In Sub Design, Look at the Work and People First
nformation technology (ITS) confirms the changing work associated with the information age. Despite the influence of this age on system and platform design, until the announcement of the new ITS rating, the rating structure in our submarines has remained constant since the late 1990s. We now have the opportunity to select and prepare a workforce that will influence, fully support, and optimize design changes on future submarines. This can be accomplished if we commit to a truly “human”-systems-integration process, which will result in a force without equal.Ratings Reflect Work
The current system of enlisted ratings began with the start of our Navy. The institutionalized system that allows for a systematic approach to assigning jobs has proven effective. Enlisted personnel are recruited for established job “families” under programs that attempt to match incoming potential or educational experience with the expected work requirements.
Once apprentice-level initial skills are gained through a Navy Apprentice or A school, enlisted members are awarded rating badges that define their entire career. As advanced skills are mastered, individual Navy enlisted classification (NEC) codes are awarded to sailors. This allows personnel-distribution organizations to assign, with additional granularity, individuals with specialized skills and expertise.
Ratings and associated NECs must be reviewed periodically for changes in the work, which may result from system upgrades (modernization) or new platform designs. However, historically the changes to ratings have lagged behind the introduction of new technology and platforms. When innovations such as steam and radio were brought into the Navy, existing rating job families were used to assign personnel. The relatively slow, incremental introduction of new technologies in the past allowed for a less-aggressive transformation to rating changes.
As the jobs corresponding to the ratings shifted to other areas or were eliminated altogether, certain ratings were disestablished and new ones created. But this approach will not serve us well in the much more rapidly evolving information age. The rate of technology development and introduction calls for more aggressive planning and forward-looking adjustments to the existing manpower structural alignment in our submarines. Failure to develop a sense of urgency and take action in this matter may result, in the best case, in a sub-optimization of systems. In the worst case, it could impact mission success.
Sub Combat Team Division of Work
The rating structure of the combat team in submarines consists of fire-control technicians (FTs), sonar technicians, submarine (STSs), and electronics technicians (ETs), with individual focus areas on navigation and communications. As already discussed, the ratings are formed around the work, which is further defined as organizational work (for example, stand watch and execute collateral duties) and occupational work (repair equipment). When examining the current structure of the combat team, important functions associated with the information age have an impact, including:
• Accelerating rates of technology insertion and increasing rates of information availability
• Desire for flatter command-and-control organizations that must be self-organizing, with greater understanding of shared situational awareness
• Greater automation of systems and their associated functionality
• Increased cross-functionality and commonality of equipment in design and operation
• Redefining of maintenance and repair skills
Practical examples from the Advanced Processor Build program and Virginia-class submarine combat design have yielded early and foretelling views of the future team alignment. These examples, including “any display anywhere,” the embedding of shared sensor information into solution-determining displays, and the automation of previously rating-unique functions such as the determination of torpedo presets, indicate a need to evaluate the current combat-system team-rating structure now.
Shake Up Traditional Approachesto Change
As a new submarine design is proposed and finalized, the existing manpower structure is considered good enough and of minimum risk. We ask ourselves the following questions: How many people did we use last time? What ratings were they? Answers to limited questions such as these, unfortunately, often win the manpower front-end analysis debate. However, if a comprehensive human-systems-integration approach were adopted employing new modeling tools (such as Second Life, currently being investigated by the Naval Undersea Warfare Center Virtual World Team), the evidence of how the changing work environment is affecting our submarines would be compelling.
A revised rating structure would maximize technology and design. It would also allow the manpower and training organizations to begin in advance of ship construction to adjust the recruiting selection process and training pipelines, and to smoothly transition the current rating structure. The overarching goals of improving warfighting capability and reducing total ownership costs would be realized.
Beginning in 2004, the Submarine Learning Center conducted work analysis that led to the overhaul of the initial skills training for the FTs, STSs, and ETs. The analysis showed a convergence of initial skills for sensor employment, analysis, and information technology. The resulting new curriculum emphasized the use of common training products, team-building project learning, and continued development of information-technology skills. The objective was to teach the importance of teams earlier, and to create a greater understanding among individuals of what information each produced and how could it be better integrated into a common picture.
Moving Forward
A logical next step in realigning ratings would be to integrate the existing three separate ones into a new rating: sensor integrator (SI). The SI rating skill set would be focused on integrating all forms of data from shipboard and off-hull sensors. Stovepiped sensor skills associated with electronic warfare, navigation, and imaging would be provided to personnel as core competencies during initial and continuing training. The commitment to a new rating would allow system designers to maximize functionality, displays, and layout.
Some early expected gains from this change to submarine combat team alignment would include an improved foundational grasp of principles (navigation, target motion analysis, and sensors), better shared understanding of decision processes, and enhanced team performance. In terms of reducing total ownership costs, possible savings would include more precise accessions selection criteria, which would reduce attrition; streamlined, more efficient training pipelines; and reduced manning levels as the work was more evenly distributed among team members.
The submarine force has a proven record of accomplishment in modernization and new ship design that optimizes technology. The time is now to conduct the required human-systems-integration processes and propose real changes for the future, to ensure that we have the right sailors on the right teams with the right skills for our submarines to maintain unmatched undersea warfighting capability.
Hindsight Can Correct an Oversight
Near the center of the shipping lanes in the Strait of Hormuz, an American fast-attack submarine creeps slowly toward its patrol area in the Persian Gulf. During the transit, only a minimum number of short-duration periscope observations are being made. It’s a sunlit clear day, with an abundance of surface traffic and a flat calm sea, which dictates prudence with the scope observations to ensure that the submarine remains stealthy. A periscope sweep reveals a large, fully loaded containership closing from astern. With the depth of the water less than 150 feet and only limited maneuvering space on either side of the transit channel, the safety of the submarine is in peril.
The CO relies on the ship’s sonar to determine which way to maneuver the boat, in an attempt to stay clear of the behemoth. He uses the passive Hindsight sonar system to help with developing the tactical picture. The sonar indicates that the closing containership’s bearings are drifting left. With this information, the CO drives the sub to the right edge of the shipping lane to maximize separation between the two vessels.
The Real Story
A situation similar to this fictional scenario occurred during the 1999-2000 forward deployment of the USS Kamehameha (SSN-642), an ex-Poseidon-class ballistic-missile submarine converted for special-forces operations. Under the command of Commander H. F. Reese, the Kamehameha relied repeatedly on data supplied by the submarine’s aft-looking sonar system, called Hindsight. My “tiger team” installed the system in 1995, pier side on board the Kamehameha. During the remaining seven years before the ship’s decommissioning in 2002, the Hindsight system was operated continually.
It consisted of a standard AN/BQR-21(V) sonar system and a deck-mounted, cylindrical shaped hydrophone array. The topside array was modified to reduce the interference posed by a large dome fairing mounted on the aft deck. A large dome could have impeded the submerged launching and retrieval of SEAL delivery vehicles housed in the deck-mounted dry dock shelters, especially during dark or low-visibility water conditions.
To reduce the array height, I replaced the 48 DT-168/BQR-21 line hydrophones, each standing at 4 feet and mounted in a 6-foot-diameter ring, with 48 DT-276/BQR7 hydrophones. Measuring just 10 inches high, these were mounted in the same circumference dimension as the original array configuration. Using the new hydrophones reduced the height of the dome fairing by approximately 5 feet. The new shorter array was enclosed in a circular mushroom-shaped steel dome only 18 inches high.
For the Kamehameha, it was determined that a teardrop-shaped dome was not needed for the Hindsight configuration. The primary reason for using the hydrodynamic shape of a teardrop is reducing the flow noise and turbulence around the array. A cylindrical-shaped dome proved to enhance the operation of the system compared with the teardrop design. With the operating envelope of Hindsight well below the blade cavitation speed of the ship, the affects of flow noise and water turbulence around a cylindrical-shaped dome proved negligible.
The operational enhancement of the array was partially due to reduction in wave-bending distortion caused by angle differences between the dome surface and the array face. As a wave front passes through a steel teardrop dome, it bends prior to striking the enclosed face of the array. This wave-angle deflection results in measureable bearing errors and signal deformation.
A wave front approaching from directly astern strikes the sharp angles evident at the pointed end of the teardrop dome. These angled surfaces subject the impinging wave to the greatest effect of distortion and refraction. Maintaining a parallel, equally spaced separation between the inside surface of the dome and the enclosed face of the hydrophone array allows the dome to appear acoustically transparent.
Hindsight’s Back Story
Before the Kamehameha, two other Hindsights were installed on board Sturgeon-class submarines modified for special operations. Both used the AN/BQR-21(V) and array configuration. Mare Island Naval Shipyard was responsible for the installations in the mid 1980s. The AN/BQR-21(V), used in all three Hindsights, was selected because it was a small, stand-alone sonar system that was readily available. This eliminated the cost of new design and hardware purchase.
But neither of the installations operated up to expectations. This was primarily because of the design shape and materials used in the construction of the sonar domes. These installations had large teardrop domes housing standard AN/BQR-21(V) arrays and were configured for under-ice operations. Because of that hostile environment, the domes were made of thick steel plates and heavy internal support beams. With identical inboard electronics in all three Hindsight installations, the cylindrical dome configuration used on the Kamehameha produced by far the best operational results.
U.S. submarines in World War II had the ability to conduct acoustic sweeps 360 degrees about the ship. This was accomplished in both active and passive modes using the QC/JK and JT sonar systems. The capability ended with the postwar advancement in sonar technology and the development of more robust systems.
Old Problems Remain Current
Even today, the complex bow-mounted sonar arrays installed on our submarines remain vulnerable to trailing advisories and/or wake-homing torpedoes. This is a deficiency that can and should be corrected. With submarines operating at speeds under ten knots, a Hindsight system would enable a continual scan of the baffle area to be accomplished. The Kamehameha’s operational history proved that acoustic contacts can be tracked through the ship’s own wake.
Some have argued that the aft area of a submarine can be successfully monitored solely using the ship’s towed arrays. The fallacy with this approach is that the towed systems were not designed for use in littoral waters or at very slow speeds, a problem that is compounded when attempting to use the towed arrays during radical course changes that are needed during SEAL-delivery-vehicle evolutions. During rendezvous to retrieve these vehicles, a submarine must hold station and hover or tightly maneuver to stay within a defined pickup area. This type of evolution negates the use of towed arrays. At such times, a Hindsight system would be invaluable for surveillance about the boat.
The three installations mentioned here evaluated a concept. Unlike the old design, a new Hindsight system only requires a single-screen operator display, with broadband signal processing and no depression or elevation capabilities. With three or four selectable digital trackers and a single trainable audio beam, baffle surveillance can be achieved. But the focus for a new system design must be directed toward a surveillance system only, and not a classification or fire-control sonar. Achieving accuracy for fire-control bearings would be a wasted effort in the aft area of a boat from which weapons were not launched. The additional capability of active ranging has not yet been tried. Installing an active directional projector on the aft portion of the keel would enable ranging on trailing contacts.
The mounting location for a Hindsight array depends on the class and mission of the submarine. On Los Angeles–class subs, the aft trailing edge of the sail fin could be used. The only drawback to this configuration is that a number of these hulls are configured to transport dry dock shelters. With these installed, the acoustic signals are blocked from the receiving window of the array. For the four ex-Trident SSBNs now converted to guided-missile submarines, the array could be faired into the aft sloping edge of the ex-missile-deck superstructure. An array housed within the deck casing eliminates the need for an external dome. The array need only be horseshoe in shape to scan an azimuth arc of +/- 90 degrees either side of directly aft.
Hindsight Remains Applicable
Our current operating fleet needs to be considered for backfit installations of Hindsight. Unlike the United States, other countries are showing interest in developing a sonar system that adds an aft-looking capability to their submarines. Russia’s latest missile-class sub, Project 935, designated Borei, is reported to be equipped with an aft-looking sonar array mounted on the trailing edge of the sail. One can expect more examples of similar Hindsight installations on foreign navy submarines.
No surface-ship commanding officer would get under way, proceeding into harm’s way, if his vessel’s radar could display only contacts in front of his ship. Yet for the past 50 years, the U.S. submarine force has sailed the oceans of the world equipped with acoustic blinders. This oversight needs to be remedied before a catastrophe occurs that will force a panicked rectification.
Mr. Hanrahan designed the Hindsight’s hydrophone array and dome fairing and was the head project engineer for the 1995 installation on board the Kamehameha, for which he won the BAE Systems Chairman’s Silver Award for Innovation in 2000. Previously he served in the Navy as an E-5 sonar technician and worked as an electronics engineer at Naval Sea Systems Command, Keyport, Washington; and BAE Systems North America Division.
Technology for Real Operations
Today’s defense-technology providers face many challenges in fielding new capabilities, not the least of which is balancing technology “push” with operational “pull.” Research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) organizations such as the Naval Undersea Warfare Center must navigate carefully in determining how best to support the Navy in finding that balance. In this era of finite resources and highly variable threats, a simple imperative remains: We must meet the warfighter’s needs in the operational environment. Focusing on a co-evolutionary approach to concept generation and development of innovative warfare solutions presents an opportunity to address these challenges.
Push and Pull
In their quest for game-changing capabilities that may shape future warfighting, technology providers eagerly push theoretical solutions based on their interpretation of perceived needs. But more urgent and realistic mandates often preclude the development of expensive, esoteric technologies.
The requirements or shortfalls that RDT&E organizations should address are identified and prioritized through specific processes. This operational pull, primarily a warfighter function, has been a vital part of military-technology development. Theoretically the push and pull complement each other, and resultant solutions represent a good balance.
Because it doesn’t always work out that way, we often find ourselves in a classic “do loop”: technology providers ask operators for requirements, while operators ask providers what the technology can do. Funding opportunities are lost, with delays in delivery to the Fleet. Although the interface between the undersea warfare operator and the technology provider is constantly improving, we must do better. Many false starts reflect technology developers’ inadequate consideration of the operational environment.
Dealing with Fiscal Restraint
Since Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced his intent to rebalance the DOD budget in early 2009, military spending habits and priorities have changed considerably. “Troubled or excess” programs were canceled, eliminating more than $300 billion in costs, and Secretary Gates’ initiatives for reducing $100 billion in overhead costs and improving efficiency were implemented throughout the services and DOD agencies.1 The renewed focus on government spending driven by unprecedented budget deficits mandates intelligent use of available resources. Indeed, the President’s proposed DOD fiscal year 2012 budget request reflects a 10 percent decrease in the Navy’s RDT&E total obligation authority from the FY 11 request.2 At the same time, military acquisition processes and programs are increasingly scrutinized and criticized.
A 2009 Government Accountability Office study of 96 defense programs showed 69 percent suffering overall cost increases that averaged 25 percent higher than the original estimates. More disturbing to technology providers, R&D cost increases were encountered in 75 percent of the programs, with overruns averaging 42 percent higher than original estimates.3 Although newer acquisition efforts demonstrate improvement, these issues illustrate the depth of challenges facing the community, especially in RDT&E, to get it right.
Concept Generationand Development
Technology developers need to expand thinking beyond traditional platform insertions and point to the operational-concept level. The Navy has chosen to do this through a new program of concept generation and development.4 First ideas are harvested, challenges and opportunities identified, feasibility and value examined, and concepts that deserve further development presented. This stage should include early involvement of end users so that it is not just another technology push.
Concept development refines the idea(s) so that potential solutions can be pursued and the concepts validated through analysis, war games, or experimentation, including live-force experiments. This phase should address how the proposed solutions will be transitioned to the organizations or agencies responsible for their implementation. The Navy’s program provides for a collaborative approach to addressing warfighting challenges and influencing acquisition and operational support.
Navy efforts are informed by joint concept development efforts in a hierarchical arrangement of institutional, operating, functional, and enabling concepts. Endeavors to envision a future way to fight and then work back from there to actions we need to take now have been under way in the Navy for some time, notably at the CNO’s Strategic Studies Group and the Navy Warfare Development Command. Although an “innovation architecture gap” had been mentioned, the Navy is making progress in identifying how ideas will translate into future capabilities.5
If the RDT&E works with the Fleet, the co-evolution of technology and operational concepts could indicate those with the greatest potential for successful implementation. Such early collaboration, starting at the problem-definition stage, will ensure close synergy between operational needs and the associated technology, well before vast sums are invested in candidates that might never be used.
The Naval Undersea Warfare Center
At the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, we have adopted processes to engage the right operational stakeholders to focus on the appropriate capabilities and affordable technology options. The NUWC has established a cadre experienced in implementing this co-evolutionary process. These innovative teams partner scientists or engineers with the skills and knowledge to generate possibilities related to perceived Fleet-capability gaps. Ideally these teams collectively bring diverse operational, analytical, and technological expertise to bear. The initial group reflects intellectual investment in conceiving RDT&E-related concepts, examining them, and assessing their feasibility and potential.
Concept teams engage organizations or commands with knowledge about or a stake in candidate ideas, thereby avoiding pursuit of technologies for their own sake. If the subject matter is interdisciplinary, they work collaboratively, not sequentially, with other teams addressing similar problems. There is no room for the tendency to keep a close hold on the best ideas. To be successful, concept teams must work as a matrix.
Performed correctly, technology-related concept-generation activities will not produce safe approaches that merely support the existing programs, offering incremental improvements. If we want to find capabilities that hold significant potential for improving warfighting, we may need to rock a boat or two. Still, our work must be grounded in thorough operational and technology feasibility assessments to be convincing.
Our teams have supported the efforts of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Office of Naval Research, Navy Warfare Development Command, Commander Pacific Fleet Warfighting Assessment and Readiness Directorate, and our own internal R&D efforts. The results underscore the need to produce ideas at the operational warfare level; to aggressively engage external organizations to expand discussions beyond the technical arena; and to employ a diverse team of members with operational, analytical, or technical skills. They also demonstrate the benefits of a co-evolutionary approach to identify the strongest candidates with operational value relating to either current warfighting requirements or future concept-driven capabilities. This ensures that the warfighter’s operational perspective is efficiently balanced with technological feasibility solutions.
What’s the Payoff?
Effective concept generation identifies key issues and elements that are borne out in later activities. In turn, meaningful concept development reduces the time to transition new capabilities to the Fleet. One reason this is compelling is that it helps technology providers to understand potential military uses of concepts.
This can clearly benefit the Navy. There has not been enough intellectual investment in this area in the recent past; we must master the skills that will allow us to get more new capabilities to the Fleet faster and more efficiently. Many at-sea tests for single-technology experiments cost up to $2 million; major field experiments with multiple technologies can run up to $20 million. Refining these activities through a close collaboration of technology providers and concept developers could help to focus these efforts, avoiding waste and duplications.
Thus, co-evolutionary concept generation and development payoffs include more meaningful development and experimentation activities, a potential reduction in time and resources, and providers who have greater insight into military realities. Of course the operational Navy has the final say as to our degree of success in these endeavors, but when they are successful, this may lead to a degree of discomfort across different communities at different times. Technology providers may learn that some of their ideas are not responsive to operational or conceptual demands. Fleet operators may have to deal with changes in CONOPS or how they train and fight, and acquisition managers might be faced with budget transitions from legacy programs to disruptive technology programs with greater warfighting payoff. Change is often painful.
As the Navy engages in a new program of concept generation and development, success is enabled by operators, operations analysts, and technologists collaborating closely. There is a sense of urgency: How much have we invested in the development of equipment or capabilities that will never be deployed? How many Fleet requirements have been too long unfulfilled? Without co-evolving technology and operational and concept-derived requirements, the Navy could end up investing more scarce resources in the wrong technologies at the wrong time, aggravating the push-pull mismatch. We can all do better, and understanding and employing co-evolutionary methodologies is a good place to start.
1. Statement on Department Budget and Efficiencies, 6 January 2011, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1527.
2. U.S. DOD FY 12 Budget Request, http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2012/FY2012_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
3. GAO-09-326SP, Defense Acquisitions, Assessment of Selected Programs, March 2009, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09326sp.pdf.
4. OPNAVINST 5401.9 Navy Concept Generation and Concept Development Program, https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-US/400144/file/53897/%23107298%20OPNAVINST%205401.9%20CONOPS.pdf.
5. RADM J. Shuford, “President’s Forum,” Naval War College Review, summer 2008.