Calls to “Learn From” are common in Chinese culture, from the 1960s “Learn From Lei Feng” campaign to the 2009 Qingdao Fleet Review, which opened with “Learn From, and Pay Respects to, the Chinese PLA.”1 While our contextual experience may lead us to ridicule or downplay such exhortations as clumsy, politically driven initiatives, they are an effective and powerful tool in the People’s Republic of China. Can, or perhaps should, the U.S. Navy learn from the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) “informationization” doctrine as our own Information Dominance Corps and its operating concepts develop and mature?
In 2009, then–Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead established the Information Dominance Corps with the charge to “exploit new opportunities in distributed command and control, networking, and the use of vast stores of collected data. . . . In short, information will be elevated to a ‘main battery’ of the U.S. Navy’s arsenal.” Vice Admiral Jack Dorsett, the former Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance, elaborated that “Information dominance means freedom of action to maneuver and act—conduct offensive and defensive actions, kinetically and non-kinetically—at the intersection of maritime, information, and cyberspace domains.” Control of the info-sphere would facilitate “leap-ahead network and information integration capability, global enterprise net-centric operations, information advantage overmatch in Command and Control and decision-making, and information power applied as the prime operational instrument.”2 It is, perhaps, a Revolution in Military Affairs not unlike the transition from sail to steam propulsion. In short, information dominance will be a warfare game-changer.
During numerous conversations with PLA officers, from Central Military Commission members to mid-grade leaders, one sometimes suspects that many of them use a Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart–like approach to informationization: They might not be able to define it, but they recognize it when they see it. It is critical to note, however, that informationization is the driving doctrinal force development in the entirety of the PLA; it is mentioned 27 times in China’s 2010 defense white paper, defines the PLA’s means and methods of modernization, outlines a strategy of warfighting (namely “local wars under conditions of informationization”), and is incorporated into the major speeches and discussions of all senior PLA leaders. Talk of informationization is constant in the PLA. We should therefore ask: What is informationization, why is it important to the PLA, and can the U.S. Navy’s Information Dominance Corps take any lessons from the PLA’s drive to informationization?
Informationization Info
According to the Department of Defense 2010 China Military Power Report, informationization, first institutionalized by the PLA in 2004, constitutes “the effects of modern information technology on military decision and weapons employment circles.”3 (Xinxihua, for the purposes of this article, is translated as “informationization.” Other translations exist, including “informatization,” but the variant used here is more common and is the “official” translation used by the PLA in the English version of its 2010 defense white paper.) Another definition is found in a recent research paper written for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission:
Informationization is essentially a hybrid development process, continuing the trend of mechanization and retaining much of the current force structure while overlaying advanced information systems on it to create a fully networked command and control (C2) infrastructure. The concept allows the PLA to network its existing force structure without radically revising current acquisition strategies or order of battle.4
A 2004 article in the PLA’s official organ identified six components of informationization:
• Information technology—the computer hardware and software which processes information
• Information as a resource—the use of information and knowledge management
• Information networks—the primary means for information transmission, exchange, and information-sharing
• Advanced weapons/weapon systems—hardware and software to defeat enemy platforms, information, and information capabilities
• Humans—the most important piece, the key to informationization
• Doctrine—the guiding processes and principles of informationization.5
Informationization, then, is, the “leveraging” of information and information systems as a military system.
PLA strategists view it as a capability to leapfrog the stages of military development. As recently as the mid-1990s, the generational differences in hardware and capabilities between the PLA and its perceived potential adversaries were immense. Informationization, the PLA would argue, allows the modernization of a force without the need to engage in a match-countermatch development of weapons, tactics, and doctrine. Further, informationization may even out the disparities between mismatched opponents. It is a methodology that builds on an existing force without replacing it. To paraphrase the explanation in the 2010 PRC defense white paper:
it has formed a system with second-generation equipment as the main body, and the third generation as the backbone . . . with the use of advanced and mature technologies and devices, the PLA is working, selectively and with priorities, to retrofit its existing weaponry and equipment to upgrade its comprehensive performance in a systematic, organic, and integrated way, so as to increase the cost-effectiveness of developing weaponry and equipment.6
It is, in short, the ideal methodology for PLA modernization.
A Short-Cut to Modernity
In the late 1970s, Deng Xiaoping outlined the “Four Modernizations” first identified by Zhou Enlai in 1963. In order to move China forward, argued Deng, a comprehensive nationwide campaign would be undertaken to modernize industry, agriculture, science and technology, and last, defense. The long period of low budgets of the PLA, because of the other modernizations, influenced a technological, doctrinal, and personnel stagnation in the Chinese military. Within the past decade, however, the PLA has enjoyed significant budget increases and modernization. “Analysis of 2000–2009 data indicates China’s officially disclosed military budget grew at an average of 11.8 percent per year in inflation-adjusted terms over the period.” Further, according to the “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China: 2010” (formerly known as the Military Power Report), in 2010 China “announced a 7.5 percent increase in its military budget, to approximately $78.6 billion.”7 China’s current military modernization has created an interesting dilemma for PLA strategists—one that is perfectly answered by informationization—namely, how to rapidly modernize the force while still capitalizing on existing order of battle and capabilities.
The Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995–96 marked a turning point in Chinese strategic thought. Senior leaders, both military and civilian, were confronted with a difficult duality: the forward-deloyed presence of the U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet, and the need for increased military capability to protect China’s interests. In China’s view, the PLA was outclassed, outgunned, and outmaneuvered by the mid-1990s 7th Fleet. This was, in the perception of PLA strategists, a direct result of decades of military-budget neglect during Deng’s modernization of China. The PLA, when confronted with this dilemma, applied a reasonable and very Chinese solution: informationization.
There could be no hope, in light of the lessons the PLA garnered from the results of the Gulf War and Kosovo campaigns, of building a PLA capable in the near term of countering U.S. capabilities in the western Pacific. Chinese strategists argued that their country must find a way to be able to skip generations of warfare capabilities to get to the next PLA—a revolutionary, not evolutionary force. This next PLA would not scrap legacy systems, but, as informationization would suggest, enhance current capabilities while designing new, perhaps revolutionary, systems and strategies to defeat perceived U.S. strengths.
The informationization process continues with an upending of previous methodologies. As Commander Leah Amerling-Bray noted in the April 2010 Proceedings, “Chinese efforts are already leading to the development of a new concept of operational art and to a new way of war.”8 This revolution facilitates “weaker against stronger” warfare.
Insights from Abroad for Revolution at Home
Any lessons to be taken from the PLA must be placed in the proper context. Certain lessons one can learn from PLA informationization are difficult, if not impossible, to apply to the U.S. Navy’s information-dominance initiative. Further, there are ample practices—centralized decision-making, ultimate authority of the Party, etc.—that offer no value to the U.S. Navy. That said, it is still valuable to examine areas of success, and friction, in the Chinese system that may give the U.S. Navy a better understanding of its own challenges and potential information-dominance pitfalls. The following are PLA lessons that can be incorporated into the U.S. Navy’s current information revolution:
Informationization can greatly aid in modernization efforts in the 21st century. As a recent Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) report outlined, today’s Navy faces incredible pressures and demands. According to the CNA study, the U.S. Navy has shrunk by 20 percent over the past decade, but the number of ships on deployment remains relatively constant. Furthermore, the “cost of personnel”—including medical care, education, housing, and retirement—is soaring, but with little likelihood of any significant budget increase to the Navy.9 In many ways, the U.S. Navy of 2012 faces, knowingly or unknowingly, an issue similar to the mid-1990s PLA—a growing external capability during an internal national fiscal “challenge.” Information dominance will allow “leapfrog” development and the ability to counter overmatch. The leveraging of new technologies, not just as weapons, but incorporated into information dominance as a whole, will allow a leaner, more effective, and more efficient U.S. Navy.
Informationization recognizes that people are the force-multiplier. The real “black box” of information dominance is the people—motivated, highly trained, highly educated, and task-organized. Vice Admiral Xu Hongmeng, PLA Navy deputy commander and a deputy to the National People’s Congress, explained, “Only by devoting great efforts to foster high-caliber personnel could we catch up with the world trend of revolution in military affairs. The conclusion the Western powers arrived at after analyzing the Gulf War, the Kosovo War, and the Iraq War is that the value of competent people is usually more important than weapons.”10 Informationization recognizes this; the information-dominance community, at least at its inception, also appears to leverage the people piece, and promises “to broaden and deepen skill sets and create world-class expertise across the Information Dominance Corps through investment in education and training.” This change will provide the “right people, at the right time, at the right place, with the right skills.”11
Unity of effort in informationization aids in its implementation and success. While the Chinese security structure likely includes skeptics about the efficacy of informationization, they are not apparent, and informationization is the prevailing standard of the PLA. The information-dominance doctrine argues that the right information, properly applied, becomes a weapon. This is, of course, easier said than done, but the realization and exploitation of deep penetration, understanding the operational environment, networks, and the adversary are worthwhile pursuits, and suggest a need for Navy-wide efforts.12
The PLA enjoys a unity of effort in information dominance that would be almost impossible in the U.S. Navy. The PLA can direct and drive concepts. It may be beneficial for the U.S. Navy to push this reformation. Indeed, Admirals Roughead and Dorsett foresaw probable reluctance to the change the Information Dominance Corps would force. The signal is “full speed ahead; abandon past practices.” Admiral Roughead pledged complete and total commitment to the concept, and current CNO Admiral Jonathan Greenert is likewise supportive. Should the Navy be truly committed to information dominance, and appearances indicate such, all effort must be made to develop the concept fully, implement the strategies, and exploit potential opportunities as soon as possible.
Informationization is a “system of systems.” Since the PLA cannot conduct a complete rebuild of the standing force, it must use new technologies on top of, and complementary to, existing capabilities. Indeed, the 2010 People’s Republic of China Defense White Paper points out, “a preliminary level has been achieved in interoperability among command and control systems, combat forces, and support systems, making order transmission, intelligence distribution, command and guidance more efficient and rapid.”13 We too must adopt this strategy, but in addition to integrating old with new, our system of systems must incorporate a fusion approach. In 2012 it is inexcusable that any platform is not a collection platform, integrating all detected activities into a “Super COP” (Common Operational Picture). All aircraft, ships, submarines, vehicles, and even personnel should feed their “understanding” of the environment into a COP: a standard grasp of the operational environment.
Further, platforms must be linkable, cross-domain-capable, and able to facilitate communications across systems, platforms, and coalitions. In the information-dominance Navy, it should be apparent that all networks should be exportable and searchable. Why should Amazon or iTunes possess search- and logic-strings more capable than our warfighting platforms?
Don’t “evolve” information, but facilitate the revolution of information dominance. The PLA believes, as outlined in an online article in PLA Daily, that the “new global-scale revolution in military affairs has promoted and accelerated the evolution of the nature of warfare toward informationization.”14 While some critics would argue against the information-dominance concept with references to the “Cult of Cebrowski” (a nod to the late information-dominance prophet Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski), it is critical to define information dominance in our terms, while avoiding the pursuit of information for information’s sake.15 Information dominance may truly be the next revolution in military affairs. As such, the information revolution of the U.S. Navy and the exploitation of the unique possibilities allow for a new approach to Naval Warfare. As Admiral John Harvey blogged in 2009:
In a networked world, where the quality of our information drives the quality of our decisions and the employment of our forces, solutions to the pressing need to improve the gathering, flow, and understanding of information cannot be effectively derived from a primarily platform-based organizational construct. This position is not about developing a “see-all, know all” view of warfare that has commonly been associated with the term network-centric warfare; this position is all about the imperative to recast OPNAV, and realign supporting organizations/commands down-echelon, to focus on the whole, rather than continually optimizing platform-based networks, C2 systems and system components that are increasingly difficult to bring together a common architecture that enables the commander to effectively deploy/employ the forces assigned.16
Work should begin immediately to exploit any current information advantage and to prevent possible adversary success in the Information Dominance arena.
While some detractors may debate the possibility, or efficacy, of information dominance, the direction from Navy leadership is clear—“Burn the ships; there is no going back.” We would be well served to push the information-dominance effort. It is clear the PLA is already well on its way down the path of informationization. They believe in information dominance—do we?
1. The author attended the 2009 Qingdao Fleet Review in his capacity as a military attaché in Beijing.
2. The U.S. Navy’s Vision for Information Dominance (Department of the Navy, May 2010), pp. 2, 4–6; www.insaonline.org/assets/files/NavyInformationDominanceVisionMay2010.pdf.
3. Ibid., p. 3
4. Bryan Krekal, “Capability of the People’s Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation,” www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2009/NorthropGrumman_PRC_Cyber_Paper_FINAL_Approved%20Report_16Oct2009.pdf.
5. “Keep a firm grip on key factors of informationization,” PLA Daily, 2 March 2004, http://english.pladaily.com.cn/english/pladaily/2004/03/02/20040302001031_bilingualnews.html
6. China’s National Defense in 2010 (People’s Republic of China, March 2011), p. 15.
7. “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China: 2010,” p. 41.
8. LCDR Leah Amerling-Bray, “Is China Bypassing Our Maginot Line?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 2010, p. 57.
9. Daniel Whiteneck, Michael Price, Neil Jenkins, and Peter Swartz, “The Navy at a Tipping Point: Maritime Dominance at Stake?” Center for Naval Analyses, CAB D0022262.A3/Final, March 2010, p. 5.
10. PLA Daily, 12 March 2008.
11. “The U.S. Navy’s Vision for Information Dominance,” p. 11, f.n. p. 13.
12. Ibid., p. 7.
13. China’s National Defense in 2010, p. 11.
14. Zhou Linhe, PLA Daily, 19 March 2010.
15. Ultima Ratioreg, USNI blog, “Information Dominance?! Say What?!” http://blog.usni.org/?s=information+dominance.
16. ADM John Harvey, USNI blog, “Information Dominance?! Say What?!” http://blog.usni.org/2009/09/18/information-dominance-say-what/.