Fortress at Sea? The Carrier Invulnerability Myth
(See J. Patch, pp. 17-20, January 2010 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral Robert F. Dunn, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Commander Patch tries to make his point in the last sentence of his first paragraph, "Carrier proponents, however, universally seem to accept on faith alone the premise that a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN) is essentially invulnerable." Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, the cover headline which trumpets, "Carriers Could Be Sunk," is a non sequitur of the first order. Admiral Tim Keating is no exception to the fact that the carrier's vulnerability is widely recognized, especially by those who sail in them and fly from them; but what ship is not? What land-based system is not? What airborne system is not?
It is precisely because those who depend on aircraft carriers realize their vulnerability that tactics and systems are continually evolving to defeat whatever the likely threat might be, from terrorists and mines to ballistic missiles and cyber attack. To go into the capabilities of each such system would take more space and classification status than space here will permit, and it takes the training, knowledge, and experience of those who command and assist in the command of these ships to put it all together. They do it well and will continue to do it well even as new threats evolve. At the same time, it's the very capacity of a CVN that permits the size, depth, and sophistication of counterthreat systems, a suite which could never be handled in a smaller ship.
Of all the counterthreat systems in a carrier, the most versatile and most potent, of course, are her embarked aircraft. When one takes it upon oneself to question the vulnerability of carriers it's well to remember what an aircraft carrier is all about: to fly airplanes from (and UAVs too, in years to come). From that basic fact, one is led to a description of just how the carrier will perform in the wide range of possible taskings questioned by Commander Patch.
One need go no further than to read Dr. Rebecca Grant's fine article in the same issue to see just what those assignments are today and are likely to be in the future. Shaping, presence, no-fly zones, stability operations, support of forces ashore, ensuring information superiority and, in the long-term, the possible need to deter a formidable nation-state foe, all must be in the Navy's kit. No weapon system other than the aircraft carrier is suitable to all these missions.
Yes, the carrier has vulnerabilities, but so do other ships, aircraft, land forces, and American civilians. The challenge is to know what they are and prepare for them. The Navy along with its aircraft carriers is on top of that challenge today, and will be tomorrow.
Captain William Aston, U.S. Navy (Retired)—I don't believe the thrust of this article is directed onto the straight and narrow path to a helpful conclusion. Nothing new is presented. All weapon systems have a degree of vulnerability. Some are measurably more resistant to attack than others. Original design matters, as does a stream of improvement based on new information and technology fitted into the defensive system suite.
Without any factual support, the author implies that several generations of sea-going leaders have not improved the strengths of the CVN or have ignored the need for a steady stream of tweaks to the tactical deployment of the carrier fleet. Naval aviation has a proven history of incremental improvement. In recent times operational commanders have gained the ability to locate opposing forces and potential threats by satellite and to use this information to tailor their operations to best avoid operational difficulties. Swarms of small boats need some place to hide. Operations of such craft on the high seas, out on the open ocean away from the littorals, seems to be a risky tactic for any potential enemy.
I do support the thought that no weapon system is immune to the need for constant evolutionary improvements. We should not be referencing the habits of battleship admirals from the 1930s who were still adapting to the genius of Admiral William S. Sims who is credited with teaching the Navy how to shoot. Keeping one's head in the sand has never been a characteristic of naval aviation.
Obama's Afghanistan
(See J. F. Kelly Jr., p. 8, January 2010 Proceedings)
Commander Gerald S. Hanley, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)
I was very disappointed after reading this piece. I have been a member of USNI since I was an NROTC midshipman in the early 1960s. I have always viewed Proceedings as a professional forum focused primarily on naval matters not a political platform as exemplified by Captain Kelly's remarks that "The President hoped to mollify his dovish liberal base . . ." and ". . . the President tried to rationalize the delay." The debate about the strategy is certainly valid but not, I feel, in the political context of this article.I am concerned that this now opens Proceedings to the same political back-and-forth we hear and read every day in the broader media. I hope this is not the direction in which Proceedings is moving.
Finding Our Balance at Sea
(See M. Vego, pp. 22-26, January 2010 Proceedings)
Commander Steve J. Coughlin, U.S. Navy
It was a pleasure to read Dr. Vego's article. I for one have great confidence that the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program will mature to the point where the U.S. Navy will dominate littoral warfare with revolutionary new concepts in the way we employ cutting-edge technology in the near-shore regions of the world. But, as the author points out, we will still have inadequate numerical strength to control all maritime areas of the world where U.S. interests must be protected. The concept of a class of multi-purpose corvettes organized in flotillas and joined by advanced conventional submarines and fast-attack craft has great merit when considering the growing requirements of our larger and more expensive ships and the challenges of confined and shallow sea space in the littorals. This seems like a terrific way to complement the LCS program while freeing up the shooters and sub chasers for operations at the high end of the combat spectrum.Another reason to consider the development of a modern small surface combatant is the command opportunities that such a program would provide to our junior surface warfare officers. When I was the commander of Patrol Coastal Squadron One, I considered the greatest responsibility associated with that assignment to be the training and development of the PC captains. To their credit, they were the best and brightest junior officers that the surface force had to offer, each of them with an exceptionally high level of confidence and competence. So, it didn't take much to move them to the next level of understanding of command at sea. But there are many more out there like that. If we had a way to get more of our qualified junior officers to sea as commanding officers of small surface combatants, we would sweeten the command training and development continuum while encouraging many more officers to remain in active naval service for greater command responsibilities. They will command our capital ships in the future, and having a hands-on understanding of the burdens of command will prepare them for the growing complexities of future operating environments.
We all agree that naval warfare is changing. We acknowledge that Fleet tactics and procedures are evolving to meet the needs of maritime irregular warfare, so we must enhance the way we groom commanding officers to contend with the complications of future naval warfare. In my view, early experience in command is an ideal way to foster those skills, and what better way to do that than in command of a multi-purpose corvette? Dr. Vego hit the nail right on the head for more reasons than just balancing the Fleet.
Reviving the Chiefs' Mess
(See K. S. Eyer, pp. 48-51, January 2010 Proceedings)
Chief Yeoman (Surface Warfare)(Air Warfare) Bernard Michael Burawski, U.S. Navy (Retired)—The author gives a good perspective on problems with the chief petty officer (CPO) community.
One is that command master chiefs (CMC) operate as a separate organization outside the CPO community and are treated differently from CPOs. The exemption from the annual senior enlisted continuation boards is one example. But also they appear, in political terms, more aligned with the wardroom. CMCs undergo a comprehensive selection process to be awarded that classification and serve in the position. That being the case, no CMC should receive non-judicial punishment. The number of CMCs receiving disciplinary action has definitely raised the issue of the effectiveness of their selection process.
Because the process and service as a CMC has become so politicized, the Navy may be better served by abolishing the position altogether and allowing the CPO mess to select its leaders. After all, this was the way things were done before the CMC program was initiated, and judging from all of the problems that the CPO community is now experiencing, may well be justified.
Let's Arm the Forces
(See B. Tillman, p.10, January 2010 Proceedings)
Major Richard G. Steffens, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)—Mr. Tillman's discussion lacks the depth of critical analysis and fails to understand the fundamental differences that exist between the sophistication and training required of a law enforcement officer in relation to a professional Soldier and the respective environments in which they operate on a daily basis. Military installations in the United States are small cities within the security umbrella provided by the "professional Soldier." The day-to-day infrastructure remains the responsibility of a mixture of civilian and military professionals trained in law enforcement and other skills required to keep the city functioning. This city serves as home, where soldiers can hang up their battlefield weapons.
To suggest that the security requirements of domestic military installations compares to the national survival of Israel pales by comparison; the "Fort Dix Six" was a domestic law enforcement issue as have been the attacks at several recruiting stations. The threat to national security flies under many different colors in the current international environment, however, short of an invasion by a regular armed force the security of a domestic military installation remains an issue for trained law-enforcement personnel under the guidance of the installation commander, not the division commander. The lessons learned from these incidents will contribute to the long list of schoolhouse lessons.
[Editor's note: Major Steffens, whose background includes intelligence and law enforcement experience, works in protective intelligence for the federal government.]
You Can't Always Give What You Want
(See V. G. Addison, pp. 28-30, January 2010 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Dan Davenport, U.S. Navy, Director, U.S. Joint Forces Command J-9—Bravo Zulu to Captain Addison for his candid and objective assessment of the naval implications of the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO). His case for a fundamental change in the way the Navy approaches the challenges facing the joint force is compelling and well founded.
The Joint Operating Environment describes the key national security challenges and defines a future operating environment characterized by uncertainty, complexity, rapid change, and persistent conflict. The CCJO provides the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman's vision for how the joint force will operate within that environment in response to a variety of future security challenges. These ground-breaking documents provide the essential foundation to guide development of the joint force based on the challenges expected rather than assume that existing or planned capabilities will be adequate for whatever comes.
In his foreword to the CCJO, Admiral Mike Mullen notes that as capable as the joint force is today, it will not be enough to meet these future challenges. Each element of the joint force must be equipped with the capabilities to understand and adapt to each situation on its own terms
not the way we'd like it to be. To reflect the overarching needs of the joint force, service capability development must be clearly defined in the context of joint operations.To increase its perceived relevance to the joint force, the Navy needs to be able to more clearly describe the contribution of the maritime force within two primary sources for joint context
joint concepts and joint doctrine. This must go beyond merely attempting to draw links between joint terminology and the language and systems we're comfortable with. The languages need to merge. Key to this is for the Navy to play a more active role in developing joint context.Timing is good
there are significant opportunities in the next year to engage in the shaping of critical concepts and doctrine. The most fundamental joint doctrine, Joint Pubs 1, 3.0, and 5.0, are currently under revision. Joint Forces Command is also leading the development of individual concepts for each of the four military activities in the CCJO. Services and combatant commands should send their best and brightest officers to participate in the writing teams for these foundational documents.Captain Addison has initiated an important debate, highlighting the unique, asymmetric strengths our Navy brings to operations. Focus on the joint operational challenges to be met is essential. I look forward to a spirited dialog that helps the Navy more effectively articulate its critical contributions to the joint force. This article, unsettling as it may be to some, will prime the pump for fresh thinking.
It's Time to Scrap Don't Ask, Don't Tell
(See C. R. Whipps, p. 10, December 2009; R. K. Culbertson, pp. 85-86, and L. R. Jefferis, p. 86, January 2010 Proceedings)
Captain Tom Nosenzo, U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS Dubuque (LPD-8)—I absolutely agree with Lieutenant Whipps' article and commend him for taking a position viewed as unpopular by many of our rank and file. The Navy and the Department of Defense must abandon the policy and allow homosexuals the opportunity to serve openly in the military.
Homosexuals are already standing side-by-side their heterosexual counterparts on the deck plates, in the office, in the cockpit, and in the classroom. They are equally dedicated to their country, their service, and their shipmates, and they are significant contributors to mission success. Unfortunately, current policy provides them an additional, unnecessary challenge that negatively impacts their potential contribution by making their lives and their service more difficult. I am confident that in many cases they outperform their heterosexual peers.
It is time for the CNO to begin the process by appointing a task force to determine how, rather than if or when, we should remove the barriers preventing homosexuals from serving openly in the Navy. There will be challenges, but they can be overcome with education and leadership. This is an opportunity to lead and control our destiny. By seizing the initiative we will be better positioned to control the transition to a true "all" volunteer force. If we fail to accept the inevitable, how and when to make the transition will be dictated to us.
It is time to open our ranks to all Americans.
Navy Diversity is Off Course
(See J. Murphy, p. 14, December 2009; P. Burgess, p. 7, and J. D. Sharpe, pp. 7 and 84, January 2010 Proceedings)
Captain Richard Hrezo, U.S. Navy (Retired)—My compliments to the author. Someone show me the science that proves diversity equals success or improvement. Unlike honor, leadership, courage, commitment, loyalty, etc., diversity has become a bragging point for commanders who want to highlight the number of minorities they've promoted or recruited. An example of the folly in this "diversity-at-any-cost" strategy was most recently exemplified at Fort Hood, where shootings were carried out by an active-duty doctor who received his medical training from the military, was identified as sub-optimal, carried throughout his residency despite his weaknesses, and allowed to plan and execute a terrorist attack because no one stepped in when aberrant activities and behaviors were noted. Along the way I'm sure there were many who were delighted to have such a diverse character under their command.
When reverse discrimination comes into play and individuals are recruited or promoted with diversity as a key characteristic, we've got a problem. I saw it while on active duty and actually had two young officers challenge me on their fitness reports because I didn't rank them higher because of their "diversity." When I asked them why I should, one actually pointed at her skin as if suggesting, "duh sir, look at this."
We need to seek out quality people, or all is lost. We must focus less on diversity and more on important traits like skill level, loyalty, leadership, etc. No more unwritten diversity quotas, no more mediocre performance. We must expect the same from every individual—this will, in return, offer them the same opportunities.
Diversity—another "PC" term that means nothing but trouble in the real world of warfighting. Quality is far more important than variety.
The Dark Side of Maritime Domain Awareness
(See J. Kraska, pp. 56-61, December 2009; D. Goward, p. 6; and S. C. Truver, pp. 6-7, January 2010 Proceedings)
Captain Robert G. Moore, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired)—I was somewhat surprised and disappointed that neither the article nor the comments mentioned e-navigation, an initiative of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), which is the other side of the same coin as MDA. The IMO defined e-navigation as ". . . the harmonized collection, integration, exchange, presentation and analysis of marine information onboard and ashore by electronic means to enhance berth to berth navigation and related services for safety and security at sea and protection of the marine environment."
E-navigation must be regarded as a work in progress, but carriage requirements for the basic shipboard suite of equipment supporting it has been incorporated in SOLAS and applications such as those based on the Marine Electronic Highway project in the Malacca and Singapore straits and the European Union's projects ATMOS IV (Advanced Technology to Optimize Maritime Operational Safety
Intelligent Vessel) and MarNIS (Maritime Navigation and Information Services) are already in use or development. One result of the e-navigation effort will be to make most if not all of MDA-like data generally available to public and private interests around the world.Given that the historical invisibility and anonymity of ships at sea must surely vanish, our focus must certainly shift to operating within the new parameters thus presented, not in playing Canute to hold back the tides of change.
We Need the Navy Port Engineer Profession
(See R. E. Staples Jr., pp. 80-81, November 2009 Proceedings)
Commander H. B. Le, U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS Lassen (DDG-82)—I wholeheartedly agree with the author that today more than ever the surface Navy needs highly qualified port engineers. As the Surface Warfare Enterprise continues "to align surface ship maintenance with the goal of achieving the right readiness, at the right place, at the right cost," it needs to continue to hire and retain quality port engineers to serve as the professional maintenance planners and advisers to commanding officers.
Notwithstanding one port engineer assigned to a prior ship, all the engineers I have encountered are dedicated professionals who keep at the forefront their ships' maintenance interests and operational readiness. To be sure, port engineers do much of the heavy lifting associated with maintenance planning and execution to "allow the officers and crew to focus on warfighting."
While attending the prospective commanding officer course at Surface Warfare Officers School Command in Newport, Rhode Island, I was somewhat concerned by what some instructors called a growing trend in the surface Navy of hiring inexperienced port engineers recently graduated from college. Who would my port engineer be? That concern grew as my predecessor informed me during our turnover that the ship's port engineer was relatively new and in fact in his first assignment as a port engineer.
Once in command, that concern quickly vanished as I watched the port engineer in action, on the deck plates and staying ahead of potential maintenance issues or responding quickly when we had emergent maintenance needs. With the ship's best interests in mind, the port engineer aggressively planned and effectively tracked our depot-level maintenance throughout fiscal year 2009, including a $6 million dry-docking selected restricted availability. In addition, I was impressed by the solid recommendations he made for work prioritization as well as his advice to improve ship's force maintenance practices as we prepared for an October 2009 Board of Inspection and Survey assessment. Our ship achieved good results during the evaluation, and the port engineer definitely contributed to that success.
While this is my port engineer's first assignment, he certainly does not lack for qualifications, which Captain Staples considers as "central to the [port engineer] program's blueprint for success." My port engineer has a degree in mechanical engineering from California Maritime Academy, has Coast Guard merchant marine engineering licenses, and has sailed as a merchant marine. As the head of my ship's maintenance team, I am thankful to have a port engineer with his extensive qualifications and background
first assignment or not.No Need for High Speed
(See M. Vego, pp. 46-50, September 2009; S. Surko, p. 6, and R. J. Natter, pp. 6-7, October 2009; G. R. Worthington, pp. 82 and 84, November 2009 Proceedings)
Commander Murry Carter, U.S. Navy—I was disappointed to find the same negative opinions that have been prevalent in LCS discussions for the past several years. As Gold Crew commissioning combat systems officer in the USS Freedom (LCS-1), I would like to clear up some of the incorrect assertions made by the author.
- "LCS has limited capabilities against enemy aircraft and ASCMs." The 57-mm gun and RAM launcher offer the same level of protection as FFGs, LPDs, or LSDs.
- "The SUW mission package [includes] two 30-mm cannons or four Army NLOS launcher." The package includes both guns and NLOS (not either/or).
- "A 3,000 ton . . . LCS should have sufficient firepower to deal with large surface combatants." Don't confuse size with mission. LCS is not intended to engage large surface combatants.
- "The LCS is not designed to sweep or neutralize weapons in an enemy minefield." No, the LCS cannot sweep mines. But neither could the MHCs we will replace.
- "The small crew raises the question of whether the ship will be able to maintain the high standards of damage-control effectiveness. . . ." Every LCS Sailor is On-Scene Leader qualified or better; you won't find that level of training and qualification on any other surface combatant.
- "This ship will have one CO [for] the ship, and another for the mission package." The Mission Package OIC reports to the ship's CO when embarked.
- ". . . the ship has to be refueled every three days . . ." This depends on the ship's operations. At cruise speeds, LCS can go for days without refueling. In addition, it's standard for surface combatants to refuel every three days or so.
- ". . . one cannot . . . envisage a situation in which [LCS] would flee when faced with . . . small, lightly armed boats." LCS will "flee" only to open the battlespace, extending the engagement window, and allowing her additional time to deal with the threat.
- "47 50 knots does not improve chances of . . . surviving an attack by a 60- or 70-knot [torpedo]." If LCS evades a torpedo at 40 knots, the closure rate is as little as 20 knots, meaning the torpedo will likely run out of fuel before it reaches the ship.
- ". . . LCS will not need to use maximum speed often." Just because we may not use something regularly (Standard missiles?) doesn't mean it's not a vital capability.
- ". . . LCS cannot attain maximum speed in shallow waters [or] in areas with considerable shipping traffic . . ." I have personally gone 40+ knots in less than 50 feet of water. LCS officers and junior officers of the deck go to a 6-week course, which employs state-of-the-art simulators to teach critical thinking at high speed, in little to no visibility, and close to land/within high-traffic areas.
- ". . . LCS should have a single crew instead of two." Sister crews help train each other, fill unexpected vacancies in the other crew, and collaborate on major events (system upgrades, certifications, etc.). I knew the Blue Crew Sailors almost as well as my own crew. They didn't reduce our unit cohesion they enhanced it.
Dr. Vego is, unfortunately, the victim of misleading and incorrect references. I encourage him to visit the Freedom (and Independence [LCS-2]) for a first-hand look at the ships and their capabilities. Both are good ships. They and their sisters will serve the Navy well.