Since August 2008, piracy in the waters around Somalia has exploded. The international response to this increase has heretofore been largely confined to conducting law enforcement responses to distress calls on the high seas. In spite of the presence of approximately 30 warships from at least 16 navies, monthly attack totals have increased, with the main variations being related to monsoons. The naval effort has therefore been unable to stamp out piracy on its own.
The maritime industry could combat this scourge by embarking security teams on merchant ships. An armed security force, however, can cost up to $100,000 per transit, and even an unarmed security detail can cost tens of thousands of dollars per transit. This is prohibitively expensive for most ship owners. Additionally, ships are typically not allowed to pull into foreign ports with firearms on board.
The law enforcement approach taken by the international community is hamstrung by an ineffective legal regimen. International law allows all states to exercise jurisdiction, but prosecution depends on the domestic law of the state conducting the prosecution. In the country attempting to prosecute, a domestic law making piracy a crime may not exist. Furthermore, to prosecute the pirates the navy that conducts the arrest must transport the offenders to Mombasa, Kenya. Even if the prosecution system was efficient, those in custody are expendable. The pirate organizers and ringleaders sit comfortably on shore in Somalia, beyond the reach of the international community.
Given that the problem originates on land, it is time for an expeditionary solution. There is a clear historical precedent for such action. In the early 19th century, in response to the piracy sponsored by the Barbary States of Tripoli, Algiers, and Tunis, the U.S. Navy mounted multiple campaigns that included one of the United States' first uses of expeditionary warfare. These wars were successful in reducing the threat of piracy to U.S.-flagged merchant vessels trading in the Mediterranean Sea.
To counter the threat of today's pirates, the U.S. military should take action to destroy infrastructure in and around the villages that serve as pirate base camps: Eyl, Harradheere, Hobyo, and Garacad. The assets of a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), acting with the support of an Amphibious Ready Group, are perfectly suited to this sort of operation.
The MEU could use its AV-8B Harriers to launch fixed-wing airstrikes on pirate-associated buildings, vehicles, and skiffs. The battalion landing team, the infantry component of a MEU, could land Marines who would then assault and destroy pirate infrastructure. This would be no repeat of the 1993 Somalia campaign; rather, these operations would be limited in time and scope. After a one- or two-day expedition, the Marines would return to their ships. Two hundred years ago this operation would have accurately been termed a "punitive expedition."
While such military action could endanger the lives of seafarers being held hostage, it should be noted that the pirates depend on minimal use of force post-capture to encourage ship owners to negotiate and prevent militaries from taking more decisive action. If the pirates change this business model by killing hostages, ship owners will be less inclined to negotiate, and militaries will be bolder in their responses.
Some would argue that the use of expeditionary warfare to combat piracy would be against international law, but there is a law presently in force that provides authorization for exactly this type of action. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1851 declares:
States and regional organizations cooperating in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia . . . may undertake all necessary measures that are appropriate in Somalia, for the purpose of suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, pursuant to the request of the Transitional Federal Government.
In other words, if the recognized government of Somalia agrees to a military operation within its borders to combat piracy, then the military action is legal under international law.
Only by changing the rules of the game will the international community succeed in tackling Somali piracy. The United States needs to show the pirate ringleaders that they will lose life, limb, and property if they continue with their piratical ways. The rules need to change, and the Navy and Marine Corps, with the support of policy makers, can change them.