The Royal Australian Navy's (RAN) surface combatant force is about to get a major boost. After an extensive upgrade, Australia's Adelaide-class frigates are planned to re-enter operational service over the next 12-18 months. In an upgrade that has taken more than 15 years from concept to operational service, they will bring an advanced level of combat capability unprecedented in the RAN.
The FFG Upgrade Project (Project SEA 1390) reflects the outcomes of indecisive defense policy and low levels of investment over several decades.1 This has had a detrimental impact on the surface combatant force along with other areas of defense. Procrastination and time and cost overruns have largely been the characteristics of defense procurement.
Program Genesis
The 1987 Australian Defence White Paper announced that the Navy would be expanded to a force operating 16 to 17 major surface combatants.2 The 1991 Force Structure Review recognized that the surface combatant force was declining in numbers (then down to ten ships), indicated an intention to replace the Adams-class guided-missile destroyers with an Anzac-class derivative, and suggested that "Anzac derivatives could also replace the first four FFGs." Prophetically, the review went on to state: "the ADF (Australian Defense Force) has for some time followed a program of mid-life modernisations of the destroyer force . . . (which) without exception, have been lengthy. . . . The concept of mid-life modernisations is not cost effective, and will not continue."3
Notwithstanding that declaration, because of supportability issues and concerns about sending baseline FFG-7s in harm's way after RAN involvement in Operation Desert Storm, the FFG Upgrade Project was initiated in 1993. By 1997 Australian defense policy statements indicated that 14 major surface combatants was an adequate number and expressed the intention to substantially invest in antiship-missile defenses and other upgrades for the FFGs and Anzacs.4 The three DDGs were approaching the end of their service lives and were to be retired without replacement.
Surface combatant numbers were not mentioned in the 2000 Defence White Paper other than that the six FFGs were to be replaced by "at least three air-defence capable ships."5 In 2007, government policy stated: "Our Navy must be able to establish sea control and operate freely within our region, while denying such freedoms to an opponent."6 Given Australia's vast maritime geography and dependence on the maritime domain for economic, territorial, and environmental security, this defense policy announcement appears sound. Australia may seek to expand the surface combatant fleet, although experience tempers optimism. The acquisition of three Air Warfare Destroyers and upgrades to the Anzac- and Adelaide-class frigates are proceeding. No announcements have been made about surface combatant numbers or acquisitions.
The ADF currently has 12 major surface combatants (eight Anzac-class and four FFG-7s). The Anzacs are shouldering the operational burden, which includes ongoing commitments in the Persian Gulf, while the FFGs are being upgraded.7
Complexity, Slippages, and Success
The FFG Upgrade Project began in earnest when ADI Ltd., now trading as Thales Australia Ltd., was selected as the prime contractor in 1998. The initial plan was for all six FFGs to be upgraded. In late 2003 the Australian government determined that the oldest FFGs, the Canberra and Adelaide, would not be upgraded, as delays meant cost effectiveness could not be justified. The project includes six sets of equipment—a Warfare Systems Support Centre, a Combat Team Trainer, and three Operator Trainers—and has proven to be extremely challenging. The system integration combines legacy units from the original FFG-7 configuration with advanced technologies drawn from a range of international sources. Platform deficiencies and deep maintenance issues also had to be rectified to ensure a planned 35-year hull life could be achieved.
The project's complexity was underestimated, and RAN and defense agencies along with the prime contractor have been party to what became ongoing schedule slippages. The project is four-and-a-half years late (the first ship should have been in service from 2004). Following extensive contract renegotiation in 2006, a revised schedule was set and upgrades are to be completed by December 2009.
A climate of frustration and disappointment has resulted. The situation was exacerbated by a trials period plagued by systems interface and perceived performance shortcomings, with several systems initially failing to meet acceptance criteria. The main problem areas have been underwater warfare (UW), electronic surveillance (ES), and the central Australian Distributed Architecture Combat System. Of late, more collaborative approaches with a sharper end focus have shown dividends, with substantial progress on rectifying problems.
There have also been highly successful results during the trials. For example, during antiship missile defense (ASMD) tests on the U.S. Navy's Pacific Missile Range Facility off Hawaii in October 2007, HMAS Sydney effectively dealt with a multiple simultaneous, multi-directional ASM attack (using realistic drone missile targets). This included a successful live Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) engagement. Incorporation of the 8-cell MK 41 Vertical Launch System—with a capacity of 32 ESSMs—into the FFG-7 hull is a considerable naval architectural design feat.
The RAN has taken a firm stand in demanding that capabilities be proven. Ongoing commitments in the Middle East dictate that electronic surveillance is the highest-priority pending acceptance requirement. In early 2008, an FFG ES Stakeholders Group was established to deal with the issues. Representatives from all the major players are involved including Navy, Defence, Thales, and Rafael.
Significant people and perception casualties have resulted from delays and the failure of some systems during initial trials. Within the RAN the upgraded FFG has become known as a lemon. Challenges are being progressively addressed and systems accepted into service, however, perceptions will be difficult to change. Further, the incoming Australian Labor Government has rightly put Defence on notice about poor project performance.8 The media have been critical, and this in turn impacts morale in the FFG fleet.9 The RAN is faced with a crisis of confidence, both internally and with the government, that must be resolved expeditiously.
There is now cautious optimism that the upgraded FFGs will "get across the line" and soon be back in operational service. HMAS Sydney, Melbourne, and Darwin are planned to be operational by early 2009. HMAS Newcastle commenced upgrade in October 2007 and should be operational in December 2009.
Many important project lessons have been learned, or relearned, during this extended and often frustrating experience. The central one is not new: A collaborative environment among all parties that focuses on solving problems is essential from the outset. There must be a clear eye on the end-state: to deliver a functional capability to the customer in a cost effective and timely manner.
The upgraded FFG offers a higher level of combat capability than previously available in the RAN. When combined with a well-prepared, led, and motivated ship's company, the upgraded FFG presents an impressive combat capability.
Air Warfare (AW)
A primary aim of the upgrade was to improve AW, particularly against new-generation antiship missiles. The upgraded FFG offers a comprehensive package with classic hard-kill and soft-kill layers of defense.
The outer layer of hard kill involves integration with U.S. forces and abilities to direct fighter aircraft and the surface-to-air missiles of other warships. These are greatly enhanced with inclusion of Link 16 for the first time in the RAN. Hostile aircraft can be engaged before they can launch antiship weapons. Surveillance and targeting is vastly complicated by imposing extended standoff ranges.
Other AW layers rely primarily on ship-borne systems although these can be cued with information from other sources. The air-surveillance capability has been enhanced by inclusion of updated radar, the AN/SPS 49A(V)1, with much-improved low-altitude and small radar cross-section target detection.
Fire control has been greatly enhanced by the MK 92 Mod 12 system, an improved version of the Mod 6 system in service with U.S. Navy, Spanish, and Taiwanese FFG-7s. The Mod 12 includes the same coherent receiver and transmitter as the Mod 6 with improved signal processing, solid-state electronics, and reliability. Performance is enhanced by a Sensor Data Fusion System, which provides Radar Integrated Automatic Detection and Tracking that combines data from the ship's search radars (AN/SPS 49A(V)1, MK 92 CAS (Combined Antenna System) search, AN/SPS 55 surface-search radar) plus fire-control radars. The outcome is automatic detection, correlation of multiple detections, and accurate prediction of target movement.
The range of the MK 92 CAS fire-control channel is now in line with MK 92 STIR (Separate Target Illumination Radar). This vastly improved, automated sensor combination has greatly reduced the reaction time for detection, tracking, decision, and acquisition to weapon firing. The engagement of multiple maneuvering targets is possible at much greater ranges than previously. The upgraded MK 92 system performance was reported by HMAS Darwin command as excellent.
Enhanced systems performance is supported by vastly improved surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). The MK 13 GMLS missile launcher has been retained with its 40-missile capacity. SM 2 Medium-Range SAMs will replace SM 1 missiles and represents a major enhancement.10 SM 2 has a maximum range of more than 80 nautical miles compared with the 25 nm for SM 1 and around 10 nm for the Evolved Sea Sparrow. SM 2 and ESSM also have much-improved effectiveness against very low targets.
For the first time the RAN has a SAM-based force protection capability. The surveillance and targeting problem for hostile aircraft seeking to attack a force at sea protected by an Australian FFG has become a whole lot harder. Previously, when friendly fighter cover was not available, hostile aircraft could loiter with impunity outside the FFG missile engagement zone (MEZ) of 25 nm or Anzac MEZ of 10 nm. The circumstance during the early stages of the Australian-led intervention in East Timor in 1999, where a U.S. Navy Aegis cruiser had to be called on to provide air-defense cover for the landing force, will not arise in the future when a RAN frigate is available.11
ESSM deployed from the vertical-launch system provides a highly effective third layer. The 76-mm rapid firing gun provides a fourth layer of hard kill. The gun's effectiveness has been enhanced by integrating the Electro Optical Tracking System (EOTS) 2500 with the MK 92 system. This includes a laser rangefinder and provides an additional three-dimensional gun-fire control channel. The fifth, last-resort defensive layer is the Phalanx 20-mm close-in weapon system, now integrated with the combat system. The AW package performance is "excellent."12
The inner layers of AW capability include the Australian designed Nulka off-board active ASM decoy. Two additional MK 137 Mod 1 decoy launchers able to deploy new Seagnat RF decoys and Pirate IR and acoustic decoys, along with long-range chaff rockets, complete the soft-kill suite.
An upgraded ES system is a major component of the air warfare capability. The AN/SLQ 32 has been replaced with the current generation Rafael C-Pearl digital electronic surveillance and warning system. It covers the 0.5
18 GHz frequency spectrum, is integrated with the combat system, is highly sensitive, and sustains a high data rate. Significant integration, performance, and human-machine interface (HMI) problems were encountered during trials resulting in low confidence among some frigate personnel. Numerous technical issues have been resolved through a concerted effort by the stakeholders group. The system is now expected to meet the RAN's requirements.Surface Warfare (SW)
Many of the air warfare capability enhancements are relevant to surface warfare. The Harpoon system has been upgraded, and the latest missile variants can be deployed from the GMLS 13 launcher. The SWG 1(A) Harpoon control panel has been installed. The embarked Seahawk helicopter's surface surveillance, targeting, and data link for over-the-horizon targeting for Harpoon engagements remains. The integrated EOTS with laser rangefinding for the 76-mm gun add to a potent surface warfare capability.
Underwater Warfare (UW)
The upgraded FFG provides the best surface combatant self-and-force protection UW capability in the RAN. The FFGs' ability to integrate with maritime patrol aircraft and direct wide-area underwater surveillance is retained along with the ability to operate two S70B Seahawk UW-configured helicopters.
The onboard package includes several enhancements. The AN/SQS 56 and Mulloka hull-mounted sonars (HMS) have been replaced with the second generation Spherion medium-frequency active and passive units. The Albatros Torpedo Detection System, a towed passive array, has been added, which when combined with Lescut acoustic decoys, offers enhanced self-defense against torpedo attack. The hull-mounted sonar and towed-array information is automatically fused and integrated into the combat system.
Like ES, initial underwater warfare trial results were disappointing. Those conducted at the Canadian Nanoose Bay underwater range facility confirmed that the sensors are performing satisfactorily and systems interface problems are being resolved. The hull sonar and towed-array combination trials results are impressive. Like the ES, significant HMI issues have been identified. All sonar data are presented in a single Sonar Operator Console, which is highly operator intensive. The workload associated with concurrency tasking is being addressed.
The Petrel Mine and Obstacle Avoidance Sonar has been added. This sonar provides three-dimensional imaging and automatic detection and tracking to around 700 meters. It is controlled from the bridge, performs well in its designed role, and provides a very useful aid to navigation in confined waters.
The Combat System
Combat Information Center layout is largely unchanged from the original configuration. New flat-screen color displays offer similar functionality to the former arrays. Advanced command and control features such as automatic detection and tracking of hundreds of targets, dissimilar sensor fusion, improved tracking in clutter, automatic threat grading, interfaces with weapons and sensors, and the multi-tier MK 92 weapons scheduler significantly improves performance and reduces operator workloads.
The command and control package includes the On Board Training System, an excellent training aid that provides realistic presentations for operators. It uses both sensor stimulation (the facility to inject false targets through the sensors) and effector (weapons) simulation.
Supportability
A major feature of the upgraded frigate is greatly improved supportability. Obsolete and obsolescent equipment has been replaced. Former FFG sailors will be pleased to learn that the problematic ships-service diesel generators and 400-Hz static-frequency converters have been replaced. Power is now provided by Caterpillar diesel generators (painted in stylish white) and the converters are solid state.
The limiting displacement has been increased from 4,100 to 4,200 tons. Other improvements include reduced self-noise and electromagnetic and acoustic signatures.
The upgraded FFGs are in many respects Australian orphans. Six ship sets of new equipment were procured so a windfall logistics outcome was achieved by not upgrading Adelaide and Canberra. The retired FFGs have also been cannibalized for spares to support legacy equipments.
Human Capability
HMI is an issue with both the ES and UW systems, and there may be shortcomings in other areas. Reduced systems familiarity has been exacerbated by limited access to systems in contractors' hands. Also, equipment application courses fell out of step with posting cycles because of schedule slippages. Combined with systems teething problems, it is not surprising that there has been a crisis of confidence among some FFG personnel. Perception and attitude issues may soon ease with the resolution of systems problems.
There may, however, be a more complex and demanding people issue. The upgraded frigates represent a quantum leap in capability for the RAN. Configuring smart systems for optimum performance and understanding the results requires equally smart and experienced operators. They need to have a deep understanding of the operating environment, whether, for example it is the electromagnetic spectrum or the acoustic environment. Generically trained combat system operators and system application courses may no longer be sufficient. The issue of deep specialization for operators in the surface community may need revisiting.
The bottom line is that the upgraded Australian FFG is a very capable warship that will make a major contribution to maritime security. Its sailors will serve with pride and distinction in these fine ships as they become operational with much improved fighting capabilities.
1. Australian Government, Department of Defence, Defence Materiel Organisation, Projects: SEA 1390 Ph 2.1-FFG Upgrade Project (FFG UP), 2 September 2008. Australia Government, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, Commonwealth of Australia, 2000, pp. 117-118. In the 2000 Defence White Paper the government committed to "the same proportion of GDP on defence as we are today. That remains 1.9 per cent." There was an ongoing commitment for defense expenditure to "grow by an average of about three per cent per annum in real terms over the next decade." Australia Government, Department of Defence, Australia's National Security: A Defence Update 2007, Commonwealth of Australia, 2007, p. 10. By 2007, due to changing strategic circumstances, Australian Government outlays on Defence had risen to "2 per cent of GDP." So far the Rudd government has indicated a similar commitment.
2. Australian Government, Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia 1987, Canberra, March 1987, p. 43.
3. Australian Government, Department of Defence, Force Structure Review, Canberra, May 1991, pp. 15-16.
4. Australian Government, Australia's Strategic Policy, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 1997, p. 62.
5. Our Future Defence Force, pp. 89-90.
6. A Defence Update 2007, pp. 50-51.
7. Sea Power Centre Australia, Department of Defence, "Offshore and Out of Sight: The RAN in the North Arabian Gulf," Semaphore Issue 06, June 2008, The 40th separate deployment of Australian naval surface forces to the international coalition in the Persian Gulf area commenced in April 2008. The FFGs initially bore the brunt of this commitment. Recently the Anzac-class ships have been rotating through the northern Gulf to meet the national commitment.
8. Australian Government, Department of Defence, The Hon. Joel Fitzgibbon MP, Minister for Defence, 29 January 2008, MIN80129/08, Speech by the Minister for Defence at the Pacific 2008 Maritime Congress and Exposition, Sydney. The Minister stated "The delays, cost blow-outs and failure to deliver we've experienced in defence procurement in recent years cannot be allowed to continue." 2 September 2008.
9. Defense Industry Daily, 14 January 2008, "Australia's Hazard(ous) Frigate Upgrade," 2 September 2008. This article is typical of negative and critical commentary found in defense media.
10. Initially SM 2 missiles will be employed in the "home all the way" mode. The mid-course guidance facility is to be incorporated in the near future.
11. A. Cobb, "East Timor and Australia's Security Role: Issues and Scenarios," Current Issues Brief 3, 1999-2000, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group, Parliament of Australia, Department of the Parliamentary Library, 21 September 1999. The Aegis-class cruiser USS Mobile Bay (CG-53) was available to provide air defense cover.
12. Based on conversations with FFG officers and RAN Surface Combatant Force Element Group staff.
13. Defence Materiel Organisation.