The U.S. Senate Should Ratify UNCLOS
(See B. May, p. 10, June 2012 Proceedings)
Remo Salta—The problem with Commander May’s argument on why the U.S. Senate should ratify the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is that he never talks about who would actually enforce this treaty. He also mentions that smaller nations in the Pacific would welcome American involvement as a counterbalance to Chinese territorial claims in the region. I’m sure these smaller countries would like nothing better than to have the United States protect them with our large Navy.
But the major problem is, what if China simply decides to ignore the treaty? Is the world willing to go to war with China over the Spratly Islands? China is making all sorts of outrageous territorial claims in the Pacific, especially around Japan. There was a dangerous encounter between a large Chinese fishing boat and two Japan Coast Guard patrol boats in September 2010 near the Senkaku Islands, which are claimed by both Japan and China. Do we really want to take on the responsibility of protecting smaller nations by somehow “forcing” the Chinese to back down from their territorial claims? We should know by now that unless a treaty has some teeth in it to enforce its own laws, it is useless.
In addition, bringing any grievances to the United Nations against China would be pointless. China is on the Security Council and could simply veto any sanctions that were brought against it. So if China wanted to take the Spratly Islands, it could do so without any fear of retribution from the U.N.
Which brings us back to the U.S. Navy. Does the U.N. think the U.S. Navy is going to enforce all the laws within UNCLOS? How would claims between nations be arbitrated, and what happens if one or more member nations simply decide to ignore the treaty? If China flagrantly violates the treaty and pursues its territorial demands in the Pacific, are we going to get stuck with the job of stopping them?
The U.N. has a pitiful record of enforcing sanctions against nations, even smaller ones. It is impotent over controlling a rogue nation such as Syria or North Korea, it showed massive corruption during the “Oil for Food” scandal when it tried to impose sanctions on Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and it could not act to prevent the massive slaughter in Rwanda when even a relatively small detachment of troops could have made the difference between life and death in that horrible situation. So now the U.N. is going to not only tell China what to do in Asia, but it’s also going to stop China militarily if it has to enforce UNCLOS? That will never happen and we all know it.
Treaties like UNCLOS sound nice in theory. But as with so many treaties established by the U.N., if it can’t be enforced against even the smallest nations, let alone a superpower like China, then it is useless.
The Coming Naval Century
(See R. O. Work, pp. 24–30, May 2012 Proceedings)
Timothy C. Duff—When Mr. Work refers to “tech-savvy people,” is he speaking of sailors with a solid grounding in physics, math, and computer programming, or are they merely lightning-fast at Facebook, texting, or downloading apps? Many people I know can’t read a map, but they can follow the lady’s voice telling them to turn left into a building, and I have been told, with my heavy electronics/engineering background, that I’m not “tech-savvy” because I multiply numbers in my head instead of whipping out my iPhone to find out what 9 x 6 equals.
It seems to me that technology has become confused with facile acquaintance with some limited applications, without the deeper understanding that allows for more powerful usage. When teaching my children to drive, I explain to them the concepts behind internal combustion, braking, manual and automatic transmissions, inertia, kinetic energy, friction, and reaction times so that they can manipulate them to their advantage, not just turn the key and step on the gas. Many of the students that I’ve tutored in physics wanted the quick rote solution, without trying to gain a knowledge that would allow them to solve all problems of that nature, not just the ones that fit the mold. So the question remains, which type of sailors do we have? Which type do we need?
The Fleet Program Needs Fixing
(See M. Farrell, p. 20, May 2012, and M. Junge, p. 8, June 2012 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral W. W. Copeland Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)—Lieutenant Farrell is correct in that there appears to have been a spate of commanding-officer firings over the past few years. He goes on to assess that the Fleet-Up program, by which an XO fleets-up to CO after 18 months, should be re-examined. The program now “removes the time away from the Fleet, a prolonged period during which prospective commanding officers can truly learn from their previous mistakes—that is essential in developing effective ships’captains.” This is apparently supported by a survey of current and former commanding officers.
In reading Navy Times, I get the impression these leaders are being “detached for cause” due to a multitude of improper behaviors such as sexual misconduct, alcohol incidents, poor headwork, poor performance, cheating, etc. Most of those appear to me to be the result of a breakdown in one’s character and integrity.
Do we believe an additional assignment between one’s XO and CO tours is the answer to strengthen character and integrity?
Commander Harold H. Sacks, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Lieutenant Farrell appears to have got it exactly wrong. As an officer who went from a one-year in-country tour in Vietnam to a two-year tour as a destroyer XO directly to a (rare in 1967) two-year tour as CO of a destroyer, believe me, never did I feel invincible. But I was at the top of my form and almost half a century later look back at that period with pride and nostalgia. As I see it, the problem the author refers to is more likely to have just the opposite cause. Too little time on the pond! The frenetic requirement to attend graduate schools, then serve in the Pentagon with a periodic return to sea duty to get one’s ticket punched is producing leaders who never truly get to understand the sea, the ships, and the people in them.
Rethinking the Strait of Hormuz
(See D. Dolan, pp. 40–46, May 2012 Proceedings)
Nathan Hughes, Director of Tactical Intelligence, Stratfor—Commander Dolan quotes Stratfor founder and CEO George Friedman as arguing that an air campaign against Iran would be the “kind of war the United States excels at fighting,” but faults him for “oversimplifying the complexity of Iran’s current A2/AD threat.” In fact, much of the rest of the argument by Dr. Friedman in the very same August 2010 stratfor.com article explicitly recognizes that complexity:
The problem with Hormuz is that the United States cannot tolerate any risk there. . . . Since many of the Iranian mine layers would be small boats, this would mean an extensive air campaign and special-operations forces raids against Iranian ports designed to destroy anything that could lay mines, along with any and all potential mine-storage facilities, antiship missile emplacements, submarines, and aircraft. Put simply, any piece of infrastructure within a few miles of any port would need to be eliminated.
In addition, Stratfor has consistently been skeptical of the utility of air power alone, given its inherent limitations—most recently in Libya.
All this is to say that while Stratfor actually largely agrees with Commander Dolan’s assessment of the threat of Iran’s capabilities in the strait—as well as the idea of Iran as a rational actor—our analytical framework grates against important elements of his conclusion. While the threat environment in the strait and probably even inside the Persian Gulf might be too high for carriers and big-deck amphibs at the outbreak of hostilities, Commander Dolan’s inclination to surrender control of the strait temporarily with the hope that Iran would allow civilian traffic to continue to transit would be a dangerous assumption in terms of Iran’s own sense of self-interest.
The ability to threaten the Strait of Hormuz is Iran’s core deterrent, and its real “nuclear” option. But should hostilities break out, Iran’s strategy of deterrence already will have failed, and its strategic imperatives will have shifted toward a wartime footing. Consequent shifts in calculus and circumstance could easily favor the ability to disproportionately harm the U.S. and world economy by disrupting traffic through the strait in the midst of a global economic crisis.
But more important, the U.S. Navy has built up a reputation for ensuring free, unfettered access to the world’s oceans and international waterways. American freedom of action against Iran already has suffered because of Iran’s ability to threaten the strait.
Certainly, no one is arguing that the United States would not be able ultimately to secure the strait and in so doing, maintain both its reputation and deterrent value. But there is ground to be gained or lost in the speed, decisiveness, and aggressiveness with which the U.S. Navy confronts any attempt to actually close the strait. And if sober analysis begins to point toward tactical withdrawal, the thing to examine might not be the operational plan, but rather the size and mix of the force necessary to credibly threaten decisive action at the outbreak to secure the strait.
Donn Dears—Commander Dolan’s article had three significant flaws. First, the world’s economy needs oil, and closing the Strait of Hormuz for more than a few weeks will have a major effect on it. Second, the strait can easily be lined with bottom mines capable of functioning at the depths found there. Third, clearing the mines will mean operating in the strait.
Removing mines would require assets operating in the strait under the eyes of Iranian forces. Mine-clearing is a time-consuming operation under the best of conditions, even using unmanned underwater vehicles that are controlled from the surface. It’s a capability that hasn’t received very much attention from the U.S. Navy.
It’s also important to recognize that an attempt by Iran to close the strait to shipping would be irrational, but we shouldn’t assume that the Iranian leadership is rational. If Iran closes the strait it will attack Saudi Arabia, and the most likely target is Abqaiq, where 90 percent of Saudi oil is processed to remove hydrogen sulfide and to lower vapor pressure.
Still Relevant After All These Years
(See J. Griffin, pp. 48–52, May 2012, and J. Mandelblatt, pp. 8–9, June 2012 Proceedings)
Norman Polmar—Commander Griffin’s valuable summary of the Falklands conflict of 1982 omits two very important points.
First, Argentine forces fired two Exocet antiship missiles from an improvised land launcher. The British had no knowledge of such a capability. The first missile failed to launch properly; the second struck the destroyer Glamorgan steaming offshore. Fortunately, the officer of the deck had seen the launch and began turning the ship. The missile struck and detonated near the flight deck. A helicopter inside of the hangar was destroyed, and 13 men were killed.
This event was reminiscent of the Israeli corvette Hanit being struck and severely damaged by a land-launched missile off Lebanon in 2006. Like the British in the Falklands, the Israelis had no knowledge that the “terrorists” ashore had Chinese-designed C-802 missiles. These events reveal a current and major threat to U.S. naval forces in littoral waters.
Second, only one of the two Argentine Type 209 submarines was operational—the San Luis. She was at sea for an estimated 36 days. The threat from that single diesel-electric submarine caused great anxiety in the British task force, with scores of antisubmarine weapons being expended to no effect. The submarine launched several torpedoes; the British targets apparently were saved by the fire-control system of the submarine having been improperly wired during a recent overhaul. Countering quiet, non-nuclear submarines in littoral areas reveals another major threat to our naval forces. (The submarine Santa Fe, a former U.S. GUPPY submarine, was employed by the Argentine Navy to land commandos on South Georgia Island.)
Hopefully, the U.S. Navy’s leadership understands those lessons as the Fleet operates in littoral waters against increasing threats.
Editor’s note: Mr. Polmar, a Proceedings columnist, was a member of the Secretary of the Navy’s Falklands study group and the author of the official Navy report Lessons of the Falklands: Summary Report February 1983.
Rear Admiral James Goldrick, Royal Australian Navy (Retired)—I would argue with few of Commander Griffin’s conclusions in regard to the lessons of the Falklands War, but he is less than fair in his assessment of the submarine arm of the Argentine Navy—although correct in his identification of the real trouble. It was not that the “Type 209s had the potential to inflict serious damage or at least disruption on the British task force if they had been aggressively employed.” The record of the submarine San Luis is that she was indeed aggressive, very much so. The problem lay in failures of the SUT wire-guided torpedoes she carried and the submarine’s fire-control system, not the resolve of her people. At least one attack was conducted manually on a British Type 21 frigate, the Arrow, but the guidance wire broke too early, and the torpedo appears to have attacked the Type 182 torpedo decoy streamed astern of the ship. The San Luis only returned to port when it was clear that her weapons were ineffective and she could do no more. The other Type 209, the Salta, was not operational—and when she was finally made ready for sea had to conduct test firings in an attempt to understand what had gone wrong for the San Luis. Neither of her two shots was successful.
The San Luis’ story and that of the Argentine submarine arm as a whole is one of brave men who were inadequately equipped for the task that they were given. The full story can be derived from reading Robert L. Scheina’s Latin America: A Naval History 1810–1987 and David Brown’s The Royal Navy and the Falklands War (both Naval Institute Press, 1987).
Understanding that story confirms Commander Griffin’s key point that “undersea warfare is an easy area to underfund and underemphasize.” The U.S. Navy learned that hard lesson in its submarine campaign against the Japanese in 1942–3, but the need to devote adequate resources to testing, trials, and testing again is an easy one to forget. In an era of desperately expensive weapons and a necessary emphasis on simulation to reduce the costs of ownership while maintaining professional standards, it is a lesson that our navies must not neglect.
Russia’s World Turned Upside Down
(See D. T. Murphy, pp. 54–59, May 2012 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Carl Olson, U.S. Navy—The Russians should not get cocky about keeping the petroleum resources on and around four Arctic islands that actually belong to the United States: Wrangell, Bennett, Jeannette, and Henrietta islands. Unfortunately, the U.S. State Department has established a maritime boundary that puts these islands on the Russian side along with tens of thousands of square miles of exclusive economic zone. The United States has received no quid pro quo for this executive agreement.
The landing on and claiming of these islands for America were terrific feats of the U.S. Navy and Revenue-Marine in 1881. Wrangell was landed on and claimed by the U.S. Revenue-Marine ship Thomas Corwin under the command of Captain Calvin Leighton Hooper. Famed naturalist John Muir was in the landing party and wrote about it in his book The Cruise of the Corwin. The USS Rodgers soon after did a survey of the island.
Bennett, Jeannette, and Henrietta islands became American thanks to the harrowing and arduous voyage of the USS Jeannette under the command of Lieutenant George Washington DeLong. The expedition was cosponsored by noted New York City newspaper publisher James Gordon Bennett (Jeannette was his sister and Henrietta was his mother). The ship got stuck in the ice just north of Wrangell in 1879 and drifted northwest for two years, finally arriving at and claiming the three islands. Unfortunately, the ship was crushed in the ice and sank, forcing the crew to head south in two longboats. They made it to Russia’s Lena River delta and were rescued. The crew was awarded congressional gold medals.
In these times of petroleum shocks and the necessity to preserve America’s resources and strategic locations in the world, the problem of the State Department’s misguided maritime boundary needs to be addressed. Fortunately, it could be reversed with the stroke of the pen by President Barack Obama or Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. I certainly hope they will do so.
There’s a Lot in a Name
(See N. Polmar, pp. 88–89, April 2012; E. W. Molzan, pp. 16–17, and W. Spangenberg, pp. 17, 154, May 2012; and K. W. Estes, p. 85, June 2012 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Douglas M. Moore Jr., Supply Corps, U.S. Navy (Retired)—The responsibility for assigning names to the Navy’s ships was formally placed with the Secretary of the Navy by an act of Congress on 3 March 1819. This act stated that “all of the ships, of the Navy of the United States, now building, or hereafter to be built, shall be named by the Secretary of the Navy of the United States, under the discretion of the President of the United States, according to the following rule, to wit: those of the first class shall be called after States of this Union; those of the second class after the rivers and, those of the third class after the principal cities and towns; taking care that no two vessels of the Navy shall bear the same name.”
The procedures and practices involved in naming of Navy ships are the product of evolution and tradition. In personally deciding on the names of new ships, the Secretary of the Navy may rely on various sources, which include the annual ship-name recommendations developed by the Naval History and Heritage Command and forwarded to the Secretary by the Chief of Naval Operations. Since World War I, ship-name recommendations have involved various factors: geographic names, names of previous ships that distinguished themselves in service, names of naval leaders, national figures, and deceased members of the Navy and Marine Corps who have demonstrated heroism in battle.
After the fiasco of the Chavez, Murtha, and Giffords, Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus in February 2012 returned to the traditional criteria and named ships for three American combat heroes and two American cities.
For many years, those of us familiar with the heroic actions of John Finn at Pearl Harbor urged the Secretary’s Office to name a ship after him and were told that the Navy did not name ships after living Navy heroes. Finn was the last survivor of the 15 men who received the Medal of Honor for heroism during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. He was the only Pearl Harbor Medal of Honor awardee who did not have a Navy ship named in his honor. Finn died at the age of 100 in May 2011. He was a true Navy hero who even in his advanced years spoke publicly and eloquently of the horrific events during the attack.
In the future, the Navy should avoid naming Navy ships for political reasons and return to the traditional sources for ship names, including honoring the service of real American heroes.
Commander T. M. Kastner, U.S. Navy (Retired)—A general review of the names given to ships of the U.S. Navy in the years since World War II leads one to wonder how and why we no longer appear to have a procedure that was of considerable merit. Do we still have a formal process for the selection of names? I suspect we do, indeed, and it is probably both lengthy and complex. How is it administered, and in particular how and why do we get the thematic variations and lack of consistency that have become all too evident?
An official response to these questions is hardly likely to get to the root of what many service members consider a problem. Let me suggest that Proceedings obtain a firsthand narrative account from several participants in the process. A candid discussion would be most welcome and might even lead us back to a system that would meet the full approval of the Navy.
That last thought is but a hope. Names of public buildings are already for sale in some places. Let’s not see that spread to ships of the Fleet.
Commander Ed Griffith, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)—Marines do not name their weapons after politicians. The Coast Guard does not name its cutters after politicians. The Air Force does not name its bombers or fighters after politicians. The Army does not name its bases or tanks after politicians. Only the U.S. Navy names its ships after politicians.
The comments by Lieutenant Colonel Estes in the June issue should be required reading for anybody serving in Washington, D.C. We ask a lot of our Marines and sailors. Aside from months of separation from family and home in arduous conditions, anyone killed in a forward-deployed training exercise is just as dead, and their family grieves just as much, as any at Guadalcanal or Valley Forge. We have less than 300 ships now, and the number is declining. Naming ships appropriately is more important than ever. Naming them after U.S. cities or states is fine because that gives a connection to our homeland. Naming them after battles is fine. Naming them after sailors and Marines who died doing their duty is even better. Continuing to name ships after politicians is not a good idea. The perception is that it is done to ingratiate an admiral or civilian to Congress at the expense of the sailors and Marines who are making the real sacrifices.