The Gulf of Tonkin incident of 1964 remains as divisive a topic as the Vietnam War itself. But according to the author, despite the current conventional wisdom, the second attack did occur.
Shortly after the August 1964 Gulf of Tonkin episode that drew the United States deeper into the Vietnam War, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara sent two civilian officials to the U.S. Naval Base at Subic Bay, Philippines, to conduct an inquiry into...
Intercepts From Haiphong by CTs at NAVCOMMSTAPHIL
I was a CTM3 stationed at NAVCOMMSTAPHIL until 24 August, 1964, working at the Receiver Site. The usual course of my duties put me all over the CT spaces. After one attack (probably the first, see below), I chanced to be in our small branch Comm Center and I read part of a Secret Codeword message on a TTY printer. I believe it was either from COMNAVSECGRU or DIRNSA. It's been too long.
It congratulated the NAVSECGRU people at NAVCOMMSTAPHIL for having provided the Maddox and the Turner Joy with approximately eight hours warning of the impending attack(s). Our COMINT operators had made a key communications intercept that had been duly reported. I believe that the Maddox and Turner Joy were ready for those boats. DIRNSA and COMNAVSECGRU did not BS us in Secret Codeword messages.
Within the message there was a bit of advice appended which made me smile then and now. I paraphrase it thus, "If such important information is subsequently intercepted, do not hesitate to send a CRITIC message."
The joke, you see, is that NAVCOMMSTAPHIL had not used the fastest possible delivery system to report the intercepts, the CRITIC Bypass, which bypassed the manual torn-tape relay at each CommSta and seized the best channel to the Pentagon, White House and DIRNSA. Thus, the message probably took many minutes to reach the East Coast, rather than a few seconds -- and it didn't set off any alarms, like a CRITIC would have.
You can see some declassified messages with the word CRITIC across the top multiple times. Each time the message hit another station, one XCRITIC disappeared, because it didn't seize the bypass until that one entire word had already been received. SOP was to have a prepared paper tape that started with a lot of the word XCRITIC, nine, I thiink.
I was in the main Comm Center once when the CRITIC alarm went off. Everybody froze in place until they identified which circuit had the CRITIC on it and waited for it to finish. (I won't explain my varying use of CRITIC and XCRITIC; this is already a bit long.)
John M. SCPO, Ret.
The truth
I was the Officer of the Deck when CIC called and reported contacts to our north east closing on an intercept course at high speed. i immediated call Captain Barnhart to the bridge from his sea cabin. He and I both looked at the rdar, agreed with CIC , and the Coptain orderedf me tpo send the ship to General Quarters. I did so, with the caveat "This is not a drill" The GQ OOD relieved me with in two minutes and I went to my GQ station as the DCA.
We sayed at sea, as I recall, for 47 more days - 58 in total. Why???? I think the poliicians wanted to keep is away feom the press. They were micro managaging the war (e.g target selection), and I know who is responsible for the death of my three USNA roommates nd 50,000 plus brave Americans - One was from Texas and the other though he ws he smartest guy in the world.
jEFF NISS
TURNER JOY, JULY 1963-DEC 1965
Mote to come when the anger subsides.
Snapshots of life
There are particular moments in ones life that will never be forgotten or disappear.
One of mine, is when my Radar Chief poked me in the side with his elbow and said, "Watch this!". As I looked toward his radar repeater, I saw a contact (about the size of a dime) which he had been tracking with his grease pencil. In the next few moments our gun fired shaking our ship.
Both my Chief and I observed the target being engulfed and within a couple of sweeps the "ocean bloom" water spray cleared and we observed the target breaking up and eventfully disappearing. James RD3, 4 August 1964, USS Turner Joy DD951
A Much Appreciated Article
Having been at GQ in Turner Joy's CIC on 4 August 1964 (I was the TJ's EMO at the time), I appreciate the sanity and perspective your article brings to the discussion of the Tonkin Gulf Incident. It's a much needed historical corrective. While I'm not willing to speculate on whether an author who has written on the subject has had an agenda, much of the literature I've read is flawed by what appear to be faulty assumptions and conclusions reached not on the merits of the primary source evidence itself, but rather because of the way such evidence, particularly the intelligence intercepts, was manipulated for political or other reasons. In other words, most of the writers I've read have had difficulty in separating the event from the effects of subsequent actions taken by policymakers.
One of the flaws of the Hanyok article that's viewed as "conclusive" is that it relies in part on a September 1964 NSA assessment--that North Vietnamese tracking of the DESOTO Patrol was "sporadic" on 4 August--that neither makes military sense given the post-2 August situation in the gulf nor conforms to the tight North Vietnamese command-control-intelligence profile the correlation of SIGINT with the actions of 2 August established for the intelligence teams. The Hanyok article exhibits additional problems, some of which you've alluded to, that render reliance on SIGINT as a determinant or validator of what did or didn't happen the night of 4 August questionable.
In any event, thanks for shedding much-needed light on a subject that for too long has been the victim of conventional "wisdom." Jim Treanor
Tonkin Gulf
I was the CIC Officer on the Maddox during that incident and was positioned only a few feet from Commodore Herrick during the entire 4 August battle. I can certainly endorse your comments on the manipulation of sources. I would go a step further and say that in a number of the instances of manipulation can be proved. I have researched the incident for years (not months) and developed reasonable proof of the torpedo sighing by the one officer and two enlisted men on the Turner Joy. Recently I inadvertently stumbled across a likely proof of the visual sightings, but I need some help. In studying the DRT record of the battle I had it appears the visual sightings from the Turner Joy were recorded in real time using standard CIC procedure but were instead recorded later, perhaps after interviewing the personnel who made the visual sightings. In one visual sighting the times noted on the track indicate an initial contact speed of 65 knots. Clearly impossible. But if the noted times were assumed after the fact I will give me the flexibility I need to prove the visual sightings were real. I believe the way ahead is cooperation amongst those of us who were there. Dale R. Evans
Tonkin Gulf
Dale, I can't answer your specific question regarding the visual sightings track, and I don't know if this will be helpful, but for what it's worth I've critiqued the major historical "no-attack" interpretations at http://jimtranr.com/Whats_Wrong_with_Tonkin_Gulf_Incident_History.html.
If you have any comments, you can reach me at jimtreanor@jimtranr.com.
Jim Treanor
Tonkin Gulf
This really for Jim, but also for James RD3 who posted below you. I believe Moise and Hanyok meant well but if you don't know the Navy first hand you will not be able to sort out the contradictory stories, or know when somebody if giving you a line of bull. I was more frustrated with Marolda & Fitzgerald who published their book in 1986. Maybe that was just personal because they gave my CIC job to another guy and either through him or some other party made a number serious errors. Anyway, with circumstantial evidence and with facts when I can get real facts I have work out reasonable proof of many issues. I have reasonable proof there was a battle on August 4th, that TJ saw a torpedo, and that at least three of your contacts were real. I have developed a very solid explanation of the weather phenomena. I don't want to release my story line at this point because I want it to be rock solid first. That said, I don't want to deceive any one so I need to tell you may not like my final conclusion. I feel it is my duty to push this to conclusion, bu my definition of patriotic may be different then yours. With that said here are some questions;
Commodore Herrick's msg 021443Z stated in para 4, "Turner Joy AN/SPG-53 RADAR INOP ETR INDEF." I was also EMO on the Maddox so I believe that meant your fire control was down and the problem was too difficult for your technicians or the part had not been found in the Navy supply system. Could please comment on that. Also your sonar was an AN-SQS-23 which was a high powered search and attack sonar for use against nuclear subs and had no passive listening capability. So you were never going to hear torpedoes. Could you please comment on that.
Dale Evans
Tonkin Gulf
Dale, the SPG-53 repair was within Weapons' purview, but note the following in CO Turner Joy report of 11 Sep 64 that due to the 53's feed horn problem (partially ameliorated by a jury rig) and the Mount 51 CASREP (elevation problem), Director 52 was designated primary control and that: "Director 52 had little difficulty in holding track inside 4000 yards although targets were small -- about the equivalent of an LCM -- and making high speed. Radar acquisition was rapid after designation from MK 5 TDS primarily due to a very good alignment check which had been accomplished on 2 August 1964." Then-LTJG Wayne Whitmore in Director 52 (and subsequently my roommate) was emphatic that their contacts were solid and duration was consistent and sustained, not spotty.
Our installed SQS-23 sometimes detected torpedoes during exercises, and on occasion not. Part of the problem in some of the historical accounts is the assumption that because the 23 was "new and improved" it _should_ have acquired the torpedo whose wake was seen by Jack Barry and others. Having seen as an ASAC what destroyer wakes can do to solid sonar contacts much larger than "fish", it's an assumption born of wishful thinking.
I've recently updated my analysis with additional material and converted it to a PDF file. Same URL except for a .pdf instead of .html extension (though going to the "old" one will point you to the new one).
Feel free to e-mail me at jimtreanor@jimtranr.com.
Jim
Fire Control Radar & Sonar
Jim, I have since found Captain Barnhart's assessment of the Fire Control Radar. It is relatively close to what you said, although he added that the Gun Control Officer in Director 52 had to "see" the contact. That seemed to indicate "visual control" rather then radar "lock on" as has often been used in other accounts of the battle. I have also found technical information on your sonar that is authoritative. I am sure much of your sonar's capability was highly classified at the time of the incident. Few would have had full knowledge of it and they would not have been able to disclose what they knew.
Anyway, I have developed a really solid case for all of your contacts except the first two. I have a good explanation for those two, but I make the case they were not "solid" contacts. Your fire control radar may have briefly 'locked on" the remaining contacts, but you did not hit or sink any of those. Perhaps the jury rigged fix on the radar created a deflection in the bearing that caused your guns to miss.
I also have a reasonably solid case that you did see a "search light."
One thing I feel really good about . . . I have been able to debunk what the aviators have said about the incident.
Dale R Evans
Tonkin Gulf
Dale, on the issue of what the aviators did or did not see you're in good company, as you're probably aware of what Captain James A. Barber had to say in a paper delivered to a 1987 Naval Institute symposium, where he recounted the difficulty CAP pilots had in locating Nasty PTF's even when the aircraft were vectored by shipboard air control onto the targets during night exercises in Vietnamese waters. (I note in this regard that in the Proceedings January issue there are three responses to Admiral Vasey's August 2010 article, and one of them relies in part on the aviator "evidence".)
If you get a chance, could you e-mail me at the address left in a previous post here? I have a question on another key issue you may be able to clarify, since you were in CIC that night. Note that for interested readers who might not have Adobe Reader, I've posted an HTML version of my analysis at http://jimtranr.com/Whats_Wrong_with_Tonkin_Gulf_Incident_History.html.
Jim Treanor
Aviators
You all will be happy to know I have been able to shred the claims of the aviators. I even have the actual names of two pilots who said they saw a wake. When they turned back to fly over it again it was gone. They conclude it had heard and shut its engine.
I will send you an email Jim
Meanwhile my email address is daleevans106@comcast.net
Dale - thanks for continuing
Dale - thanks for continuing to share with Jim. Jim was sitting directly to my right side during the Incident. Question - Do you have any information concerning "hump freqs" and their bearings that night, especially just prior to us changing course to the south? James RD3
coming together
Dale,
I was aboard the TJ. I was then a RD3 and was sitting next to Johnson RDC.
I was on the AC net waiting for CAP and the Chief was waiting to control.
Because CAP was not up, he had switched to surface search and was tracking a contact with a grease pencil. As he had "offset" capability on his repeater, he had the contact painted at a very large size, wherein as the TJ fired we both witnessed our shells hitting the target and then the target breaking-up.
Shortly thereafter I was notified that CAP was on the way and both the Chief and I became busy with that portion of our GQ assignment.
James RD3
August 4th 1964
I remember that night very well. I was the telephone talker in the combat room between the Executive Officer and Capt. Barnhart. I can asure you we were not playing tic tac toe. I reported to the Captain Barnhart what the Excutive Officer was experiencing at that moment. So Randy you can be proud of you dad as proud as I was under his command and leadership. In my experience aboard the Turner Joy there is no other finer human being on this planet.
Gerard Roberts CT3 Uss Turner Joy.
Thank You for this Article
My father is Capt. Robert C. Barnhart, jr., and was commanding officer of the Turner Joy during the Tonkin Gulf Incident, as mentioned in this article. All of his life, he has had to listen to his reputation being put down with articles and books coming out and stating that the second attack never occurred. As stated in an earlier post, "By 1969 belief or skepticism in the Gulf ofTonkin attack was largely determined by whether one supported or opposed the war......."
Over the years, I have followed the controversy over the second attack, and I have got to admit, not impartially. I have found that most of the articles that stated that the second attack never occurred all deal with peripheral issues, second and third hand accounts, and the opinions of "experts" who were not there. And almost all of them opposed the Viet Nam War.
As my father approaches his 90th birthday this month, I cannot think of a better birthday present than the redemption of his honor and integrity through this article - the honor and integrity his family has known he has had throughout his life.
Thank you, RADM Vasey, for this article.
I Second the Thanks
I had the pleasure of visiting with your father on 23 September, the first time we'd seen each other since we'd both had duty in D.C. 44 years ago. I served aboard Turner Joy as Electronics Materiel Officer from 1963 to 1965 and was at GQ in CIC on 4 August 1964. Everything I saw and heard then and immediately following that night left me with no doubt that the TJ and Maddox had been attacked. Thus I've considered most of what has been written since about the event fiction, though some of it, however flawed in its assumptions and conclusions, has been well-crafted. Like you, I welcome RADM Vasey's article as an historical corrective and, equally, as vindication of your father, whose own very pertinent observations on that night have unfortunately been given such short shrift.
Jim Treanor
Comment re. Capt. Barnhart, former skipper of USS Turner Joy
Thanks Randy. Your commentary on your father nspire me in knowing that my efforts have "made a difference", it has alll been worthwhile ---- several months of research to insure the accuracy and objectivity of the article in setting the record straight. I believe your father will be interested in reading the following comments on the article recently received from Admiral Thomas Hayward, a former CNO. QuoteThis article will properly go down in history books, to be argued unceasingly by both sides, probably never to be resolved for a variety of egoistic and long established prejudiced positions. The breath of fresh air provided by the specifics you elaborate will remain irrefutable. Thank you for what we both know was not an easy challenge for you to undertake. But clarifying historical records is a huge accomplishment for which we will be forever grateful. Unquote. Please tell your father that I salute him on his forthcoming 90th birthday, and wish him happiness and good health in the years ahead. R.Adm. L.R. "Joe" Vasey USN Ret. Author
Tonkin 2 August 1964 attack by torpedo boats.
No way Robert ! Such an alleged discrepancy would have placed the Maddox over 30 miles inland from the North Vietnam coast.
In all seriousness, the position of the Maddox was verified and reconfirmed immediately after the attack by the ship's commanding officer Commander Ogier and his Operations Officer together with the Unit Commander Captain Herrick who was on the ship, and subsequently reconfirmed again personally by the Commander Seventh Fleet Vice Admiral Roy Johnson and his staff who examined the charts after they were transferred by heiicopter to the Fleet Flagship USS Oklahoma City. These men were all professionals
Moreover with a discrepancy of 60nm as alleged by your friend, the air cover sent by the aircraft carrier USS Ticonderoga would not have located the Maddox even though it was broad daylight. As it turned out, the planes were overhead in a matter of minutes and together with the Maddox sank or damaged the attacking torpedo boats.
With all respect, I don’t doubt that your Quartermaster friend heard somewhere what you wrote, but the facts of life, belie it.
The author
1-2 Aug DD-741 PIM vs DRT "After Action Report" analysis
I'm questioning veracity of how completely USS Maddox (provocative night steaming) ship movements two (2) days BEFORE the events reported ...
My CincPacFlt Sea Surveillance Officer (c322) tour supported VADM David C. Richardson's efforts to merge current intelligence & current operations sources for improving integrity of group decision support systems. (1969-79) ...
Maddox movements reported
I have obtained two copies of the Maddox's navigation log from the Navy archives (Washington Navy Yard). One was sent electronically to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (I believe this was in response to a request that had come down the chain of command) on August 8, and the other was attached to the patrol report dated August 24. They give positions exact to a fraction of a mile, at 15-minute intervals, for the periods when the Maddox was close enough to the North Vietnamese coast for the exact distance to matter. So far as I am aware, nobody has ever challenged the accuracy of these records.
They show the closest approaches of the Maddox to the North Vietnamese coast around 1800 local time (Golf Time) on July 31, and around 1100 on August 1. In each case, the closest approach was between eight and nine nautical miles, close to the eight-mile limit the Maddox had been given, but not in violation of that limit.
I have gone through a lot of the Navy's records on the Tonkin Gulf incidents, and I have interviewed a number of the officers and men who had been aboard the Maddox, including Herbert Ogier (Captain of the Maddox) and John Herrick (COMDESDIV 192, aboard the Maddox as commander of the DESOTO patrol). I also interviewed Admiral Roy Johnson, who as COMSEVENTHFLT was Herrick's boss. I got no hint from any of the documents or interviews that anyone in the United States government had ever believed the Maddox had gone improperly close to the North Vietnamese coast.
A few years later, a civilian journalist named Joseh Goulden suggested, incorrectly, that the Maddox had behaved provocatively. But I don't believe any such suggestion had been made inside the government.
Ed Moise
first hand report
In 1969, while a midshipman on the USS New Jersey in a training squadron that, coincidently, was under RADM Vasey's command, I finagled my way on to the USS Turner Joy for a couple days of ASW exercises. On the night watch in sonar I was on watch with a sonarman who told me he had been on duty the night of the attack on the Turner Joy and assured me that the attacks were real.
By 1969, belief or skepticism in the Gulf of Tonkin attack was largely determined by whether one supported or opposed the war, so I always valued a first hand report. I thank RADM Vasey for providing the details that back up that sailor's report.
Gulf of Tonkin Attacks
Appreciate your comments. Your penultimate sentence is exactly on target, "By 1969 belief or skepticism in the Gulf ofTonkin attack was largely determined by whether one supported or opposed the war.......". In my extensive research for the article, which included hearings by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Congressional Research reports, that point was loud and clear.
Adm. Vasey
PS I recall the Midshipman cruise of 1969 with fond memories
Lessons NOT Learned ... Decision Traps and Framing Errors
I renewed my acquaintance with a USS Cimarron (AO-22) shipmate who was Quartermaster of the Watch aboard USS Maddox (DD-731) on 2-Aug-1964.
This retired Senior Chief QM indicated that the navigator's execution of classified information "Need to Know" practices resulted in his ordering a course to a position 1 degree longitude (60nm) closer than intended.
With major attention focused on subsequent events, this "provocative action" became a letter of reprimand from CDR Herbert L. Ogler (CO, USS Maddox).
Maybe this investigative (after-action report) oversight was a precursor of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" leadership practices?
60 miles closer than intended?
I am astonished by this story. On August 2, 1964, USS Maddox was under orders to spend a large part of the day orbiting in the vicinity of Point DELTA, 19-47N, 106-08E, about 11 nautical miles from the North Vietnamese coast. It would not have been physically possible to go 60 nautical miles closer to the coast than had been intended.
I would appreciate any further information Robert may be able to provide.
Signed Ed (the host computer seems to want to call me "Anonymous").
Incomplete DD-741 Failure Mode & Effects Analysis (FMEA)
Ahoy Ed - I'm seeking verifiable independent sources to help validate first-hand account of DD-741 "errors & omissions" during her night-steaming toward verbally-designated SIGINT surveillance point. During this transit, the USS Maddox closest point of approach (CPA) to North Vietnam's coastline may have compromised her highly classified operational orders.
ASW-NCAPS (Naval Control & Protection of Shipping) sidebar:
SRNS-1 precision navigation resources were first deployed aboard USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2) during her NASA Apollo-13 Command Capsule Recovery mission.
Movements of the Maddox
The Maddox (DD-731) was not following verbal orders. The list of sixteen data collection points designated ALFA through PAPA, and the time the Maddox was to arrive at each one, was circulating in written form long before the patrol began. See for example DIRNSA 21 July 64 http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/gulf_of_tonkin/command_msgs/releas...
I know the Maddox had gotten this, in written form, by July 28. I would be surprised if the Maddox had not gotten multiple copies of it.
In the early part of the DESOTO patrol, it seems to me that the Maddox was in pretty good compliance with the letter and spirit of the orders that had been given. After it became apparent that the North Vietnamese were in a seriously combative mood, the Maddox began to deviate from the orders by staying farther away from the North Vietnamese coast than the orders had contemplated.
I have just submitted a reply to Robert, which should appear above at about the same time as this appears, giving other comments on the movements of the Maddox.
Ed Moise
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