Use Our Diversity Better
010 earthquake in Haiti, the U.S. Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps were making significant contributions to the humanitarian-assistance and disaster-relief efforts titled Operation Unified Response. Among the services’ most important assets were the Haitian-American Sailors, Coast Guardsmen, and Marines who served as operators and translators. Aside from the valuable duties they carried out, an intangible element of the goodwill ambassadorship was the service members’ shared ethnicity with those they were helping.To better engage with international partners, we need to devise a strategy aimed at capitalizing on ethnic diversity in the Navy. Sailors who were born in other countries or are first- or second-generation Americans can be useful to the objective of building relationships with foreign partners.
Today’s Navy is among the most diverse that has ever sailed the high seas, as a result of a sustained push to create such a force. This well-publicized effort is obvious in the service’s recruiting strategies and programs for both officers and Sailors. Senior officers and chiefs often emphasize that diversity at every level, from seaman to admiral, is a force multiplier for the Navy. Therefore, it is essential that we implement an approach that makes maximum use of this characteristic to support the tenets set forth in the current U.S. maritime strategy.
Stretch Our Horizons
The Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower advocates increased international partnerships, forging of relationships, and gaining mutual trust with foreign partners. We practice it in thousands of theater-security-cooperation events, from routine port visits to foreign humanitarian assistance. This approach has become a staple of U.S. Navy peacetime operations around the globe.
In all these interactions, a culturally aware force builds rapport. To this end, the Naval Postgraduate School’s Regional Security Education Program and the Center for Information Dominance’s Center for Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture have developed training materials and programs to prepare officers and Sailors for international engagements. Yet these courses cannot—nor do they purport to try to—teach the inherent advantage that the Navy’s diverse Sailor affords.
Internationalism in Today’s Navy
A typical day for an officer fluent in French on board a ship in homeport may look something like this:
• When embarking, the officer is saluted by the petty officer of the watch, a first-generation American with roots in Guyana.
• The officer then holds quarters with the division, which includes Sailors whose parents are from the Philippines, Nigeria, and India.
• Finally, the officer reviews evaluations with the chief petty officer, a naturalized citizen from Panama.
Clearly the U.S. Navy can boast of an extremely diverse force. And the force’s activities range across the globe. On any given day, a scan of Navy Web sites—from the official site to those of the numbered Fleets—might reveal the following:
• The USNS Comfort (T-AH 20) conducts a humanitarian and civic-assistance visit to Georgetown, Guyana.
• An amphibious ready group conducts exercises with the Philippines Navy.
• Navy Expeditionary Combat Command security squadrons work with Nigerian port security during an Africa Partnership Station mission.
• Commander, Seventh Fleet conducts high-level visits with counterparts in India and Japan.
In each of these events, American Sailors can leverage their inherent expertise to uniquely contribute to the mission. The opportunities abound for Sailors to participate in these engagements. During port visits and theater-security-cooperation events, local news reports tend to spotlight Sailors of the country’s ethnic background. During a recent annual Thailand-U.S. Cobra Gold exercise, a second-generation Thai-American information-technology second-class petty officer accompanied a Navy admiral to serve as her translator. Upon arrival in Thailand, the local newspaper interviewed the petty officer, who also appeared on television news. A Thai admiral praised her for professionalism and contributions to the mission.
Without question, her presence and role extended the visibility of Thai-U.S. cooperation, contributed to a positive perception of the U.S. Navy in Thailand, and provided a level of capability to the security-cooperation mission that cannot be matched by training in cultural awareness alone. If this seems rather unspectacular, how many other navies on the planet could field this same capability in several dozen countries around the world simultaneously?
Working Together for the Globe
The sight of U.S. Sailors rendering aid or training to their countries of ethnic origin is powerful. It is not a coincidence that after the 2010 Haitian earthquake, most U.S. news outlets reported on Haitian-American servicemen and women who helped with relief. The American public learns of such stories and responds with wide approval. Moreover, these Sailors showcase the Navy’s tagline “A Global Force for Good.”
Currently there is no concerted Navy effort to deliberately use our ethnic diversity advantage in terms of “Sailor country of origin” in support of the maritime strategy and theater-security-cooperation events. Sailors native to a particular country who provide support to engagement in that country are included in the mission largely by happenstance. For example, before a port call or humanitarian assistance effort, it is common on Navy ships to hear an announcement asking that all Sailors native to the visited country identify themselves.
Recognize Our Strength
At the 2009 National Naval Officers Association conference, a Navy lieutenant who was a native of Cameroon expressed frustration that she had not been able to participate in the USS Nashville’s (LPD-13) visit to Cameroon months earlier, during the Africa Partnership Station mission. She rightly felt that she had a unique contribution to make to the Navy’s operations and the nation’s objectives—but it was not being tapped. So how does the service capitalize on this strength?
The first thing to do is to recognize our ethnic diversity as an asset. Then we need to maintain a record of the ethnicities of first- and second-generation American Sailors who have language proficiency and cultural familiarity, as well as a separate listing of those who may not be native, but are fluent in another language and familiar with the culture. Steps toward this end are already in motion through the efforts of the Chief of Naval Operations’ Navy Foreign Language Office (N13F) and Directorate for International Engagement (N52). Having an accurate database of diversity specifics allows for better decision-making beyond Sailors’ rates as they progress in their careers.
The Navy must also devise a method to make use of these Sailors, who will undoubtedly volunteer for duty related to their countries of origin more often than not. But this duty cannot detract from their service community or rate. Further, it must be done without unduly creating gaps in their current command’s manning. One way of overcoming this problem could be temporary assigned duty for short periods during down times of operations at their home commands.
For example, a Sailor native to Trinidad serves as an operations specialist on board a ship that is undergoing an extended maintenance period. He could be sent on two-week orders to another ship visiting Trinidad as part of a Continuing Promise mission. This would provide a valuable resource to the gaining command and enhance the Sailor’s contribution to the Navy mission—and most likely also to his morale—while detracting minimally from his home command. These should be targets of opportunity, not necessarily priorities of assignment.
Another way ahead may be to create an enlisted rating to accompany the foreign-area-officer designator. Navy foreign-area officers maintain regional expertise through education, job assignments, and engagement. Because the enlisted corps is more diverse than the officer corps, it will have a broader pool of talent from which to pull, and a reduced learning curve for native Sailors. This will facilitate rapid employment. One obvious billet for assignment outside of forward deployments is as instructors to the Center for Information Dominance Center for Language Training, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Awareness.
Proceed Deliberately
The Navy does already capitalize on its diversity, which makes for better force protection, shiphandling, medical services, and special operations. Diversity in daily business has contributed to its being the most powerful Navy on Earth. Engaging internationally to build relationships is another mission area that will benefit from a deliberate and applied use of the service’s diversity.
This strategic and tactical advantage that the Navy has over most foreign counterparts has yet to be fully realized, but the current emphasis on cultural astuteness nearly mandates the efficient use of the officers, chiefs, and Sailors who give our Navy its distinctive makeup. The maritime strategy makes the point that trust is not something that can be surged. But surely the use of a diverse force tailored to foreign engagements contributes to the gaining of trust, perhaps in much the same way as a forward-deployed force contributes to a surge through proper positioning.
Lieutenant Commander Johnson is an information-warfare officer at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Previously he served at Expeditionary Strike Group Seven.
Prioritize Cultural Instruction for the Marines
As the nation’s first line of defense and premier expeditionary force, the U.S. Marines are the first to fight or help anywhere in the world when the need arises: they are mobile, fast, and innovative. This independent force is required to carry out land and amphibious operations, for which they must also be culturally competent. Warriors must strive to understand other cultures to attain maximum operational success. This may be a challenge, but Marines must make time for cultural instruction that is relevant to their missions.
From Montezuma to Tripoli and Far Beyond
The Small Wars Manual, published in 1940, provided several lessons on operational culture, stressing the effectiveness of cultural knowledge. In the same vein, Lieutenant Colonel Earl Hancock Ellis, reporting on his trips to the Japanese islands in the early 1920s, predicted there would be a major conflict approximately 20 years before Pearl Harbor was attacked. This was possible because of his abilities to understand and absorb Japanese culture and language.
Such knowledge has always been a “must-know” for the intelligence military occupation specialties rather than for the typical warriors and their commanders, who have been more focused on other elements of the mission. But now the world has changed. Marines have learned important lessons from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Leaders have decided that the Marines must study other languages, that they must have the capacity to work with foreign cultures.
It may sound paradoxical to ask warriors with a proud, aggressive institutional culture of their own to understand other cultures. But the justification is very simple: it contributes to mission success and saves lives. The Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning at the Marine Corps Base Quantico was established in 2005; since then it has been responsible for providing the Corps with innovative approaches to bringing cultural awareness and knowledge into the operational sphere.
Learning Japanese
As a direct consequence of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. armed forces have been compelled to quickly reorient their planning processes, training, and education programs. Centers were created for this purpose, providing cultural awareness before deployment. Military leaders now encourage competence in other cultures and language training at all echelons. It is vital that we incorporate this early in the military-planning process. The U.S. military is making great strides to institutionalize such training.
The United States has a rich history of leaders who applied knowledge like this to planning and occupational duties. During World War II, on several occasions General George S. Patton used information about countries and their specific military cultures to make important decisions and/or obtain tactical advantages. For example, he was able to predict some of General Erwin Rommel’s tactics because he had read his nemesis’ writings and used knowledge about the Germans and their military to anticipate the enemy’s next move.
The savage Pacific battles between U.S. Marines and Japanese soldiers taught future generations great lessons about the intelligent application of operational culture. Navy Cross recipient Marine Private First Class Guy Gabaldon singlehandedly captured more than 1,500 prisoners during a series of missions. His prisoners were die-hard troops from the Japanese army and marine forces. Gabaldon was fluent in Japanese and culturally savvy enough to use his skills to appeal rationally to the enemy. He convinced them that if they surrendered with honor, they would be treated with dignity and the U.S. Marines would not kill them. He was careful to use the word shogun when referring to his top commander. This strong Japanese term relates directly to honor and the promise of fulfilling one’s given word. So by understanding how the enemy was going to interpret what he said, Gabaldon saved lives on both sides.
In a 1998 interview with the War Times Journal, he said: “The big job was going to be in convincing them that we would not torture and kill them—that they would be well treated and would be returned to Japan after the war. I understood that their Bushido Code called for death before surrender, and that to surrender was to be considered a coward. This was going to be a tough nut to crack” (“Guy Gabaldon: An Interview and Discussion,” http://www.wtj.com/articles/gabaldon/).
In Japanese, Gabaldon spoke to his enemies.
I am here to bring you a message from General Holland Smith, the Shogun in charge of the Marianas Operation. . . . General Smith admires your valor and has ordered our troops to offer a safe haven to all the survivors of your intrepid Gyokusai attack yesterday. Such a glorious and courageous military action will go down in history. The general assures you that you will be taken to Hawaii where you will be kept together in comfortable quarters until the end of the war. The general’s word is honorable. It is his desire that there be no more useless bloodshed.
More Lessons from Haiti
Operation Unified Response after the January 2010 Haitian earthquake is a great example of the Marine Corps’ expeditionary culture. Immediately service members were dispatched for humanitarian operations. Armed with lessons learned from working with other cultures, these Marines were more adaptable and attuned to operate in foreign environments. They were better trained and equipped than ever before to provide assistance to Haitians. Their ability to understand and work in that culture, as well as appreciating the severity of the circumstances, certainly contributed to success in the aftermath of the devastation.
Sailors and Marines of Haitian descent who spoke Creole were deployed as interpreters—this was a great plus. In The Washington Post, Michael Gerson wrote after visiting Haiti:
Where in the world did U.S. Marines learn this kind of cultural sensitivity? Lt. Col. Rob Fulford, in charge of the Carrefour operation, answers: “In Iraq and Afghanistan, where the equivalent was dealing with tribal sheiks . . . There is a maturity level inside our Marines that didn’t exist in 2003 when we invaded Iraq. A cultural awareness. An ability to leverage relationships” (“America’s Tenderhearted Legions in Haiti,” 17 February 2010).
Natural disasters pose challenges similar to those following conflicts or during insurgencies: security of the population and food sources, health issues, communications, the possibility of looting or other aggressive behaviors, logistical difficulties. It seems clear that operational culture should continue to be held in high regard everywhere U.S. forces operate. Should we need to help the Mexican government defeat that country’s current plague of powerful gangs, these skills will once again come to the fore.
Things They Don’t Tell You About Command
Congratulations, Captain. You’ve finally arrived; you’re taking over your own ship. But, despite the years to get to this point and months of training, there’s much you don’t know about commanding a warship—and you won’t find out until you’ve experienced it firsthand. The following is a partial list of things no one ever told me, complied from my own time on the bridge: 41 months in major command.
Most Dangerous Place
There are many such places around the world, depending on who’s talking. All share the same characteristics: high traffic density, constricted waters, different requirements for day and night transits. Historically they are scenes of multiple collisions and near-misses. And they have served as cemeteries for many Navy careers.
Tokyo and Hong Kong are spotty, but the worst is Singapore and its approaches. It’s a great liberty port but a bear to get to. Its maritime environment is not particularly dangerous, just absolutely unforgiving. The three times I came closest to collision were near Singapore. Heavy traffic volumes—approaching from either east or west—require that the captain be on the bridge for extended periods. He’s guaranteed at least a day and a long night without sleep before the ship is secured.
You’ll soon identify these places, and others that may not be so well known. Bottom line: take nothing for granted, be on your toes, and ensure that your best bridge team is on duty.
Most Dangerous Time
For your ship, the most dangerous time is the hour before your elite, specially selected navigation detail assumes the watch prior to entering port, and your regular bridge team is in place. You’re getting close to your ultimate destination, and traffic of all descriptions is starting to increase, especially the fishing fleet. Your handpicked navigation detail is still an hour away from assuming the watch, so the normally scheduled officer of the deck (OOD) and his team have the watch.
Since you may be going pierside in the morning hours, it’s possible that this period will be in darkness, and everything is harder in the dark. As a new commanding officer with less than one month on the job, I had a hair-raising near-miss involving a new OOD, and thereafter I always made it my business to be on the bridge during this critical time.
Your presence is required. In the worst-case scenario, you may prevent a collision or grounding. Best case: You’ll have a quiet cup of coffee or two in your bridge chair and get to watch your well-oiled underway watch team in action.
Most Dangerous Person
The most dangerous person on your ship is a newly qualified OOD. It is true that he will have completed a rigorous training program and have earned your complete confidence: he wouldn’t be there otherwise. However, when the training wheels come off and he’s alone on the bridge in the dark with all eyes on him, things may be different.
Watch this one closely. Writing an intelligent watch bill will help; it may not be the best use of talent to have your newest, most inexperienced OOD on the morning watch in the approaches to the Tokyo Wan or in the heavy Singapore traffic.
Worst Thing You Can Do
While shooting the messenger can be very satisfying on a personal level, it curtails the free exchange of information you require as the commanding officer. Do not stifle communication.
Your team won’t talk to you if they learn from hard experience that delivering unwelcome information results in an unscheduled flame spray. Examples abound: read between the lines of the 1985 USS Enterprise (CVN-65) grounding on Bishop’s Rock and you will find an exhausted captain who fits this description. The result was an aircraft carrier run aground and $16 million in damage to a national asset.
Be especially wary of that early morning phone call. No matter how tired, sleepless, and irritated you are, you must not ever fail to be professional and courteous to your OOD when he wakes you up at 0330, regardless of how stupid the question or report. Just one incidence of your butt-chewing the OOD will make him reluctant to talk to you.
Second-Worst Thing
Brief everything, and insist on following the same procedures every time: start on time, review the data, and insist on participation. If the briefing does not satisfy you, do it again. Never forget to brief and debrief every evolution.
Nothing involving the safety of your ship can be classified as routine. “Routine” is your enemy, and it’s these evolutions that will bite you. “We just did that [entered port, exited port, went alongside, anchored, conducted a pre-action aim calibration fire] yesterday, we don’t need a briefing.” Wrong!
In the 1996 USS Gonzalez (DDG-66) grounding, there had been a bad briefing, last-minute changes to the watch bill, and uncertainty regarding the captain’s intentions. The ship ran aground on a clearly marked reef, with $10 million damage to a brand new warship that could have easily been avoided.
Debrief everything. But the debrief doesn’t count if you are not part of the discussion, and if your decisions are not subject to respectful discussion. Your crew will know where that line is, your dignitas will be safe, and your crew will respect your honesty.
Do Not Follow Procedure Mindlessly
International agreements provide excellent guidelines when two ships meet while under way. The vessel to the right has the right of way and maintains course, while the one to the left yields by turning to starboard and passing astern of the “stand on” vessel, avoiding collision.
A trap for the unwary mariner is when the give-way vessel delays his turn until very late, and the stand-on vessel wrongly turns left turn at the last minute to avoid what appears to be an inevitable collision. Bad!
This aversion to turning left is almost a mania with officers of the deck. I have seen cases of ships refusing to turn left even when the rules of the road did not apply (meaning there was no danger of collision) and the situation clearly required a left turn.
At OOD boards I emphasized this point by slapping my hand on the table in time to the words: “Rule 17: Never-ever-turn-left-in-close!” Then I added: “Unless you absolutely have to.” Here’s a true war story: We were in the northbound lane of the Singapore traffic-separation scheme, en route to Yokosuka after participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom. As always near Singapore, traffic was heavy. It was dark but visibility was excellent. We could clearly see the masthead and running lights of north- and southbound traffic, stretching to the horizon in both directions.
We’d cleared the Strait of Malacca and Singapore, the situation was finally “routine,” and after 13 hours straight on the bridge, I turned it over to the navigator and OOD. I retired to my cabin for a quick break: What could go wrong now?
Then, in my cabin, I felt the ship heel as she took a sharp turn to port: highly unusual under the circumstances. When I got to the bridge I saw a huge dark shape and a green (starboard) running light passing across my bow, at what looked like 500 yards or less. A large, fully loaded container vessel in the southbound traffic-separation lane had inexplicably decided to turn 90 degrees left and pass through the northbound traffic, directly in front of us!
If the OOD had not come left we would have T-boned the crossing vessel at 25 knots, probably cutting him in half and killing people, and possibly sinking ourselves. We’d all be famous, studied by generations of marine-safety students the world over. The OOD later said my prohibition against turning left was very much on his mind—but my firm “unless you have to” gave him the nerve to do what was required. He turned left in close to prevent a collision. Obviously, I’m glad he did. So, I emphasize once again: Don’t turn left in close, unless you have to.
The Only Rules Are No Rules
In many foreign ports you will discover that local shipping traffic follows its own rules. To outsiders these appear arbitrary and dangerous. Additionally, depending on the port, local mariners may show studied indifference or even hostility to U.S. warships, sometimes going out of their way to demonstrate how really unimpressed they are with your presence in their neighborhood. The worst of these places is the inner harbor and anchorage in Hong Kong, where there are no rules. Almost as bad is around Singapore, particularly near the Horseburg Light. Being aware of these places is a great first step to ensure that your bridge team is prepared for any eventuality.
My list could continue. But you’ll develop your own: experience is a hard teacher. Thinking carefully about some of these issues might help you to avoid future, possibly career-ending, difficulties.