Braced for the Next Response
(See J. DiRenzo III and J. Hull, pp. 28–33, August 2010 Proceedings)
William Thayer—It is very appropriate to discuss the lessons learned from the BP oil spill and response. Hopefully, this is the first of several articles, for while the authors discuss the organizational response and available resources, they do not discuss the technical response, which was critical. Here are some thoughts:
Managerial Failure. The crucial issue was to stop the leak at the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico. When BP finally installed its cap and plugged the leak, the problem ceased getting bigger and started to be resolved. If the problem was at the bottom of the gulf, then it was a managerial failure to put the Coast Guard, a surface force, in charge of the entire operation. What the United States should have done is have the Coast Guard in charge of surface operations and our best resource in charge of the seafloor operations. That resource is the undersea U.S. Navy and its associated elements, which were completely left out.
Perhaps one of the most dramatic examples of U.S. undersea capability was Project Jennifer (See Norman Polmar’s Project Azorian: The CIA and the Raising of the K-129, forthcoming from the Naval Institute Press). Basically, the CIA (an associated element) picked up part of a Russian sub from more than 15,000 feet below the surface of the ocean—a task slightly more difficult than plugging a leak at 5,000 feet. Furthermore, this was done nearly 40 years ago. None of these resources was used. A fateful decision was made to delegate the technical response to BP alone.
The Technical Solution. There might be many ways to have solved the BP leak problem. What worked was a cap. One counter-argument was that if the well were capped, the pressure of the well would cause the rocks to crack, and the result would be many oil geysers sprouting up from the gulf floor. Rubbish. First, it didn’t happen. Second, if this were the case then the whole concept of a shutoff valve would be invalid in the first place. What BP did endlessly was try to siphon off the oil. Next time a leak occurs, cap it!
The bottom line is this: If such a deep-sea disaster happens again, do not delegate the technical response to the oil company alone. Use all of our national resources, especially including the undersea Navy, CIA, and associated elements.
The Platinum Coast Guard
(See R. Bollinger, pp. 41–44, August 2010 Proceedings)
Master Chief Gunner’s Mate William R. Wells II, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired)—Not having been intimately involved in the Coast Guard’s small-arms training program in a couple of decades, I have to ask what has occurred to produce “Officer Friendly.” The Use of Force policy is virtually the same it was in the mid-1970s. Deadly-force rules have not evolved into “maybe” instructions. No commandant would tolerate an unwarranted shooting incident; however, what is warranted may occupy a very large gray area. If there has been a change, then it is in the philosophy of instruction. But in the past, to use Master Chief Boatswain’s Mate Bollinger’s cliché, the Coast Guard has never been bashful about “dropping the hammer” when, or when not, needed.
By the time of the August 1927 CG-249 incident, the Coast Guard and Treasury Department had already been involved in 15 shooting fatalities. In 1929, two Coast Guardsmen shot and killed Niagara resident (and suspected smuggler) Jacob Hanson. The two Coast Guardsmen were later cleared of manslaughter charges, but the shooting did prompt a congressional investigation. Then there was the infamous 1929 I’m Alone case that remains a point of contention between the United States and Canada. What has changed in the Coast Guard since Prohibition enforcement is a cultural shift caused more by the service’s involvement in the Vietnam War than by an unwillingness to give a citizen a case of “lead poisoning.” The CG-249 case provides no example of weapon use. But it does provide an example of incorrect arrest procedures and the lack of prisoner, or detainee, control.
The author did err in his comment that the hanging of smuggler Horace Alderman was “the first and only time the service hanged a man.” The execution did take place at the Coast Guard Base at Fort Lauderdale, but over the Coast Guard’s objections. The location was the Coast Guard’s only involvement. Anyway, this was not the first execution to take place at a service unit. That came by order of President James Monroe on 25 May 1820, when two officers of the piratical schooner Le Brave were hanged for piracy on board the revenue cutter Louisiana; this was the first and only instance of direct service involvement in executions.
We hope the Coast Guard is not training the “bad cop” side. If it did, then it would be doing a disservice to its members and the nation. The aggressive side of training is just as integral a part of training as the less aggressive. Aggression and killing are part of the training package. Every Coast Guardsman should know of that possibility, which is why the Use of Force policies are in place. They do not teach judgment, but give tools to the individual on which to base judgments. In other words, it is philosophical and psychological training.
The cultural shift is evident in the Eric Smith cartoon on page 7 in the August issue. It shows the Coast Guard attempting to juggle all its missions—and the only ball missing is the military mission.
A Coast Guard in Distress
(See Z. Warrender, p. 8, August 2010 Proceedings)
Charles Warren, U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary—Unfortunately, some of the budget increases for the Coast Guard since 9/11 have gone to improved or expanded office space. The Regional Examination Center (for processing merchant maritime documents and licenses) moved from a perfectly functional World War II–era building on Coast Guard Island in Alameda, California, to a very pretty and expensive space in the Ronald V. Dellums Federal Building in downtown Oakland. This year, I see that Coast Guard is getting a nice new building in Washington, D.C. I wonder how much of this has to do with promoting the feasibility or construction of office buildings, which, last time I checked, is not a core mission of the Coast Guard.
What Really Happened at Wanat
(See K. Ross, pp. 38–45, July 2010 Proceedings)
Dr. Griffin T. Murphey—Kudos to Kirk Ross for his scholarly article. As a competitive rifle shooter with 45 years’ experience with the M1, M14, M16, and civilian clones, it really surprised me to learn that the M4 is guaranteed to fail after 540 rounds of full-auto fire. According to this article, an M4 failed at Wanat after 12 magazines (360 rounds) were expended over a 30-minute period. That’s really only 12 rounds per minute, about the rate of fire in NRA high-power rifle rapid-fire competition. Shocking.
Several points come to mind. I remember reading that even the veteran M1 rifles “burned up” repelling the human-wave attacks in Korea. Having never used a rifle in combat myself, it nevertheless occurs to me to quote the old saying: “Fifty misses a minute is not firepower. One hit is firepower.” It must be a terrible temptation, when one is under heavy full-auto fire, to return high volumes of suppressive fire without careful aim. Inevitably, although the men at Wanat were combat veterans, the question of fire discipline and marksmanship training arises.
Having seen the NBC Dateline presentation on Wanat, I think possibly an even bigger question is the placement of a combat outpost in the bottom of a valley, where it was guaranteed to be exposed to plunging fire. As an Army ROTC graduate, I was taught to defend the military crest of a hill. The location at Wanat was militarily unsound yet was ordered by higher authority, although the unit commander did not agree with it. NBC aired several video clips in which the men of Chosen Few Company were seen before the battle pointing out the higher ground, enemy avenues of approach, and predicting they were going to be hit.
Additionally, it is my understanding that there was a wait-time of one hour before Apache gunships arrived, and there was no Predator drone coverage. There were many other factors that led to this debacle beyond problems with the M4.
Colonel Don Weiss, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired)—Mr. Ross’ obviously detailed research deserves revisiting with more clarity. I hope that he does that.
The article’s opening photo is captioned with the claim that “leadership failure was a more likely cause” (than weapon stoppages of the M4 carbine). That assertion is neglected until a reference to the involved company commander’s receipt of a “career-ending reprimand” in the next-to-last paragraph of the article. Reference the opening caption, what “failures in leadership”?
The opening section’s historical information and anecdotal evidence seem to support the idea that weapon stoppages were a potential contributor to the losses at Wanat. The tone of the article notwithstanding, nowhere is there a discounting or diminution of this contrary contribution to the opening premise.
Discussion of a Center for Naval Analyses study plays numbers with which one might take issue: “Of these respondents,” (917 who carried the M4 on their last deployment, or 35 percent of 2,607 total Soldiers) “173, some 19 percent, reported they had experienced a weapon stoppage during an engagement.” The discussion then goes on to apply that number to the presumable total low/high number of engagements reported in the study, reaching the low percentage of occurrence of stoppages of 6.75 to 2.37. More apropos would be to use the fraction of total engagements reported comparable to the fraction of Soldiers on whose M4 experiences the analysis is based. The answer should be approximately three times that given, or 19.5 to 7.11 percent. This disparity completely changes the argument’s tone, or the numbers suggest a better explanation.
The article’s midsection treatment of automatic weapons begs for an article on requirements, requirements-creep, and requirements-response in our acquisition system. It does not otherwise contribute to the article’s opening premise.
A post-midsection discourse on the dangers of rebuilt weapons or improper cleaning habits is lost as a relevant contributor to the article. Is there some evidence it was a factor at Wanat?
The section on dust tests is not clear in relation to weapon defects. What selectivity was used by the contractor in conducting its own test to refute the Army’s results? The contractor “states that ATEC’s testers were unfamiliar with the M4’s 3-round burst configuration which, depending on the position of the cam, will sometimes fire 1 round or a 2-round burst before firing a 3-round burst.” How did a defect like this enter service? Did Operational Test and Evaluation find it and let it go? Why? Now, instead of a defect, it’s an excuse for poor performance. Here’s another bid for a follow-on acquisition-system article.
My compliments to Mr. Ross. His article lays out a great deal of information demonstrating significant research and hard work. The subject, however, deserved a better focus. The opening premise that leadership failure played an important role is unsupported, as are implications that M4 weapon stoppages were not attributable to the weapon. Additionally, several implications regarding the acquisition system deserve their own special treatment.
Book Review: Red November
(See N. Polmar, pp. 72–73, June 2010; and T. A. Brooks, et al., p. 84, August 2010 Proceedings)
Norman Polmar—I am flattered that several naval officers took the time to read and comment on my brief review of Craig Reed’s book Red November and that they agree with me that they are reluctant to appear to lend credence to it as a “historical work.” But that is exactly the way Mr. Reed and his publisher have “sold” the book.
Further, I am confused by their characterization of the massive errors in the book—averaging one per page—as “errors of detail.”
Do these officers accept or believe that:
The senior (Ensign) Reed personally briefed President Kennedy on COMINT (pp. 135–136)? (His name does not appear in the White House admittance log or on the President’s briefing list.)
That the Soviet Navy—through intercepts using a “stolen” KW-7—knew that the submarine K-129 was being trailed by a U.S. submarine and “armed with that knowledge, the K-129 would have gone deep.” (p. 207)?
That the U.S. submarine Swordfish (SSN-579) “limped” into Yokosuka—observed by a Soviet spy ship (p. 209)? (The Japanese press observed her arrival and ran a photograph showing no damage to the sub except for a bent periscope.)
That U.S. Navy intercept stations intercepted the K-129’s (several) radio transmissions and SOSUS heard her snorkeling more than once? And that SOSUS recorded the “bang” that sank the K-129 (pp. 211–212)?
That in May 1968 SOSUS detected a Soviet submarine trailing the USS Scorpion (SSN-589) and recorded both the Soviet sub’s torpedo launch and the torpedo striking the U.S. sub (pp. 213–214)?
That the barge HMB-1—weighing almost 11,000 tons—was carried to sea by the salvage ship Hughes Glomar Explorer and lowered to 16,000 feet to recover the sunken submarine K-129 (p. 224)? (During the salvage operation, the HMB-1 could easily be seen moored at Redwood City, California.)
The list continues. Did those who signed the comment to Proceedings actually believe that these were “errors of detail?” Or was their comment part of a U.S. naval intelligence “disinformation” effort to confuse past and present enemies?
I will close with the statement made by the most senior officer who signed the commentary: “I can only say that your rather negative review was too charitable. It is one of the sloppiest books I have ever read. Full of mistakes of facts . . ., uncorroborated sea-stories, and out-and-out BS.”
Lee J. Mathers—While it may be a trivial exercise of memory for these gentlemen to separate facts from fiction in Red November, the uninformed public is faced with a book that mixes both in an undifferentiated mangle, which is represented to be factual history. Unable to sort out fact from error or exaggeration, and lacking a background of naval service and intelligence leadership in key positions within the government, the general public by default takes Red November as represented—as history.
It is common for intelligence professionals to direct the public’s attention away from ongoing operations to maintain the value derived from such operations. It is uncommon, however, indeed frowned upon, for U.S. officials to use disinformation (i.e., lying to the public), rather than just retreat behind “no comment” when the public seeks information on sensitive operations. Allowing the public to gain a trust in Red November as a source for an accurate appreciation of U.S.-Soviet Cold War submarine-intelligence confrontations and exploits comes perilously close to confounding the public by disinformation.
The prevalence and frequency of error and exaggeration in Red November is such as to deny it any respect as a historical rendering, and leaves it suspended between memoir and sea-story. These memoirs and sea-stories may highlight valor and professionalism displayed during the Cold War, but the book Red November should not be endorsed as a historical document lest we misrepresent recent naval history and further confuse a public already poorly served by a press uninterested in naval-intelligence matters, and by the general reticence of the government to declassify 40-year-old Cold War intelligence history.
[Editor’s note: The author is a former U.S. Navy intelligence officer.]
Taking Sides: Repealing ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’
(See D. Goldich, “Don’t Use the Military as a Social Laboratory,” and A. Webb, “Why Make Lying a Prerequisite for Service?” pp. 66–67, July 2010; and C. Whipps and R. J. Brown, p. 82, August 2010 Proceedings)
Senior Chief Cryptologic Technician Daniel Moore, U.S. Navy—Both Mr. Goldich and Mr. Webb make compelling arguments for and against repealing “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” yet both fall short of actually making a convincing argument either way. Mr. Goldich trots out several tired arguments against repeal, but ultimately relies on the idea that the military should not be used as a proving ground for social experimentation. Mr. Webb’s arguments are no more valid simply because they are based entirely on emotional appeals for change and supposed “fairness.”
To answer Mr. Goldich, the military has always been used as a social laboratory. As Mr. Webb points out, many of the arguments against integration of women and African-Americans in the military services were based on the idea that the military is not the place for social experimentation. Those arguments were just as specious then as they are now when applied to the ban on gays serving openly. Militaries are, and should be, reflections of the society they serve. Like it or not, the homosexual community is a segment of our society from which patriotic citizens will rise to defend their country. Denying them that opportunity because of a mistaken belief that the military is not the place for social experimentation violates one of the principles on which this country was founded: the right to stand up and defend it from its enemies.
Mr. Webb’s arguments advocating change for change’s sake may play well in the civilian world, but fall short when applied to situations where lives depend on trusting the other Soldier, Sailor, Airman, or Marine fighting next to you. In fact, Mr. Webb’s use of Colonel Prakash’s quote to dismiss the “unit-cohesion argument” actually supports Mr. Goldich’s argument that there is simply not enough hard data to make an informed decision on the repeal of DADT. I agree with Mr. Webb that there is nothing inherent in the homosexual psyche that would preclude them, as a group, from military service. But trust is the lynchpin of any organization, especially the military, and this paucity of statistical data on how the repeal of DADT would affect unit cohesion and readiness is direct evidence that more study is needed before any decision is made.
Arguing for repeal of DADT using emotional pleas isn’t in the best interest of the military, the homosexual community, or the nation. Unfortunately, neither is making the case against repeal by arguing that the military isn’t the place for social experimentation. The United States is one huge social experiment that has been going on for over 234 years. The U.S. military always has been and always will be a part of that experiment.
Colonel John C. McKay, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)—It is refreshing that Proceedings, reputedly conservative, can discuss this issue with welcome candor. I do have some observations, however, concerning elements of both authors’ arguments. Mr. Goldich and Mr. Webb have made salient points concerning a policy that transcends those of the integration of African-Americans and women (not fully thus far) into the U.S. armed forces: repealing “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”
Mr. Goldich is holding up a red herring by invoking an individual in a position of authority using his or her position to extract homosexual favors from subordinates. As with heterosexual favors similarly solicited or obtained, the Unified Code of Military Justice provides ample corrective recourse. Mr. Goldich rightly points out that the attitudes of enlisted women and men should be taken into account. Whether the methodology being used on the latter is appropriate is not the point; it is being done. Moreover, he is remiss in dismissing out-of-hand other countries’ and militaries’ experience in this arena. The tenets of success on the battlefield and the high seas are universal. The experience of the Israeli Defense Force, the French Foreign Legion, the Royal Marines, and the Netherlands Royal Marines, to name just a few, cannot be summarily imputed because of “vastly different military responsibilities and natural character.” What about the military prowess of Sparta? See, among others, Kenneth James Dover, Greek Homosexuality (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1989).
Of the two major social changes in the U.S. military services since World War II, distress over the ongoing full integration of women into the armed forces comes closest to the current debate. The unspoken acknowledgment that increased interactions between the sexes would entail more than just professional camaraderie was, and is, perceived as an issue. To date, this has not proved to be the case, though initially there were certainly some headline-grabbing accounts sensationally bantered about. The recent excursions into Iraq and Afghanistan have all but debunked these concerns; women have performed with distinction without the imagined disruptions to good order and discipline.
Mr. Webb errs on the side of omission. He correctly introduces the “ick” factor, but does not expand on it. Personal experience in commanding infantry units from the platoon to a joint task force in peace and war has shown me that the “ick” factor goes beyond knowing of the presence of gays in the ranks. It is constituted of imagining (particularly among men) the intimate interactions ascribed to gay men, while consensually engaging in many of the very same practices with a heterosexual partner. The latter is all well and fine while the former is “icky.” Further, in accordance with Mr. Webb’s observation, experience has likewise demonstrated that this is less an issue among women in the services.
Jettison the shibboleths, allow reason to dominate emotion, and follow the principled lead of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen: Repeal “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” Our nation and our military will gain enormously from doing so.
Captain Roland A. Bowling, U.S. Navy (Retired)—According to Mr. Webb, quoting U.S. Air Force Colonel Prakash, the unit-cohesion argument is no longer valid since it “is not supported by any scientific studies.” That may be, but appearing under oath before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Norman Schwarzkopf (former Desert Storm commanding general) testified that “in my years of service, I have experienced the fact that the introduction of open homosexuality into a small unit immediately polarizes the unit and destroys the very bonding that is so important for the unit’s survival in time of war . . . . in every case [he was] familiar with . . . whenever it became known in a unit that someone was openly homosexual, polarization occurred, violence sometimes followed, morale broke down, and unit effectiveness suffered.”
As for the “ick” factor, “Get[ting] over it” is a trite solution to legitimate concerns, as pointed out by General Colin Powell (former Army Chief of Staff and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) appearing before the same committee. He testified that “the presence of open homosexuality . . . is very difficult in a military setting, where you don’t get a choice where you live, to introduce a group of individuals . . . who favor a homosexual life style . . . I think, that it is a very difficult problem to give the military.”
The Senate Armed Services Committee held nine days of hearings and heard from almost 50 witness and the House Armed Services Committee held five days of hearings before enacting the current law (Sect. 654, Title 10, U.S.C.) allowing homosexuals to serve in the armed services, but not openly. Given the potential for unintended adverse consequences, repealing DADT should have the equivalent open hearings as when it was adopted. The members of the armed services and their families, whom repealing will directly affect in both their professional and social lives, and the public deserve it—not a precipitous political abrogation.