Naval Special Warfare (NSW) forces need to operate from the sea. For long-range open-water transits they depend on the Navy. But they rarely practice with blue-water ships, which are not outfitted to support U.S. special operations forces (SOF) with space for staff planning; troops; stowage for ammunition, small arms, and demolitions; a diving-recompression chamber; or dedicated communications terminals. Worst of all, amphibious ships are earmarked full time for Marine embarkation and not available to SEALs, especially with the 2006 establishment of Marine Corps Special Operations Command. SEALs and Special Warfare Combatant-craft Crewmen (SWCC) need dedicated open-ocean ships.
NSW comprises several SEAL teams, a single SEAL delivery vehicle (SDV) team, and special boat teams. These commands are blended together for deployments as a squadron, and all report to the commander, U.S. Special Operations Command through the NSW Command headquartered in Coronado, California. Overseas, they report to the geographical combatant commanders.
The teams—supported by various units and U.S.-based groups—catch rides in whatever surface ships or submarines are allotted for a given operation. But, as noted previously, the surface ships are not oriented to special operations forces that could be Army Special Forces, Marine Special Operations, or (most usually) Navy SEAL and SDV teams.
NSW craft include the 82-foot MK V special-operations craft, now approaching 20 years’ service. This has an aluminum hull, water-jet drive, some crew-served weapons, and is capable of 50-plus knots and a 600 nautical-mile range. Next down, the 36-foot rigid-hull inflatable boat, a workhorse capable of 40 knots, has a crew of three SWCC and can transport eight SEALs. At the bottom of the list is the 15-foot combat rubber raiding craft, made by Zodiac of North America. This carries nine passengers at 30 knots for 60 nautical miles. SDVs are specialized, free-flooding underwater insertion vehicles.
So why do SEALs need a dedicated blue-water support craft?
In World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, underwater demolition teams operated from fast transport ships (APDs), which were 2,000-ton destroyer-like hulls configured to carry Marines and frogmen in advance-force scenarios in support of the amphibious force. Since Vietnam those are long gone, and no dedicated vessel has replaced them. Present-day construction is highlighted by the littoral combat ship (LCS), the design of which is SOF-limited.
SEALs need open-ocean ships that can carry shooters and combatant craft for insertion. The vessels need to operate independently of other naval forces but, depending on the threat environment, immediate backup support from naval aviation would be planned in advance.
SEALs in forward operating ships is not a new idea. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review stated: “Special Operations Forces will exploit Afloat Forward Staging Bases (AFSB) to provide more flexible and sustainable locations from which to operate globally.” For the past decade, these forces have been engaged in the Afghan mountains at 10,000 feet. But the desert-mountain regional emphasis will not endure forever. Someday maritime SOF will return to sea.
So with all the resource ballooning in the past decade, why no consideration of forward NSW sustainability, and no blue-water troop transports penciled in? SOF can influence the low-intensity outcome if employed early enough with a full-time ship that has some of the following capabilities:
• Engineering repair: SEALs and SWCCs have equipment that requires routine maintenance. Boats often need to change engines. SEALs need armory, gunsmiths, electronic repair for sensors, radios and boats, and repairs to inflatable hulls.
• Medical support: A central part of counterinsurgency, beyond own troop health, is the ability to provide some health care to locals. They appreciate and admire this.
• Communications, staffing, and mount-out spaces: SOF require highly classified intelligence input and instantaneous communications reach-back to commanders and, often, national command authorities.
• Two helicopter deck spots: SOF routinely depend on helicopters for insertion and extraction. In a riverine operation, airborne support is backup for fire suppression and early warning.
• Employment: A precedent for this was the Solid Anchor facility on the tip of Ca Mau Peninsula, South Vietnam. Riverine craft could tie up, refit, and refurbish. A dedicated SEAL-support ship could perform this function.
The Navy needs to be ready. The LCS is not the answer to littoral operations involving SOF. A new, revamped design needs drafting and metal bent. Refurbishing Newport-class tank landing ships might work.