A World of Trouble: The White House and the Middle East-from the Cold War to the War on Terror
Patrick Tyler. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2008. 640 pp. Illus. Notes. Index. $30.
Reviewed by Peter L. Hahn
In his latest book, seasoned New York Times and Washington Post correspondent Patrick Tyler presents an engaging overview of U.S. presidential policymaking in the Middle East from the days of President
Dwight D. Eisenhower to President George W. Bush. The author argues that the ten presidents he studies performed poorly at the task of managing American interests in the region. "What is most striking about the half century of U.S. effort," he notes, "is the record of vacillation, of shifting policies, broken promises, and misadventures, as if America were its own worst enemy." What might be called a continuity of discontinuity also characterized U.S. diplomacy, as Tyler emphasizes "how much each leader sought to distinguish himself from his predecessor-a very human trait-and in doing so injected a permanent element of instability to Middle East policy."
The core of the book surveys presidential policymaking toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, the emergence of nationalism in Egypt and Iran, the various wars in the Persian Gulf, and the rise of terrorism. While President Eisenhower earns a high grade for his handling of the Suez Crisis, successive presidents attract scorn for their mismanagement of such episodes as the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 (Lyndon B. Johnson) and 1973 (Richard M. Nixon), the Iranian revolution (Jimmy Carter), and the civil war in Lebanon (Ronald Reagan). President George H. W. Bush "fumbled" his immediate reaction to the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Although President Bill Clinton advanced the Arab-Israeli peace process, Tyler notes, his policy "was missing the most essential ingredients: trust that he would do what was necessary, unwavering principle, and political discipline." The second President Bush led an invasion of Iraq that was "a model of military efficiency" but one that quickly became a "catastrophe" because of mismanagement of the postwar phase.
A World of Trouble deserves some accolades. In places it exudes drama befitting the momentous events it covers. It occasionally presents new information on scholarly debates, such as policy disagreements among top officials of the Nixon administration and the role of covert CIA officers in U.S.-Iraqi relations during the 1980s. Tyler relishes the colorful anecdote, such as Bill Clinton's extensive preparations in September 1993 to avoid a ceremonial kiss from Yasser Arafat. The intermittent appearances of Prince Bandar bin Sultan in the halls of power in Washington illuminate a cross-cutting perspective on the consistent Saudi influence on U.S. policy.
Yet the book contains flaws. Its foundational judgments are not sustained by rigorous analysis. Tyler does not thoroughly investigate the actual (or counterfactual) alternatives to the presidential policies that he considers faulty. Nor does he resolve the apparent contradiction between noting the flaws in each administration's policy and then criticizing its successor for failing to maintain continuity. He also neglects to examine such factors as oil, anti-Soviet (and ultimately anti-fundamentalist) security concerns, Israel, and the domestic political and ethno-cultural influences that have shaped U.S. policy for generations. Neither does he adequately assess the role of foreign powers and players in affecting U.S. policy. In addition, his treatment of the presidents is uneven: John F. Kennedy's term goes relatively unexplored, and even George W. Bush's is allocated merely 30 pages (compared with Bill Clinton's 123). Also troubling is the author's tendency to present thick layers of detail without careful attention to chronology or causation.
A World of Trouble is based on primary sources from presidential libraries, a survey of the secondary literature, and the author's own reporter's notebook. While some effort is made to give the story a global context, international archives were not consulted. For long-term historical perspective, the book remains surpassed by the accounts of journalists such as Kenneth Love, in Suez: The Twice-Fought War (1969), of Patrick Seale, in The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Postwar Arab Politics, 1945-1958 (1965, 1987), and by the scholarly account of George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East (1990).
Never Forgotten: The Search and Discovery of Israel's Lost Submarine Dakar
David W. Jourdan. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009. 248 pp. Illus. Index. $34.95.
Reviewed by Commander Irvine G. Lindsay, Royal Navy
David Jourdan's new book tells the story of the INS Dakar, formerly HMS Totem, which sailed without its lucky "totem pole" on its maiden voyage to Israel and was lost without trace. The narrative begins with the submarine's last days in Great Britain-a tale instantly recognizable to any who have ever struggled to prepare a ship or a submarine for commissioning-and its glimpses of the domestic lives of the doomed ship's company lend pathos to the story of its ultimate disappearance.
Jourdan gives a powerful account of the families who wait for the return of the submarine, realizing that the crew may be lost forever, and the military's concern that the submarine had been lost through enemy action. This is not a book about statistics and strategy, but about the investigation that will allow those left behind to close a particularly tragic chapter in their lives. The author describes how he became involved in the mystery, beginning with his own submarine service in the U.S. Navy and his growing passion for underwater exploration. This led to his founding Nauticos LLC, a private underwater research company with an impressive reputation for finding lost objects in the world's oceans.
Jourdan's painstaking methodology and research allowed him to eliminate the wilder theories surrounding the loss of INS Dakar. He covers the controversy over the discovery of the emergency indicator buoy on a beach in Gaza a year after the disappearance of the boat and presents the detailed analysis of factors which led to the conclusion that the search had been conducted in the wrong area since it disappeared in 1968.
The technology used and the search process employed were in themselves impressive, but what comes across is the determination, verging on the fanatical at times, of the Dakar search committee's efforts to solve the 31-year-old mystery. The search for and subsequent discovery of the wreck in 1999 were clearly due to the dedication of the committee and its frank refusal to give up.
Other than Chapter 11, Jourdan's account of the tourist sites in Jerusalem, the narrative of the search and recovery operation is gripping. The result of the forensic investigation into Dakar's loss remains inconclusive. All that is known is that the submarine was not lost through enemy action. Submerged collision seems highly unlikely. Given the cost of further investigation I suspect that this information is enough for the Israeli Navy, and the wreck will now be left undisturbed as a military gravesite, with the recovery of the bridge-fin as a memorial in Haifa-a fitting tribute to those lost in the tragedy.
The photographs supporting the text are crisp and well-produced, and the photograph of the familiar Royal Navy compass repeat on the wrecked bridge is an uncomfortable reminder of the dangers of going to sea.
I found Jourdan's dramatized reconstruction of the final minutes on board Dakar unnecessary. There seems no need to include such a graphic yet hypothetical account of how this submarine died. The story of the disappearance, the wild theories proposed over the years, the discovery of the wreck, and subsequent retrieval of the bridge-fin are dramatic enough.
Yet Never Forgotten tells a fascinating story and in general tells it well. It exonerates the Dakar's commanding officer and allows the surviving families some closure on this longstanding mystery. The book should find its way onto the shelves of any who revel in undersea mysteries.
Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad
Devin R. Springer, James L. Regens, and David N. Edger. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009. 320 pp. Figures. Tables. Notes. Bib. Index. $26.95
Reviewed by Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein, MSC, U.S. Navy
Devin Springer and his colleagues have written an important work for those wanting a deeper understanding of the way al Qaeda functions strategically, operationally, and tactically. The book distills the theories of some of al Qaeda's most important ideologues, past and present. As an Arabic linguist, Springer advocates listening to what al Qaeda says and has derived much from reading as well as analyzing its Web sites. James Regens is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and David Edger previously worked for the National Clandestine Service at CIA.
The authors correctly identify in militant Islam a pervasive, constantly evolving ideology. Among the intellectual fathers of violent Islamist theory are Ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1327), Muhammad ibn Abdul-Wahab (1703-1792), and Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966). Qutb condemned modern Muslim society as being in a state of jahiliyah (ignorance), and argued that a vanguard must remedy this godless society. He became the most important modern theoretician of militant Islam, and since his execution in 1966 several notable ideologues and leaders have attempted to operationalize his theories. For instance, in the 1970s, Muhammad Abdel-Salam Faraj postulated the "near-enemy" and "far-enemy" dialectic, advocating that waging jihad against the near enemy (corrupt Arab regimes) is a duty before striking the far enemy (the United States and Israel). Ayman al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden would reverse this long-held militant view. The authors examine the reasons for this philosophic shift and the ensuing debate the attacks on the United States have generated among militants.
Islamic Radicalism does a marvelous job of providing a short biography of Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, considered the spiritual founder of al Qaeda, but fails to link his philosophy of al Qaeda al-Sulba, (translated as "The Solid Foundation") to the creation of al Qaeda. Nevertheless, the text contains an excellent discussion of the many disagreements within al Qaeda-associated movements, such as the schism over whether it was premature to declare an Islamic State of Iraq in 2007. It also covers the nuances of grievances that the Islamic Army in Iraq held against al Qaeda in Iraq.
The book ends with an appeal to understand the subtleties within militant Islamist groups and to recognize jihadist vulnerabilities. Laymen should first read Karen Armstrong's Islam: A Short History, (Modern Library, 2000) for a holistic view of Islam to distinguish it from militant Islamist ideology, and then delve into militant Islamist groups in the three-volume, The Terrorist Perspectives Project: Strategic and Operational Views of Al Qaida and Associated Movements (Naval Institute Press, 2008). That said, this book is a required read for those involved in counterterrorism, force-protection specialists, Middle East Foreign Area Officers, as well as intelligence officers.
Network-Centric Warfare: How Navies Learned to Fight Smarter through Three World Wars
Norman Friedman. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009. Illus. Index. 360 pp. $32.95 ($26.36 USNI members)
Reviewed by Captain George Galdorisi, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Network-Centric Warfare is a necessary book for professionals and laymen alike who want to understand a complex topic that virtually every other book on the subject renders obscure. Given the importance of command and control, communications, and computers to warfare today and how other books have cloaked the subject of network-centric warfare in murky and confusing terminology, this is the definitive work on the subject.
Dr. Friedman earned a Ph.D. in theoretical physics from Columbia University and has spent decades working on early networking systems like the Navy Tactical Data System (NTDS). He has access to senior military and industry officials as an adviser and consultant.
His book's central thesis is that while many tout network-centric operations and network-centric warfare as a relatively new concept, its origins go back more than a century. Friedman takes the reader through this history in a fast-paced, extensively cited tour of the origins and development of the technology, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures that have since culminated in our current capabilities.
In the early 20th century, British Admiral Sir John "Jackie" Fisher first developed what the author has dubbed "picture-centric warfare," whose ocean surveillance, communication, and signal intelligence concept was foundational for later systems. After successfully testing this model as Mediterranean fleet commander, Fisher brought it to the Admiralty in 1904 as First Sea Lord. He established two war rooms, one with a global picture and one with a more focused picture of the English Channel. The Royal Navy evolved the concept in the decade leading up to World War I and exploited it to gain the upper hand on the German navy during the war.
True to the book's subtitle, Friedman demonstrates how, from these relatively humble beginnings, Fisher's notion of picture-based warfare evolved through two world wars and the Cold War. We learn not only how adversaries built picture-based systems, but how and why the side with the best picture and wherewithal to exploit it was typically victorious.
Friedman's descriptions of U.S. and Soviet efforts to get the upper hand in picture-based warfare are excellent. For anyone who served on active duty during the Cold War, they lift "the fog of war" from what was happening at the macro-level, given that we saw much of this history through a soda straw on our ships, submarines, or aircraft. Friedman also describes how many other navies developed this capability. This history alone would make for an extraordinarily valuable book.
But Network-Centric Warfare is about far more than history; it is about the future of picture- or network-centric warfare itself. This comes through in each of the book's first 20 chapters and is reprised in the final chapter, "What Does It All Mean?" Here Friedman offers a vital prescription as we evaluate how the nation invests hundred of billons of defense dollars each year:
It is by no means clear that moving investments from platforms and weapons toward surveillance and communications saves much money. The question of how to balance the two kinds of investment has not yet been answered, partly because the new kind of warfare has been misnamed. If we call it network-centric then investment will go to produce a better or more reliable network. If instead we call it picture-centric, then at least we can trade off picture quality against weapon requirements.
If you read only one book this year, read this book. If Network-Centric Warfare isn't yet on the Chief of Naval Operations reading list, it should be soon.