps necessary in a given space by using dimming electronic ballasts and reflectors to increase output per lamp. This retrofit would pay for itself in energy savings in less than one year.4 These improvements will cut into maintenance budgets but would decrease operational budgets for years to come. This is what Secretary Mabus envisioned when he heralded “lifetime energy costs” to the Naval Energy Forum.
Improving Capability
Further, “All of RMI’s recommendations and suggestions aim to increase operational effectiveness, and at a minimum, in no way to reduce combat effectiveness or resilience.”5 Such language seems prophetic in light of the secretary’s recent vision for the Great Green Fleet: “. . . to lower our reliance on fossil fuels, we need to improve the efficiencies of our systems and develop platforms that operate as a system of systems, are integrated together, and reduce our tactical vulnerability.”
What does efficiency mean, tangibly, for our Navy ships? Since the surface fleet runs on marine diesel fuel, to the surface warfare officer this means more miles traveled for underway training or operational tasking and more electricity delivered to combat suites with fewer underway replenishments. And for our nation, less dependency on foreign oil. This also translates to enormous potential savings in operational budgets and more operational capability. In sum, increased warfighting capability through energy efficiency.
Secretary Mabus issued a challenge for energy reform. The surface Navy can either meet his fuel-savings goals through conservation by remaining pierside to the detriment of its warfighting capability, or it can rise to the occasion through large-scale implementation of energy efficiency retrofitting to become the Great Green Fleet he envisions.
1. See “Get on Board with Alternative Fuels,” Proceedings December 2008; “Weaning the Navy from Foreign Oil,” January 2009; and “Conserving Fuel at Sea,” June 2009.
2. Amory Lovins, Chris Lotspeich, Ron Perkins, Jim Rogers, and Edwin Orrett, “Rocky Mountain Institute Energy Efficiency Survey aboard USS Princeton CG-59,” 30 June 2001, 5.
3. Ibid., 24.
4. Ibid., 103.
5. Ibid., 8.
Lieutenant Heyworth is the navigator on board the USS Fort McHenry (LSD-43). He holds a bachelor of science degree from the U.S. Naval Academy in ocean engineering and a master’s degree in civil and environmental engineering from Stanford University, where he maintained a focus on atmosphere and energy.
Joint and Coalition Tactical Networking: There’s an App for That!
Downloading application software from online stores created by companies such as Apple has radically transformed the market for goods and services around the world. Now, joint and Coalition tactical networking for U.S. service members is benefiting from a similar business model. The Joint Program Executive Office (JPEO) for the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) is expanding competition, reducing costs, and increasing innovation in defense communications by sharing and reusing tactical networking waveform software applications that significantly improve warfighter capabilities.
Recognizing the crucial need for improved tactical interoperability, situational awareness, and informed decision-making, the Department of Defense (DOD) initiated the development and acquisition of JTRS networking capabilities at the beginning of the 21st century. In 2005 the JPEO was established to lead these efforts. To encourage competition and innovation, the JPEO created a new business model to acquire tactical networking capability. The JTRS Enterprise Business Model gives companies without government contracts access to tactical networking waveform software applications, allowing them to develop networking radio products that compete directly with those being developed under government contracts. The new approach is more agile than traditional defense systems acquisition and generates a greater variety of powerful, affordable networking solutions for joint and Coalition warfighters.
By sharing waveform software applications through its own app store, known as the JTRS information repository, JPEO/JTRS greatly expands the number of competitors in its radio hardware market. More competition lowers procurement costs and accelerates innovation.
How It Works
Like the app-store model, the JTRS business model is fostered by common standards that JPEO/JTRS established with communications-industry partner participation. These standards ensure that shared applications will operate properly on suitably developed hardware and operating environment software. Another important factor is acquiring sufficient government purpose rights in the waveform development contract to allow the delivered software to be shared with radio hardware providers at the government’s discretion.
Reusing waveform software applications significantly improves radio interoperability and reduces the cost of entry into the tactical networking market. Radio developers no longer need to develop waveform software applications concurrently while producing radio hardware operating environments. This is a significant advance over older models, in which each radio provider developed redundant and often incompatible versions according to government specifications. Since companies using this model do not realize a return on their investment until integration is complete, they are also strongly motivated to deliver products efficiently.
The success of the business model already has expanded the scope of competition for integrating tactical networking capabilities into operational forces. The JTRS model permits broader non-developmental item procurement contests among all defense communications developers. A broader portfolio of tactical networking devices yields more features that complement military network modernization strategies.
Eliminating Barriers
Statutory, regulatory, and security certification requirements for communications systems present significant challenges. The traditional defense acquisition model assumes the serial progression of a single system from development and demonstration to procurement and fielding. The JTRS model commercially develops multiple tactical networking systems simultaneously apart from a traditional program of record. While this is desirable for acquiring wireless networking capabilities, statutory, regulatory, and certification requirements must still be met.
JPEO/JTRS has developed new approaches that better support the JTRS business-model objectives. Semiannual large-scale Army network integration evaluations are used to generate operational assessment opportunities for all tactical networking systems regardless of development approach. The National Security Agency (NSA) also supports JTRS solutions through its commercial communications security evaluation program. JPEO/JTRS eliminates another potential barrier by integrating commercial radio providers’ products into JTRS Enterprise Network Manager system development, ensuring common tactical network planning and monitoring regardless of the specific hardware solutions procured.
Delivering to the Battlefield
The Soldier Radio Waveform (SRW) uses mobile ad hoc networking technology to deliver Internet protocol networking capability to warfighters and unattended sensors/vehicles on the battlefield. SRW capability is a key performance parameter requirement for JTRS airborne, ground vehicular, man-portable, and unattended vehicle/sensor radios.
Using a traditional acquisition approach, the number of SRW-capable networking radios would be limited only to government-funded programs of record. Making SRW available to commercial radio developers using the JTRS Enterprise Business Model has tripled the number of SRW implementations competing for procurement contracts at no additional cost to the government.
In March 2011 Major General James L. Huggins, commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, commented that SRW
“. . . performed in a remarkable fashion, allowing soldiers within the platoon to exchange both voice and data information. This exchange allows junior leaders to more efficiently command and control their formations and provides a [common operating picture] to the fire team level. Providing both voice and data beyond line of sight communications to the fire-team level, [SRW] meets operational requirements and fills a gap where no capability currently exists.”
In July 2011, the NSA certified the first SRW-capable radio for secure deployed operations. This milestone was achieved by a commercial implementation that used the JTRS Enterprise Business Model to integrate SRW software without government funding.
In September 2011, JPEO/JTRS verified over-the-air interoperability of seven SRW radio implementations—three from programs of record and four from commercial developers. In November five were tested during a large-scale Army network integration evaluation.
In February 2012, U.S. Army Rangers completed an operational assessment of SRW while deployed to Afghanistan. Multiple Ranger special-operations platoons employed SRW under combat conditions for the first time during various tactical missions. Rangers indicated that SRW greatly improved their ability to network and exchange key information, such as location, more efficiently. They considered SRW to be very effective for conducting operations, especially at the small-unit level. “This is a near-perfect example of how early engagement by the warfighter working closely with the acquisition community can deliver capability smarter and faster,” said Brigadier General Michael Williamson, joint program executive officer for the JTRS.
These successes illustrate the value of adopting the app-store approach to sharing networking waveform software applications. The JTRS model demonstrated that it can increase the number of competitive, cost-effective, and interoperable tactical networking solutions that meet warfighter requirements.
Competition and Innovation
JPEO/JTRS has also established a Joint Reference Implementation Laboratory (JRIL), which removes additional barriers to competition. JRIL facilities allow commercial developers to test and evaluate their tactical networking products against a government-owned reference implementation. JRIL engineers manage waveform software releases and test compliance to applicable standards. The JRIL also facilitates adoption of new technologies into joint and Coalition tactical networks by identifying and integrating additional relevant apps.
JRIL enhancements to the JTRS business model further advance the acquisition agility in the tactical networking arena. JPEO/JTRS will continue to use this successful approach to expand competition, stimulate innovation, and reduce costs while delivering interoperable connectivity to service members engaged in defeating adversaries and supporting Coalition partners around the world.
Captain Hoyle completed operational tours on board five nuclear-powered warships, including command of the USS Maine (SSBN-741) Gold. As JTRS Network Enterprise Domain program manager, he led the development and delivery of wideband tactical networking waveform and network management services capabilities for joint and Coalition forces.
The New Command Culture of Cooperative Leadership
Much has been written about workplace culture, and many speak of “culture shaping.” Google’s business culture, which focuses on encouraging creativity, ingenuity, and critical thinking, continues to receive a great deal of attention. We see value in fostering similar characteristics in our command.
Though not a Silicon Valley-based, publicly traded corporation, Navy Information Operations Command (NIOC) Pensacola is a proud team of sailors and civilians predominantly comprising “millennials” (people born between 1977 and 1990) who are passionate about information technology. As a result, we find ourselves occupying an intersection of traditional Navy culture and a Google-based business philosophy. We focus our efforts on fostering a command climate that allows 21st-century sailors and a technology based command to reach its potential. Please note: we make no claim to be creating anything. Our objective is to work cooperatively to encourage the most valued behaviors already present.
Old Values, New Emphasis
Our command values of continual improvement, teamwork, effective communication, and entrepreneurship remain constant. Although each value, except entrepreneurship, is likely promoted to varying degrees by leadership at just about any Navy command, we deliberately foster a climate in which these values thrive daily. We go out of our way to:
• Over-communicate “why”;
• Celebrate competence over collar device and performance over relative seniority;
• Reward failure; and
• Provide constructive and continual 360-degree feedback.
Over-Communicating Why
NIOC Pensacola is no more physically diverse than any other Navy command, though our experiential diversity—and thus our diversity of thought—is part of daily life. We ask each team member, regardless of rank, to help define how we execute our existing or developing processes. To ensure everyone has a solid basis from which to make recommendations, we go out of our way to explain the reasons for our actions. We call it “explaining the why.”
Because we work in the relatively new mission area of computer-network operations, we not only have the luxury, but also are required to do far more than blindly execute standard operating procedures. This cooperative leadership model results in shared ownership and a continuous improvement loop. By focusing on the “why” (even if after the fact), sailors can tie an action to a strategic objective, resulting in creative problem solving, new approaches to old tasks, and endless opportunities for mentorship. We all want to be and to know that we are significant members of the team—not mindless cogs executing specific tasks. Though this has been the case for years, it is even more pronounced among those of us, regardless of generation, who share this point of view.
Competence over Collar Device
Each promotion brings additional responsibility, authority, and privilege. The military culture assumes that experience in uniform is the primary measurement of operational competence. Blind faith in such an assumption is obviously flawed. Sailors are joining the Navy each year better educated and more experienced than those who preceded them. At the same time, they have been raised to expect to have more control over their careers from the beginning. They grew up with the luxury of not having to rely on a single authority to give them the answers; they found the answers themselves after a few strokes of the computer keyboard. These sailors are a product of video games that have defined objectives and continuous feedback that allowed them to dictate their own pace of progress. They were not constrained by artificial barriers, and they flourish under a meritocracy. We all want these very things: control, clear objectives, continuous feedback, and recognition for contributions without regard to rank. Unfortunately, traditional military culture tells us that rank and seniority trump all.
Rather than embrace it, we attempt to counter this tendency to automatically align responsibility, authority, and privilege to a collar device. Many choose to assign sailors based on relative seniority among peers and push those nearest the next promotion gate to the front of the pack. We don’t.
Our department heads are not always the most senior person in the department; our early promotes on a given evaluation cycle are not those most senior within a competitive category; and our most prized shipmates are those who create the most value. Our evaluations and fitness reports reflect these facts.
Rewarding Failure
The military has long had a “zero-defect” mentality, which continues to promote a risk-averse attitude that stifles initiative. We acknowledge that the most significant lessons are learned through failure and want everyone to accept the notions of “failing their way to success” and “making it up as we go.” At NIOC Pensacola, if a failure (not concerning personal conduct) is made with good intentions, we don’t merely “manage” the mistake—we reward it. We recognize in a high first-time failure rate the hallmark of entrepreneurship. We’ve noted several interesting results at our command: sailors are less reluctant to try new ideas, they err on the side of action, and they share their lessons with others.
In essence, we are fostering a cooperative climate. We turn individual learning curves into a single collaboration curve, minimizing the number of times we make the same mistake and increasing trust across the ranks.
360-Degree Feedback
Midterm counseling is often done with a check-the-box mentality, and even when accomplished in a thoughtful way, it reflects the viewpoint of strictly senior to junior. Instead, we make the process the most important feedback tool in our continual performance review. Anonymous input is provided from a 360-degree array (including seniors, peers, and juniors), and the aggregate results are delivered by the reporting senior. Receiving feedback from many levels is immeasurably useful, if the command climate teaches that the feedback itself is valued, constructive, brutally honest when required, and timely.
Allowing team members to compare perceptions of their performances from different points of view reveals potential crevices, or perhaps even canyons, that must be bridged for them to perform at the required levels. Additionally, peers and subordinates enjoy a different level of interaction, giving them a new perspective from which to measure performance. The notion of 360-degree feedback permits juniors to become significant contributors to their workplace, resulting in greater productivity regardless of the task. By taking in all points of view, the reporting senior gains a new appreciation of the member’s performance, either changing his or her perception or solidifying it further. After all, feedback is not about stroking egos or hurting feelings, it is about improving performance.
Traditional command climates are not necessarily less effective and are likely more efficient. However, considering that the naval profession requires us continually to improve our level of performance and that of those with whom we serve, the traditional climate promotes short-term success over long-term growth and encourages risk-averse task followers over creative problem-solvers. In this century—and for those of us working in technology oriented fields—there is no time or place for a legacy approach to today’s challenges. If we are to benefit from a Fleet of critical thinkers tactically contributing to strategic efforts, unafraid to challenge the status quo, who understand that their collar devices do not define their worth, then we must do our part to foster a 21st-century command climate.