How Does This End?
(See J. Patch, pp. 16-17, July 2010 Proceedings)
Charles Warren, U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary-Piracy ends when the ability to shelter in, and operate from, bases on shore ends. That's what happened in the Caribbean two centuries ago. Now, how might we get there from here? A start could be to establish de facto recognition of Puntland and Somaliland. This is not a preferred option to the African nations struggling to maintain the borders bequeathed them from the colonial era. Still, it is an option that should not be ignored.
Going this route might become even more attractive if the two non-states were to affiliate as something like "the confederation of Somali states." Possibly the recognized but ineffective government of Somalia might even be receptive to the idea. If Somaliland and Puntland were able to achieve some prosperity as well as stability, perhaps piracy would lose some of its allure and the pirate ports might even decide to join them. In the meantime, the confederated states could provide, with suitable aid and training, indigenous coastal-patrol assets.
Remo Salta-Commander Patch states, "Admiral Mark Fitzgerald, commander of U.S. Naval Forces, Europe and Africa, asserted in April that not only were operations very costly, but that there were higher-priority naval missions elsewhere." Well, what are they? What is more important than safeguarding our sea lines of communications with trading partners and friendly nations? What is more important than protecting American and NATO-member merchant ships from the horrors of modern-day piracy? This is a mission the U.S. Navy has been given since 1801, when President Thomas Jefferson sent a small American task force to fight the Barbary pirates off the coast of North Africa. Since this mission has such a noble and illustrious heritage behind it, why is the Navy so eager to get rid of it? Why does the Navy keep carping about this mission when it receives an enormous amount of positive publicity from it, not only here but around the world as well?
Nobody likes pirates, and everybody knows they are a dangerous menace to international trade. People get that. The successful rescue of Captain Richard Phillips and the container ship Maersk Alabama, plus the killing of three of his captors, probably did more for the Navy's prestige than a dozen "good-will" visits to countries nobody's heard of.
In the March 2008 issue of Proceedings, "The Commanders Respond" section asked the question, "How do you explain to your government and fellow citizens why your navy is necessary and worth what it costs?" In the March 2010 issue of Proceedings, also in "The Commanders Respond" section, Vice Admiral Matthieu J. M. Borshoom, Royal Netherlands Navy, answered that question by stating, "Maritime activities can only remain economically viable and contribute to our prosperity and our way of life if global commercial trade routes and choke points are safeguarded." Our NATO allies understand the importance of protecting merchant shipping.
This mission is a public-relations bonanza for the U.S. Navy, and it should embrace this task rather than try to avoid it. Congress would happily fund antipiracy missions since the Navy can actually produce examples of their success, such as the number of pirates killed or captured and the number of merchant ships assisted or rescued. Congress also knows these missions are popular with voters. Success in killing or capturing pirates could also translate into larger naval budgets. So if sustaining these patrols means foregoing a mission in another part of the world, so be it. Remember, most Americans don't know what UNITAS is. Dead pirates, they get.
The Answer is the Carrier Strike Group . . . Now, What Was the Question?
(See V. G. Addison, pp. 46-51, July 2010 Proceedings)
Jon Solomon-Captain Addison should be applauded for a remarkably flexible and adaptable force-deployment concept. In some ways, his ideas reflect the fact that surface and submarine elements assigned to a specific Carrier Strike Group do not always deploy simultaneously with their group's carrier. Rather, these elements sometimes deploy individually or within task units weeks or months before or after their strike group's carrier deploys. Although these elements might operate independently of the carrier and the other elements of their strike group for the duration of a deployment, they are prepared to join with their carrier or other carriers in theater for strike-group operations as needed. Captain Addison's concept seems to formalize this approach to make naval force-package planning and preparation efforts more efficient.
An important requirement that emerges from Captain Addison's definition of a "naval task force" is the need to resume training the Fleet for coordinated multi-carrier and amphibious group operations. Infrequently practiced over the past two decades, this capability will be vital to maintaining operational readiness and conventional deterrence credibility in the face of potential future adversaries with robust area-denial capabilities. Though such a force package would likely only be appropriate for major combat operations in contested environments, it represents the logical maximum level of tactical proficiency called for by his concept.
Other implementation considerations need to be addressed if Captain Addison's idea is to work in practice. As the deployment model increasingly moves from a routine cycle to a more flexible and reactive posture, how will the Fleet's maintenance-planning model need to be adapted, especially with respect to yard availabilities? If a particular task unit's pre-deployment training is focused on a specific combatant command's needs or specific missions, how can we ensure that unit is sufficiently proficient with other missions or regions should it be retasked during its deployment to respond to an emergent situation?
Perhaps most important, it may prove difficult in practice for standardized tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to serve on their own as the basis for making any one element of the force interoperable with any other element. Force-level TTPs and doctrinal standards already exist, but group commanders must often adapt them based on the unique natures of their assigned missions, operating environments, and subordinate units. The more these TTPs are adapted for such factors, the more the subordinate units must practice with each other so they can gain familiarity using them with each other. Knowing how a fellow commander thinks or how another unit generally performs a specific tactical action builds confidence and enhances decentralized coordination within a group, which in turn has historically paid dividends in combat.
Taking Sides: Repealing 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell'
(See D. Goldich, "Don't Use the Military as a Social Laboratory," and A. Webb, "Why Make Lying a Prerequesite for Service?" pp. 66-67, July 2010 Proceedings)
Lieutenant C. Randolph Whipps, U.S. Navy Reserve-Mr. Goldich has it backward. The onus should be on the military to justify why, based solely on their sexuality, potential recruits must be excluded and decorated combat veterans must be discharged.
Virtually everyone would agree that discrimination based on medical problems, intellectual limitations, and prior criminal conduct is justifiable for reasons of military efficiency. However, Mr. Goldich fails to offer a rationale for excluding open homosexuals. What is the compelling reason that Lieutenant Colonel Victor Fehrenbach, who flew combat missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, should be shown the door just shy of retirement? Mr. Goldich's argument boils down to this: enlisted personnel, especially in the combat arms, are potentially unwilling or incapable of fighting next to open homosexuals, so "barracks culture"-presumably homophobic-should drive national law and policy. One wonders what Harry Truman would say to that.
Captain Raymond J. Brown, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired)-I've heard from my long-ago shipmate Andy Webb only infrequently in recent years, but I think I will respond to his latest missive. We need not go beyond his first paragraph, which has three argumentative flaws.
First, the comparison of racial discrimination to "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" (DADT) is ridiculous. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell said as much during the initial debate-and he should know. Whatever feelings may be abroad concerning skin pigment (among all people in a ship's berthing area), the introduction of sexuality is quite a different matter. Try being XO of a high-endurance cutter for some perspective.
Second, to dismiss reluctance to repeal DADT to "cultural prejudice" is unfair. Both heartfelt religious beliefs that yet inform the United States' recruiting pool and honest concern for good order and discipline are not evil prejudices. To imply as much impugns many a serving officer of good will.
Last: "Have they never had to execute disagreeable orders?" Andy and I did so, and those on active duty still do so, all the time. As I have often said in a jest that is true, "If there is a harder way to do it, we'll find it." But leaders are not obliged to obey illegal (still the case) orders or immoral (may well be the case) orders. And is not Andy's encouragement to "mask personal beliefs" another form of the official lying he himself so thoroughly trashes?
Point the Finger Inward
(See J. Murphy, p. 14, July 2010 Proceedings)
Commander James Nugent, U.S. Navy-Senior Chief Murphy's column was a great first start to airing an issue that is urgently in need of addressing by the Navy. Why urgently? For every month of this year, save April, a commanding officer has been relieved of command. As Senior Chief Murphy asks, why are so many leaders failing?
Ask the average non-Navy-affiliated citizen the name of a naval officer and you'll likely get Bligh, Queeg, or Captain Jack Sparrow. Ask a Sailor and you'd hopefully get Nimitz, Spruance, Stockdale, and others whom we'd most want the general public to remember and for all Sailors to emulate. Ask these Sailors for negative examples of officer leadership and you'll likely get Bligh, Queeg, Arnheiter, and now, Captain Holly Graf. The main trait common to these bad examples is an officer who abused the crew and poorly represented the service.
Senior Chief Murphy focuses on Graf while she was on the USS Cowpens (CG-63). The failures he points out are all too true; senior enlisted were too concerned with their own careers to put themselves on the line for the Sailors they were responsible for, enlisted and officer, who were routinely abused on not one, but two ships. It all reflects a systemic failure in how the Navy promotes its officers. Graf's advancement to command of a destroyer and cruiser was aided and abetted by a long line of officers throughout the chain of command, but especially by senior officers whose failing was also due to a greater concern for career over service.
In the surface community in particular the tendency has been to put up with officers whose professional behavior is abusive and inexcusable. Such officers kill careers, sour Sailors, and cut a swath of professional destruction for those under them; the problem simply cannot be overlooked by a service that ostensibly holds itself to a higher standard and otherwise clearly cannot afford to in any way tolerate. The questions are, why was this allowed to happen, and what is the Navy going to do to keep this from happening in the future? Until we resolve the issue there will continue to be a cloud over the service, and unless we clear this up publicly and forcefully, it will continue to reflect poorly on the service and those who lead it.
The Climate is Changing, the Navy is on Course
(See R. Parsons, p. 8, June 2010; and L. G. DeVries, pp. 6-7, July 2010 Proceedings)
Scott Johnson-Captain DeVries is entitled to his opinion that "the jury is still out on 'climatic change' as a euphemism for 'catastrophic man-made global warming requiring intervention,'" but your readers should be made aware of several items.
The opinion of his "sea-level expert," Nils-Axel Mörner, that there will be no significant increase in sea levels by 2100, is not shared by his former organization, the International Union for Quaternary Research (INQUA). In a letter dated 21 July 2004 the President of INQUA told the President of the Russian Academy of Sciences that "INQUA, which is an umbrella organization for hundreds of researchers knowledgeable about past climate, does not subscribe to Mörner's position on climate change. Nearly all of these researchers agree that humans are modifying Earth's climate, a position diametrically opposed to Dr. Mörner's point of view."
The Web site of another of Captain DeVries' experts, Dr. Roy Spencer (www.drroyspencer.com), admits that the vast majority of climate scientists disagree with the climate-change skeptics and even includes a link to a study on "Expert credibility in climate change." According to the study's abstract, "preliminary estimates from published literature and expert surveys suggest striking agreement among climate scientists on the tenets of anthropogenic climate change (ACC)." The abstract cites data indicating that "97-98% of the climate researchers most actively publishing in the field support the tenets of ACC [emphasis added] outlined by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and . . . the relative climate expertise and scientific prominence of the researchers unconvinced of ACC are substantially below that of the convinced researchers."
Some choose to disbelieve in significant man-made global warming. As for me, if I knew there was a 97+ percent chance that someone was going to rob my home tomorrow, I'd choose to do something about it.
Book Review: Red November
(See N. Polmar, pp. 72-73, June 2010 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Director of Naval Intelligence; Rear Admiral Isaiah C. Cole, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Commander Naval Security Group Command; Rear Admiral William J. Holland Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired), Vice President, Naval Historical Foundation; Captain William H. J. Manthorpe Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired), former Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence; Captain Alfred S. McLaren, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Commanding Officer of the USS Queenfish (SSN-651); Rear Admiral Maurice H. Rindskopf, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence and World War II Commanding Officer of the USS Drum (SS-228); Rear Admiral Edward D. Sheafer, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Director of Naval Intelligence-In his review of the book Red November by W. Craig Reed, Mr. Polmar rightly points out many specific errors of detail. Indeed, from our knowledge, the book is full of errors of fact. From that perspective we are reluctant to appear to lend credence to it as a historical work.
Nevertheless, those critiques by a naval historian and others deeply knowledgeable in these areas should not keep others who are interested in the broad history of the Navy during the Cold War from reading the book.
As Mr. Polmar points out, the book has value to naval professionals, historians, and buffs for its discussion of U.S. Navy communications intercepts-that is, the Naval Security Group story. He notes that the description of Naval Security Group operations provides useful information and the account of Navy signals intelligence during the Cuban Missile Crisis is of value.
In general, the signals-intelligence capabilities developed, the systems deployed, and the operations conducted by the Navy in the employment of those capabilities and systems that are highlighted in the book are true.
Because most of the information provided by the book about those activities is from sea stories, the specific details of how those capabilities were developed, the systems deployed, and the operations conducted are known only to those directly involved. They may remain classified, private, and unknown for years.
But those sea stories highlight the great ingenuity of naval intelligence planners, the unusual technical talent of Naval Security Group and National Security Agency personnel, the outstanding operational abilities of submarine commanders and their crews, and the extraordinary heroism of Navy divers.
Recording for history the existence of those capabilities, systems, and operations, and giving recognition to the exceptional officers and Sailors of the Navy who, supported by government and industrial civilians, undertook and accomplished them, is the real contribution provided by this new book.