Ramping up Navy Counterterrorism
Terrorist networks have evolved significantly since 2001, with more lethal and effective tactics. Our approach to fighting them has made tremendous strides as well. The Navy has become an important
partner in the overall strategy to defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates-but we need to increase our involvement even more. Terrorist groups find safe haven in rugged, ungoverned terrain such as mountains, or they hide in plain sight in congested urban spaces. In 2008, the State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism reported that more than half of their safe havens are in coastal countries, reinforcing the idea that the Navy is well positioned to contribute to their elimination. In 2007, a number of al Qaeda documents captured in Iraq showed that the listed 328 jihad fighters and suicide bombers had traveled from only seven Middle Eastern countries-all of them adjacent to the sea.1
As ground forces draw down in Iraq and become increasingly engaged in land-locked Afghanistan, the enemy will migrate into other regions in search of safe havens. But the sea will remain a transit corridor for networks of drugs, weapons, and people. This traffic includes terrorists, as demonstrated in November 2008, when 16 Pakistanis hijacked a fishing boat to provide cover for their insertion to attack multiple targets in Mumbai, India. Piracy in the Horn of Africa is another area ripe for our enemies' exploitation, though evidence of a nexus remains elusive.
Ashore, disparate guerrilla groups often form interrelated nodes that offer mutual benefits in critical areas such as finance, logistics, operations, recruiting, and propaganda. Maritime networks are similar. Rather than being simply a mechanism to move cargo from port to port, they have become intertwined assemblies. Traditional naval operations have little chance of countering these sophisticated, albeit informal, networks.
Tracking Individuals: A New Navy Mission
Counterterrorism requires a change in how we view our enemy, and how we plan to defeat him. Dismantling these groups is a methodical process that involves attacking network nodes rather than interdicting individual smuggling vessels. We must develop the intelligence to track and hunt not only vessels on the water, but also individuals.
So far, our efforts on the high seas against terrorism have consisted mostly of an expensive push known as maritime domain awareness. The idea is that with enough sensors and partners sharing information, a complete picture of maritime activity can be formed, thus enabling bad traffic to be illuminated from the good. This panacea absorbs time and resources, but does little to find enemies who are adept at hiding among the population and using both legitimate and illicit commerce to mask and support their activities.
Hunting individuals is a long-duration mission. To carry it out, we need dedicated platforms from which to develop a target and then prosecute it. Navy multi-mission forces can provide the firepower, persistence, and flexibility to support such operations. Ships of various sorts-both traditional gray-hulled naval and merchants-allow for a persistent, low-visibility base of operations instead of a massive U.S. footprint on the ground. These ships have the flexibility to stage special operations and other counterterrorism missions from the sea-anywhere in the world. They can provide strategic surprise and compress the time needed to respond to an often-fleeting enemy.
How to Build on Progress Made
The Navy has improved its capabilities in tactics such as visit, board, search, and seizure teams. These are important-and a small factor in the counterterrorism effort. The longstanding rift between intelligence personnel and operators must be overcome. After years of fighting terrorist tactics, the special operations community realized that its unique, direct-action capabilities were worthless without precise, timely intelligence to get them to the right objective at the right time.
They surmounted this obstacle by embracing and supporting the intelligence community. This shift required a change in mindset by both parties. Operators became more intelligence-minded; analysts more aware of real-world actions. We need this kind of partnership in Fleet intelligence teams.
The Navy spends exorbitant amounts of money on large programs designed to counter potential nation-state enemies. Lower-cost irregular warfare efforts get short shrift, and this must change. Land-focused counterterrorism operations have taught us that integrating targeting and engagement capabilities onto a single platform offers maximum responsiveness and flexibility.
The Navy has integrated capability in its multipurpose combatants. These combine sensors and weaponry, assets that can be used for hunting individual enemies. But we need to develop persistent naval intelligence collection and processing. To do so, we should use innovative programs such as the Super Tucano, a reconnaissance and close-air support aircraft built by Embraer. The Tucano currently languishes because of budget limitations-while untold billions are dumped into warfighting efforts of questionable value such as the DDG-1000. This large guided-missile destroyer was presumably designed to fight in the littorals but is better suited for blue-water engagements against a conventional enemy.2
Go on the Offensive
Insurgents do not reconcile with governments because they have a change of heart. They do it because pressure is applied to their network, or because the government becomes more sympathetic to their demands. In the absence of the latter situation, network leadership and facilitators who are preoccupied with their survival cannot conduct effective operations. Hard-core terrorists who are irreconcilable can only be captured or killed.
Traditional interdiction efforts are irrelevant if smugglers maintain adequate supply lines anyway. Only when the network is disrupted, or the stakes become too high for those involved, does the illicit activity cease. Lawless areas that maritime criminals favor are unlikely to have effective law enforcement and judicial systems. Vessel boardings and temporary apprehension will not dissuade a sailor who has decided to make a living by smuggling or supporting terrorism. We need a more offensive mindset, with less reluctance to use lethal force at sea.
No one is under the illusion that we can capture or kill our way to victory in the fight against illegal seagoing networks.3 But we cede a massive sanctuary to our enemy if we do not change our approach to become more lethal in interdicting maritime threats. Just like their ground-based counterparts, operational-level naval commanders must aggressively seek the authority and approval to use kinetic action, at sea and ashore.
Increased lethality brings the potential for negative or unintended effects, though maritime counterterrorism operations pose far less risk for collateral damage, or even the perception of it, than do land-based operations. Still, we must maintain a delicate balance between aggressive pursuit of our enemies and avoidance of alienating the mariners amid whom they seek refuge. Another advantage of using lethal force at sea is the improved ability to control the information that results from the operation. On land, journalists and enemy personnel often spin the story contrary to facts. The remoteness and inaccessibility of the high seas give us the upper hand in mitigating blowback from enemy propaganda.
Necessity, Not Mission Creep
Some likely believe that counterterrorism is mission creep and a distraction from the Navy's primary role of sea control. Clearly, the maritime services are unique in their ability to fight on and under the sea, a superiority that cannot be abandoned in favor of irregular warfare. But we live in an age of irregular warfare, and our military forces must meet this threat with all of our assets and capabilities. Even if al Qaeda were defeated tomorrow, the new maritime terrorism threat would not disappear.
Globalization and technology allow small groups of individuals, regardless of their motivation, to collaborate against nation-states. Attacking them precisely and rapidly has become an enduring mission for the U.S. military. Maritime forces provide an operational advantage that is not present in other services.
A relatively minor investment in new platforms is essential and will serve our country well in defeating operational challenges at sea. In the long term, the Navy will benefit from the tactical and operational leaders we will develop by engaging directly in counterterrorism operations. And closing the gap between naval intelligence and operations at all levels will greatly improve our ability to defend against maritime threats of any type.
1. "Al Qa'ida's Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records," U.S. Military Academy, Combating Terrorism Center, 19 December 2007, http://ctc.usma.edu/harmony/pdf/CTCForeignFighter.19.Dec07.pdf.
2. Andrew Scutro, "U.S. Eyes Super Tucano for for SpecOps Work," Defense News, 13 March 2009, http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3989450. Department of the Navy, Research, Development, and Acquisition, "DDG 1000," http://acquisition.navy.mil/content/view/full/4687.
3. Remarks by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), 15 July 2008, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1262.
Networking Communicates the Kill
Once again technology is on the move. Recently I communicated with extended family across the country-this time over the Internet. Amazingly, I used a Web camera to see real-time video of my family, and at the same time we talked and exchanged pictures. My laptop was connected to a wireless router, so I could walk with my Web camera down the driveway to show them my house and the view. They have never been to the West Coast, where I'm now living. Why can't we network our Marines this way? How much more effective would Marines be if we could connect via some device that also made available needed information? More to the point, to gain acceptance and momentum for such a concept, where do changes need to take root?
We have been down this road before. There have been several initiatives in recent years to better network the Corps. Some have met with success, but we still face challenges. The Marine Corps can settle for riding the tide of technology-or we can help to define the future on our terms. This is the crossroad at which we now find ourselves.
Progress Has Been Made
The past five years have seen a tremendous increase in communications equipment distributed to infantry battalions and support elements. Having more ground and vehicle radios has enormously impacted our ability to increase battlefield tempo and situational awareness. Platoon and squad members are now almost all connected via radio. Many have the benefit of satellite-based blue-force tracking, in which friendly forces' locations are displayed on a digital map, helping to synchronize and increase decentralized decision-making on the battlefield.
Over a relatively short period of time, squad leaders have replaced hand and arm signals with low-level voice communications. Did hand and arm signals die? No, of course not. They will always have their place. The difference in small unit comms is elementary but significant. Squads can now be in touch without taking their hands from their weapon systems. They can patrol and give fire commands with increased rapidity and across increased distances. Reaction time is decreased. Greater situational awareness is achieved simply because everyone is connected to a network, in this case a radio network.
The Next Steps
The use of mobile communication devices is likely to explode during the next five to ten years. Many Marines already use Palm Pilots and Blackberrys to conduct day-to-day work and personal activities. Most own a cell phone and have figured out how to manipulate it to meet their everyday information needs. They access the Internet, send and receive photos and files, text-message, manage their calendars, and carry out other quotidian activities. Individual networking technology is already connecting our force in many ways professionally. Yet tactically, as a military force, we are years behind in the ways we employ or view technology.
Incremental change can be good: technological change that occurs too fast can make it very tough for a large organization to adapt. However, we are now at the point that we need to change dramatically how we view information flow and how we use communication systems. The Corps must fully exploit technology and change the way we communicate for the better.
Our Cultural Needs
Historically, the flow of communication has been along the lines of the organizational structure. Distributed, asymmetric battlefields require less rigid means, but some structure must still be in place. Therefore our communications equipment and the information it carries must be as fluid and flexible as our missions. Designs should be tailored and modular, so that individual Marines can adjust how they send and receive information to suit their needs. Equipment should be integrated into our existing structures.
As one example, a helmet can serve as an antenna or bridging node for the network. A flak vest may have some integrated circuitry that reduces the weight of external devices. Handsets could be wireless, and their size reduced to those of hearing aids. These are just a few ideas that have been explored by various manufacturers and government agencies. However, due to fiscal realities, many of these technologies may never actually reach the individual Soldier or Marine.
Such changes should always take place where they matter most, and in the Marines this will always have to be wherever operators trained in the art of the kill can best apply technology to help them out-think and out-maneuver their enemy. To better communicate the kill, we must fundamentally change how we see Marines in the networked battlespace.
Potential Solutions
- Every Marine should have a network communications device. It should have some common protocol attributes and a modular design, allowing for simple battery management and software upgrades. Features such as position location, voice and data communications are important. Conversion from tactical to garrison use should be seamless. Therefore, interoperability with other network devices is needed. When not in direct use, these devices should bridge others, together creating a network cloud.
Once trained, Marines should be required to conduct garrison and tactical activities using these devices. They will refine the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and standard operating procedures (SOPs). Leaders at all levels will participate in user-defined operations leveraging information flow to all Marines in real time. The organization will thus evolve while improving processes to move Marines forward. In this environment, small unit leaders will manage their information requirements more effectively.
- All vehicles and aircraft should contain some type of network-enabling antenna and smart-routing capability. Mobile networking platforms will enhance the personnel devices. This is especially important in austere environments. Because mobile platforms have power requirements, taking advantage of this on the ground provides duel usage. Most of our vehicles operate in the elements, and we should make use of solar energy as an alternate power source for networking elements working behind the scenes.
- We need to invest in base networking infrastructure. This will significantly improve the way the Marine Corps views networking. By establishing key nodes within the bounds of our CONUS bases, we will realize a truly networked Corps.
Imagine this scenario: A lieutenant taking his platoon to the field has to maintain radio communications with higher headquarters and range control in some capacity. He discovers another unknown unit training close by. Deconfliction of his unit's activities (coordinating so that they do not conflict with another unit) and self-synchronization (which reduces operational friction of those activities) filters up, then back down the chain, thereby wasting time.
If the two entities were networked, this event could have occurred between the two units, saving time and energy. In a battlefield situation, two units, fully networked, can better understand their battlespace. Units converging onto single or multiple objectives can better deconflict actions, fires, and movements.
Marines who are fully networked can send and receive information seamlessly. For example, networked rifle scopes provide "eyes on" views to multiple entities rather than to only one user. Voice communications are not separated by unit nets, but rather by battlespace.
But without a stable base networking infrastructure in place in CONUS, developing possible TTPs and SOPs is much more difficult. Often it leads to wasted investments in technology, simply because the tools were never fully implemented in peacetime. The same device that a Marine carries to communicate in the field should be the one he carries to the chow hall or PX. The only difference is the environment in which they are used.
Marines will integrate networking technology if it significantly improves their situational awareness and efficiency on an individual level. Such technology will become an extension of their body, much like their weapon system. Networking devices extend information flow processes, furthering the goal of tactical lethality and survivability.
- Training is the tie that binds. We need to change how we employ communication Marines. Radio operators must be fully trained in networking equipment, and the use of tactical data nodes must be a fundamental skill. Passing digital communications wirelessly is essentially the same as radio communications, so radio operators should master the use of such devices.
The number of communication Marines within a battalion should also be increased. One such fully trained and networked Marine in each platoon will facilitate information flow through technical expertise. One networking expert per platoon is required to ensure the maintenance, updates, and proper manipulation of networking equipment.
Technology is rapidly changing the way society processes information. Our enemies are already taking advantage of this. The Marine Corps needs to quickly and decisively take steps in the same direction. Our foes will not need to place huge investments in technology, because the commercial sector has so efficiently made it available to them at low cost. Military systems cannot mirror commercial systems, but we can take strategic steps to provide Marines the ability to define their battlespace. To make this a reality, Marines must be better trained to create their own information flow networks that facilitate fluid and rapid decision-making.
We can only get there by equipping and establishing network architectures that best reflect combat environments. If all Marines master the art of creating networks tailored to their battlespace, information requirements will define themselves. Marine ingenuity will prevail when systems are scalable through a common set of networking protocols. These systems need to be seen as assets and as an integral part of the planning and execution process. When Marines are granted control over their information requirements, we will have a better Corps. This means exploiting technology that better communicates the kill.
Build the Trust for Naval Innovation
Leadership influences creativity and innovation, which may be linked to performance and growth. Yet-paradoxically-Navy leaders face barriers when they undertake such efforts. Risk-taking can result in destroyed careers, a situation that encourages not outside-the-box thinking but toeing the line. We need to change this. Vincent Davis (1960s), Rear Admiral Ronald Kurth (1970s), Stephen Rosen (1990s), and Admiral Vern Clark (2000) developed various theories about naval innovation. The lessons drawn from these models can assist today's naval leaders as they strive to create an imaginative environment. Those in charge of the innovation process???--rank action officers such as lieutenant commanders and commanders-can use these models.
What Defines Innovation?
Culture reflects the current beliefs and behaviors of a group of people, as well as their history. When the past interacts with new trends, the combined picture constitutes contemporary culture. Innovative culture also expresses past and present beliefs, ideas, and behaviors. Innovation occurs because people cause it to, consistently and over time.
In the business world, it is linked to performance and growth through improvements in efficiency, productivity, quality, competitive positioning, market share, and so on. But all organizations can innovate, including hospitals, universities, and the military.
In the Navy, just as in business, innovation must be significant. In economics, the change must increase value; in business, it must create a competitive advantage. Naval innovations need to provide a tactical advantage, improve the quality of life, or enhance the operational effectiveness of our maritime forces.
The term innovation may refer to radical or incremental changes. Its often unarticulated goal is to solve a problem. Maritime strategists have been attempting to outline naval innovation for decades, but no single model explains all cases. This is why we need to consider the four listed earlier. Just as the technology that enforces our maritime strategy has evolved dramatically over the past centuries-from cannons to ballistic missiles-so has our approach to innovation. As the following sections will show, first we reinvented ourselves politically, then behaviorally. And now we need to move to the organizational level.
The Politics
The naval innovator, said Davis in 1967, "simply does not give himself or his career a thought when he embarks on the advocacy process. His single-minded concern is to achieve what he views as a dramatic improvement in the Navy, and he does not calculate one way or the other what his crusade may do for or against his personal advancement."1
Davis examined Navy efforts to develop nuclear technology and concluded that the creative process usually requires an advocate in the middle ranks-lieutenant commander, commander, or captain. This champion has "a uniquely advanced technological knowledge pertinent to the innovation that is not generally shared within the navy."2
Davis also notes that these champions build support among peers, then move up the chain of command to people in key positions.
Politics of Technological Innovation
Rear Admiral Kurth considered the problem from a different perspective: the contrast between incremental changes and what he called "innovative departures," meaning "radical departure from the technology supporting existing weapons systems."3 In Kurth's view, while as the civilian sector was making technological progress, the Navy was disorganized and needed more how-to information.
Like Davis, Kurth notes that the politics of incremental changes are fairly simple, because small changes are easier to promote and encounter little resistance. Innovative departures, by contrast, involve complex politics. The advocates of these efforts are rarely rewarded and sometimes discredited. Therefore, naval innovators often attempt to adapt radical innovation in small stages.
The Psychological Factor
Stephen Rosen identifies two types of military innovations: behavioral and technological. The former are brought about by operational requirements, while the latter result from new technologies such as guided missiles, radar, electronic warfare, and so on. Behavioral innovations are further divided into two categories: peacetime and wartime.
Rosen focuses on innovations that require a reorganization of military strategy, for example downgrading warfare tactics or weapon systems. Peacetime innovations follow from "new ideas about the ways wars would be fought in the future and how they might be won."4
He opposes the concept that failure in wartime is a prerequisite for innovation in peacetime, and does not believe that the military can be creative only with civilian intervention. The process still involves politics, but Rosen takes it to a higher level than those that Davis and Kurth studied. The Rosen model is driven by how much risk Navy leaders in the admiralty are willing to take, versus action officers at the mid-rank level.
Trust Overcomes Hurdles
We have seen that ground-breaking efforts need champions. But even in the Davis and Kurth politics models, these people do not complete their tasks alone. In the Navy, a "co-creative" approach is the most efficient. "This endogenous, collective solution ensures a broadening of the behavior repertoire of the organization as a whole, enabling it to develop common solutions and increase the likelihood of internal adaptation to the external environment. This concept of leadership underlines the close relationship between leadership and learning."5 Co-creative leadership relieves pressure from one of the major barriers in the naval innovation process: risk taking.
Some obstructions are external, but others are internal and ultimately under the organization's control. Internal causes of failure associated either with the cultural infrastructure or with the innovation process itself. Cultural infrastructure varies between units, but all organizations face stumbling blocks at some stage. They may include communication and empowerment. Obstacles to the process itself include risk management, lack of commitment, poor communication, and lack of access to information. To break these down, we need to develop relationships of reliance-in short, build trust.
For junior officers, most innovative moments come when their supervisors, mentors, or colleagues force them out of their comfort zone or push them to think beyond their normal limits. Fear of making a mistake causes many to avoid taking a chance. To create a culture in which officers are unafraid to take risks, creative teamwork and collaboration are key.
Researchers Cynthia Ruppel and Susan Harrington used a survey of 111 managers to test the correlation between trust, perceptions of commitment, and innovation. Their findings support the argument that open communication leads to trust and trust leads to commitment, which in turn leads to an innovative organization. "Only trust can assure people that they will not be overly penalized for new ideas that fail or that they are free to try improvisations leading to competitive innovations." 6
Followers are less likely to take the risk of advocating different ideas or take steps to bring them to fruition if they cannot trust their leaders. Anxiety associated with this causes a feeling of need to protect oneself during transactions, resulting in an erosion of both trust and commitment. An element of reliance is involved in every innovative effort because of the risks. And the commitment of the parties to that effort is enhanced by greater trust.
How to Create Behavior Patterns
We can plan for, nurture, and enhance innovation through the creative functioning of the Navy. Former CNO Admiral Vern Clark explains his efforts to create an innovative environment: "We had to embrace change by convincing ourselves that we can be creative and then rewarding innovation. A disciplined way of developing creativity was to encourage a team of deck-plate leaders to figure out how to do things better."7 Most leaders do not directly inspire novel ideas in the groups they lead. They do not present some groundbreaking idea that sparks team members' imagination. Instead, day-to-day behaviors profoundly and indirectly influence the creative process.
Teresa M. Amabile, professor of business administration at Harvard Business School, studied the journals of 26 high-powered project teams headed by middle managers. Amabile found that leaders' support was critical: "That perceived leadership support seemed to influence innovative work down the road."8 When team members had a sense of competence and ownership in the process, she found, the result was deeper and more motivated involvement.
The same applies to the Navy. A uniformed leader who expresses confidence in those under her or his command will generate the desire to be part of this strong and creative team. But if there is no sense of top-level investment in a dynamic group effort, that same lackluster, workaday attitude will pervade the unit. It all has to start at the top, and mid-rank officers should make good use of the Kurth, Rosen, and Clark models as they begin to make it a priority.
1. Vincent Davis, Ph.D. diss., "The Politics of Innovation: Patterns in Navy Cases" (Denver: Monograph Series in World Affairs 4, no. 3, 1967), 35.
2. Ibid., 33.
3. Rear Admiral Ronald J. Kurth, Ph.D. diss., "The Politics of Technological Innovation in the United States Navy" (Harvard University School of Government, 1970). See also Steven E. Sloan, Ph.D. diss., "The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Politics of Innovation in the U.S. Navy" (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 1994). See pps. 2-3, 12.
4. Sloan, "The Revolution in Military Affairs," 26.
5. Alexander Schieffer, "Co-creative Leadership: An Integrated Approach towards Transformational Leadership" Transition Studies Review 13, no. 3 (October 2006): 609.
6. Cynthia P. Ruppel and Susan J Harrington, "The Relationship of Communication, Ethical Work Climate, and Trust to Commitment and Innovation," Journal of Business Ethics 25 (2000): 319.
7. Ongoing personal communications with Admiral Vern Clark (Retired), 27th Chief of Naval Operations, from 2000 to 2005.
8. Teresa M. Amabile, "Five Questions About How Leaders Influence Creativity," Harvard Management Update, article no. U0312D (2003), 3.