Until September 2009 I will be on an individual augmentation (IA) and completely detached from the naval service. I wear the Army combat uniform and carry a 9mm and a ball-point pen as a staff planner for NATO/International Security Assistance Force in Kandahar, Afghanistan. My role is to work with the U.S. coalition forces staff and outside development agencies to improve governance, reconstruction, and development in the southern region. Here's the paradox: this billet has nothing to do with my actual job in the Fleet. I am a surface warfare officer in a war zone where tide tables are useless. At the end of my tour, I will begin department head school, and it's unclear how this wayward assignment for the Army and NATO will affect my career. My story is not unique; many Sailors have gone before me, and many will follow.
Since 9/11, 67,000 Sailors have deployed as individual augmentees.1 Most supplement or replace Army and Marine Corps ground support forces. Those not serving in this capacity serve in other missions around the globe. Navy IAs are both officer and enlisted, active and Reserve. Most are conventional Sailors who volunteer or are ordered to work side-by-side with Soldiers and Marines. The global demand for Navy IAs at any given time is approximately 10,000 personnel, with 2,400 supporting Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and 6,350 supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). In Afghanistan and Iraq, Navy IA Sailors comprise eight percent and three percent, respectively, of all troops on the ground. These statistics are significant.
Serving Outside the Sea-Lane
Admiral Mike Mullen, while serving as chief of naval operations, described the IA mission as "a long-term commitment by the Navy." In testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 28 February, 2008, he said, "I'm anxious to pitch in as much as we possibly can for the duration of this war. You can't stay 1,000 miles out at sea and watch the rest of the world go by." Despite the Navy's over-the-horizon commitment, Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower, told Navy leaders that he was concerned "about the long-term effect of this [IA] program and what it says about the current and future readiness of our Navy. All of these personnel are taken from their Navy unit, whether on shore or on ships, with no replacement."2
There is significant tension over the issue of the wars' current demands and overall maritime readiness. The Navy IA program is bolstering ground operations in Afghanistan and Iraq; but by how much and at what price to Fleet readiness? Lest we be unprepared for critical maritime missions, U.S. leaders must carefully weigh the costs and benefits of sending Sailors to serve as Soldiers in support of these conflicts.
What Is an IA?
Individual augmentations are not new; the inter-service exchange program was established in the 1980s. It allows combatant commanders (CoComs) to augment existing units and organizations with temporary personnel to perform their mission. Since 2003, the increase in IAs has been unprecedented. IAs assisted an overextended U.S. Army and Marine Corps, they accommodated the Navy's desire for a greater role in the war on terrorism, and IA Sailors added new skills to the ground fight.
Originally the IA program mobilized and deployed a few hundred Navy Reservists to OEF/OIF, but by 2008, the IA program expanded to include thousands of active-duty Sailors.
Does the Program Work?
By most accounts, Navy IAs have been a success in their new roles. In measuring the program's effectiveness, one should consider three criteria: the Navy's ability to supply Sailors to a growing demand, Navy IA performance through niche skills to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the Army's evaluation of the Navy's contribution.
The IA program sparingly fills the void and supplements the overextended sister services. Certain IA skills appeal to commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq. Navy IAs serve in base operations, combat air support, communications, intelligence, staff augmentation, and training team support, among others.3
The demand for IAs is filled only after the Office of the Chief of Naval Personnel (OPNAV) approves specific requests for forces (RFFs) that fit core Navy skills. For instance, many Sailors today support detainee centers in Iraq. The detainee center in Camp Ramadi and a new facility in Camp Bucca are manned by naval provisional detainee battalions (NPDBs) and guard more than 3,000 enemy combatants. With moderate training, Navy Sailors can accomplish an array of assignments outside their core rating.
IAs Add Skills
The Navy is not simply filling the void for the overstrained services, it is also providing special skills. For example, in May 2008, Lieutenant Mark Dye was awarded the Bronze Star for his service in improving IED defense tactics. Dye and 300 other electronic warfare (EW) specialists taught troops how to defuse bombs by jamming the electronic signals insurgents use to detonate them.4 The Navy provides another tailored skill via the counter rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-RAM) mission. Navy fire controlmen maintain the Mk16 Phalanx weapon systems on barriers in the Green Zone in Baghdad to provide antimissile defense capabilities. Since July 2005, the C-RAM system has disabled more than 100 inbound mortar rounds and provided more than 1,500 localized warnings of incoming attacks, which allowed troops time to take protective cover.5
Navy IAs stabilize operations through civil affairs missions and provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). Commander Dave Adams, a submarine officer, and Commander John "Duke" Wade, a SWO, each received the Bronze Star for valor while serving as a PRT commander in Afghanistan. Ann Marlowe, an embedded reporter writing for the Wall Street Journal, described their successes in Khost, Afghanistan as a "perfect storm" created by "personality, the fruit of the collaboration of Governor Jamal with the brilliant and personable Lieutenant Colonel Scottie D. Custer and Commander Adams, which created great success against the Taliban."6 PRTs consist of 100 personnel and are the lead for many reconstruction and development projects, which furthers good governance.
No formal surveys have been conducted, but anecdotal evidence indicates that the Army is pleased with the Navy's contribution to the fight. Lieutenant Colonel James Crider said that his battalion was greatly served by IA EW officers during a surge deployment in 2007. His battalion had one EW billet, which was first filled by a Navy augmentee and then by an Air Force officer. Crider said, "Both officers provided IED support skills my Soldiers just didn't have." Lieutenant Colonel John Peterson concurred, commenting, "The squadron did not have the technical expertise necessary to manage the counter-IED equipment, software, and upgrades. If it weren't for the Navy IA, we would have been much less efficient." Most Navy IAs' needs can be supplied by general-purpose Sailors. Other IAs, like the EW, C-RAM, and PRT commanders, are irreplaceable. Both groups serve with distinction far from ships and aircrafts.
Costs to Home Life and Career
The IA mission is not a complete success story. Assigning thousands of Sailors to billets outside their scope of operations has some harmful effects on Fleet readiness, professional development, and a Sailor's quality of life.
The tactical tradeoffs to sending Navy personnel to a ground fight are often ignored. Spending 6 to 12 months in Iraq or Afghanistan does not improve the skills required to navigate a ship, steer a submarine, or fly an aircraft. IA missions "take a Sailor who has lived on a 564-foot ship, and all of sudden integrate him into a ground combat environment. It's night and day for us," one master chief petty officer commented.
For example, SWOs use two career periods to educate, train, and prepare junior officers for command at sea. These time windows, during division officer and department head billets, total seven years and provide hands-on experience. Under existing Navy policy, officers can forego a division officer or department head tour and replace that time with an individual augmentation.7 The skills needed to be an effective SWO are perishable and can only be attained within the lifelines of the ship. This argument applies to enlisted Sailors as well. Serving as a prison guard, an Army logistics coordinator, or a mechanic on HUMVEEs does not correlate with a Sailor's professional development.
A Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) study argues that those serving as IAs are professionally at risk. Shortened sea tours due to IA deployment inhibit a Sailor's likelihood of promotion. In fact, CNA concluded that officers who served as IAs were more likely to be passed over for command. A similar trend applies to the enlisted ranks. E4-E5 Sailors deployed in FY 05 were 15 percent less likely to promote than their non-IA peers, while Sailors who deployed one year later were just as likely to be promoted by 12 months as their non-IA peers. Those who became IAs from sea duty were 30 percent less likely to promote, and those coming from shore duty were 18 percent less likely.8 Unless there is clear, rating-specific knowledge derived from an augmentation assignment, the Navy should thoroughly scrutinize the impact of IA deployments on a Sailor's career.
Some Navy leaders are under the impression that IAs are billeted in a seamless manner; however, personnel at lower levels—those actually sent on short-notice deployments—view the IA process as far from flawless. The greatest problem is a lack of ownership. When IAs leave a large command, they go into individual detailing limbo. Sailors are sent on temporary assigned duty (TAD) orders for 180 to 365 days with a limited support network and no immediate oversight.
Anxiety felt before an IA assignment and the post-deployment stress associated with a combat tour are also critical issues. IAs operate alone, in non-Navy environments, and few until recently have received the attention, resources, or education needed for deployments. IAs are given shorter notifications, less specific information, and experience homecomings very differently than when they are attached to a large unit. Being selected for an IA is surprisingly arbitrary.
Lieutenant Ryan Petrosky will be serving in Afghanistan for one year to train the Afghan police. He commented, "I was the only one eligible who was single, with no kids." Vice Admiral John Harvey, former chief of Navy personnel, has attempted to increase capability-driven sourcing and match skills to CoCom requests, but the Navy rarely provides "the right Sailor with the right skills at the right time to meet our nation's GWOT support requirements."9 The Navy is simply overwhelmed with Army requests and can not tailor the detailing process on short notice.
With regard to attrition, evidence suggests mental and emotional effects from IAs are binary: IA missions either increase or decrease retention. In a 2007 address to the Surface Navy Association, Rear Admiral Sonny Masso, head of Task Force Individual Augmentation (TFIA), reported, "82 percent of all IAs have come from the Reserve component, yet [he] sees letters of resignation from active duty officers listing a fear of IA assignment as being a reason they are getting out. If you speak to junior officers on the waterfront, you would think that half of their wardroom is IA'd."10 On the other hand, a recent study at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) finds that JOs who went on IA deployments were more likely to stay in the Navy.11 The exponential increase in IAs catalyzes fear of short-notice deployments and creates uncertainty for career and family planning, and these factors increase attrition. Conversely, many of those who are sent or volunteer for IA assignments continue to serve because of the camaraderie they experienced in the combat zone.
Identify, Equip, Train, and Deploy
The Navy is working hard to overcome the growing pains described above. There are two important areas that still need work: improving command and control of IAs and creating a reward structure for those who serve.
In January 2008, U.S. Fleet Forces (USFF) became the executive authority of all IA sourcing. USFF marries its services with those of the Expeditionary Combat Readiness Command (ECRC). ECRC serves as the parent command for those Sailors on GSA/IA in transit to a new duty station or on TAD from an existing command. ECRC facilitates the transit, education, training, and redeployment of all IAs. Knowing how, why, and to whom the Navy sources IAs is vital to the overall organization when planning for future Fleet operations. In addition, creating a single command to assign (USFF) and a single command to care for (ECRC) Sailors improves the process exponentially.
There are also new rewards for IA veterans, including extra points on advancement exams, hazardous duty pay increases, sub-specialty titles, and guaranteed follow-on placement.12 Vice Admiral Harvey commented, "If giving two award points to a Sailor who volunteers to go to al Anbar Province and fight the IED battle helps him advance, then I think that is the right thing to do." USFF commander, Admiral Greenert, said, "We have some amazing patriots that are doing a wonderful job and sometimes don't quite get credit for what they do. What they do is extraordinary."
Adapting the detailing system from the IA legacy model to the Global War on Terror Support Assignment (GSA) was meant to be an improvement but has negative implications. The new GSA model allows personnel to schedule an IA mission between two assignments instead of being "ripped-to-fill" on short notice. GSA detailing minimizes the windows in which a person is vulnerable to selection for an IA and increases Sailor morale. But this is a problem. The spirit of an IA mission is short-term, need-based assistance for a CoCom, which implies IAs are not an enduring requirement. The programmatic shift to the GSA model incorrectly signals a long-term commitment to Army augmentation. The GSA model could exacerbate an inter-service dependency, which weakens the overall Navy institution.
Recommendations
The IA sourcing system is not broken, but lacks long-term intent or a structured process. Navy personnel are left to interpret IA guidelines through fragmented naval message traffic called IA Business Rules. Sending Sailors on IA is not a business; real people take on obscure jobs in combat zones and they deserve clarity throughout the experience. The Navy is in need of a top-down education program. Start teaching Sailors about IAs at boot camp and indoctrination to help them understand what missions are available and why, who is chosen for IA missions (and why), and what impact deployment will have on their careers.
Under President George W. Bush's administration, there has been the sense that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan would never end. Thus, the IA program grew without a clear endgame, full speed ahead. Now, with President-elect Barack Obama heading to the White House, there is no telling how long or what the requirements in OIF/OEF will be. If U.S. forces draw down in both theaters, the IA system could be maintained, dismantled, or mothballed. Each course of action has merits, especially under tightening economic budget constraints, but there is zero evidence that the Navy is discussing these outcomes and how it will impact the Fleet.
The IA reward system, the establishment of the ECRC, and the shift to expeditionary missions suggests the IA program will not be temporary. IAs are assets to the Navy and our nation, but should not come at the cost of U.S. seapower. Although I am a SWO specifically, I am a military officer first. Like most Sailors, I willingly contribute to the sister services in need of manpower support. The Navy should fortify the IA process, professionalize the training, and ensure that the IA billets filled have a symbiotic effect on the Army and Navy. There should be three- to five-year commitment from senior Navy leadership to ensure this happens. Otherwise, the Fleet lacks direction and Sailors will continue haphazardly to fill the gaps in Iraq and Afghanistan, with little confidence that that their sacrifice will be career enhancing.
The media depicts the Army and Marine Corps as overstretched and exhausted from doing the majority of ground combat operations
and these services deserve limitless praise for their efforts. Less well-known is that the Navy has been filling combat support roles in ways that may undermine sea/air mission effectiveness. Large-scale contributions to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are a source of pride for Navy leadership and Sailors alike. Recognizing and properly caring for these Sailors, however, must be a priority for senior military leaders. No matter the demand for Soldier-Sailors in the future, leaders should better assess the cost and benefits of the IA program. The success of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the effectiveness of tomorrow's Fleet may be contingent on that decision.
1. Unless otherwise stipulated, the term "augmentees" includes individual augmentees (IAs), global war on terror support augmentees (GSA's), ad-hoc detachments, and in-lieu-of (ILO) units.
2 Senate Armed Services Committee testimony, 28 February, 2008.
3 This list does not include low density/high demand (LD/HD) billets which are SeaBees, NCW, FMF, NAVELSG, SPECWAR, BUMED, CEC, ED, SUPPLY, IP, Information Warfare/cryptology, and intelligence.
4 Melissa Nelson, "Military Calls on Navy Specialist to Defeat IEDs," Joint Defense News, 17 March, 2008.
5 Jim Crider, "Countering Capability Intercepts 100th Rocket Mortar in Iraq," 9 May, 2008, www.army.mil
6 Ann Marlowe, "In War, There Is Personality," the Wall Street Journal, A11, 14 June, 2008.
7 Commander Naval Forces, Business Rules for SWO Selection ISO Individual Augmentation, 051110Z May 06.
8 Peggy A. Golfin and Steven Blecher, "Active-Duty Individual Manpower Augmentation: Selection and Career Impact," Center for Naval Analysis, Alexandria, Virginia, pg. 62.
9 Vice Admiral John Harvey, NAVADMIN 002/08.
10 Lieutenant Justin Cole, U.S. Navy, chief of naval personnel public affairs, "Masso Dispels IA Myths at Surface Navy Association Conference," www.news.navy.mil, 11 January, 2007.
11 Mike Paisant, "The Effects of Individual Augmentation (IA) on Navy Junior Officer Retention," Naval Postgraduate School, March 2008.
12 Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Tucker Yates, "Fleet Forces Commander Visits Sailors in Pacific Northwest," 24 June, 2008, www.navy.mil.