The Wrong Ship at the Wrong Time
(See J. Patch, pp. 16–19, January 2011 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral F. C. Pandolfe, director, Surface Warfare Division, OPNAV N86—Commander Patch’s article on the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) draws on dated information that does not accurately represent this vital program’s status or potential. Most notably:
LCS costs are stable. As a result of rigorous competition, Congress recently authorized the Navy to enter into fixed-price contracts with both LCS builders to produce ten ships of each design at an average price of $440 million.
LCS is a focused-mission ship. Each LCS mission package will come with its own expert operators to clear mines, destroy submarines, or counter surface craft. These are vital tasks that we need to accomplish in the littorals. No other ship has the speed, volume, and modularity to accommodate and employ these mission packages.
LCS designs are mature. LCS-3 and -4 are well into construction and exhibiting an exceptional degree of design stability. LCS-3 was recently launched, 80 percent complete before it entered the water. LCS-4 is more than 50 percent complete and has used less than 10 percent of its change budget.
LCS is efficient. It will replace three classes of ships, require far fewer Sailors, and generate greater forward presence. By employing rotational crewing, each LCS will operate forward approximately 50 percent of its life, as compared with 20 percent for a traditional ship.
Additionally, both LCS variants exceed the range requirement established for their missions. They are fuel-efficient on diesel engines and extraordinarily fast on gas turbines, providing peerless operational and tactical flexibility. LCS meets Naval Vessel Rules standards for damage control and stability, allowing it to operate in dangerous areas. LCS weapons and sensors, as well mission packages, are testing well. Where we have encountered difficulties, corrections are in progress.
LCS is in the Fleet now. Its mission packages will continually add new systems in the years ahead, to become ever more capable. And because it is being built with open-architecture combat systems and common interfaces to enable the insertion of future mission modules, LCS will remain mission-effective in a rapidly changing world.
The bottom line is that LCS is the right ship at the right time, and our Navy is committed to adding these exciting new vessels to our Fleet.
Senior Chief John Cataldi, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Since Commander Patch penned his article on the shortfalls of the two LCS designs, the Navy has decided to buy ten more copies of each version. So now that scrapping the program and starting over is out of the question, what should the Navy do to get the most bang for the buck with these ships? I suggest that rather than continuing to pour money into trying to make them into multi-mission platforms, the Navy should instead ditch the removable mission modules and then optimize each class of LCS into single-mission ships.
One of the LCS designs could be made into armed minesweepers to replace the mine-countermeasures ships that the Navy decommissioned not so long ago. For now, the ships could rely solely on embarked helicopters to sweep mines, while the kinks are worked out of the shipboard mine-countermeasures equipment.
The other design could be tailored to a surface-warfare mission rather inexpensively just by “bolting” on a couple of Harpoon-missile canister launchers. In the meantime, development should continue on a reliable ship-mounted surface-to-surface missile system that could attack both land and sea targets.
Both ship designs could retain their forward gun, helicopter facilities, and stern boat ramp for low-tech secondary missions.
How Are the Mighty Fallen: A Crisis in Leadership
(See K. Eyer, pp. 20–24; and N. Polmar, pp. 84–85, January 2011 Proceedings)
Thomas J. Klitgaard—The articles in Proceedings about the relief of commanding officers were very timely in light of the recent firing of Captain Owen Honors, former CO of the USS Enterprise (CVN-65). But I think that the Navy needs to go the extra step to provide a safe and timely outlet for complaints of this type of conduct. How can anyone respect the institution if it allows such things to happen? It was no secret; at least 3,000 Sailors and their families knew. Who could feel proud of their son or daughter having to serve on such a ship?
Isn’t the officer’s relief a sleight of hand? What about his captain (now an admiral) on the ship when the events occurred? Why didn’t the Navy have procedures to allow someone to complain without fear of retribution? Everyone had to know what was going on. Any person with any values must be looking on our naval command as tolerating depravity and lacking processes to address these issues. How can our culture condone such conduct, without retribution up the line to those in charge? This was more than just a case of bad judgment!
One practical solution is to have an independent civilian ombudsman to whom any Sailor or officer could voice concerns. This would have to be someone outside the Navy’s hierarchy or interest groups. Other countries, such as the Philippines and Thailand, have such arbiters in place. The ombudsman hears the complaints, makes an investigation, and then files a report. Going through the chain of command in the Navy is apparently not the answer.
Also, I think the press should make a full disclosure of all the conduct, not just a brief report in a newspaper. It should detail all that occurred, and the tapes should be played for Congress and the President.
I think that the “v” in Navy should stand for values.
Commander Darlene Iskra, U.S. Navy (Retired)—As a retired female naval officer, former shipboard Sailor, and one-time commanding officer, I have to rebut Captain Eyer’s conclusion that the Navy’s policy on women at sea is the cause of many of the firings. The assumption that “women are a problem” is just plain wrong.
Women are not on ships because of political correctness. They are there because the Navy could not crew the ships without women. It is all about the needs of the Navy.
In my experience as both a naval officer and a Ph.D. in sociology, sex appears to be the number-one thing on the minds of many men, given the comments about “distractions in the workplace.” From what I could conclude, ships that had the worst problems with harassment, pregnancy, and fraternization were those whose commanding officers did not make clear, through word and deed, that those behaviors were not to be tolerated, or did not take swift and appropriate action when needed.
Once a person gets to the top levels of leadership, especially in a shipboard environment, he or she should be held to the highest possible standards. A CO is supposed to set the standards, live the standards, and be a positive example to the crew. To blame policy for the moral ineptitude of the commanders who have been fired is just plain wrong.
Perhaps part of the reason for shipboard reliefs may also have to do with senior leaders’ fears for their own careers. They appear to deal with any perception of inappropriate behavior by firing first and asking questions later. An investigation should be swift and sure, and include input from both the accused and the accuser. I think this happens less often than we realize. Once a CO is taken from the ship, there is no going back.
As a retiree, I have to ask this question: Are the fraternization policies too strict? Shipboard romance is going to happen. That does not mean that the Navy is condoning a “love boat” mentality. While I was on active duty, this was dealt with by transferring one of the parties to another command, without repercussion. It can and does cause issues with personnel replacement, but isn’t that better than causing a whole ship turmoil by having its CO or XO relieved for cause?
I believe the firings occurred for a number of reasons, some outlined above, but it is not because of women at sea.
Captain Pat Gormley, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, U.S. Navy (Retired)—president, Alliance for National Defense—For Captain Eyer to reduce the cause of CO firings to the Navy’s women-at-sea policy is ludicrous. In 1978, the Navy could not have fully manned all of its ships without the women-at-sea program, as it could not currently. How would such a personnel shortfall impact the effectiveness of the Navy?
Any lack of leadership support for Navy personnel policies, particularly toward women, leads to problems with morale, motivation, and retention for both men and women, and therefore directly impacts military effectiveness.
One might agree with Captain Eyer’s early speculation regarding the cause of a less-ready Fleet: elimination of the Surface Warfare Officer Basic Course (geared toward newly commissioned ensigns), the “gutting of the inspection cycle,” or decisions regarding the long-term maintenance cycle. Reduced deployment cycles and increased operational tempo, the newer policy of “fleeting up” from the XO to the CO position, without an appreciable break—these are more likely causes of mistake-making and leadership fatigue than the presence of women at sea.
The Navy’s history of condoning sexual misconduct by deployed Sailors on shore leave could have an impact on today’s male Sailors’ and officers’ views toward women as sex objects rather than as professional colleagues.
But it is worth noting that there are 287 ships in the Navy, needing 287 (or more, depending on change-of-command cycle) commanding officers for those ships. Yet only six of 287 were fired in 2010. How is that a crisis? Less than 2 percent of shipboard CO firings means that 98 percent of Fleet commanding officers are doing their jobs, and doing them with women on board (at least those in the surface fleet).
Any, all, or none of these circumstances could contribute to a ship’s CO being relieved for cause. Yet the main tack Captain Eyer chose to take was essentially blaming the existence of mixed-gender crews for the poor decisions made by a hapless commanding officer. This is a travesty toward the women in the Navy who are doing their jobs and doing them well, and to the men in the Navy who view their female colleagues as part of a winning team.
Nothing is gained by rehashing old arguments, bringing up outdated attitudes, and reducing the morale and motivation of a substantial percentage of naval personnel. That rhetoric is what decreases military effectiveness, not the Navy’s 33-year-old women-at-sea policy.
Captain Raymond J. Brown, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired)—Captain Eyer’s comment that casual observers suppose that mixed crews will not have fraternization problems actually is not limited to only casual observers. Of course Sailors do not avert their gazes, and they never will. But with respect to crewing ships, policymakers have long done just that and ignored a blatant reality. Bromides abound.
The only tour I served in a mixed ship’s company was as executive officer, with 190 male and 10 female sailors. There were problems, though relatively few as the CO and I were clear in our standards and swift to follow through on any infractions affecting good order and discipline. Shortly after I completed my XO tour, an officer in personnel at headquarters gave me a call about being a member of a promotion board. In an aside he mentioned, “You must have been doing something right.”
I asked what he meant, and the response was that I was the only XO of a Hamilton-class cutter in the preceding two years who had not had to deal with an indecorous scandal of a sexual nature. The shame of that observation is that the associated disgraceful incidents become such a diversion of time and energy from the real mission—and a soap opera for the ship’s company. But even postulating that mixed crews afloat might not be a great idea was known to be a career killer.
In some ways, it all reminds me of the destructive drug culture that permeated the armed forces during and after the Vietnam War. The difference is that we eventually faced up to reality and did something about that.
Command Performance
(See W. Parker and C. O’Connor, pp. 30–35, January 2011 Proceedings)
Gerhardt Thamm—Bravo Zulu to Captains Parker and O’Connor. Their article should be turned into a booklet that should be in every ship’s library. It should be required reading for every naval officer and Sailor. It also is a reminder that being the captain of a ship is not always easy sledding, and that not everyone is suited for command.
‘Down to the Seas’
(See S. N. Kumar, pp. 18–23, December 2010 Proceedings)
Commander David J. Grover, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)—Captain Kumar has made a useful contribution to maritime history in showing how the changing globalization of merchant shipping has created a different and often alien culture for those men and women who pursue careers in that industry. It’s good to see that the concept of mismatched culture finally gets attention from maritime historians in trying to understand why some officers and ships have not become the efficient and harmonious fit they were expected to be.
Since World War II the ups and downs of the shipping industry have made it difficult for officers looking for jobs at sea. With the federal and state academies turning out 600–700 new graduates a year for a fleet of little more than 200 deep-draft ships, some job-seekers have been forced to sail on foreign-flag ships where the culture is admittedly different. Now, with the changes to a global maritime economy that Kumar describes, it’s clear that many American mariners looking for jobs must be prepared for culture shock in taking that route.
It can happen even on American ships. Late in my on-again, off-again career at sea I flew to Scotland to take command of an American-flag oil-industry supply vessel. It would have been my first command, but when I found that the crew of about 14 men was made up of citizens of seven different countries, I declined the post, and flew home. I sensed that more than the loneliness of command was involved; I felt somewhat akin to a captain out of a Joseph Conrad novel, not at all sure of the loyalty of his crew or of his own judgment in undertaking the assignment.
Years later, in writing maritime history, I came across the distressing case of U.S. Merchant Marine cadets who were assigned to foreign-flag ships in World War II. There they served, and in some cases died, without contact with American officers and unnoticed by either the bureaucrats who sent them there or the historians who should have detected their isolation. Thus, we were abetting cultural isolation of impressionable young mariners at an early time, but simply turned our backs on it all.
Now that our merchant fleet is so small, let’s address the needs of American seafarers who must compete for jobs on a global basis. If we don’t, there may not be a pool of such officers available when they are needed in the future on our own ships.
Tonkin: Setting the Record Straight
(See L. R. Vasey, pp. 66–71, August 2010; and R. R. McDonald, D. M. Showers, and C. E. McDowell, pp. 81–82, January 2011; and L. R. Vasey, p. 85, February 2011 Proceedings)
Admiral Thomas Hayward, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Chief of Naval Operations, 1978–1982—So, Rear Admiral McDowell tries to cut off the thoroughly researched, lucid report of Rear Admiral Vasey designed to give us another on-scene, professional analysis of the Tonkin Gulf situation on the night of 4 August 1964 with the proclamation, “Case closed.” To which I respond, “Bull.”
Rear Admirals Showers and McDowell alike offer subjective views of uncertain observations, or more precisely, the absence of one particular kind of proof (signals intelligence) becomes the reason for doubt. All three critics, including Captain McDonald, reply to the article by Rear Admiral Vasey without commenting on the substance of the arguments presented in it.
Readers of Proceedings should re-read Rear Admiral Vasey’s story. It comes from one who was on-scene, a highly respected “Sailor of Sailors,” supported by more than adequate visual and radar confirmation that the attack on the night of 4 August 1964 was real, was seen, and was experienced by a considerable majority of those in positions of responsibility to observe.
To those who would fall back on the testimony of the airborne observers that they saw nothing, and therefore nothing happened, let me proclaim that as an old F8U fighter pilot with more than adequate night-flying experience, the odds of even the sharpest eagle-eye reliably seeing what was transpiring on the surface of the sea while cruising at 700–1,500 feet under a solid overcast sky on a black night are nil. There is no basis whatsoever for arriving at the conclusions, which too many wish to portray, that we really entered the battle against North Vietnam under faulty pretense.