For the past six years, the military buzzwords have been "counterinsurgency (COIN)," "irregular warfare," and "unconventional operations," with great emphasis placed on stabilization and reconstruction. Although counterinsurgency is hardly a new topic, the combination of counterinsurgency with stabilization and reconstruction, also referred to as nation-building, has produced a dynamic that has not been encountered before in this nation's history.
The United States was heavily involved in nation-building in both Germany and Japan after World War II yet, in those instances, faced no organized insurgency. The same was true in Korea, Vietnam, and even in our more limited operations in Grenada and Panama. Each had semi-functional governments in place. Although dealing with substantial enemy forces, minimal nation-building was required in developing their governments politically and economically. The United States was not starting from scratch.
It is interesting that after six years of a counterinsurgency and nation-building effort (or "COIN-plus") in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State (DOS) construct remains the same as it was when the wars began. To improve matters, a new interagency unit at the tactical/operational level is needed.
The U.S. military has halfheartedly attempted to accommodate this new element of warfare by using provisional reconstruction teams (PRTs), especially in Afghanistan. These teams are doing the best they can with what little they have. Typically, they are commanded by military officers with little or no experience in COIN or diplomacy.
In the northeast sector of Afghanistan in spring 2009, for example, the three PRT commanders completing their service-required individual augmentation tour included a Navy submariner, two Navy surface warfare officers, and an Army military police officer. They reported directly to the conventional brigade commander, who for the most part had no authority over the special operations forces working in the region. Most coordination with the local and regional governments occurred through the brigade and their conventional battalions. These negotiations often involved the activities of special operations forces working in the region. In many cases, the operations caused considerable friction between the conventional units and special operations units and led to the degradation of trust between the local leadership and their conventional counterparts.
The lack of a local unified command consisting of conventional security and stability operations, special operations counterinsurgency force, and nation-building nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) confused matters and resulted in lost opportunities. It also placed sensitive regional political issues in the hands of the military commanders with scant diplomatic training.
Crossing Barriers or Crossing Signals?
Collaboration between the NGOs and DOD is weak at best. Each brigade commander has one State Department adviser on his staff to inject political considerations into military operational planning. In Afghanistan, stability, typically a military function, and reconstruction, typically a State function, is a fragile conglomeration of multiple entities all operating separately at the behest of the U.S. government.
This problem is not specific to Afghanistan. While working in the Philippines in spring 2008, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the State Department's main muscle for reconstruction, was sending representatives to the southern Philippines where the Joint Special Operations Task Force was conducting operations with no notice or coordination. Major community development plans, such as the construction of major bridges and critical roads costing millions of U.S. dollars, were being made with local leadership without any DOD involvement in areas where special operations forces physically lived alongside their Philippine military counterparts.
This disconnect between DOD and State at the tactical and operational levels is consistently accentuated by the growing trend of civil-military operations focused on stabilization and reconstruction rather than conventional military force-on-force. The need not only for greater interagency coordination but for an entirely new way of organizing our interagency forces will only increase in the future.
Old Plan, New Model
The concept of an interagency model is not new. The Clinton administration published a Presidential Decision Directive in May 1997, "Managing Complex Contingency Operations," intended to institutionalize interagency coordination at the strategic-planning level. The directive focused on interagency planning, rehearsals, and training. The Bush administration superseded the 1997 directive with its own presidential directive in 2005, "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization. It stated,
The Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. The Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict.1
In the 2005 directive is clear guidance for State to lead stabilization and reconstruction activities and coordinate with the Secretary of Defense. What is odd is that in Iraq, Afghanistan, and even in the Philippines, military commanders on the ground take little guidance, if any, from the State Department. The grunt-work of stabilization and reconstruction are two separate activities led by DOD and State, with little interaction between the two.
DOD issued a reply to President Bush's directive in late 2005, titled "Military Support for Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations"2. This was recently updated and signed on 16 September 2009 by Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy. The new directive establishes that DOD will Lead stability operations activities to establish civil security and civil control, restore essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure, and deliver humanitarian assistance until such time as it is feasible to transition lead responsibility to other U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments and security forces, or international governmental organizations.3
In Iraq, that transition has taken place, at least in all of the major Iraqi cities, with the turnover of security to Iraqi forces. In Afghanistan, DOD still maintains the lead in stability operations as well as the responsibility for a good portion of reconstruction. State occupies an infinitely smaller, supporting role in the region.
Will Success in Iraq Translate?
The mantra pertaining to Afghanistan, especially since more forces have shifted there from Iraq, is "This is not Iraq!" The formula for success there is not necessarily one that can be repeated elsewhere. Eight years of military operations have taken a heavy toll on Afghan civilian relations with the U.S. and Coalition military. Although additional troops will certainly speed the training of the Afghan force and stabilize the country, it will also stress a population that is weary of being scrutinized by both camps-Taliban and Coalition military. For the planned troop increase in Afghanistan to succeed, interagency integration must be stepped up by implementing DOD's latest directive at the tactical and operational levels.
A new, three-pillared interagency unit composed of a conventional brigade, a special operations task force, and a State Department "mission," headed by an executive with experience in at least two of the three pillars, would bring the necessary focus at the operational and tactical levels. The three pillars must combine to form a single unit, with each pillar absolutely depending on the other two.
The conventional force would provide security through presence and training their conventional partners. The special operations forces would provide surgical lethality against the destabilization forces and also train their host-nation special-operations counterparts to do the same. The State Department element would lend a diplomatic hand as well as economic and development support to local political and business leaders. Lack of attention to any one of the pillars will weaken the others. The current lack of coordination among these three elements along with the back-burner approach to the political issues by the military could very well be a reason for the Taliban's recent success in reoccupying Afghanistan so quickly.
The head of the interagency unit must use each element according to the situation on the ground. Initially, more attention would be paid to conventional security and special forces counterinsurgency operations. Intensive efforts should be made to train the host nation's military and civilian police forces and eventually would lead to more reconstruction and fewer military operations. The selection of the executive to lead this unit should be dictated by the environment. At the beginning of the campaign, a military officer with experience in both conventional and special operations would be appropriate to ensure basic stability is established. Some experience with the State Department should be required. The military lead must ensure that at least half the time spent is on working with local leadership outside the military bases. This means dressing the part-wearing traditional Afghan clothing, such as tombaan (trousers) and payraan (overshirt)-and having at least a basic understanding of the language and culture.
When to Engage or Stand Off
At some point stability will gain a foothold, and regional prosperity will provide a good portion of the remaining progress. At that point, an executive from the State Department with military experience would take the lead of the interagency force. It will be critical that military operations not counteract the fragile progress made during the previous phase. Ignoring the necessity of military engagement, however, could destabilize the region and potentially hinder political progress. It will be a fine balance, with a slight priority given to NGO reconstruction operations. The final phase of the transition will be to local civilian leadership to ensure stability and prosperity. The crux of this transition will be for the local leadership to direct its own forces to adequately provide security and stability.
In the case of Afghanistan, the fact that most informed Americans can name the senior military leader-Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan General Stanley A. McChrystal-but not identify the senior State Department diplomat working in Afghanistan, Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry, speaks volumes. An interagency force that is neither military-centric nor State-centric must be created. The head of this force will provide direction for its conventional, special operations, and State Department leaders in the region. The agency source for the head of the unit accentuates the focus of effort based on what is happening on the ground. There is a natural progression from military operations to reconstruction efforts with civilian control. Also, in accordance with the 2009 DOD directive, the military departments should "organize to train and equip forces capable of conducting stability operations" by providing a pipeline for officer leadership to gain interagency planning experience in addition to cultural and language familiarity.
COIN-Plus around the World
An October 2005 article published in Joint Force Quarterly, by Martin Gorman and Alexander Krongard, titled "A Goldwater-Nichols Act for the U.S. Government: Institutionalizing the Interagency Process," argues for the formation of an interagency organization for strategic planning. In addition to the strategic level, an interagency approach at the tactical and operational levels is long overdue. The wars we're fighting now will not be won exclusively with military might. This warfare is often characterized as "80 percent political and 20 percent military."4 Our leadership at the tactical and operational levels favors the military side and significantly undermines the predominantly political piece of the puzzle.
Unstable regions elsewhere in the world, such as Somalia and Sudan, promise further challenges. A central tenet of the 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy is that promoting democracy and stabilization in at-risk countries will loosen the grip of terrorism around the world. Unless we concentrate on both DOD and DOS and how they operate together, the present course of increased violence and instability will continue.
1. Gabriella Marcella, "National Security and the Interagency Process," Chap. 20, U.S. Army War College: Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy, Second Edition, June 2006.
2. Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, "Military Support for Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations," September 2009.
3. Ibid.
4. Frank G. Hoffman, "Principles for the Savage Wars of Peace," Chap. 17, Rethinking the Principles of War, Naval Institute Press, 2005.