Fighting Today’s Wars: How America’s Leaders Have Failed Our Warriors
David G. Bolgiano and James M. Patterson. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2011. 192 pp. Intro. Notes. Index. $19.95.
Reviewed by Colonel W. Hays Parks, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired)
In this well-researched volume, two combat-seasoned senior judge advocates general (JAG) challenge the way the U.S. military prepares for, trains, and fights its current conflicts. Fighting Today’s Wars identifies contemporary deficiencies, some preceding the past decade of combat, many precipitated by the U.S. military’s unpreparedness for the conflicts in which it has engaged. The authors lay out their argument in an articulate, well-documented fashion.
Jim Patterson, a Special Forces soldier before becoming a JAG, begins the book by describing his experience in reporting to his current assignment. To use military computers, time-consuming online information-security training in “thumb-drive awareness” is required, notwithstanding the fact that thumb drives and other removable media have been banned from use in government computers for more than two years as a result of the alleged leak of classified documents to WikiLeaks by Army Private First Class Bradley Manning. But to undergo the training, it is necessary to have someone log in under his or her name and turn the computer over to the trainee—itself a violation of computer security.
This is an example of one of the authors’ points: today’s military emphasis on form over substance through institutional overreaction to a single, serious but isolated incident. The authors also cite social programs, such as mandatory annual classes on financial responsibility, equal opportunity, and sexual-assault prevention, along with political correctness. (The book’s description of the response of senior Army leaders and others to Army Major Nidal Hassan’s 2009 murder of 13 soldiers and civilians and the wounding of another 31 at Fort Hood is damning.) These have replaced emphasis on combat skills, warfighting, and war winning—the military’s raison d’être.
One the authors’ primary focuses is the overly restrictive construction, interpretation, and implementation of rules of engagement (ROE) by commanders and their judge advocates in Iraq and Afghanistan. By way of full disclosure, I identified this problem in a Proceedings article prior to 9/11 (“Deadly Force Is Authorized,” January 2001). The authors demonstrate, through examples, that the problem has been exacerbated in the conflicts of the past decade.
Caution in engaging armed insurgents began in Iraq following the transition from the Phase-I offensive operations that led to the defeat of conventional Iraqi forces and then to the Coalition occupation of Iraq. Military commanders were untrained and unprepared for the transition. Military units continued to apply overwhelming firepower in response to any threat, resulting in the death of civilians. The military leadership responded by directing the investigation of any discharge of a weapon, even if the discharge did not result in injury or death of a civilian. I have been told that a brigade on average experienced 1,000 or more investigations during a tour of duty. As the authors explain, this “leadership-by-investigation,” coupled with risk-averse training, had a chilling effect on the decision-making process of the individual soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine, regarding his or her use of force.
As insurgency operations gained a foothold in Iraq and Afghanistan, many commanders were unable to adjust to the changing battlefield environment by doing something other than labeling it “asymmetric warfare.” U.S. military circles seem surprised that smart opponents know better than to play to our strong suit. While some commanders responded positively to the changing combat environment, concrete steps could not be taken until the Army and Marine Corps researched, wrote, and published new counterinsurgency doctrine in December 2006—more than five years after U.S. forces entered Afghanistan, almost four years after the U.S.-led Coalition invaded Iraq, and more than three decades after U.S. military leadership turned its back on the counterinsurgency lessons learned in Vietnam.
The new doctrine was flawed from the outset in its seeming infatuation with the lessons learned from the 1948-1960 British conflict in Malaya (today Malaysia) and contemporary British emphasis on “soft power,” which Frank Ledwidge sharply criticized for its lack of success in Iraq and Afghanistan in Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan (Yale University Press, 2011). Errors in implementing the new doctrine are best illustrated by a comment a JAG made in addressing a class on the subject: “In COIN [counterinsurgency], you may have to ‘take one for the team’”—meaning that a soldier had to be shot before he could respond with force, provided, of course, he or she survived.
The unnecessary deaths of U.S. military personnel caused by overly rigid ROE came to light when the Medal of Honor was awarded to Marine Sergeant Dakota Meyer, after it was revealed that during the 2009 action for which he earned that award, U.S. soldiers died because the fire support then-Corporal Meyer had requested was refused. Supporting command decision-makers were hesitant to act lest they violate the ROE. An investigation into the incident determined that these officers were negligent in refusing Corporal Meyer’s request but did not take into account higher command failure to provide less-restrictive ROE and clear command guidance.
Through Bolgiano’s leadership and in an effort to correct ROE that are more restrictive than legally required or politically necessary, the authors have conducted use of force/ROE training at the U.S. Army War College and, at the request of other military commands, throughout the United States. Readers of this book will benefit from their research and experience.
In some cases the authors have put forward arguments that may be extreme. In reaction to the Fort Hood massacre, they argue that military personnel on military bases should be armed at all times. But the risk of negligent discharge of a weapon due to the fundamental inadequacy of firearms training makes this impractical. Further, the authors question the treatment provided Guantanamo detainees, correctly noting it exceeds that required for prisoners of war (a status to which Guantanamo detainees are not entitled), but they offer no alternatives.
Finally, they challenge the military’s performing missions that are not directly related to our national security interests, such as those it conducted in the Balkans, Haiti, Somalia, Libya, and nation-building operations, particularly given our responsibilities as the lone superpower. However correct this view may be, it is a fundamental American principle that our military is under and must respect civilian authority. A response to the inappropriate use of our military forces by the political leadership lies through the resignation of senior military officers and appointed officials or in the voting booth. Our history shows the latter is the only dependable option.
This book will invite strong reactions. As noted, the authors sought to challenge the status quo in the hope of correcting the many shortcomings they identify. It is an excellent book and would be ideal for a war-college course or seminar discussions. At the very least it should be read by serving officers and openly but fairly debated.
The End of Modern History in the Middle East
Bernard Lewis. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2011. 188 pp. Foreword. Intro. Index. $19.95.
Reviewed by Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein, MSC, U.S. Navy
Having read Bernard Lewis for years, I can always count on his work to be intellectually provocative, which is why I return to it time and again. The Princeton University Middle-East scholar has written many books, and his latest explores a collection of ideas that attempts to explain the complexity of the Middle East, its history, and its people. He observes that even today, some responsible Arab statesmen and scholars blame their situation on conspiracy theories that previous generations of leaders favored. Currently, the people of the Middle East have no colonialist to blame, and even the era of the neo-colonialist Arab despots is coming to an end, leaving Arabs to accept responsibility for their own affairs.
If one follows closely the events of the Arab Spring, it’s clear that Lewis may be on to something. The generation of protestors that provoked the Tahrir Square uprising exhibits a boldness the previous generation never showed. In some circles of Arab youth, this borders on contempt for their parents’ generation for having accepted a social contract in which the despot subsidized daily living in return for blind loyalty. In places such as Egypt, this contract began to fray with Anwar Sadat and became acute under Hosni Mubarak as Egypt’s population swelled to 85 million, at a rate of about one million a year.
Lewis’ characterization of our adversary as Islamic fundamentalism, however, is becoming tiresome. This trope had its day but is not useful in the second decade of the 21st century. The truth is far more complex, with militant Islamists trying to impose an Islamic social order through violence, Islamists attempting to bring about Islamic social change in their image through various peaceful means, and Muslims asking the very pragmatic question, “Whose Islam?” Of course, Islamists and militant Islamists despise one another, and varying groups have different visions of what interpretations of Islam they wish to impose mainly on other Muslims.
Lewis does acknowledge this subtlety when he notes that blowing up hotels and murder are perverse forms of Islamic fundamentalism, and that this terrorizes Muslims at home and non-Muslims abroad. I would better characterize Islamic fundamentalists as militant or violent Islamists to distinguish them from spiritual fundamentalists who practice a rigid interpretation of their faith while engaging in nonviolent proselytizing, or politically active Islamists who choose the ballot box to express their desires for Islamic change in their image.
The author revisits his earlier ideas, offering a critique of Israeli political trends. He writes that when the Israelis are free from the threat of war, they can concentrate on their differences without troublesome consequences. He notes that the political debate in Israel is moving from the issue of right versus left, to secular versus religious, and European (Ashkenazi) versus Middle Eastern (Sephardic) Judaism. In finding a remedy to the Israeli-Palestinian question, Lewis quotes T. E. Lawrence’s 1920 essay, “The Changing East.” In it Lawrence writes, “The success of the Zionist’s scheme will involve inevitably the raising of the present Arab population to their own material level. . . . It might well prove a source of technical supply rendering them independent of industrial Europe.” What Lawrence advocated was an economic merging between Israel and the Arabs to raise the standard of living for all.
Lewis notes that nationalism and socialism dominated Middle East political thinking throughout much of the 20th century. Socialism was discredited, and nationalist aspirations have been realized—leaving deprivation and subjugation among modern Arab states. He uses this fact to discuss the influence of propaganda in sustaining these states. He also notes that the modern term for this art was created in 1622 as the Congregatio de Propaganda Fide or the Congregation for Propagating the Faith, an office of the Vatican that at the time focused on proselytizing to Jews and Christians in the Middle East.
I enjoyed reading the author’s discussion of the manipulation of the Hadith (sayings of Prophet Muhammad) and his citing of a 15 December 1990 edition of an Arabic newspaper that quoted Muhammad as saying, “The Greeks and Franks will join with Egypt in the desert against a man named Sadim, and not one of them will return.” Lewis notes that it is not difficult to ascertain for what purpose this Hadith was invented—as part of a propaganda war in the service of Saddam Hussein during Operation Desert Storm—and that propagandist predictions are not limited to fabricated Hadiths.
Lewis presents many interesting and thought-provoking ideas, but this is not his best work. What Went Wrong (Harper Perennial, 2003) offers a more vivid discourse on how the modern Middle East has coped with disappointment, exploitation, and victimization, from the arrival of Napoleon in Egypt in 1798 to the early 21st century. Lewis’ new book does not help us define with precision the ideology of violent or militant Islamists. It may instead allow them to cloak themselves in Islamic fundamentalism and Islam in general, and this is not useful, as violent Islamists pose a threat to Muslim and non-Muslim alike.
Asia’s Space Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International Risks
James Clay Moltz. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012. 274 pp. Notes. Index. $35.
Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Brian Hanley, U.S. Air Force (Retired)
Asia’s Space Race makes an important and arguably unique contribution to contemporary strategic studies and ought to spur debate over how the United States’ permanent interests might best be secured in the face of the emerging space race among Asia’s regional powers. At the very least, the book should be on the “must-read” list of senior and mid-level officer education programs. Professor Moltz’s volume would be especially useful to members of the intelligence community, who are attuned to subtle but potentially decisive shifts in strategic priorities among allies, rivals, and enemies.
Moltz presents a clear analysis of the latest—and perhaps the most consequential—arena for deep-rooted rivalries among Asia’s nation-states. The jury is still out as to whether the competition will take a benevolent or belligerent trajectory, Moltz observes, which presents the United States with an opportunity to engage with greater purpose and vigor Asia’s regional powers, to mitigate potential conflict.
Asia’s Space Race begins by surveying the political, historical, and cultural context of the region’s military and civilian exploitation of outer space. Chapters two through six discuss, respectively, the space programs of Japan, China, India, South Korea, and those of a clutch of emerging space participants: Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, North Korea, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam. The final chapter examines the geopolitical implications of Asia’s space race. Each of these chapters stands by itself—making the work a handy reference that delivers a solid payoff in understanding for a modest investment of time.
Moltz offers no surprises in his commentary on the main states in the race. China occupies the strategic pivot of the region. Economically, militarily, and by extension, diplomatically, China sets the tempo and direction of the region’s space race, which, as the author points out, at once undermines and advances regional security. The successful test firing of an anti-satellite missile in 2007 was the culmination of a fairly aggressive program of ground-based interceptor development. On the other hand, China has been a leader in promoting space-arms control, and also has shown the way toward peaceful cooperation among nations—the post-World War II European model, as Moltz points out—rather than feral competition of the kind that, after some 50 years in gestation, detonated World War I. Specifically, China has sought to build mutually beneficial relationships with the European Space Agency, NASA, and the Russian government. The upshot is that China’s rise as an economic and military rival of the United States in the Pacific region over the past ten years has aggravated what are probably substantial differences in strategic outlook between the People’s Liberation Army and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The polar opposite of China’s space program is that of North Korea. China’s space program is sui generis among the Asian powers—though Japan’s is a worthy competitor—thanks in large measure to China’s great-power status. By contrast, North Korea’s space program is effectively impotent, lacking strategic direction and almost entirely destitute of sustainable financial support and technical know-how. Even so, as Moltz points out, North Korea continues to function as a reliable sponsor of Iran’s missile program, and its ambition to use weapons of mass destruction to register as a power to be reckoned with cannot go ignored by Asia’s other nation-states, most especially South Korea and Japan. So North Korea’s mere gesturing toward a military space program is a destabilizing influence and provides an international and domestic justification for defensive space programs across the region.
The book’s commentary on the space programs of India and Japan is very much worth pondering. Indeed, Asia’s Space Race in general is wrought with few traces of fat (which take the form of academic-speak, e.g., “negative outcomes,” when “war” might be the more apt term). Readers will find this book to be a highly useful primer on the nexus of space technology and geopolitics.