On the Verge of a Game-Changer
(See A. S. Erickson and D. D. Yang, pp. 26-32, May 2009 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral T. A. Brooks, U.S. Navy (Retired)—The article by Erickson and Yang concerning the Chinese anti-ship ballistic missile is, in itself, relatively well-balanced. Unfortunately, the title of the article and the lead, "Chinese Carrier Killer," on the cover only contribute to the hyperventilation being seen in naval circles concerning a weapon system concept that is not even new and a threat that is considerably less than meets the eye.
In the 1970s, the Soviets experimented with the SSN-X-13 antiship ballistic missile. They spent a fortune on the development program and on fielding a satellite-borne radar ocean reconnaissance satellite to provide targeting data. The U.S. Navy was very concerned about the vulnerability of our carriers.
But by the early 1980s, the Soviets had scrapped the system. There were a number of reasons for doing so, but among these were:
- To be effective, the system required a nuclear warhead option, and thus the very launch of an SSN-X-13 could bring on nuclear war.
- It was found that space-based systems could not be relied on to locate carriers. They could be spoofed.
- Inasmuch as close-range tracking and targeting would still be required, it was far more effective to arm the tracking unit (e.g., SSGN) with a short-time-of-flight supersonic cruise missile to attack the carrier.
True, today's multiple warhead and terminal guidance technologies were not available to the Soviets, but neither was today's Aegis antimissile technology available to us. On balance, the Chinese DF-21E—if it ever becomes operational—will have the same problems as the SSN-X-13, with an important additional shortfall being that we can probably defend the carrier strike group against incoming ballistic warheads today whereas we could not do so in the era of the SSN-X-13.
The authors state: "We should probably assume that at least a large portion of articles published [by the Chinese] are intended to influence U.S. perceptions." Over-hyping the threat ensures that the articles do, indeed, influence U.S. perceptions. This commentator would offer that the DF-21E will be a game changer only if we make it one!
[Admiral Brooks is a former director of Naval Intelligence.]
Our Waning Influence to the South
(See P. Paterson, pp. 34-39, May 2009 Proceedings)
Admiral James G. Stavridis, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Southern Command—From our perspective at U.S. Southern Command in Miami, I found Commander Pat Paterson's energetic article on the region overly focused on "threats" and short on appreciating the "opportunities."
We need to begin by recognizing that Latin America and the Caribbean are most emphatically not "Our Backyard"—a tired cliché too often heard in this country.
The Americas are, rather, a vast shared home with 41 countries and protectorates, each distinct and diverse. The geographic, cultural, economic, political, security, and historical linkages that tie all of the nations of the Americas together are numerous and compelling. As in any shared home, there will be disagreements. But we should welcome the dialogue that comes from mature nations speaking with honesty and frankness to each other.
And the successes in the region are notable. Some examples:
- Colombia's gains against a narco-terrorist insurgency have positively affected the security of the Americas. Although the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) continue to pose a threat, for the first time in decades the conflict has shifted as the democratic government consolidates its presence in former insurgent strongholds. Today, the Colombian government has an active presence in each and every municipality while the FARC have seen their numbers of fighters cut in half and have less than a 2 percent popularity rating. The Colombian-led military successes were exemplified by the rescue of the 15 hostages, including 3 American contractors, last year. While the U.S. military has provided training, logistical, and intelligence support to Colombia's armed forces, their successes can ultimately be credited to their professionalism and dedication to defending the nation and its citizens.
- Counternarcotics is another zone of real and powerful interaction and teamwork. Under the leadership of the Joint Interagency Task Force South in Key West, the United States and 11 partner nations work together to stop illegal trafficking in the Americas. Over the past three years, nearly 750 metric tons of cocaine have been interdicted en route to markets. JIATF-S is a strong example of international, interagency, and indeed private-public cooperation.
- Building on last year's regional medical training successes with the Kearsarge (LHD-3) and Boxer (LHD-4), which performed more than 200,000 patient treatments, the hospital ship Comfort (T-AH-20) is back for the second time in three years, participating in Continuing Promise 2009. The Comfort, engaged in humanitarian medical training and outreach, is currently on a four-month deployment through our area of focus with 11 partner nations and 22 non-governmental organizations along with representatives from all four armed services and four other U.S. government agencies. By the end of her deployment, the Comfort will visit seven partner nations and treat hundreds of thousands patients. A key aspect of the mission is the partnership of military personnel with other government agencies and non-governmental organizations, like Project Hope and Operation Smile. Such diversity of humanitarian expertise enhances mission effectiveness. It also lays the foundation for relationships that could pay dividends in the event the United States responds to a potential humanitarian crisis in the region.
- The Navy's Fourth Fleet just finished hosting UNITAS Gold, the 50th iteration of a huge hemispheric maritime exercise. This year included a record 12 nations, 27 ships, 80 aircraft, and 7,000 Marines and Sailors
- Finally, the rise of regional multinational organizations dedicated to promoting security and stability in the Americas is a positive development and one we embrace. Examples such as the Conference of Central American Armed Forces (CFAC) and the South American Defense Council (SADC) are positive vehicles enabling multinational cooperation by enhancing capabilities and information sharing. CFAC will deploy a Joint Multinational Peacekeeping unit through the United Nations this year. Although we are not a member, it is clearly in our national security interest for the SADC to increase the transparency, trust, and cooperation between regional states by creating a positive forum to address transnational security problems like crime, illicit trafficking, and response to natural disasters. Brazil is a strong leader in the region, and our cooperation with that nation at a military-to-military level is extraordinary and positive at every level.
The United States is actively engaged with our regional partner nations to create secure and stable environments that promote prosperity for all. There is more opportunity than threat in the Americas, a region we must continue to engage in peaceful and respectful ways.
We May Be Only Halfway Through This War'
(See T. Ricks, pp. 20-24, May 2009 Proceedings)
Captain Anthony Cowden, U.S. Navy—Thank you, Tom Ricks, for reminding us that "the surge [in Iraq] improved security, but that was not the stated purpose of the surge. The purpose was to improve security to create a breathing space in which a political breakthrough could occur."
The Bush administration defined 18 "benchmarks" associated with the political reconciliation within Iraq that was the defined goal of the surge. It has been frustrating that after the first (required) report to Congress on the attainment of the benchmarks, which showed scant progress, the purpose and value of the surge has been widely misconstrued. Without the fundamental changes embodied within the 18 benchmarks, the increased security associated with the surge will prove to be a fleeting by-product of the increased levels of U.S. combat troops.
While I share the President's, and the nation's, desire to leave Iraq militarily, I share Mr. Ricks' concern that the political reality of 2009 may undo the tactical gains before the political reconciliation necessary for a stable Iraq has occurred. We overlook the causal linkage between war and politics that Karl von Clausewitz taught us at our own peril—if Iraq descends into violent lawlessness after we leave, then no diplomatic, informational, or economic actions we take can bring about our nation's strategic goals. As Mr. Ricks said, "I'd rather stay in small numbers than have to go back in large numbers, which is what we'd have to do."
Midshipman Second Class Robert Davis, U.S. Naval Academy—Mr. Ricks expressed an idea that I found interesting and highlighted an important point. He commented that no influential post-9/11 book has been written by a Navy officer. Unfortunately, it seems that the reason for this is that the Navy has yet to define itself in a useful capacity in a war on terrorism
centered Department of Defense.Many programs (some terminated or failing) have the Navy flailing about trying to make itself useful to a Defense Department that faces some tight budget cuts. The littoral combat ships seem like a step in the right direction but have yet to prove their usefulness to the new administration. Even worse is the DDG-1000 program that was recently acknowledged as being less than desirable for the new 21st-century U.S. Navy.
Until the Navy's top officials come out with a definitive plan for how they want to help fight terrorism (a difficult task since those combatants seem to still be largely land-based) there will be no great books by any of the big thinkers in the Navy or intellectual voice that speaks for it.
Put ROTC Back in the Ivy League
(See K. Harbaugh, p. 14, May 2009 Proceedings)
Terence Roche Murphy—Kenneth Harbaugh's article is splendid and timely for this Harvard NROTC alum of the Class of 1959 and doubtless for many others.
I was the moderator of a symposium on "America and the World" at our 50th reunion in June, with a Pulitzer Prize historian, a senior intelligence officer and renowned scholar on the Middle East, and a Harvard Business School professor expert on China—all classmates—as presenters before a full house in the university's top venue. None of my ROTC classmates present in Sanders Theatre was a career Navy or Marine Corps officer, and only one of us was an O-6 in the USNR. (Others present were O-6 USMCR and Air National Guard, the latter a
flight surgeon.) But as undergraduates we were admired by our peers, and we became good citizens as did they.The fevers of Vietnam have long cooled on Ivy campuses, except among some "tenured radicals" past retirement age. For good or ill, Vietnam is several wars back. As for Don't Ask, Don't Tell as an anti-ROTC vehicle, a unanimous Supreme Court scornfully rejected the brief of the "best and brightest" Ivy League law faculties. (My own professors at Michigan declined to participate in that unworthy and losing cause.)
This year many old grads of NROTC '59 and their cross-service peers watched General David Petraeus and Harvard's new President Drew Faust swear in the regrettably few new Harvard officers from the ROTC program now shared with nearby MIT. Many ROTC alums wore the National Defense Service Medal to salute those who follow us. We were led by our NROTC classmate, retired Navy Reserve Captain Darnell M. Whitt, a long-time intelligence adviser to the undersecretary of Defense for Policy and a professor at the Naval War College. He served only a few years of active duty.
Mr. Harbaugh is correct on another point. For good or ill, the Ivies are leaders, and Harvard is in the front row. My best wardroom peers were junior officers from Auburn, the Naval Academy, the Merchant Marine Academy, and tiny Grove City College in Western Pennsylvania. The Ivies were mixed, some fine, some less so. But in NROTC they had been role models at Yale, Princeton, Brown, Dartmouth, and indeed at Harvard, as are their young successors. And there aren't enough of them.
Because the Ivies are leaders, restoration of an important institution like ROTC is inevitably political. Harvard's Kennedy School of Government long has had retired senior officers on the faculty of its military programs. But it will take much more to move the Harvard faculty of Arts and Science on undergraduate ROTC. That's the role of senior military and senior national leadership. The presence of General Petreaus at the ROTC commissioning ceremony was not a coincidence.
Lieutenant Colonel Steve Percy, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired)—As one of those Yale graduates (Class of '53) who served very proudly as a Marine infantry officer on 10 years of active duty and 21 years of total service, I wholeheartedly endorse Mr. Harbaugh's recommendation to return ROTC to the Ivy League.
In point of fact, ROTC has almost snuck back into the Ivies. In 2008, five Harvard graduates received commissions in the armed forces through the ROTC program at MIT, which they attended with the obvious endorsement of both universities. While the experiences of these five individuals were enhanced by attending two such prestigious institutions at the same time, think how much stronger their experiences would have been had they been able to accomplish their ROTC course at their college—Harvard.
As Mr. Harbaugh pointed out, the Ivy League schools have long had both a history and tradition of turning out graduates committed to careers in public service. Up until the late 1960s, this almost always included service in one of the branches of the armed forces—the "real world," in Mr. Harbaugh's words. I still remember what a feeling of pride and patriotism I felt when I saw the NROTC cadets—in uniform—on the campus. I am sure that kind of feeling still exists on the campuses in the Ivy League, and it would be greatly enhanced by having NROTC cadets—in uniform—on campus again.
Just as having the privilege of serving our country in one of the armed forces invariably makes us become better individuals and citizens, so, too, does living, studying, and working in the company of those who serve.
World Navies in Review
(See E. Wertheim, pp. 54-66, March 2009 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Bryn Weadon, Assistant Deputy Minister, Finance and Corporate Services, National Defence and the Canadian Forces—As the Chief Financial Officer of Canada's military, I would like to correct two items in Eric Wertheim's Review of Canada's Navy.
First, the Joint Support Ship project has not been canceled—this program continues on, following the unsuccessful contracting process in 2008, with options for moving the project forward currently under development.
Second, Canada's mission in Afghanistan has not impacted the naval acquisition program. The Canada First Defence Strategy, published in 2008, commits the Canadian government to reimbursing the Canadian Forces for the total incremental costs of major operations such as Afghanistan. In addition, having adopted accrual budgeting in 2005 for the acquisition of new capital equipment and infrastructure, Canada's military is protected from the swings in available capital investment experienced in prior decades as the capital budget amount is now based on the annual amortization of assets instead of in-year cash appropriations.
Buy Fords, Not Ferraris
(See H. J. Hendrix, pp. 52-57, April 2009; J. A. Stout, N. Woodworth, and P. J. Madden, pp. 8-10, 160, May 2009 Proceedings)
Jim Preston—I have been receiving Proceedings for a number of years now and this article is the best I've read. Commander Hendrix hits the nail squarely on the head, and I'm sure most of the black-shoe community did not like it. I think it is a great idea, but it will be dismissed because it used too much common sense and logic. Hendrix should be applauded and promoted to a position where he could implement his ideas. Of course, he won't. Hats off to Commander Hendrix.
Rear Admiral W. J. Holland Jr. U.S. Navy (Retired)—In Commander Hendrix's eagerness to reduce acquisition costs, he continues to fall into the trap of confusing cost with value. Among his recommendations for cheap acquisitions are diesel submarines. Describing their hoped-for cost and their potential virtues, he does not provide any discussion of their mission or utility. This is perfectly understandable, because battery-powered submarines have no utility for the United States.
Only if an enemy appeared in the Gulf of Mexico could a case be made for buying battery-powered boats. The areas of interest to the United States are far afield—not close aboard. In any conflict early arrival on the scene is vital, nowhere more so than in antisubmarine warfare.
That mobility was a major mission justification for increased speed and endurance of the new Maritime Patrol Aircraft. Submarines with speeds of advance less than 15 knots and endurance measured in days hardly qualify for early arrivals or the prolonged prosecution inherent in ASW. Their utility in surveillance suffers from the same inhibitions of low speed and short endurance. In warships as in most other things, cheap tools are not worth their cost.
How to Make Mentoring Work
(See W. B. Johnson and G. Andersen, pp. 26-32, April 2009 Proceedings)
Captain Richard A. Dirks, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)—In 1995, then-CNO Admiral "Mike" Boorda decreed that all personnel would receive regular, formal performance counseling. It fell to me to write the implementing instruction, which I did with some misgivings. I carefully titled the instruction "The Navy Performance Evaluation and Counseling System" (emphasis added) and tried to make the process as constructive and efficient as possible. Still, the potentials for time wasting, lip service, and gundecking were obvious.
The instruction (BUPERSINST 1610.10) is now in its B version. The words "and Counseling" have been removed from the title, but the chapter on counseling remains virtually word-for-word as I wrote it, which suggests that it has been either entirely successful or entirely ignored. As a clue to how well compulsory mentoring will work, it might be a good idea to find out how well compulsory performance counseling has actually performed over the past 13 years. This is not just idle curiosity. If people are our most valuable resource, it is performance that makes them so.
Of course, mentoring and performance counseling are not quite the same thing, but they overlap, and both are good if done right. The issue is whether making them compulsory makes them better or worse for the Navy. It may turn out that whatever is lost for those already savvy enough to find good mentors will be more than offset by a benefit to the Navy as a whole.
Command Sergeant Major Jeff Mellinger, U.S. Army—No matter how smart or accomplished we think we are, every one of us needs a mentor. Mentor, of Greek mythology, was Odysseus' trusted counselor. Mentors are really wise counselors or advisers, and sorely lacking in the Army (and many other professional organizations) today.
Mentoring is not about hanging onto the coattails of a successful person, or trying to gain wisdom or status through osmosis, nor dragging along promising subordinates. Mentoring is about taking and giving advice and wise counsel, about taking the time to share ideas and experiences with others. It provides beacons and checkpoints, provoking and stimulating thoughts and ideas, vision and goals, as well as azimuth adjustments, all in an effort to steer and guide. Each of us as citizens, Soldiers, and leaders has a responsibility to serve as a guidepost—directly or through example—for those around us.
As we think back on our lives and careers, each of us can recall those people who unwittingly left their mark on us. Many of us have a mentor whom we call on for advice, guidance, or simply to sound out our latest brilliant idea.
Mentoring is one of the easiest things you can do as a leader: just demonstrate care and concern for the well-being and development of others. Get involved with the future of those who will follow you so that the legacy you've inherited will pass to succeeding generations. Start first with those immediately around you—your peers and subordinates. Make yourself available to them, and set an atmosphere conducive to frank discussions and open dialogue. Care enough to spend your most valuable resources—time and experience. Our young leaders and Soldiers are starved for your attention, guidance, and counsel.
What should you do to be an effective mentor? Be the leader who injects guidance at the proper moment, who makes corrections before catastrophe or failure strikes, and be the leader to whom Soldiers can come for advice or simply to air concerns. Be the leader who leads, not pushes, but is always prepared to take corrective action when standards aren't being met or corners are being cut.
Army Special Forces Colonel James "Nick" Rowe, a prisoner of war during the Vietnam War, often related a lesson from his first-team sergeant who, with a piece of string, asked Rowe to push the string anywhere. Of course, the string didn't go far or where he wanted it to. The sergeant then told Rowe to grab the string and pull, and see if it didn't go everywhere he led it. This was a great lesson in leadership, but is also applicable to mentoring. You too can get your Soldiers to go anywhere you coach, train, lead, and mentor them. But if we aren't careful, we will allow a generation of leaders who do not know how to lead, care, and train.
You can make a bigger difference. Teach your Soldiers to think, not what to think. Teach them to act with foresight, purpose, and vision, not react after the world has passed them by.
Be a mentor.