Three-hundred-sixty-one pounds per square inch-this is the pressure experienced at 800 feet, the rated operating depth for a Los Angeles-class submarine. At such depths all submarines and the Sailors who operate them are under extreme stress. Today the entire U.S. submarine force is feeling similar strain from all sides, because of an increase in worldwide submarine proliferation and an overall decrease in its force size and in Navy-wide antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, leaving them but a shadow of what they once were. To fulfill the Submarine Warfare Division's mission for the U.S. submarine force "to remain the world's preeminent submarine force" and "to maintain dominance throughout the maritime battle space," these challenges must be recognized and confronted head-on.
Subs and Modern Maritime Strategy
The legacy of the U.S. submarine force was forged in the Pacific during World War II. Submarines placed a stranglehold on Japan's access to resources and hampered its ability to move men and other war materiel throughout the Pacific. The submarine force also gave the U.S. Fleet a chance to recover from the blow it sustained at Pearl Harbor and allowed the United States to begin constructing the aircraft carriers that were so instrumental in defeating the Imperial Japanese Navy.
During the Cold War submarines continued to prove essential to naval operations, particularly in the Cuban Missile Crisis; the Vietnam War, when they were used for SEAL insertions; and for missions such as Operation Ivy Bells, which involved wire-tapping underwater Soviet communications lines to gather intelligence about their Yankee- and Delta-class nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines.
The post-Cold War years saw a redrafting of the geopolitical landscape, but the missions performed and the capabilities required remained largely the same. Development of new technologies allowed for Tomahawk cruise missiles to be carried and used to great effect in the first Gulf War and Operation Iraqi Freedom. New technologies, such as air-independent propulsion (AIP), allowed diesel submarines to remain submerged for longer periods. Supersonic sea-skimming cruise missiles and wake-homing torpedoes are now found in torpedo rooms of submarines belonging to countries, which if not enemies, certainly have adversarial relations.
Stealth's Practical Advantages
Why submarines? As Robert Kaplan writes in his book, Hog Pilots, Blue-Water Grunts (Random House, 2005), "The more powerful the media, the greater the benefit of being unseen. The sub was where the true intentions of a nation were revealed." Submarines offer unmatched capabilities in special operations, intelligence-gathering, and antisubmarine warfare. They provide coastal defense cost-effectively and are considered highly asymmetric platforms, as they are notoriously difficult to detect and can deliver quite a punch, particularly against surface ships.
It should come as no surprise, considering their capabilities, that nations seeking to increase their maritime assets at low cost turn to submarines. According to "The Military Balance 2009," an annual assessment of defense capabilities and economics released by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, China's strategic submarine fleet grew threefold with the addition of two Jin-class SSBNs; and while its tactical fleet shrank from 67 to 62, the number of new, stealthy diesels grew. Ten Song-class, eight Kilo-class, two Shang-class, and two Yuan-class were procured during this time. These new boats represent an overall qualitative improvement in the Chinese submarine force. India has nearly completed its indigenously designed advanced technology vessel, rumored to be nuclear-powered and armed with cruise, and potentially, ballistic missiles. The Nuclear Threat Initiative's submarine proliferation database reveals that India also is finalizing the lease of two Akula-class submarines from Russia and is currently training three crews in St. Petersburg.
Russia has long been an exporter of submarines, with Kilo-class diesels found in the inventories of Iran, India, and China. Russia also has equipped these submarines with the SS-N-27 Sizzler antiship missile. Such armaments pose a threat to high-value U.S. assets transiting through choke points and are ideal for a strategy of anti-access/area-denial such as the one pursued by China. These trends demonstrate the premium placed on submarines and their potential range of applications, from the traditional roles of antisubmarine warfare to swimmer delivery, intelligence-gathering, cruise-missile strikes and choke point seizure. Increases in the number of newer, quieter, and more capable submarines, as well as an increased number of countries operating them indicate that the submarine is gaining traction as a primary maritime strategic platform.
Smaller Force, Greater Demand
In contrast to these global trends, the U.S. attack submarine force, once numbering almost 100, has decreased in size considerably. Our ballistic-missile fleet has been reduced to operate under the current arms-control regime and is adequate to meet the assigned mission.
A 1999 study quoted in the November 2008 Congressional Research Service Report concludes that the United States will require 55 attack submarines by 2015 and 62 by 2025 to meet Unified Combatant Command's warfighting requirements. The Navy presented a proposal to Congress in Fiscal Year 2006 for a 313-ship Navy, which included 48 attack submarines. The study further claimed that, "Although the 313-ship plan calls for a total of 48 SSNs, the 30-year shipbuilding plan does not include enough SSNs to maintain a force of 48 boats consistently over the long run." The submarine force is predicted to decline to a minimum of 41 SSNs around 2028. The driving force behind this decrease is that the retirement rate of Los Angeles-class attack subs is greater than the production rate of newer Virginia-class submarines. In an attempt to meet operational commitments and warfighting requirements, the Navy is examining the option of extending the service lives of its Los Angeles-class boats.
The Department of Defense has pursued additional measures to get the most out of its current submarine force. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review recommended moving 10 percent of the submarine force to the Pacific Fleet to achieve a 60/40 balance. However, this measure alone will not suffice, as 60 percent of a 41-boat submarine fleet amounts to only 24 boats-three fewer than the 27 boats under the 50/50 balance. Forward basing of submarines, such as the three the Navy currently has stationed in Guam, would decrease steaming time to theaters of operations, but would still require depot-level maintenance to be conducted stateside. An underlying concern is that with fewer subs and current or increased requirements, operating tempos will increase, subjecting submarines to greater wear. In short, there is no substitute for having the required number of submarines available to meet operational commitments around the world. This will be necessary regardless of our involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, because cruise-missile strikes are only a small part of the submarine's portfolio.
ASW
Assets Somebody Wants?Submarines are the key, but certainly not the only, component of undersea warfare. The United States' undersea warfare effectiveness comes from its submarine force combined with aerial and surface platforms and undersea surveillance systems. Antisubmarine warfare was the Navy's top priority in the days of the Soviet submarine threat. When that threat vanished, it inevitably assumed a lower spot in the pecking order. ASW was reemphasized in 2004 by Admiral Walter Doran, then-Commander U.S. Pacific Fleet, when he called it his "number-one warfighting priority." ASW remains a costly and time-consuming endeavor to build scenarios on which to train. Platforms have disappeared from the Fleet or have had their roles evolve into something else.
Such an example is the S-3B Viking, which was originally conceived as an antisubmarine platform. Before being phased out in January 2009 it served as a tanker. The Spruance class of destroyers was another platform with ASW as its primary mission, but it has been succeeded by the Arleigh-Burke class, featuring the Aegis system. While they retain a notional ASW ability, the ships are primarily an antiair warfare platform. The Navy's fleet of P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft is aging and rapidly approaching the end of its service life. While the P-8A Poseidon is slated to replace it, it will still take some time to fully regain that capability.
The potential threat posed by foreign submarines has developed over a relatively short time. It will take considerably longer for the United States to develop and rebuild its ASW capabilities. In the meantime, it will once again fall on the submarine force to shoulder the load while the Fleet rebuilds, much as it did during World War II.
The Backbone of the Fleet
At a reception held at the Naval Academy for future submarine officers in January 2009, I asked Vice Admiral John Donnelly what, in his mind, a capital ship was. He replied, "Anything with a nuclear reactor in it." This statement is profound. Each of our nuclear-powered attack submarines is a capital asset, of strategic value to our national defense. Each contributes an unmatched and irreplaceable capability to our combatant commanders. While a submarine may never match a carrier's ability to demonstrate U.S. presence or serve as a flagship, she may well be considered the new capital ship, because she is the centerpiece of a new maritime strategy-ours or someone else's. It should come as no surprise that commanders are always eager to acquire another submarine for their theater of operations. Despite submarines' great importance, of all the areas in the maritime battle space where we are likely to lose dominance, it most likely would be beneath the surface. This is where we face competition from China and other nations that are acquiring submarines in lieu of challenging U.S. superiority in realms such as surface combatants or aircraft carriers, which they have yet to develop.
The U.S. submarine force has a long history of performing under pressure. It is being called on to do so once again. Long-range planners must appreciate what submarines bring to the fight and should not lower the bottom line to save costs at the expense of carrying out mission requirements. An appreciation of submarines' capabilities in modern naval warfare should lead to a new emphasis on their role in U.S. maritime strategy. Given the current state of the U.S. economy, it may be some time before shipbuilding receives the shot in the arm it needs. In the meantime, fortunately for submarines, as well as for the officers and Sailors who man them, working under extreme pressure and doing more with less is what they do best.