Since the end of the Cold War, theorists and others have analyzed the details, nuances, and meaning of the new global environment. Meanwhile the Marine Corps has been operating in this environment, learning its lessons firsthand. This new world features many old characteristics with which the Corps is intimately familiar. Counterinsurgency, a dominating concern in modern conflict, is something that many view as a new entry into armed conflict.
But such operations, by definition of varying intensity, are nothing new to conflict or to the Marine Corps. In fact, the service has a long history conducting counterinsurgency operations and other forms of irregular warfare, codifying the hard-learned lessons from these conflicts in the Small Wars Manual.
Today we are once again engaged in counterinsurgency, this time in Iraq and Afghanistan. Clearly such operations maintain themselves as a persistent theme throughout our history. Because an associated doctrine is necessary, the Marine Corps and Army jointly introduced the Counterinsurgency Field Manual. As a step further into today's complex challenges, in December 2007 the Corps introduced the Long War Concept.
This concept is envisioned partly as a response and partly as a proactive adjustment to the changing global environment and conflicts, designed to help the Marine Corps adapt. Just as evolution is a continuous process, this concept will need ongoing modification to best support our nation's missions and requirements.
Forming Partnerships for Strength
The concept is designed to build the security capacity of partner nations (referred to as building partner capacity) and thus deter potential adversaries, with the ultimate hope of preventing, or at least mitigating, conflict. In the event that conflict does erupt in places where Marines are engaged in partner-building and deterrence efforts, the service will then possess invaluable regional and cultural knowledge.
We must maintain our dominant ability to conduct high-end combat operations, such as during the 2003 "March to Baghdad" or Fallujah in fall 2004, but it is also critical that the Corps adapt to any environment in which we must fight. The past 20 years have demonstrated that Marines must be flexible, intelligent, and lethal warriors who can quickly and effectively transition between different levels across the range of military operations.
Adapting to changes in conflict while also maintaining conventional dominance are precisely the objectives that the Long War Concept encompasses. Marines need to take a proactive approach to preclude crisis from occurring—while simultaneously retaining our ability as two-fisted fighters able to win any fight at any time. This is not a change to what the Marine Corps is or does. Rather, it is an adjustment to current methods that ensure the Corps will remain appropriately positioned to succeed into the 21st century.
Getting to the Roots
Success in conflict has always been contingent on the skills and abilities of the Marines sent into action, as well as on the method in which they are employed. As we have continued operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, it has become apparent that removing or addressing the conditions that allow for terrorist and insurgent groups to take hold is as important as defeating them in combat.
As has been borne out in al Anbar Province, making an environment inhospitable to terrorists is a critical step in eliminating them. Historically, low-end operations have been such things as crisis response. But they can also involve setting the conditions through building partner capacity, in a phase (0) preliminary to the actual operations (Phase 1), where we target regions on the edge of instability and at risk of infiltration by adversaries using irregular methods of warfare. (In 2004, the Secretary of Defense directed that a broader range of operations be considered to address the entire security environment. The revised range of military operations is organized into six phases as follows: Phase 0: Shape the Environment; Phase 1: Deter the Enemy; Phase 2: Seize the Initiative; Phase 3: Dominate the Enemy;, Phase 4: Stabilize the Environment; Phase 5: Enable Civil Authorities.)
Proactive engagement of indigenous forces in these areas promotes growth of security and stability. Partnering Marine units with local national forces and conducting bilateral training designed to use the Marines as primary trainers and mentors passes on security-related skills. Importantly, Marines will pass on not only physical skills but also an intellectual approach to critical concepts such as the rule of law and human rights.
Thus, Marines contribute to countering opponents through conflict prevention and mitigation. The Corps brings a unique capability to this new mission: the Marine. In most cases, when Marines have contact with the general populace, they leave a positive impression. This influence is a great force multiplier. It adds a moral and psychological dynamic to the physical skills that we teach to people of other nations.
Combatant commanders have consistently recognized Phases 0 and 1 as critical to their ability to manage conflict. To support them, the Corps is developing the Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Force (SC MAGTF) and the Marine Corps Training and Advising Group (MCTAG).
Developing International Awareness
The SC MAGTF will essentially be a version of the Corps' long-standing Special Purpose MAGTFs. Designed to conduct Security Cooperation missions, these MAGTFs will be specifically organized, trained, and equipped in accordance with requests from combatant commanders to support their identified requirements.
Similarly, missions and target locations will vary as situations change and as combatant commanders' engagement strategies direct. Upon arrival in theater, the SC MAGTF will disperse throughout the region to conduct security and other capacity-building activities with host nation elements. Employed in this manner, and carrying out the security cooperation mission, Marines will be employed in a distributed operations method and will have a significant strategic impact.
Before deploying, each SC MAGTF will undergo training programs that focus on understanding regional issues. This will be in addition to the expeditionary and combined arms instruction that have long been the backbone of Marine Corps education. Most of the training that Marine units will undergo will remain focused on the development and maintenance of core warfighting skills such as those taught in Combined Arms Exercises at Twentynine Palms, Mountain Warfare in Bridgeport, and amphibious exercises at Camp Lejeune and Camp Pendleton.
Nothing in the Long War Concept diminishes the ability of Marine Corps units to conduct high-intensity combat operations. Diversified security cooperation training will, however, enhance the Corps' ability to operate across the spectrum of operations and significantly increase our operational capabilities in the many irregular environments across the globe that we are likely to encounter.
An enabling partner to the service's security cooperation efforts is the Marine Corps Training and Advisor Group (MCTAG). Initiated in 2007, this group will serve as a training cadre for advisers who will deploy to conduct security cooperation activities.
Its base of knowledge will come from operational experience and Marine Corps institutional sources such as the Security Cooperation Education and Training Center, Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning, Marine Corps Intelligence Agency, and foreign area and regional affairs officers on the MCTAG staff.
Training and Advising to Suit the Culture
A core characteristic for the success of the SC MAGTFs and MCTAGs is regionalization. In the recent past, Marine regiments have focused on environmental conditions. The Long War Concept adopts this same theme, but the focus is now on the cultural landscape instead of environmental conditions. By assigning a regiment a specific geographical region of expertise (such as Second Marines being assigned Sub-Saharan Africa)—and thus SC focus—the service will be able to focus human talent and proficiency together while simultaneously expanding and further developing the skills and capabilities necessary for effective partner-capacity building. (For a comprehensive discussion of regionalization, see Lieutenant Colonel Edward W. Novack's accompanying article "Regionalization: Optimizing Security Cooperation").
Developing and maintaining cultural and regional expertise is an obvious requirement for successful engagement operations. Additionally, local cultural knowledge is now recognized as a decisive factor in counterinsurgency operations that succeed. Because we understand that future conflicts are likely to be dominated by opponents with indigenous knowledge, it is important that the Corps also develop a substantial base of this knowledge.
In addition to serving obvious benefits to MCTAG and SC MAGTF activities, this will lead to more informed planning and execution of future contingency operations while greatly facilitating our information operations efforts.
Working with the Navy to Coordinate Internationally
Another important aspect of the Long War Concept is the reinforcement of our relationship with the U.S. Navy. Interoperability between the two services is a key part of the maritime strategy and the Naval Operating Concept. These documents reemphasize the traditional rapport between our services, and they outline plans for continued growth.
In particular, an opportunity exists for cooperative and mutually enhancing activity with the Navy's own Phase 0 concept: the Global Fleet Station. Marine Corps Security Cooperation is not a unilateral event. Our activities must be part of a well-coordinated, holistic, joint, interagency, and international effort. Only through the combined efforts of all concerned will we be able to achieve positive results from our engagement activities.
In essence, the basis for the Long War Concept capitalizes on what has always made the Marine Corps a preeminent organization: the superb capabilities and inherent adaptability of our Marines. We will make maximum use of the Marines and their attendant ethics and capabilities, while making slight adjustments that capitalize on technological advances and developments.
We will hold on to our core competencies, naval character, warfighting skills, MAGTF legacy, and expeditionary mindset, and we will also better prepare Marines. Applying the Long War Concept will lead to a thorough understanding of the human landscape and challenges inherent in future operating environments. We expect Marines to be successful fighting and operating in any conflict. Now that we better understand and recognize that the future battlefield will likely be among the people, we will teach our Marines to be familiar with, and operate within, the human as well as the physical terrain.
The demands of engaging an irregular enemy require that we evolve to counter the threats of a changing world. The Long War Concept is one part of this evolution, one that helps adapt the Corps to face new challenges while maintaining its core as the hard-hitting fighter that has won so many of our nation's battles.