The Supercarrier is NOT Superfluous
(See C. J. Murray, pp. 28–32, September 2011 Proceedings)
Colonel Stuart K. Archer, U.S. Air Force—I eagerly anticipate each new issue of Proceedings and as an active-duty Air Force officer and aviator, I genuinely admire the American naval culture and the unique traditions of naval aviators. Those traditions endure, and naval aviators retain a preeminent position among warfighters even against the backdrop of rapid changes in technology and warfighting. I am growing fatigued, however, by the continued derision of U.S. Air Force air power by naval aviators to somehow justify the relevance of carrier aviation.
Captain Christopher Murray’s article on the future of the supercarrier includes what seems to be just the latest “obligatory snipe” in a long line of articles that seek to maintain the status of naval aviation in part by disparaging land-based air power.
Carrier aviation provides phenomenal power projection, unrivaled deterrence attributes, and humbling show-of-force capabilities prior to conflict. During conflict, carrier aviation provides rapid response, concentrated fire power, and unique flexibility for both military decision-makers and political leaders. Carriers are highly versatile air power platforms . . . but platforms that deliver strategic and tactical effects in a very similar fashion to land-based assets. Certainly, a debate over carrier size and force structure is valuable in the context of defense strategy, but one that constantly challenges the value of land-based air forces does so at the expense of eroding overall perceptions of air power.
Air power, both land-based and sea-based, has been decisive in Desert Storm, Kosovo, Libya, and Afghanistan. All these actions were accomplished through the coordination and synchronization of both land- and sea-based assets. Our national security depends in large part on America’s air arsenal and the inherent strategic and offensive capabilities it provides.
However, those who advocate that the best warfighting solution is always “boots on the ground” and the only real deterrence is the “82nd Airborne Division on alert” are eager to underrate air power and advance ground-centric warfare in method and from any source available. Diminishing the aspects of either land- or sea-based capabilities will eventually cheat the American public out of a critical and cost-effective mode of national security. In an era of shrinking budgets and relentless cost constraints on air platforms, derisive attacks on land-based air power are detrimental to not only our overall strategic posture but also to defense reform in general. Those attacks and arguments only serve to lessen the public’s perception of air power, and arm critics with inaccurate yet potent ammunition in which to diminish the strategic contributions of air power overall.
Pure naval-aviation advocates who downplay the value of land-based air do so at their own peril, because after the budget-and-strategy “boogeyman” comes to strip the Air Force of its resources and missions, he’ll come for naval aviation next. Future contributors to Proceedings should carefully discern not only how poisonous their rhetoric is to the Air Force–Navy relationship, but also how it unintentionally undermines the overall perceptions of air power and its value to our national security.
Please Keep the Marines Off the Beach
(See N. Polmar, pp. 86–87, November 2011 Proceedings)
Dave Byrd—Mr. Polmar’s article makes a number of side points on the way to his main one (all good). However, from the outset, I do not see the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) requirement being as special as the U.S. Marine Corps is making it.
For example: 25-knot run-in speed for an hour. I have an idea: How about 12 knots and you leave early? It’s all about time on target, not velocity, and as any nautical engineer will tell you, speed is the most expensive performance parameter, so you had better really need it.
I have a suggestion (ignored for years): What about just making the thing semi-submersible? It practically is a sub anyway, so seal it up and let it run a foot or three below the waves. Snorkels are tricky, but it’s been done and, best of all, if a Silkworm missile gets you, all you lost is a vent stack.
The concept of using water as a shield seems to have skipped everyone’s mind. If you are running three feet below the surface, you’re essentially immune to radar, small arms, small craft, and even large weapons because they can’t see you and if they could, they’d have to dive vertically to get you. You can’t hide from an antisubmarine-warfare platform, but if you are in that sort of environment, somebody screwed up and sent you to the wrong war.
If the Department of Defense could get out of a “perfect or nothing” mind-set long enough, the advantage of a landing craft that could run subsurface when needed (loud voice to ops planners) but otherwise is conventional would be obvious. The worst-case ultra-threat landing is when it needs to run at 10 knots 3 feet down, but not other times. And of course, if you are sending landing craft in and you have not neutralized the antiship defenses, you should be fired. That’s like sending strike aircraft over areas with intact air defense—a great way to run out of resources and volunteers in a hurry.
Last but not least, the number of antiship weapons is not infinite. See missile, drop a foot. Pop up. Repeat. The Navy lives on and in the water—I have never understood why it is seen only as a mask and not as armor.
Happy Birthday ‘Big E’
(See J. L. Holloway III, pp. 64–69, November 2011 Proceedings)
James M. Roherty—It was with no small amount of pleasure—and anguish—that I read Admiral Holloway’s article. In closing out his much-deserved paean to the USS Enterprise, CVA(N)-65, he takes us back to the tumult attending the issue of nuclear or conventional propulsion for the America (CV-66) and John F. Kennedy (CV-67). Admiral Holloway straightforwardly reminds us of the incontrovertible fact that the “stumbling block (in the way of nuclear propulsion) was Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.” But at the same time he appears to want to give the then-Director of Research & Engineering Harold Brown “an out.” I am not so inclined. Throughout a seemingly endless series of hearings, Director Brown persistently opposed the nuclear option on grounds of “lack of proof” for the effectiveness of nuclear propulsion. After-the-fact observations by Mr. Brown are just that. In this unfortunate episode, let me nominate my hero of the hour: Vice Admiral John T. Hayward. How about a CVA(N) Hayward?
A Different Age, A Different Navy, A Familiar Dilemma
(See S. B. Munsch, pp. 8–9, October 2011; and J. Ulry, pp. 80–81, November 2011 Proceedings)
Brian C. Chao—Captain Munsch’s article on the U.S. Navy, declining budgets, and strategic opportunities missed an important point. His article tells us persuasively why certain capabilities must be retained, but he does not tell us how we will resolve the problem of spending money we do not have.
Despite all of Admiral of the Fleet Sir John “Jackie” Fisher’s reforms (including those both mentioned and unmentioned by Captain Munsch), the United Kingdom’s budget situation was never resolved satisfactorily. As late as 1914 (before the start of war), the Royal Navy’s growing budget demands in the face of German naval modernization resulted in a Cabinet crisis, which was only defused when His Majesty’s Treasury and the Admiralty compromised by agreeing to raise the Royal Navy budget that year, but lower it the following year.
The article also underemphasized the geostrategic environment facing Britain at the time. His Majesty’s Government was united on the German threat: in perception, action, and reaction, British German policy and naval policy fused into one. This allowed for such things as redistribution of the fleet, recalling capital ships from distant waters, and withdrawing British naval presence from large parts of the world. Britain in essence gave up maintaining freedom of navigation in large parts of the world to concentrate on one challenger. Today, by contrast, we in the United States are not united in either perception or action when it comes to a new global competitor. China’s future vis-à-vis the United States is still very much in dispute, and the U.S. government’s official policy is still one that very much sits on the fence (“hedging,” as it were).
Britain tried many things to relieve pressure on its naval budget. It asked its competitor for a mutual shipbuilding moratorium; it asked the Empire to contribute by financing and building its own warships; it streamlined the naval service by decommissioning old ships that were dispatched overseas to fly the flag, as opposed to undertaking kinetic operations; it redeployed vessels closer to the home islands to meet the German challenge in the North Sea. In the end, none of these measures, singly or collectively, relieved the British government’s budgetary troubles.
The United States today also faces fiscal austerity, though its Navy’s strategic environment is decidedly less threatening than what faced the Royal Navy a century ago. Nevertheless, cuts will come. It is time we not only ask ourselves, “What should the Navy keep?” but also, “What can the Navy do without?”
The Maritime Domain Awareness Conundrum
(See E. C. Jones and J. E. Vorbach III, pp. 28–33, October 2011; and N. Polmar, pp. 9, 80, November 2011 Proceedings)
Paul L. Manigrasso—I respect Mr. Polmar’s analyses greatly and have for many years; however, in his response to the article by Captain Jones and Commander Vorbach, I believe he may have not considered two factors.
I surmise that terrorist goals are largely twofold:
• Apply terror tactics against the civilian populace of the United States to effect political change, and
• Force the United States to spend considerable resources to combat an asymmetrical threat (using $100,000 missiles against $5,000 trucks).
Mr. Polmar states that a terrorist organization would not use a semi-submersible vessel for an attempted weapon-of-mass-destruction insertion because:
• The terrorists on the vessel would have a significant possibility of being intercepted.
• They would be unable to communicate.
• They could suffer navigation issues or adverse weather.
• They would have to conduct an at-sea transfer to deliver the payload.
My thought is that a successful delivery would actually be far less effective than a failed one. This is based on the premise that public perception (through media) is the actual target, rather than a geographic location.
A successful delivery where the semi-submersible gets away would tend to eliminate evidence of the insertion method in the resultant detonation, as there would be little forensic information (e.g., airport security cameras) available. Our nation would likely do more of the same things we’re already doing to secure the borders (a linear response rather than a exponential one).
A failed insertion would show the “Southern Sea Frontier” as a vast, undefended Maginot Line requiring the immediate and continuous presence of forces capable of establishing an exclusion zone throughout the Gulf of Mexico, Strait of Florida, and possibly even the southern Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the continental United States. In an era when our ships, aircraft, and crews are at historic operational-tempo levels, this might force redeployment from forward ocean areas back to our maritime frontiers, as well as the deployment of ground-based combat forces to patrol U.S. beach and port areas. Others more qualified than myself would have to calculate the requirements for such a force, the resultant impact on Navy and Coast Guard deployment cycles, and the requisite logistics chain this might entail.
In sum, if interception occurs (or is orchestrated, preferably with a close in-shore detonation for the six o’clock news), the ensuing onshore movement is unnecessary. Communication is more of an issue for our forces than for groups long accustomed to situations where centralized formal command and control do not play a central role. Navigation is problematic in our era of GPS, especially when putting your heading on “N” will pretty much get you there. Weather and storms might play a factor, but outside of hurricane season, these areas of the sea would tend to favor employment of such low-freeboard vessels.
Wake Up . . . and Speak Up!
(See J. Murphy, pp. 14–15, October 2011 Proceedings)
Chief Yeoman Bernard Michael Burawski, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Senior Chief Murphy’s article is, unfortunately, old news. The leadership problems that he outlines have been well known for years (well before the 1990s) and do not only pertain to the chief petty officer community. The fact that, as the author points out, those problems have been ongoing for years is evidence that it is already too late. Corrective action should have been done before it got this far. Our leaders should welcome dissenting opinion and critical thought, which ultimately opens the door to an improved organization.
It’s been my experience that most senior leaders view any disagreement with policy as being disloyal and not worthy of serious consideration, and often follows with some form of retribution. Sadly, the stifling of any ideas that might shed a situation in a bad light is not confined to just the Navy—the rest of the military services operate under the same mind-set. My hope is that the military’s culture of condoning such actions will change; otherwise more of the problems that all of the services are currently experiencing will continue well into the 21st century and beyond.
Enhancing Bridge and CIC Leadership
(See J. Kersh, pp. 92–93, September 2011 Proceedings)
Steven A. Palmer, Chief Mate, M/V Horizon Eagle—Captain Kersh’s article reminded me of many sea-and-anchor, underway-replenishment and flight-quarters duties while stationed on the USS Sacramento (AOE-1). All of the author’s points have merit and are good for developing teamwork through a positive and professional environment.
If you are confident in your personnel, I suggest pushing their boundaries a little. Choose a fairly benign port and try a reduced-manning approach. I realize with the rash of commanding-officer firings, such a move may seem anathema, but it will increase confidence in the long run. Maintain all your normal bridge team and combat-information-center positions, but operate with just the CO, conning officer, helmsman, and lee helmsman. Those four should be able to safely navigate the vessel to the pilot-boarding area. The rest of the team should perform their normal functions as the backup to the reduced bridge team, but not intervene unless things start going sideways.
During one voyage, I had our second-class deck cadet from the California Maritime Academy conn the ship along the coast of Guam and to the pilot station. This was outside his comfort zone, but he did very well. Our bridge team was the master, the deck cadet, the helmsman, and I. Our normal bridge team for entering or leaving port is the master, watch officer, and helmsman.
A Navy bridge team is designed so the ship can navigate through a minefield or very narrow waters while engaging in combat operations. I am not advocating a change to a merchant-style bridge team, just periodically pushing people outside their comfort zones. The pulse rate might elevate a bit, but they will enjoy the sense of accomplishment.
My time on the Sacramento gave me an opportunity to use much of what I had learned at the California Maritime Academy and introduced me to things not normally done on a merchant vessel (underway replenishment, etc). My first job after leaving active duty was second mate on the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ship S/S Cape Borda (ex-Howell Lykes). Going into Singapore the master stood back and observed, while the chief mate was the backup anti-collision officer and took care of the radio calls. I did the conning, navigation, and primary anti-collision until we were roughly three miles from the pilot station. My underway-replenishment experience was a great help when overtaking vessels close aboard.
I cannot emphasize enough Captain Kersh’s point about looking out the window. If what you see does not agree with your radar picture, you need to figure out why. Are they small boats with poor radar-return close-in or larger boats with really bright lights farther out?
When I was chief mate on the RRF vessel S/S Comet, our motto was, “If it can go wrong, it will go wrong—at exactly the wrong time!”
COs, give your people a shot at the occasional merchant-style bridge team. If it was rocket science, I would not be here! Fair winds and following seas.