The bad news as we all know by now is that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) claims it is developing a maneuverable antiship ballistic-missile (ASBM) warhead that can effectively target moving ships, particularly aircraft carriers, operating far off the littoral.
The good news is that near
off-the-shelf solutions can defeat such a weapon. These are capabilities that the United States already tested or even formerly possessed that could be modified for use by the current Fleet. While not necessarily inexpensive, they are capabilities whose research and development costs are already (and the only thing) sunk. In other words, they are already paid for and could provide considerable leverage in fashioning modern variants.The ASBM threat is not ten-feet tall. If the game is naval warfare, the threat is not a game changer. It is a natural developmentof the continuing offenses-versus-defenses competition in military technology. In such competition, there is always the potential for developing counter moves. Potential near
off-the-shelf counter moves include putting antisatellite missiles (ASATs) on carriers, reconstituting the Fleet Deception Groups, and counterattack planning that focuses on land-based ASBM command and control (C ).The Sky is Not Falling
The breathlessness with which some expert commentators have addressed the threat of the Chinese antiship ballistic missile now under development is reminiscent of the "carriers are sitting ducks" debate of the 1980s and '90s. At that time, members of the military reform movement insisted that aircraft carriers were essentially indefensible and lacking in utility. Following the immediate use of naval aviation in the Gulf War and subsequent conflicts, and the use of a carrier with an "Army air wing" in the Haitian crises, many critics changed their tune concerning utility, but not necessarily survivability.1 And they are right. Carriers could become sitting ducks but only if we let the enemy see them and allow the ships within their defenses. The enemy must find the carriers, a fact that leads to a better understanding of the nature of the threat.
The identified ASBM characteristics are indeed fearsome. According to Chinese sources, such a missile will be targeted by a network of sensors, perform radical reentry maneuvers, deploy decoys, use on-board radar for terminal guidance, steer itself toward the target, and have a range of 1,500 kilometers (810 nautical miles).2 As a former ship's commanding officer, I would not be sanguine about coming up against such a weapon.
But a powerful weapon is meaningless in itself, and assessing a particular weapon against the defenses of a particular platform is misleading. As noted expert and Proceedings columnist Norman Friedman points out:
the battle is not between a missile and a ship, or a submarine and a ship, or a mine and a ship. It is between our fleet and an enemy. The missile or mine or submarine has to come into proximity with the ship, and to do that effectively the attacker has to detect the ship and arrange an engagement. In some very important cases, prospective enemies seem not to have appreciated the extent to which other capabilities are needed to make their missiles and mines or torpedoes effective against us. Conversely, our own countermeasures may be most effective against elements of enemy force other than the actual weapons.3
An effective ASBM must get its targeting information from a network of land-, ship-, air- and space-borne sensors, all of which are vulnerable in themselves
possibly much more vulnerable than the missile itself. Detaching any link in this chain reduces the missile's effectiveness. Thus, evaluating the effectiveness of the SM-3 missile or other weapons versus a terminal-phase ASBM gives a very incomplete and potentially inaccurate view of the risk to U.S. forces.Look First to History
The United States faced this theoretical threat before. In the 1980s, the Soviet Union had constructed an antiship ballistic missile, but it was discarded in favor of the ongoing arms-control process focused on its objective of getting Pershing II missiles out of NATO Europe. One of the reasons the Soviets were willing to give up on this effort was that they
like the United States viewed long-range antiship cruise missiles as a far superior method of targeting ships. But if the Soviets would have stuck with their ASBM program, their targeting capabilities would have dwarfed what China has today, using their orbit-changing electronic-intercept ocean reconnaissance satellites and radar-ocean reconnaissance satellites, both specifically designed to target U.S./NATO carrier battle groups and presumably capable of launch-on-demand.Ironically, the technology used to construct China's ASBM appears to have been reverse-engineered from the Pershing II. In essence, the missile and maneuvering warhead are 1980s technology. That does not mean they cannot be effective in the 2010s, but it simply acknowledges that the Chinese ASBM is not some technological breakthrough. It evolved, just as potential countermeasures can.
Another historical fact of interest: Chinese defense literature4 In that situation, the whole discussion might be an effort to wrest an American concession to keep its ships and aircraft out of international waters near China, lest its navy develop real capabilities. Or the discussion may be intended to provide the PLA Second Artillery Corps (which would develop and operate the ASBMs) an argument by which to acquire more resources for a new naval role (which may or may not be under control of the People's Liberation Army Navy). Even Andrew Erickson and David Yang in their influential articles admit that we don't know if the PLA has actually developed the capabilities, is involved in a theoretical or internal dialog, is simply trying to pressure America concerning Taiwan, or is trying to intimidate South Korea and Japan and interfere with their relationship with the United States.5
being tightly controlled by the ruling Chinese communist party has in the past been used to send external or internal signals for strategic communications purposes by discussing capabilities that they do not yet possess or whose development is still under debate within the PLA or party.It is, however, prudent to take the ASBM threat seriously, and begin by determining how and with what capabilities we already possess or could soon possess to neutralize the threat.
Hit the Intermediary
Shooting the messenger is absolutely the worst form of leadership, but it may be the best tactical action that could be taken against an ASBM threat. In this case, the phrase means destroying, jamming, or spoofing (deceiving) the transfer of information from targeting sensors to command-and-control facilities directing the missile launches. There are a variety of ways to do this, most of them classified, but there is certainly room for new ideas from the overall defense community.
Narrow-beam transmissions from satellite sensors are difficult to jam, but a more radical idea would be satellite jammers that trail the Chinese satellites and could be steered close to them. Conceptually, jamming space-to-shore satellites is not as difficult as the Cold War situation in which Soviet satellites could download information directly to warships armed with long-range cruise missiles and in closer proximity to their American targets, thereby making command-and-control ashore unnecessary. ASBMs fired from shore would require a different, perhaps more elaborate form of C
. Another possibility for shooting the messenger would be the use of non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse weapons in the vicinity of the Chinese satellites, a technique the PLA itself has previously examined for use against U.S. communications.The second step in countering satellite sensors would be to destroy them. As soon as one starts to discuss antisatellite weapons, one bumps into an arms control lobby that has outlasted the Cold War. Its objection is that ASATs could have the ability to shoot down the national technical means satellites, which the nuclear powers depend on for alert of a strategic nuclear attack. The world may have changed since 1991, with Russia, China, the United States, and perhaps other nations having antisatellite capabilities, but this fear has not. Less objectionable, however, might be ASATs specifically designed for tactical use, particularly against ocean surveillance satellites used for ASBM targeting.
As one proven countermeasure, more SM-3 missiles can be modified to hit low-earth-orbit satellites. But perhaps even better would be to put the capability right on the prime ASBM targets themselves
on carriers.Arm the Targets
In 1985, the United States successfully tested the ASM-135 tactical antisatellite missile by destroying the P78-1 Solwind astrophysics satellite at an orbit of 345 miles. The weapon was not launched from a land-based site, but from a fighter aircraft, a modified F-15A flown from Vandenberg Air Force Base to a position 200 nm off shore over the Pacific Ocean. (The F-15 used in the test, minus its ASAT capability, was still in service with the Florida Air National Guard in 2008.)
The 1985 test was conducted as a response to Soviet ASAT testing. But it was the only actual ASM-135 test (successful) against a satellite because Congress6
determined to make a statement about the destabilizing Reagan administration arms build up banned further tests against satellites. Successful follow-on tests were conducted against fixed points in space. Yet the program was cancelled in 1988 because of the rising costs of development and equipping 20 F-15A fighters. According to some sources, however, cancellation was primarily because of the internal changes developing in the Soviet Union and the fact that Air Force leadership never fully supported the program.In essence, the aircraft acted as the booster stage for the ASAT missile, which was launched from a special centerline pylon. The use of a common fighter aircraft as the launch platform provides a significant element of deception. It would be difficult to tell which particular aircraft was ASAT-capable during routine operations.
It is time to determine whether an off-the-shelf ASM-135 or derivative can be carried and launched from carrier-based aircraft. An assessment of the ability of the F/A-18 to do this has not been made and is beyond the scope of this article. But a quick layman's check of the F-15 and F/A-18 weapon load characteristics would suggest that it might be possible. However, the F-15's maximum speed is higher, and the Navy may need to reactivate F-14 "Bombcats" for this mission while waiting for a modified version of the F-35. In any event, the concept would provide the carrier with its own organic means of countering the sensors required for an ASBM attack. Using an ASM-135
type weapon in conjunction with SM-3s might provide an even greater synergistic effect.Giving tools to neutralize key nodes of the ASBMs' targeting to their presumed primary targets
U.S. aircraft carriers reduces any intimidation effects that the threat might provide.Practice Deception Again
The second off-the-shelf recommendation is to reconstitute the Fleet Deception Groups. During the Cold War, both the Pacific and Atlantic fleets used these commands to mask the at-sea operations of carrier battle and amphibious ready groups by equipping a variety of platforms to mimic the transmissions and radar signatures of high-value units, such as the carriers. Another task was to teach operations and commanding officers camouflage and deception techniques. Staffed somewhat casually and not exactly rich with resources, the deception groups were underrated. Their disestablishment during the post
Gulf War drawdown was based on their aging assets and the rapid decline of the Soviet Navy. The focus became highlighting carrier capabilities as part of presence missions, not hiding them.Even during the Cold War, Fleet Deception Group equipment was somewhat primitive in comparison to the technology of the day. Having commands specifically dedicated to and focused on fleet deception operations, however, is a proven concept. Equipping such groups with cutting edge rather than improvised tools for electronic and physical deception (while an even more specialized organization performs cyber deception) could create useful assets to complicate ASBM targeting.
Tell Them and Plan
The third off-the-shelf solution is a combination of declared policy and war planning. It should be openly declared that land does not provide a sanctuary and that an attack on an American warship at sea by ASBMs (or any weapon, for that matter) will trigger an immediate response of a tactical counterattack on all hostile assets involved, including launchers, sensors, and C2 nodes and networks, no matter where they are located
sea, air, space, or land. This response would be an attack on military capabilities, not an indiscriminate assault on infrastructure.To carry out such a precise counterattack requires a great deal of intelligence, planning, and tailoring of joint assets, and specific tactical assignments as part of a pre-established response plan. Since the ASBM launchers would likely be mobile, destroying them in the initial response may be difficult. But much of the Chinese Army's C
assets would not necessarily be mobile, particularly given that it is a military run on centralized decision-making. It is not difficult to tell where operational-level decisions are likely being made. Since an aircraft carrier is a joint asset, an attack certainly merits a joint response.The focus of the counterattack (and our declared policy) must be initial effectiveness, and not an incremental probing, "shock and awe," or signaling, which experience in Vietnam and Iraq indicates do not work.
Critics could claim that such prepackaged near-instantaneous responses would provoke a "real" war with China. But what is an ASBM attack on an aircraft carrier? A diplomatic signal? Potentially, more Americans could be killed on board a carrier than in the World Trade Center on 9/11. The idea that in event of an attack on its naval forces the United States would not use non-nuclear land-attack cruise missiles
with which practically every warship and attack submarine is armed against the sources of the attack is absurd.It is always possible, despite our preparations, for an opponent to achieve the first salvo by surprise. If the Chinese were to fire off a bolt from the blue
multiple simultaneous salvos with no warning (such as an increase in public tensions over Taiwan's future) they could indeed achieve a Pearl Harbor and pick off a number of surface ships. But they would not pick off the nuclear-powered attack and cruise-missile boats of our submarine force, which would be our key assets in controlling the waters of the Taiwan Strait and initiating the counterattack.Don't Forsake Diplomacy
Given the realities of our current war-focused defense budget, an initial emphasis on near
off-the-shelf solutions is simple common sense. But all readers of military affairs have bumped at least once into Carl von Clausewitz's dictum: war is politics by other means. So what can we do in international politics and diplomacy to counter the potential ASBM threat?In their Naval War College Review article, Erickson and Yang advise that the United States must take public action to demonstrate that it recognizes the ASBM threat and that it is developing "innovative new capabilities" to counter it. "The most perilous approach" for America, they maintain,
would be to neglect such military innovation [Chinese ASBMs] while continuing to insist that the United States maintained its ability to keep the peace, when in fact the military capabilities that underpin that ability were diminishing, at least in a relative sense. Such a discrepancy between rhetoric and reality would erode America's regional credibility and fuel Chinese overconfidence.7
While the ASBM threat should be put into appropriate perspective so we can take near-term measures to blunt its kinetic and psychological effectiveness, we must deflate any possible Chinese overconfidence concerning their ability to reduce American influence in the Asia-Pacific region. A primary role for American diplomacy and strategic communications is to remove the perception that the Chinese communist party has acquired a game-changer.
First, we must make it clear that we will take measures to neutralize any potential ASBM threat. These measures could potentially (if the programs are properly managed) cost much less than a fully developed, tactically effective ASBM capability. These countermeasures are already, to some degree, proven. The message should be: ASBMs will not prevent us from preserving peace in the region.
Second, we should do our best to convince the Chinese government that a build-up of ASBMs is not in its ultimate best interest. Former Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig referred to this as "dissuasion."8 This requires a carrot as well as a stick. The first carrot is moderation of the arms competition. You cut the ASBM program, we will not work on a carrier-based weapon that can shoot down your satellites. The first stick is public acknowledgement by the United States that, in the long term, an economic relationship cannot be sustained between military rivals. Legislation should then gradually increase tariffs that would be triggered by significant Chinese military developments.
Third, it must be clear to the Chinese communist party that it can never be certain of conducting a war at sea with its land remaining a sanctuary. The United States has no interest in invading China, but we should maintain a continually updated counterattack plan for destroying every possible military target
and the infrastructure they depend on with conventional weapons.The party must be assured that the United States would never strike the first nuclear blow. Our nuclear weapons exist for deterring other nuclear weapons, not for warfighting. No matter what happens in the Taiwan Strait, a nuclear response would not be justified. The Chinese, however, also need to be reminded of our nuclear arsenal capabilities in the event deterrence efforts fail and we decide to use the weapons. Their leadership would not survive.
It is important to stress the destruction of the Chinese communist party rather than China the nation. Most Americans do not realize that the nation of China has no armed forces. The army and navy are pledged to the party, not the state. Even those who consider themselves Chinese nationalists must pause to consider that what is good for the party and its control of Chinese society may not be good for the Chinese nation.
Annexing Taiwan by force or the threat of force might be good for the party because it would cement party faithful as the ultimate winners of the Chinese civil war and thereby the rulers of all China as "designated by the heavens" (or at least by the bayonet). But it would end as a tragedy for the Chinese nation, setting its economy back by many decades. As Tom Barnett puts it: "the rule-set fall out from a United States9 Simply put, the export economy on which modern China depends would be broken.
China conflict over Taiwan would be enormous for globalization, effectively barring Beijing from stable Core [global economy] membership for the foreseeable future."What would be the first response by the United States in event of a Taiwan Strait war? The most effective initial reaction would be to declare all U.S. government bonds in Chinese hands to be null and void. Financially, China would lose far more than the dollar cost of a handful of aircraft carriers.10 Then, after we declare an end to all Chinese imports, who will buy all those Barbie dolls? Perhaps the threat of these actions is the ultimate defense against the ASBM threat.
1. See, for example, William S. Lind, "The Navy," in Winslow T. Wheeler, ed., America's Defense Meltdown (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), pp. 123-124.
2. See Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, "Using the Land to Control the Seas: Chinese Analysts Consider the Antiship Ballistic Missile," Naval War College Review 62:4 (Autumn 2009), pp. 53-86, and "On the Verge of a Game-Changer," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 135/5/1275 (May 2009), pp. 26-32.
3. Norman Friedman, "Globalization of Antiaccess Strategies?" in Sam J. Tangredi, ed., Globalization and Maritime Power (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2002), p. 488. The book is available at https://digitalndulibrary.ndu.edu/u?/ndupress,27044.
4. Erickson and Yang, "Using the Land to Control the Seas," p. 78.
5. Ibid., pp. 72-77.
6. The USAF had proposed canceling it in 1987. "ASM-135 ASAT" from Wikipedia, posted at http://en.wikipedia/wiki/ASM-135_ASAT, which cites Peter L. Hays, Struggling Towards Space Doctrine: U.S. Military Plans, Programs, and Perspectives During the Cold War, Ph.D. Dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, May 1994.
7. Erickson and Yang, "Using the Land to Control the Seas," p. 78.
8. Richard Danzig, The Big Three: Our Greatest Security Risks and How to Address Them (New York: Center for International Political Economy, 1999), pp. 22-24.
9. Thomas P. M. Barnett, The Pentagon's New Map (New York: Berkley Books, 2004), p. 242.
10. This is not to neglect the tragic loss of lives of brave U.S. Sailors, but is meant only to suggest that the human cost may be not the primary calculation of the Chinese communist party.