The Submarine’s Role in Reprioritizing Antisubmarine Warfare Tasks
onvey the message that recent technological advances in sensors would render potential torpedo attacks by non-nuclear submarines against high-value U.S. targets virtually ineffective. The literature also speaks of indications that many nations—China, for example—have converted up to 80 percent of their front-line diesel-electric submarines to firing modern, long-range antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) such as the jointly developed Indian-Russian stealthy hypersonic BrahMos cruise missile. It would appear that U.S. high-value units will indeed not be at great risk from torpedo attack. Once again, submarines have proven to be the ultimate noncooperative target—by choosing not to operate in a manner that makes them vulnerable.If modern non-nuclear submarines refuse to give ASW forces the chance to detect and engage, if employing air-independent propulsion (AIP) at slow speeds and a long distance from their targets allows them to elude broad-area searches, and if they can effectively attack from a distance of hundreds of miles, what are their remaining vulnerabilities whose exploitation could mitigate the anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) threat these submarines represent? It is a matter of some importance for the operational art of U.S. naval forces, especially the submarine fleet, to turn the perceived advantages of such potential adversaries into liabilities.
Examining the Options
In one unclassified list addressing the prioritization of ASW, attacking submarine command-and-control (C2) nodes on shore was number seven of seven tasks. This would seem to downplay the fact that these deployed, unlocated ASCM shooters cannot do their own targeting “from a distance” and that target locations as determined by other fused all-source assets—possibly to include one or two somewhat good nuclear submarines or very capable AIP boats—have to be forwarded to these shooters by such nodes, and done so as quickly as possible.
True, if the object is to sink an adversary’s submarines, degrading its C2 network doesn’t accomplish that goal. However, if the intent of early action is to neutralize the enemy’s ability to perform its mission, then disrupting its sensor-to-shooter grid by engaging fixed on-shore targets is a classic effects-based campaign.
Since the value of shore-based nodes is certainly evident to any likely adversaries, they would undoubtedly have significant air defenses, and the chances of successfully striking them would be greatly enhanced by close-in attack from several unexpected threat axes. This could include the type of engagement at which Tomahawk submarine-launched cruise-missile SSNs/SSGNs excel. If these nodes were sufficiently disrupted, ASCM-shooting submarines would be forced to employ their organic sensors, a process that involves moving—thereby using up any AIP capability or conducting frequent snorkeling patrols, greatly increasing vulnerability to detection and engagement.
Many A2/AD scenarios include the potential of antiship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), which again require some near real-time targeting information if the intended target is to be within the reentry body’s “footprint” for terminal homing. While such weapons can easily be attached to mobile launchers or in “hide sites” until they are used, they also depend on other assets to generate their aim points, such as the few survivable underwater assets mentioned above, or fixed (and far more vulnerable) sensors on shore, such as large over-the-horizon radar sites.
Satellite-based connectivity from shore nodes to submarines also must be addressed on both sides. The Navy already has begun to acknowledge that it must regain its capacity to function in a satellite-deprived environment. It is intuitive that if the U.S. satellite constellations are considered to be at risk, a potential adversary’s must be even more so. Jamming or soft/hard destruction of that adversary’s space-borne assets is certainly a viable contingency plan.
It is also conceivable, however, that both sides in a future conflict might hesitate to attack the other’s space assets for fear they would lose more capability in the initial exchange than would their adversary. U.S. forces must be prepared to cope seamlessly with the extremes of total or no space-asset deprivation and everything in between. Also, as with other such skills, having developed it means nothing if it isn’t periodically tested.
Recent nuclear-arms reduction agreements with Russia have the potential to free up many D5 launch tubes, since maintaining a fiducial level of SSBN platforms is more material to the deterrent system’s effectiveness than the number of warheads deployed. Given the importance of space-based assets in modern conflicts, the opportunity could exist to load each deployed SSBN with a couple of “launch-to-orbit” communications, intelligence, and navigation satellites so that even in the worst case, these constellations could be almost immediately reconstituted, making the platforms even more strategic in nature.
Most Valuable Player
The submarine force has long been considered the “pointy end of the spear” of ASW efforts, but the timeliness of any submarine-versus-submarine actions by them has been significantly affected now that new, quiet submarines are operating at slow speeds, at a distance, in their own waters while awaiting orders to fire ASCMs down a bearing and to a range as provided by a third party on shore. The search times required to “sanitize” the huge areas involved renders this option infeasible. In lieu of destroying these platforms expeditiously (a nearly impossible task), their effectiveness can be negated by “on-demand” submarine missile attacks against those communication nodes and onshore over-the-horizon radar sites that are providing ASCM-shooters and mobile launchers with targeting information.
It is imperative that the submarine’s unique characteristics be used to support Fleet and national objectives. During the Cold War this involved exploiting (indispensably coordinating with the shore-based sound surveillance system and maritime-patrol aircraft assets) superior stealth to localize and hold Soviet submarines at risk in the open ocean. This is not necessarily best when dealing with nearly stationary and quiet submarines operating in their own littoral waters. However, another of the submarine’s indispensable capabilities is that it can deeply penetrate an A2/AD zone (of which these quiet ASCM-firing submarines are a major constituent), keeping other land-attack platforms out of effective weapons range.
It is vital that the means by which U.S. submarines and other forces reach, maintain, expand, and even reconstitute a “connectivity advantage” over prospective undersea adversaries constantly develop, and that cultural mindsets in the entire ASW community adapt as technological and tactical changes occur.
Captain Patton served on five SSNs and two SSBNs, commanding the USS Pargo (SSN-650). He is the founder of Submarine Tactics and Technology, Inc. and has consulted for many commercial and government entities. He spent three years as the technical consultant to Paramount Pictures on the film The Hunt for Red October.
The Resurgence of Tactical Air Offensive Mining
On 11 December 2010, a division of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251 (VMFA-251) F/A-18Cs launched from the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) and delivered seven inert Mk 62 Destructors to the Lake George mining range in central Florida. The scenario was developed by Commander, Strike Force Training Atlantic for Joint Task Force Exercise, the final at-sea evaluation for the Enterprise Strike Group and Commander Carrier Strike Group 12. The results were impressive, with all seven weapon deliveries captured on video by an accompanying F/A-18F’s advanced tactical forward-looking infrared pod and measured by cameras in manned towers on the lake.
The impressive characterization of this tactical flight was a result of planning, the pilots’ skill, and the accuracy of the deliveries. This is even more impressive considering that this skill has not been actively practiced and measured in recent work-up cycles despite mine-warfare readiness requirements. The drive from Fleet commanders, manifested in a newly developed training syllabus, has once more touched the Fleet tactician. This atrophied skill is again being discussed and practiced in strike-fighter ready rooms on both coasts.
A Little History
The skill is not without precedent. The most notable example was Operation Pocket Money and the mining of Haiphong Harbor in May 1972. A-6 Intruders and A-7 Corsairs took off from the flight deck of the USS Coral Sea (CVA-43) to deliver Mk 52 mines designed to stop the importation of wartime matériel to North Vietnam. Not unlike the Marine-led flight originating from the Enterprise in 2010, this combat strike included Marine aircraft, most notably A-6s from Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 224. (UMFA-224) Marine Corps Captain William Carr, the bombardier/navigator in the lead aircraft, established the critical attack azimuth and timed the mine releases. The mines were set with 72-hour arming times to allow commercial ships, currently inside the harbor, an opportunity to leave. The scope, intent, and risk to shipping were defined in the Notice to Mariners warning:
All mariners are advised that the United States has announced that, in full coordination with the Republic of Vietnam, the internal and claimed territorial waters of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in and around the entrances to the ports of Haiphong, Hon Gai, Cam Pha, Vinh, Quang Khe, Dong Hoi, and The Thanh Hoi, are being mined by the United States as part of the collective defense efforts in response to the new armed attacks by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam against the Republic of Vietnam and the United States forces remaining in that country. The minefield will be active at 1100Z, 11 May 1972. Vessels transmitting these waters after that date must do so at their own risk.
These harbors were the primary means by which the North Vietnamese received the fuel and other war supplies from China and Russia. It was estimated that 80 percent of supplies and all oil came through these ports. More than 11,000 mines were laid over the next months, stranding 31 cargo vessels for eight months. Some researchers have estimated that the mining aircraft involved produced more far-reaching results than had 8,500 aircraft and 7 million tons of ordnance that had been expended throughout Indochina since 1961. Combined with Operation Linebacker I, the two offensives prompted the North Vietnamese to quickly bargain in earnest for a resolution to the war.
A more recent example of the effects of mine warfare is Operation Desert Storm. The Iraqis used mines in both offensive and defensive roles. The shallow approaches to Kuwait’s beaches were heavily mined to prevent seaborne invasion, while the waters in the north Persian Gulf were littered with mines. Both the USS Princeton (CG-59) and the Tripoli (LPH-10) suffered near-catastrophic damage in the gulf when they struck mines. Those mines were used as an asymmetric tactic against the overwhelming afloat striking power of the U.S. Navy. While this example supports the defense of the land-based antagonist, another argument can be made for the tactical effect of bottlenecking an opponent’s sea lanes and harbors. The “soft-kill” effect of an enemy remaining in harbor is the same as hard-killing him when he puts to sea. Freedom of navigation is retained, and defense of the fleet at sea is realized.
Today’s Mine Requirements
Offensive mine warfare is a capability that satisfies a particular need in today’s warfighting environment. Mines are weapons that wait. Once they are in place, no lives are at risk confronting the enemy, and the opposition knows they are there and must proceed at their own risk. This psychological effect adds another dimension to the weapons’ effectiveness. The bravado of the first embarked crew to challenge a minefield at the direction of his superiors is honorable. The second and subsequent crews that have watched the mine’s detonation against the first crew now are “soft-kills,” as their tactical movements are hindered or stopped. The threat of damage or added damage can thus force an adversary to yield or comply. The potential for latent violence from a stealth adversary can powerfully influence an enemy’s choices.
Offensive mining often exploits a critical vulnerability. Most nations do not have the technical expertise and resources to develop mine-clearing capability. In North Vietnam, the United States was required to sign a protocol to the Paris Peace Accords that forced it to clear all mines laid by the Navy during operations Pocket Money and Linebacker. The complexities of mine clearing were demonstrated in the fact that Operation End Sweep took approximately seven months to complete.
Center of Excellence
The Navy Mine and Antisubmarine Warfare Command (NMAWC) is the Navy’s center of excellence for ASW and mine warfare. NMAWC was critical to the Enterprise Strike Group’s briefs related to various theaters’ offensive-warfare status during fleet-synthetic training academics at Tactical Training Group Atlantic. Unique to Carrier Air Wing-One was the fact that only VMFA-251 could carry the Mk 62, because clearance for the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet is still evolving. A cadre of Thunderbolt Marine pilots had completed ground and flight training to be qualified as mine-warfare subject-matter experts. Based on initial training from NMAWC professionals, each strike fighter squadron now has such an expert. VMFA-251’s cadre of air crew and our targeteer initially comprised the entire expertise of the air wing. Unlike the advanced training received at the Navy Strike and Air Warfare Center (NSAWC) in Fallon Range Training Complex, there is no method for basic and advanced offensive mine-warfare training for strike-fighter squadrons. Likewise, the ability to mensurate, weaponeer, and build a mine-planning folder singularly resides at NMAWC. Initial talks have begun between NSAWC and NMAWC to bring this training fleet-wide into a standardized format, enabling it to be understood and executed through the air-combat training curriculum.
The Future of Offensive Mining
Mine warfare is at a crossroads. Carrier air wings continue to transition to Super Hornets, which are not cleared to carry mines. The mine-warfare readiness requirement has atrophied throughout carrier aviation. Additionally, new platforms need clearance to carry today’s aerial mine inventory. New weapons also must be developed and added to the inventory to confront current and future threats. High-drag practice weapons that accurately emulate current mines must be fielded. A center of excellence must apply the same rigorous training and evaluation processes as are applied to strike warfare in the continuum of air-combat training. Ranges must be developed to measure, with fidelity, the results of weapons delivery.
The mine-warfare capability of today’s Hornet and Super-Hornet aircraft has been rightfully subjugated to the demands of overseas contingency operations, but this needs to change. While air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons have matured with the changing battle space, the innocuous mine has remained as it is best described: “invisible.” Mine warfare provides unique kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities against potential adversaries. It is time to invest resources into this critical capability and provide our fleet commanders necessary mine-warfare options in contingency operations or conflicts.
Captain Whitesell is chief of staff for Commander 5th Fleet and the former commander, Carrier Air Wing One embarked on the Enterprise.
A New Model for Enlisted Naval Leadership
The U.S. Navy’s selection-board process is a complex mechanism, artfully obscure but also rich in dedication and good intentions toward all ranks. On the enlisted side, a key career transition is from E-6 to E-7. Not a mere step up in pay, the pay grade defines Chief Petty Officer, a revered position resolutely earned through a legacy of Navy tradition. “Chiefs” are the backbone connecting officer leadership to the working sailor. The transition is not just a progression of skills over time; it marks the Navy’s determination that sailors have distinguished themselves as more than technicians and have begun the crucial transition from deckplate efforts to officer leadership.Although the digital age has exponentially increased the capability to ingest and manipulate information, the selection-board process has yet to capitalize on this capacity. The goal in improving the process is to uphold the intent of the current system while applying more direct response and cost-effective deployment.
Choosing Chiefs
The Navy is currently replete with a talented pool of sailors. To continue this trend, using more accurate and timely information both up and down the chain of command is crucial. Highly qualified sailors who are passed over for the next year or for several years simply will lose faith. In better economic times, the best will go where their abilities are recognized.
The chief selection process is a paper evolution. Candidates are judged on performance carefully, or not so carefully, and their history is contained in the notorious “permanent record.”
Because the system is paper-based, the record easily lends itself to errors and omissions and a tremendous amount of interpretation during the board process. The culmination of good intentions provides excellent leadership for the Navy but does not accurately reflect the most fully qualified candidates.
Translating Leadership’s Intent
The qualifications for selecting chiefs, or any rank, are promulgated by the board’s “Precept,” a multi-page policy document that describes the traits the Navy seeks in a chief petty officer. The precept does not attach weights to the desirable traits it names or articulate the means to determine them from the records. Translating leadership’s intent to those who rate sailors in the field leaves much room for ambiguity.
The greatest margin for error, though, comes from the deckplate level itself. There is a loose connection between senior leadership and evaluation writer. If the raters are not well versed in the precept and if the writers are not also good writers, the sailor is at a disadvantage.
Numerical assessment is a vital role of the decision process. As each record is reviewed, the rater’s meticulous notes are quantified for both objective and subjective qualities that are summed for the sailor’s total competitive score.
Several areas in the selection process should be improved. Basic revamping to capture digital information is a necessary correction. Progressively altering the process using Web-based techniques and popular trending has even greater potential.
Going Digital
The first step is to digitize the paper process. This entails transferring the evaluations and other administrative inputs to a digital database. The Navy’s databases can integrate to the digital record, or less ideally, they may be input separately. The evaluation becomes a portal document, immediately relevant as soon as it is published.
Entering information into the database does not eliminate human error, but it removes several steps currently incurred through digital-imaging paper. Ideally, the record (including the evaluations) is a live document, and the changes are effected immediately on entry, which also reduces the feedback loop to recognize and correct errors. This provides timely use of the information for the member or for leadership for operational readiness and deployment.
Elaborating Evaluations
Several elements included in evaluations that currently are vague, inaccurately reported, or omitted can be spelled out in the live, digital personnel record. Qualifications, collateral duties, language skills, awards, and education all become drop-down elements that are captured in each evaluation and in the record as a whole. This means that not only can the specific elements be traced to the source for verification but tracked for longevity.
The greatest influence under the current system is the evaluation’s narrative section. This language can either make a chief or disadvantage sailors. The current system lends itself to bias.
In a digital evaluation, the six areas of rating will have these targeted items listed, including appropriate and universal scoring. The items are drop-down elements that leave no room for interpretation. For example, the critical section on leadership would include drop-downs for how many people the candidate supervised, which is then quantified by how long the candidate held that position.
Open Communication
Removing, or at least minimizing, the narrative section ironically gives a clearer, less ambiguous picture of a sailor’s record. Weighting and quantifying the accomplishments lets sailors know exactly what points they are gaining when they sign their records. Not only do they know how many points they have earned; they also know how it ranks them against their peers at any given time.
The entire scoring system is open architecture, as are the scores of all the competitive candidates as a group. As mentioned, because the system is live, it updates constantly (or as technically capable). Thus, sailors can see exactly what items keep them from promoting, such as homesteading, lack of education, or the number of supervised personnel. They can view how peers are performing via trends to make promotion.
Ideally, the system also provides career-planning tools wherein sailors can build scenarios. The system would graph how many points sailors could achieve by working certain collateral duties or special assignments or by including various sections of their records. What if they accept special assignments away from their rate? What if they earn bachelor’s degrees? Thus, sailors explicitly understand what traits are holding them back or where they can grab opportunities.
How are these complex traits assigned and weighted in the new system? The answer lies in both senior leadership intent currently provided in the precept and in the rating community leadership provided by the board. After initial weighting, the system gives statistical feedback on what traits are affecting the greater proportion of promotions. The community then can decide whether that reflects their intent, and the scoring can be steered gently in the desired direction.
Stepping up the chief-selection process to digital capture and altering the rating process toward immediate quantification provide more accurate, effective, and efficient capabilities for choosing critical leadership.
Data capture into a live database immediately validates information. Senior and community leadership also can communicate intentions more accurately. The loose interpretations can be tightened, and the qualities desired from sailors are more apparent for all layers of leadership.
Live capture also removes several layers of human error and system delay. Leadership can evaluate promotions and determine future manning needs more readily. Careful evaluation of the trends of sailors’ performances tells leadership where sailors are excelling and where training can be inserted.
Efficiency means less time spent by board members hand-writing notes and more time developing the “gut calls” that are the hallmark of successful leaders. Fiscally, efficiency also means board members spend less time in selection-board spaces instead of at their commands, as the process eliminates previewing and reviewing records.
The Next Generation of Leaders
Choosing leaders for the world’s greatest navy is a tremendous responsibility. Ensuring that sailors are represented as best possible for promotion is critical for the continued strength of the U.S. Navy in its multiple missions in an austere environment.
Today’s sailors are not only accustomed to immediate feedback and open architecture; they expect it. This is not about arrogance or impatience—this is about capability. The information age accommodates this in so many aspects of their lives. Expecting this of their careers is an admirable and highly desirable trait to have for a 20-plus-year commitment.
It is in the Navy’s interest to secure the best and most qualified sailors for promotion. Providing the tools and resources that reflect the capabilities of a dynamic world is possible and infinitely desirable for the Navy’s mission of peacekeeping and warfighting from the sea.