Disorder on the Border
(See D. Danelo, pp. 44-49, October 2009 Proceedings)
Richard Kinsella—This excellent article is a rude awakening to the immense illegal drug problem facing the United States through the activities of narcotraficantes that continue to thrive among our Latin American neighbors. From 1972 to 1987 I was posted, first at Caracas, Venezuela, and later at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, as maritime attache for Latin America.
On one of numerous official visits to Bogota, Colombia, in April 1984 I was invited by an embassy staff member to stay at his home. On the second night, 30 April, while having dinner, my host received an urgent phone call requiring his immediate presence at the embassy. The following morning I learned the reason for his abrupt and excited departure; while being driven home, Colombia's Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Castilla was brutally murdered in cold blood by hit-and-run assassins on motorcycles. It was alleged that the Medellin cartel, headed by untouchable and arrogant drug kingpin Pablo Escobar Gavaria, was instrumental in ordering the killing in response to a formerly non-enforceable extradition treaty between the United States and Colombia.
Your article brings to mind a conversation I had with the Consul General of Colombia during a 1985 Fourth of July reception at the U.S. consulate in Rio at which time he didactically pointed out that the United States is principally responsible for its illegal drug problems. With that conversation in mind, in March 1986, I wrote a letter to the Miami Herald that was published on 4 April. It read:
Re your March 19 article titled 'Mexicans blamed for drug woes': After all of these years and hundreds of millions of dollars spent on trying to solve the drug problem by concentrating on halting smuggling from Mexico, Colombia, and other Latin American countries, it's obvious that the problem continues practically unabated.
But let's not put so much blame on our Latin American neighbors; we in the United States are primarily responsible. After all, we are the market, without which there would be no drug problem.
Perhaps we will be able to eradicate the drug trade by spending more on educating our citizens to the dangers of drug use, which results not only in ruination of one's health and loss of one's personal wealth, but also degradation of the United States and the condemnation of our citizens' children and grandchildren to God knows what kind of a future.
Eliminate the demand, and you eliminate the supply. At the same time, those convicted of smuggling narcotics into the United States as well as those convicted of receiving drugs for illegal distribution should be given the maximum penalty that the law provides.
After more than 20 years, apparently the most significant change concerning our illegal drug problem is its highly accelerated growth patterns. Under the circumstances, it is not difficult to agree with those who are convinced that decriminalization, i.e., legalization, is the most viable, and perhaps the only, solution.
Captain William H. Mattingly, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)—Mr. Danelo's research is apparently in depth relative to this problem, including increasing numbers of the U.S. public who are clamoring for the legalization of drugs, particularly marijuana. However, I am puzzled that he failed to mention the work done by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) working with select elements of Mexican federal law enforcement officers in fighting the drug traffic emanating from the interior of Mexico and destined for American users. Surely, Mr. Danelo's research indicated to him that the U.S. Border Patrol has jurisdiction only at the border and not into Mexico's interior. Also the author incorrectly stated that John Sullivan is the Los Angeles County Sheriff. Leroy Baca has been the sheriff since 1998.
I know something about the Mexican drug problem since I am a retired DEA supervisory special agent and have worked undercover in Mexico on a heroin lab located in a city just south of the Mexico-Texas border. Interestingly enough, my partner in that investigation is the current sheriff of Maricopa, Joe Arpaio, known as the "Meanest Sheriff in America" because of his undying efforts to ferret out and deport illegal aliens.
Modernize Navy Advancement
(See J. Murphy, p. 14, October 2009 Proceedings)
Chief Warrant Officer Three Chuck Berlemann, U.S. Navy (Retired)—I would advise extreme care when modifying the enlisted advancement system. Small, well-meaning changes can wreak havoc on the quality of the enlisted leadership for years to come. The best example I can give is a change that occurred in the mid-70s that limited the number of 1st Class, CPOs, and SCPOs who could advance to the next grade if they had less than a certain amount of time in service. As I recall, it was 12 years to advance to CPO, 16 to advance to SCPO, and 18 to advance to MCPO. On the surface this seems reasonable. The more time in service (TIS), the more seasoned and experienced leader we would get. It fails to take into account the "Peter Principle" that states a person will advance to their level of incompetence. The Navy was famous for advancing hard chargers who were accomplishing the mission. However for several years after the change in TIS requirement, a backlog of E-6, E-7, and E-8s who had stagnated for good reasons were being promoted instead of the best performers.
The enlisted advancement system is Darwinian in nature, in that any advantage a specific trait gains means people with that trait will float to the top. Let's examine preference given to people who attain degrees in off-duty education, for example.
While PO-1 Jones stays late to ensure that the ship or aircraft is ready for the next day's mission, PO-1 Smith can't stay over because it would conflict with off-duty education. Frequently PO-1 Smith is granted relief from accompanying the unit on unplanned short deployments to attend classes. Think about what happens when the Chief's list comes out and the boost PO-1 Smith gets from the associate's degree he attained turns into an advancement while PO-1 Jones stays in the First Class Mess.
This is harmful to PO-1 Jones because of the missed opportunity. It's harmful to Chief Smith because he learned that gaming the system works. Most of all it's harmful to the Navy and the unit these petty officers served in, because the degrees obtained through most off-duty education are of little value in accomplishing a unit's missions.
It seems heretical speech to denigrate degrees, but in truth enlisted Sailors fill technical billets unlike the ones officers fill. The rate training available in Class "A" and "B" schools plus the equipment-specific training afforded in Class "C" schools, backed up by on-the-job training on the actual equipment best prepare enlisted Sailors to perform their missions. Use it as a tie breaker? Maybe, but I would always wonder who was covering for this person while they were taking classes off duty.
Several years ago a friend of mine had the opportunity to serve on a CPO selection board. He told me that the president of the advancement board told the members before beginning that the most important thing to look for when making a decision was "performance while serving in the member's rate in a sea-duty billet." I think that was exceptionally good advice.
It Takes a Carrier: Naval Aviation and the Hybrid Fight
(See T. B. Kraft, pp. 20-24, September 2009 Proceedings)
Colonel Stuart K. Archer, U.S. Air Force—Admiral Kraft's article supports a legitimate argument for the viability of America's carrier force and the need for variety and diversity in America's military arsenal. Unfortunately, his zeal to promote carrier-based aviation provides only a limited perspective of one part of America's air power arsenal. Indeed, carrier aviation plays a critical role in our nation's defense, but like most other weapon systems it also carries significant vulnerabilities and limitations. Your readers would have been better served had the admiral demonstrated how well carrier aviation can support the joint fight and how weaknesses in one weapon system can be minimized by the strengths of other systems.
The power-projection capabilities of our Navy's carrier strike groups are absolutely remarkable and provide the country with an unmatched rapid-strike capability. However, the admiral's supposition that carriers "were the only viable solution for tactical air support" in recent conflicts belies the serious limitations of carrier aviation and discounts the capabilities of land-based aviation. He purports that there were no practical basing options at the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), when in fact numerous Persian Gulf bases were available and used during all phases of the conflict. Although the location of these bases mandated longer transit times for land-based strike aviation, the time generated was only 1.5- to 2-hour longer sorties than for carrier-launched sorties.
Although carrier aviation may have provided nearly 75 percent of strike sorties through 23 December 2001, land-based heavy bomber and strike aircraft provided well over 70 percent of the munitions expended. These platforms produce an economy of force and have adapted to the dynamic demands of a changing conflict. Heavy bombers and large strike aircraft have proven their flexibility in today's fight. They provide the accuracy and precision needed for close air support or the wholesale large-scale destruction needed for strategic operations and effects.
Land-based support aircraft also provide the critical elements of air refueling, command and control, reconnaissance, and enhanced early warning that our carrier aviation cannot. No doubt carrier aviation played a critical role in the rapid victory over the Taliban regime in 2001, but it operated as an integral part of a well-executed joint and coalition air war that synthesized the positive aspects of multiple weapon systems and minimized their limitations.
The admiral also too lightly discounts the vulnerability argument against the carrier, not only to antiship ballistic missiles, but also to geographic challenges in critical areas such as the Malacca Strait, the Persian Gulf, or the Gulf of Aden. With the enhancements to missile capabilities and quiet diesel submarines, the geographic tyranny of the littorals produces limitations that should not be so readily discounted.
Additionally, naval aviation is no more exempt from the foreign entanglements that he cites for land-based aircraft. Securing overflight privileges produces similar limitations to securing foreign bases, and this was overtly demonstrated in both Desert Fox, where all strike aircraft were prohibited from overflying Saudi Arabia, and Operation Enduring Freedom, where overflight rights for coalition aircraft had to be granted from Pakistan.
All things considered, carriers provide the rapid-strike capability that the admiral cites, but they also carry critical vulnerabilities and limitations not found in land-based aircraft. The better discussion is how these forces work together and the overall capabilities that joint air power provides to the United States. When focusing on the carrier aviation argument as the only remedy it unfortunately dilutes the emphasis on the overall air war and the huge benefits to the America's arsenal that air power provides.
No Need for High Speed
(See M. Vego, pp. 46-50, September 2009 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral George R. Worthington, U.S. Navy (Retired)—It's not solved yet—littoral combat operations—but there is lots of lip service starting with Forward . . . From the Sea, the second paper on top of the original, From the Sea. The white paper purported to reinvigorate the Navy-Marine Corps relationship, which did not need verbiage to invigorate it. The Navy foundered on its post-Cold War shipbuilding, not really certain what would be needed. Wild visions of "arsenal ships" standing off land masses lobbing rounds into on-shore bunkers ricocheted around the Navy E-Ring. Carrier battle groups continued deployments with stolid support of national goals. But the littoral remained naked.
In 2005, the Sea Fighter (FSF-1) was christened at the Nichols Brothers Shipyard in Seattle, Washington. A 256-foot catamaran—which made 55 knots during builder's trials—she was touted as an experimental hull form to learn about technologies that could be incorporated into the NAVSEA effort, the much-touted Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).
Two LCS builders were contracted for $220 million with two entirely different lead ships built. Fifty-five 3,000-ton LCSs were scheduled and remain the target. But times and situations change. The Navy announced selection of one will take place early in 2010. Because the ships are so different, crews cannot cross-deck and have to be specifically trained for each version. Then the Secretary of the Navy cancelled the program for cost overruns.
Dr. Vego further questions the LCS's need for speed and its modular-oriented engineering aspects. Both LCS designs displace 900 tons more than a 2,100-ton World War II Fletcher tin can, which I first served in and was a great littoral ship in her own right. Destroyers stood 500 yards off Normandy on D-Day and saved a lot of Army bacon firing flat trajectory rounds into bunkers behind the berm. Can the LCS do that? Vego also lambasted the mine countermeasures mission by exhorting the Navy to upgrade its existing mine warfare force—none of which requires 50 knots. And yes, the Sea Fighter was constructed in 22 months and in the water for $83 million. It's not perfect, but it could support special operations forces and do the littoral mission at acceptable cost. And it can be improved.
Why is Digital Camouflage All the Rage?
(See J. W. Hulme, p. 10, October 2009 Proceedings)
Major Richard Longshore, U.S. Army Reserve (Retired)—Much has been written about the Navy's uniform regulations as they pertain to wearing the new Navy Working Uniform (NWU). Most will agree that the regulations, if not myopic, are at least too rigid when compared with those of the sister services. Anyone who has been in a large metropolitan airport recently has seen Soldiers, Airmen, and Marines who have traveled for hours, if not days, clad in their relaxed combat uniforms, while Sailors of both genders seem uncomfortable and out of place in the new black-and-tan abomination.
A more basic question is why the Navy's leadership felt another new uniform was needed, and Mr. Hulme addresses that question admirably. Recently, I have seen naval officers (0-5 through 0-7) sporting the NWU on which they have adorned their names, warfare specialty emblems, and "US NAVY" in bright gold thread. Obviously, these natty details defeat the very concept of camouflage. This begs the questions: Did the Navy leadership suffer "camouflage-envy" or did it just want a cool costume? How much of the Navy's dwindling fiscal resources were expended in this "feel good" exercise?
An Operational LCS
(See N. Polmar, pp. 86-87, September 2009 Proceedings)
Remo Salta—Mr. Polmar hit the nail on the head with his recommendation for the Danish-built Absalon to be used as a model for our Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). Not only is the Absalon well armed for the task, but also she combines size and endurance with flexibility, key elements for any ship hoping to sustain long overseas deployments. Mr. Polmar cites many reasons why a ship like the Absalon would be ideal as an LCS, but there are two more reasons why she could be an indispensable warship to the U.S. Navy.
First, if one of the most important reasons for the LCS is to combat small and fast enemy speedboats or patrol boats, it has been proven many times in the past that the most effective weapons against these types of tiny warships are helicopters and other fast attack craft. The Absalon (or a variant of such a ship) can carry both. She already has the capability of carrying two large EH-101 Merlin helicopters, which can easily be armed with guns and rockets. She could also be modified to carry several heavily-armed amphibious assault craft, such as the Swedish Stridsbat 90H-class fast personnel landing craft. These amazing boats can travel at 40 knots and mount heavy machine guns, Hellfire surface-to-surface missiles, as well as an 81-mm mortar. These boats are also in use with several navies, including Mexico's, which uses them as patrol boats. The Absalon could act as a mother ship for these small craft, much like the old LSTs did for the small PBRs and Swift Boats in Vietnam. These fast and heavily armed amphibious assault craft, along with armed helicopters, could act as a forward defense against suicide speedboats (which the Iranians seem so fond of) as well as be used for amphibious assault or covert operations in extremely shallow waters. The Absalon could also carry vertical take-off unmanned aerial vehicles armed with 3.75-in rockets, thereby acting as yet another layer of defense against attacking speedboats and fast-attack craft. If we used several Absalon-class LCSs in a layered defense against small but heavily-armed speedboats, it could go a long way in deterring such attacks.
Second, the LCS would also be expected to assist in humanitarian relief operations around the world. The Absalon would be an excellent choice for this mission. Not only does she have a 9,688 square-foot container deck that could be used to store supplies and equipment, but also has her two large helicopters. In addition, if the ship carried several Stridsbat 90H fast landing craft, they would undoubtedly be useful in any disaster-relief operation, moving equipment, supplies, and personnel to and from shore. Extensive medical facilities could be maintained on board the vessel as well.
If the Absalon's speed could be increased to approximately 28 or 30 knots, she would be the ideal candidate to replace the two ships that are currently being considered for our future LCS.
The End of Sea Power
(See R. B. Watts, pp. 40-44, September 2009 Proceedings)
Captain D. A. Yesensky, U.S. Navy (Retired)—While serving on the National Security and Decision Making faculty at the Naval War College from 1997 to 2000, I often read student papers similar to this that identified a problem without the author describing a solution. Too many writers do this and shortchange the reader. This author factually supported his thesis and opinions that Alfred Thayer Mahan's strategy does not provide today's and tomorrow's needed naval force structure. Simply, the Navy is not structuring based on threats of today. In many forms, and often, the author states that today's Navy is stuck in a frozen history and he artfully defends his position. He recognizes future war-at-sea peer competitors and argues why they are not a threat, and recognizes the vital importance of sea power, its continued development, and that the oceans are vital to the interest of the United States. I think that few will disagree with him on the need for sea control. His persuasive presentation captured me and had me looking forward to what his Navy force structure would look like.
Captain Watts discusses the Navy's centric focus on power projection afar, and the Coast Guard's maritime domain awareness of tracking the vast number of ships bound for the United States. But then he states that the Coast Guard has neither the financial means nor assets to complete this task. What a great setup for how he will explain how to overcome this. I was thinking naval fortress America on our sea frontiers.
I thought the last section, "What is the Threat?," would provide a new-era strategy to solve the problem of a naval force structure for this nation. But it read like a politician speaking in generalizations?have an analysis, have a strategy, resource this strategy, and can we change. I agree with the captain that we need to act and develop a naval strategy that supports our national interest for today and tomorrow.
The piece spent too much time on the problem and not enough on how to fix it. The author's lack of a solution left this reader wondering.
Jon Solomon—Captain Watts makes a number of curious statements. He believes traditional sea power's secondary role in contemporary conflicts renders it a strategically wasteful use of national defense resources. He initially suggests sea power has figured minimally in the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts, but later implicitly acknowledges the sea services' extensive roles in deploying ground forces to these forward locations as well as supporting them once ashore. He focuses his definition of sea-based power projection on the strike mission, excluding other ongoing missions supporting ground forces such as logistics provision, special operations, maritime interdiction, and wide-area ISR. He broadly states long-range strike can be conducted by numerous other means at significantly less cost than using traditional sea power but provides no scenario-specific comparisons with alternatives. Nor does he counter the argument that traditional sea power's strategic mobility hedges against the risk other nations will limit or deny American use of their sovereign territory. The fact is, without the rapid and persistent combat employability of forward-deployed Navy and Marine Corps forces, not to mention the throughput capabilities of Military Sealift Command assets, the United States could not have initiated this decade's operations in distant theaters at the scale and on the timelines desired by political leadership. Nor could these operations be sustained at their present respective levels of intensity without the contributions of "traditional" maritime forces.
The author accuses the Navy of being driven by blind Mahanism. No voice associated with Navy leadership credibly argues any other power would instinctively seek a single decisive battle against American sea power, let alone need mirror-image forces to effectively conduct major maritime operations. As Jon Tetsuro Sumida observes in his book Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command, not even Mahan argued these things. Mahan, like Clausewitz, believed theory was a teaching tool and that applying it dogmatically as doctrine was a grave mistake.
Captain Watts also notes other nations continue to build up their maritime forces but then declares that none of these forces are designed for "big war." One must assume by big war he means trans-oceanic war. True, only the U.S. Navy presently possesses sustainable trans-oceanic warfare capabilities. However, the absence of competing grand oceanic fleets does not mean other nations lack political-strategic ambitions within their home regions, and that these ambitions do not clash strongly with U.S. and allied interests. Such powers' maritime forces are configured for coercing their neighbors as well as sustaining an active defense against superior forces. Operationally significant numbers of theater-range conventional forces are acquired for supporting regional political-military objectives, not fisheries patrol.
As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' 2008 National Defense Strategy makes clear, the long war against transnational terrorism has not altered the international system's anarchic nature. Within the framework of DOD strategy, the Navy must rigorously analyze how it can most effectively balance near-term demands against long-term risks. History ended neither in 1991 nor in 2001, and the future is rarely kind to strategies rooted in determinism.
An Odious Practice
(See T. Cutler, p. 93, October 2009 Proceedings)
Commander Tyrone G. Martin, U.S. Navy (Retired)—In his 1981 biography of Commodore William Bainbridge, the late Dr. David F. Long detailed how the commodore was the "gray eminence" behind the duel, working primarily through Master Commandant Jesse Duncan Elliott to maneuver his two fellow commodores into the confrontation. Bainbridge, it appears, had a personal vendetta against certain of his contemporaries who had achieved some measure of success in the Barbary War, as against his impetuous loss of the frigate Philadelphia. Decatur, in addition to the fame he attained then, had presided over Barron's court martial following the Chesapeake-Shannon incident. It was through this relationship and a menu of innuendo and false information regarding it that Barron was maneuvered into his challenge. It was Decatur's ego that prevented a peaceful resolution.
In addition to his 1820 success in eliminating Decatur, Bainbridge, in 1814, had sought, unsuccessfully to get Commodore Charles Stewart court-martialled for some alleged shortcoming while commanding Constitution on her third war cruise. And in 1823, he would press for the court-martial of Commodore Isaac Hull for malfeasance while commandant of the Boston Navy Yard. Hull was acquitted.
We'll never know just how venomous William Bainbridge was, for, upon his death, his wife carried out his orders to burn all his personal papers.
We Need to Invest in Oceanography
(See J. F. Sahid, pp. 60-65, August 2009 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral David Titley, U.S. Navy—Ensign Sahid made some cogent points about the benefits of oceanographic study, past accomplishments, and the current state of the national oceanographic fleet. I'd like to provide a look at what operational oceanography is accomplishing today in the Navy.
The operational program, composed of roughly 3,000 military and civilian personnel under the Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Command, provides detailed environmental information to keep the fleet operating safely and effectively. The program operates under the "Battlespace on Demand" construct: a data collection foundation using a network of ship, land, air, and space-based sensors; environmental data fusion and forecasting systems operating at two Navy supercomputing centers and several operational commands; teams of military and civilian experts at various reachback cells determining how the predicted environment will affect fleet operations; and military oceanography teams forward embedded at the tactical and operational levels using this environmental information to help decision makers. This process supports decision superiority by informing options, aiding course of action development, optimizing tactics, and quantifying risk based on environmental conditions both now and predicted in the future.
In addition, the command operates seven T-AGS survey ships that conduct high-resolution bottom mapping, and physical, chemical, and biological oceanographic surveys world-wide in support of COCOM requirements to improve the Navy's understanding of the physical environment in areas of interest.
The Navy is currently investing in a new modified T-AGS ship that will include a moon-pool for the deployment and retrieval of unmanned vehicles and sensor systems. We are also funding the acquisition of 150 ocean gliders, long-duration autonomous underwater vehicles, as part of a persistent ocean sensing network. Unmanned undersea vehicles and robotic systems have incredible capabilities and have proven to be safer, less expensive alternatives to manned deep submersibles. In fact, the Navy helped support a return to Challenger Deep in 2009 by the remotely operated vehicle Nereus, launched and controlled from a Navy-owned research ship.
Navy contributions for the procurement of large research vessels used by academic and marine science institutions exceed those of any other federal agency. Currently six ships operating in the academic research fleet are Navy owned, with several built since the mid 1990s. The Navy has also invested funding for two new ocean-class research vessels with targeted delivery dates in 2014.
The Office of the Oceanographer of the Navy, the Office of Naval Research, and the Naval Research Laboratory provide significant resources for marine science research and technology development, ensuring that our understanding of the marine environment and our predictive capabilities continue to meet the challenges that will confront naval forces in the future. For example, the Navy currently spends about $26 million annually on marine mammal research to better understand their behavior, migration patterns, and response to acoustics. Navy sponsored research is the largest contributor to the existing scientific literature on marine mammals.
I am proud of not only the past accomplishments of oceanography science but also the contributions our men and women make today supporting the Fleet.
'Patrolling the Front Lines of History'
(See C. Flaherty, pp. 32-35, September 2009 Proceedings)
The Pilotless Squadron
(See D. Umpa, pp. 36-38, September 2009 Proceedings)
Captain Michael F. Morrison, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)—Seldom have I seen a better illustration of old thinking versus new than in the back-to-back articles in the September issue on piloted-versus-pilotless maritime surveillance. Lieutenant Commander Flaherty is to be commended on his prideful description of historical maritime patrol (P-3C) operations but must be reminded that nearly all P-3 ASW success was a direct result of cueing provided by deep-water Integrated Undersea (acoustic) Surveillance Systems (IUSS). Such detection and cueing was never available in (acoustically) shallow water and, to my knowledge, no longer exists in deep water.
The post-Cold War submarine threat has radically changed. Air-independent diesel-electric powered submarines operating in home waters could be a substantial threat to future forward-deployed U. S. naval units. Without comprehensive real-time battle space awareness and threat cueing neither the next-generation multi-mission maritime aircraft (P-8A Poseidon) nor our dwindling SSN fleet is likely to be a cost-effective counter to this threat.
If effective ASW is to be conducted, especially in the littorals, it won't be through acoustic means. What we need is a new overhead maritime surveillance system that operates around the clock providing IUSS-like alerts to our limited and vulnerable manned ASW forces. National all-source intelligence and space-based surveillance augmented by high- and mid-altitude long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) could provide such surveillance in advance of and in support of future regional battle group operations.
In a maritime surveillance role UAVs could be equipped with electronic emission intercept, synthetic aperture and periscope/mast detection radars, full motion video, electro-optic and infrared search capabilities, and satellite communications. UAV operations evolved from the current Middle East Predator patrols could be launched from nearby land or carrier bases and controlled from almost any satellite-connected site. Sensor data could be correlated with geographical maps and merged with live and stored images in processing and fusion centers. This form of regional surveillance can be surge-deployed prior to forward operations. Once a UAV-based system of surveillance is developed it would be interesting to explore using similar aircraft, now armed with air-to-surface missiles (e.g. up to 14 Hellfire missiles on the Predator Reaper), to further discourage threat operations in the area.
It's time for the Navy to stop reminiscing about ASW attributes of the maritime patrol aircraft and turn to more modern and cost effective technologies.